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9Foreword by the editors
The series of our labour market yearbooks was launched with the goal of review-
ing the main developments in the Hungarian labour market annually, and of 
giving an in-depth analysis of selected issues.
1. The Hungarian Labour Market in 2008-2009
Following several years of stagnation, employment entered a course of decline 
towards the end of 2008. The introductory chapter gives an overview of the la-
bour market impact of the first year of the economic crisis, and the policy re-
sponse to it. The crisis is interpreted as an asymmetric demand shock which 
resulted in declining employment and rising unemployment in the industries 
affected. New claimants on the unemployment register are typically male and 
better educated than the existing pool. While wage adjustment has been weak, 
the significant cut in social security contributions and job protection measures 
by the government may have mitigated the fall in employment. Factors con-
tributing to the recent decline in employment included not only the crisis but 
also various demographic processes and structural problems that had been left 
unresolved for decades. Cohort effects explain most of the observed reduction 
in labour supply, somewhat dampened by the increase in the level of education. 
Structural problems discussed in the chapter include high minimum wages and 
the relatively generous conditions for obtaining welfare provision. Importantly, 
the slump in employment has not been accompanied by a drop of similar mag-
nitude in economic activity. This may be attributed to a welcome shift in em-
ployment policies, which ensures that the reduction of economic inactivity is 
now given as much attention as unemployment.
2. In Focus
The In Focus section of the Hungarian Labour Market yearbook usually focus-
es on a single topic in more detail based on previously published research.*  In 
this year’s In Focus section we analyze labour market discrimination and seg-
* In Focus parts of the previous volumes discussed the following topics: 2002: I. Wages: A Decade of 
Transformation, II. Income Support for the Jobless; 2003: I. Labour – the Supply Side, II. Labour – 
the Demand Side; 2004: Labour Market Inequality and Geographical Mobility in Hungary; 2005: 
Education and the Labour Market; 2006: Industrial Relations in Hungary; 2007: Wages: New 
Developments. 2008: Education and the Labour Market. 2009: presents a statistical overview of the 
Hungarian labour market as seen through the European Labour Force Survey, and on the outcomes 
and problems of “uncertified” vocational training. Each volume can be downloaded from the homepage 
of the Institute of Economics-HAS: http://econ.core.hu/english/pub/mt.html
foreword by the editors
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regation. Despite the fact that the anti-discrimination legislature of developed 
countries theoretically ensures the equality of every demographic group based 
on the principle of equal treatment for all, there is still much debate as to the 
extent of discrimination in the real world, the source of observed discrimina-
tory phenomena, and the most effective ways of handling discrimination. The 
section presents a summary of these major unresolved issues and problems, and 
surveys the most recent research aimed at their more accurate measurement and 
resolution in various demographic groups in Hungary. The studies presented 
help assess the current situation in the Hungarian labour market, and place it 
in an international context.
First, the introductory chapter of the In Focus section summarizes the dif-
ferent types of observable statistical differences between groups present in the 
labour market, introduces the standard economic models of labour market dis-
crimination, and discusses non-discriminatory phenomena which may also lead 
to the observed between-group differences in the labour market. The models 
are differentiated based on the source of the discriminatory behaviour (taste-
based or statistical discrimination), its outcome (in wages, employment, or oc-
cupation), and the stage of the life path that is affected (pre-labour market vs. 
labour market discrimination). After summarizing the possible forms in which 
discrimination may appear, the chapter outlines the difficulties inherent in the 
measurement and assessment of labour market discrimination. Finally, the tra-
ditional and newest methods used in discrimination research are introduced, 
many of which are applied empirically in the subsequent studies of this year’s 
In Focus section.
The first study begins the assessment of the Hungarian situation with the 
analysis of the legal framework. The main concepts of European equal oppor-
tunity legislation and Hungarian regulatory practices are summarized, as well 
as the tools available for enforcing the laws, and the reality of their practical 
fulfilment. The study shows that the current legal tools available in Hungary 
are not sufficient for ensuring the principle of equal treatment for all, since 
both the content of the norms, and practical enforcement are generally char-
acterized by over-cautiousness. Despite these problems, the observable changes 
in legislature and practical enforcement can be viewed as encouraging, as they 
seem to reflect a clarification of social values, and an increase in knowledge re-
garding the issue.
The second study describes the next level in the realization of anti-discrimi-
natory policy: the functioning of labour market programs aimed at aiding the 
Roma, their problems and deficiencies. The analysis points out that the past 
years’ programs aimed at Roma employment were not able to successfully influ-
ence the level of Roma employment. The problems of the system can be linked 
to the difficulties in defining the target population, the goals and priorities, the 
indicators used, and the procedures for grant applications, as well as the lack 
foreword by the editors
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of monitoring and impact analysis. The chapter lists numerous practical steps 
that could improve the effectiveness of employment policy.
The remaining chapters of the In Focus section present empirical results from 
Hungary that can be linked to the methodologies used in the newest interna-
tional research described in the introduction. First, one of the main pitfalls of 
Roma employment is discussed in detail: the segregation of the schooling system. 
The authors give a comprehensive picture of the extent of segregation between 
and within schools, the regional differences, and then analyze the determinants 
of the dispersion of city, town, and micro-regional segregation indexes, as well 
as the long term trends in the segregation of Roma students. The Hungarian re-
sults are compared to those of research conducted in the United States, and this 
shows that while the level of ethnic segregation in schools is lower in Hungary, 
an increase in the ratio of the most disadvantaged ethnic minorities increases 
segregation between schools in a similar way.
The next study attempts to determine the level of labour market discrimina-
tion based on research that uses several different empirical approaches. Data on 
the perceptions of people regarding the extent of discrimination in Hungary is 
compared with other European countries, and then also with data from surveys 
conducted on representative samples of the population and minorities that are 
aimed at assessing the chances of becoming a victim. According to the survey 
data, in Hungary, Roma ethnicity and migrant status increase the level of per-
ception of discrimination. Next, the method of discrimination testing is used, 
where controlled experiments are conducted to measure the level of discrimina-
tion against various minority groups. This method is based on the analysis of job 
postings, as well as on tests conducted by phone, where researchers measure the 
frequency of rejection of applicants who share all the characteristics relevant to 
the experiment (to the job posting), but differ in regard to the single character-
istic that is the focus of the test. The Hungarian results indicate that the occu-
pations assessed are characterized by significant gender segregation. The testing 
shows that young workers are more sought after than older workers.
The next study describes the employment situation of the Roma population, 
and analyzes whether there has been any significant changes in it since the dra-
matic fall in employment seen at the beginning of the nineties. The results show 
that the level of Roma employment has stabilized at a very low level – around 
30 percent – and that the typically Roma workplaces are extremely unstable. 
These indicators are much worse than those of the average worker with com-
parable education levels: the employment rate of those with a maximum eighth 
grade education level is double the rate measured in the case of Roma workers, 
and their workplaces are, in addition, much more stable.
The situation of women in the Hungarian labour market is assessed in two 
studies using two different approaches. The first study examines whether the in-
creased level of product market competition following the transition led to a fall 
foreword by the editors
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in the unexplained wage gap (the wage gap that remains after taking observable 
characteristics into account) between men and women. If certain employers fa-
vour male workers over females with equal productivity, increased competition 
may force such behaviour out of the market, since firms have to behave more ef-
ficiently to succeed. The study finds a significant negative correlation between 
the level of competition and the wage gap. Based on the estimates, increased 
competition accounts for fifteen percent of the fall in the overall gender wage 
gap during this period.
In the last study of the In Focus section, the relative productivity and relative 
wage of women compared to men is estimated based on firm level production 
functions and wage equations. These group level relative productivities and wages 
are then compared to assess the extent of wage discrimination against women 
in a new way. The results indicate that the previously published estimates of 
the wage gap between the genders is not explained by the lower productivity of 
women, women not appearing to be significantly less productive than men in 
any specification. The study points out that the estimated level of discrimina-
tion depends greatly on the data, since the estimated difference between relative 
wages and productivities differs according to the type of wage measure used.
3. The Legal and Institutional Environment of the Labour Market
The economic crisis has overwritten the priorities of employment policies and 
has triggered emergency measures including the reallocation of resources to 
stabilise jobs and mitigate social tensions. The first chapter gives an overview 
of the characteristics of international responses to the economic crisis includ-
ing policies and their implementation. The second chapter presents Hungary’s 
responses to the economic downturn. Chapter 3 discusses the process of in-
tegration of the administration of social benefits into the public employment 
service and the implementation of the “Pathway to Work” program started 
on January 1, 2009, and several new implementing rules came into force. We 
also discuss measures such as the preparation of Public Work Plans, the tasks 
of the Public Work Coordinators, a new cash benefit to persons of working 
age, the creation of the Employment and Social Database and the revised ob-
ligations of social benefit claimants towards the local offices of the public em-
ployment service.
4. Statistical Data
The closing chapter presents a comprehensive collection of statistical data on 
the Hungarian labour market. It gives exhaustive information on the social and 
economic developments, such as demographic trends, employment, unemploy-
ment and inactivity, wages, education, labour demand and supply, regional dif-
ferences, commuting and labour relations, along with some international com-
parisons. Labour market developments broken down to the regional level are 
foreword by the editors
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also included. This year the chapter significantly expanded the statistical data 
on the changes of industrial relations and characteristics of welfare benefits.
* * *
The publication of this volume was supported by the National Employment 
Foundation. The editors are grateful to numerous experts from the Institute 
of Economics HAS, Central Statistical Office, National Employment Service, 
Corvinus University of Budapest, Central European University, Ministry of 
Social Policy and Labour and the Public Employment Service for their valuable 
contributions, comments and suggestions.
The hungarian 
Labour MarkeT 
in 2008–2009
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely 
& 
Ágota Scharle

the hungarian labour market...
17
Following several years of stagnation, employment entered a course of decline 
towards the end of 2008. This chapter examines the first year of the economic 
crisis, with special emphasis on labour market processes and the policies af-
fecting these processes. As will soon become clear, the factors contributing to 
the decline in 2008 included not only the crisis but also various demographic 
processes and structural problems that had been left unresolved for decades. 
It should be noted that the slump in employment was not at that time accom-
panied by a drop of similar magnitude in economic activity. This was prob-
ably in large part due to employment policies focusing on the reduction of 
inactivity just as much as on the tackling of unemployment, which had not 
been the case during the years following the regime change.
1. The economic scene
The global financial crisis emerging during the second half of 2008 gave rise 
to a substantial decline in both production and consumption in the econo-
mies of the European Union, which led to a major shrinkage in both inter-
nal and external market trade. Among the Visegrád countries, Slovakia and 
Hungary suffered the greatest drop in GDP (Figure 1). By the second half of 
2009 there was some improvement thanks to recovery measures in the cen-
tral budgets and the reserve banks. The decline in public consumption was 
somewhat slower than in investment or export, which immediately reacted to 
the disturbances in the financial markets, but it is expected to persist longer 
as a result of the rise in unemployment.
Figure 1: The development of real GDP in the Visegrád countries  
(percentage changes relative to the corresponding period in the previous year)
Source: EUROSTAT on-line database (teina011).
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Hungary felt every effect of the crisis that other countries felt. The paradigm 
change in credit and funding practices constituting the root of the crisis de-
serves special mention. The credit sources previously within easy reach have 
been blocked one after another and enterprises relying on these loans have 
been forced into a very tight corner (MNB, 2009a). Circumstances specific 
to Hungary have meant, however, that the country has had to face further 
challenges. The insecurity surrounding the change of Prime Minister and the 
substantial government debts had an adverse effect in more ways than one on 
the business environment and, thus, the position of enterprises. The exchange 
rate of the Hungarian forint floating since February 2008 immediately reacted 
to the finance position of the country and to the market’s level of confidence 
in the government. As a result, starting in the summer of 2008, the exchange 
market value of the forint fell by about a quarter in half a year, which meant 
another blow for those having foreign currency loans, including enterprises. 
Once its initial struggles were over, the newly formed government pledged to 
carry through a series of long overdue structural reforms. In parallel with its 
activities, the intensive stock market conjuncture, the financial turmoil and 
the convulsions of the exchange rate settled, and in August 2009 the economy 
was characterised by relative calm and a confident outlook.
Looking at the entire year, over the first three quarters the Hungarian 
GDP displayed an increase of about 2 per cent compared to the same period 
of the previous year, which was then followed by a sharp decline. By the sec-
ond quarter of 2009 the reduction had reached 7.6 per cent and there were 
few signs of positive change. Figure 2 displays the Hungarian GDP values 
(left axis) and wages and employment (right axis) over recent years. While 
the changes of the past few months are of a magnitude not seen for a long 
time, the annual figures unequivocally indicate that the decline started ear-
lier in Hungary – in parallel with the Gyurcsány government’s stabilisation 
programme of 2006.
The employment figures displayed in Figure 3 are also suggestive of a deeper 
and earlier crisis. Across the EU-27, the employment rate among the 15–64 
year-old population increased fairly dynamically from 62.9 in 2005 all the way 
to 65.5 per cent in 2008. In the Visegrád countries, especially in Poland and 
Slovakia, the employment rate showed an almost uninterrupted rise during 
the post-2006 boom preceding the collapse of the financial markets. For Hun-
gary, however, the figures show continued stagnation over the same period.
In Hungary, the slump in consumption and especially in export demand at 
the beginning of 2009 brought about a clear decrease in employment reaching 
well beyond general seasonal effects. This meant that the modest improvement 
experienced over the preceding decade was essentially nullified: the employ-
ment rate in the first quarter of 2009 was once again at 55 per cent, where it 
had been in the first quarter of 1999.
the hungarian labour market...
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Figure 2: macroeconomic indicators in hungary, 2001–2009
Note: GDP value of 2009 is a Eurostat estimate. GDP volume: 2001 = 100, earnings: 
average earnings in the business sector in 2001 = 100, real earnings deflated accor-
ding to the consumer price index. Employment rate on the right scale.
Source: Earnings, employment: authors’ calculations based on Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office data. GDP: Eurostat on-line database (nama_gdp).
Figure 3: Quarterly employment rates in the Visegrád countries,  
population aged 15–64
Source: Eurostat on-line database.
But the situation is not as bad as it seems. The ten-year improvement in em-
ployment was primarily grounded in a steady decrease in inactivity, a rise in 
the statutory retirement age and an improvement in schooling, and these 
trends are expected to persist in the future. Importantly – as shown in Fig-
ure 4 – in contrast with previous shocks, the slump in employment has not 
so far been accompanied by a significant increase in inactivity, but has main-
ly been realised as an increase in unemployment (right axis). The micro-level 
data of employment leavers are concordant with this observation. As can be 
seen in Figure 5, the first quarter of 2009 was marked by a sudden rise in the 
percentage of people becoming unemployed, while the increase in the pro-
portion of people exiting employment for inactivity was only slightly higher 
than is usual at the beginning of a new year.
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Figure 4: main labour market indicators, 1999–2009
Note: Unemployment rate displayed on the right axis.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HCSO Labour Survey data, the 15–64 
year-old population.
Figure 5: Quarterly exit rate from employment, population aged 15–64
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HCSO Labour Survey panel, unemploy-
ment as defined by the ILO.
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2. Labour DemanD
The labour demand effects of the economic crisis
The global crisis started as a credit and finance crunch, but its effects soon 
spread out to the real economy. The sectors most deeply affected by the finan-
cial market turmoil were the automotive industry, the various services and 
retail businesses selling high-value goods. In Hungary these sectors were hit 
by the crisis through three different channels: local consumption decreased 
both because of the constrained credit market and as a result of the drop in 
incomes, and as the European (especially the German) market was also in cri-
sis for similar reasons, the demand for export also plummeted (MNB 2009a, 
2009b). Given the decline in investments on account of increasingly limited 
credit options and failing prospects, and the fall in incomes among the pop-
ulation, the effects of a financial turmoil will sooner or later be felt by every 
sector of an economy. As can be seen in Figure 6, agriculture was left largely 
undisturbed by the crisis until the end of the first quarter of 2009. While in 
the construction industry there was a decline in demand, this was part of a 
longer-term process. The sectors showing the strongest signs of decline were the 
heavily export-oriented industries, especially the manufacturing industry.
Figure 6: Quarterly change in real output in selected sectors, 2006–2009
Notes: At year 2000 prices, the GDP of agriculture in Quarter 1 of 2005 = 100. The 
figure displays the GDP of individual sectors relative to agriculture: the figures for 
the beginning of 2005, for instance, show that the contribution of the service sector 
to the gross Hungarian output was more than ten times that of agriculture, and the 
manufacturing industry contributed more than four times more.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO data.
Figure 7 displays changes in the workforce sizes compared to the first quar-
ter of 2005 in the different sectors. In the construction industry and in agri-
culture the downward trend began, respectively, in 2007 and 2005, i.e., well 
ahead of the crisis, as a result of sector-specific business cycles and, presum-
ably, of their capital intensive restructuring. In industry, especially in manu-
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facturing, and in the service sector, in contrast, the decline in employment 
clearly developed in parallel with the crisis.
Figure 7: Quarterly change in employment in five main sectors (Quarter 1 in 2005 = 100)
Source: HCSO.
Due to the geographical distribution and the specialised labour demand of 
the enterprises involved, the sector-specific demand shock concentrated in 
the western part of Hungary and among skilled workers. Although a decrease 
was observed in the country’s overall employment rate as well as for each ed-
ucational group, the drop was markedly steeper, and statistically significant, 
among skilled workers in the Northwest and West border regions (Table 1). 
This may also explain the fact that men and women were affected differently 
by the crisis, since the manufacturing industry employs men in considerably 
larger proportions. While the employment rate among women fell by half a 
percentage point, from 50.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2008 to 49.6 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2009, the corresponding change among men was 
more than 1.5 percentage points, from 62.5 to 60.8 per cent.
Table 1: changes in employment rates between the first quarter of 2008  
and the first quarter of 2009 (percentage points)
Region Primary Vocational Secondary Tertiary All
Central Hungary 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
Northwest 0.00 –0.05 0.00 0.02 –0.01
West border –0.03 –0.06 0.00 –0.01 –0.02
Southwest –0.02 0.02 0.03 –0.01 0.02
Northern Hungary –0.03 –0.03 0.01 –0.02 –0.01
Northeast –0.03 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
Southeast –0.02 –0.03 –0.02 0.00 –0.02
All –0.02 –0.03 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
Note: Statistically significant changes are marked in italics.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HCSO Labour Survey.
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The labour market impact of the global crisis also surfaces in the Hungarian 
Employment Service records of workforce reductions and vacancies. The pe-
riod when the number of employees laid off as part of an announced work-
force reduction increased to a level well above previous years’ average was be-
tween December 2008 and May 2009. As we can see in Table 2, dismissed 
employees do not immediately appear among the customers of job centres, 
and those living in regions characterised by higher levels of unemployment 
are more likely to register.
Table 2: Workers registering as job seekers after being laid off  
as part of mass layoffs by region
Region
Announced 
lay-offs,*  
N
Of those registering as unemployed, N Ratio of regis-
tering workers 
to announced 
lay-offs
October-December 
2008
January-March 
2009
April-June 
2009
Central Hungary 5 927 6 190 851 13.2
Southeast 2 129 6 317 304 35.8
Northwest 6 845 15 1 255 1 750 38.9
Northern Hungary 3 105 7 394 795 44.9
West border 4 924 22 569 1 880 56.2
Southwest 2 921 45 216 1 205 59.9
Northeast 3 770 356 693 620 63.1
All regions 29 621 457 3 634 7 405 38.8
* The number of people affected by layoffs following 1st October 2008 whose notice 
period ended by 30th June 2008. Classified according to the laid-off workers’ place 
of residence (rather than the job location).
Source: Hungarian Employment Service.
Figure 8: number of registered subsidised and non-subsidised vacancies
Source: MNB (2009b) Hungarian National Bank figures based on Hungarian  
Employment Service data.
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The number of announced non-subsidised jobs entered a phase of steady de-
cline in the summer of 2008 (Figure 8). The Pathway to Work programme was 
launched during the first quarter of 2009 with the goal of counteracting this 
trend, and while it has improved employment and unemployment figures, it 
cannot alleviate the effects of the crisis – more will be said about this later.
The decline in labour demand resulting from the increasingly poor profit 
prospects is reflected not only in mass layoffs but also in wage levels, although 
wage responsiveness appears to be slowing down for the moment (Figure 9). 
The average wage continued to fall but the figures of the last quarter indicate 
a slower rate of decrease. The interpretation of the trends remains uncertain, 
however, given the increase in part-time employment displayed in Figure 10 
(MNB, 2009b).1
Figure 9: Gross real wages in the public and the private sectors, 2005–2009  
(at Quarter 1, 2005 prices)
Source: HCSO on-line database.
Figure 10: Proportion of part-time employment, 2005–2009
Source: HCSO Labour Survey.
There may be a number of (not incompatible) explanations for the increasing 
share of part-time employment: a general upward trend in more flexible atypi-
cal employment models; the introduction of increasingly stringent measures 
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fighting the shadow economy from 2006 onwards; confidence in the tempo-
rary nature of the demand reducing effects of the global crisis; or the crisis 
life belt offering cash incentives to employers having employees changing to 
part-time employment.
Policies
Governments in every country in the world have developed some strategy of 
fighting the impact of the crisis. At the rather late date of May 2009, the Em-
ployment Summit was held by the European Union in Prague. The Summit 
agreed on strategies related to the tackling of the crisis and to employment 
policies, several elements of which involve the triggering of a positive shock 
– relying on government expenditure – to counteract the negative shock of 
the crisis. Since the proposals were made almost three quarters of a year into 
the crisis, a considerable share of the strategies agreed on had already been im-
plemented in the various member states and were now granted funding.
The publication summarising the strategies of the European Union (Shared 
commitment for employment) proposes three main policies in addition to oth-
er measures related to the crisis: 1) to save existing jobs, create new jobs and 
encourage mobility, 2) to provide training and improve the match between 
labour market demand and supply, and 3) to improve employment odds.
The Hungarian government’s policies have approached the task of tackling 
the crisis from two major directions. First, credit opportunities, export ar-
rangements and guarantees were expanded in an effort to counterbalance the 
turmoil in the financial market.2 These large-scale support programmes offer-
ing hundreds of billions of forints (billions of Euros) are primarily aimed at 
saving enterprises hit by the crisis, and if they are successful, the jobs at risk 
will also be saved – careful research will be needed, however, to assess the im-
pact of these measures in the future.
The other strain of policies involves a substantial boost in the resources al-
located directly for job preservation and creation. In the first phase of the pro-
gramme locally financed funds were opened: a job preservation fund with a 
1.5 billion forint (about 5.5 million EUR) budget devoted to the prevention 
of mass layoffs; a variety of job preservation funds mediated by regional job 
centres (wage subsidies, training, temporary services for people about to be 
laid off) with a budget of 10 billion forints available until the end of 2009; 
and three competition-based grant schemes maintained by the Hungarian 
Employment Foundation and open to enterprises. The three grant schemes, 
which were announced in February 2009, and depleted by March, distribut-
ed more than seven billion forints in total a) to prevent the loss of the jobs of 
employees threatened by layoffs (Preservation programme); b) to secure a hu-
mane arrangement for those who could not avoid layoffs and help them find 
and start a new job (New Prospects programme); and c) to provide support for 
2 http://www.kormanyszovivo.
hu/page/valsagkalauz_vallalko-
zasoknak.
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enterprises that were in a position to employ those whose jobs fell victim to 
the crisis (On to Work programme). The quick depletion of the funds suggests 
that they were highly popular – it will be the task of future studies to assess 
their effects together with the effects of other job preservation programmes.
The local sources of financing the intervention measures suggested by the 
European Commission are supplemented by the more substantial source of-
fered by the European Social Fund. This provides the financial support for the 
large-scale Social Renewal Operational Programme No. 2.3.3. A launched in 
May 20093 with aims similar to those of the Preservation programme. With a 
budget of 20 billion forints (about 75 million Euros) in total, the programme 
offers grants to micro-, small and medium-sized businesses and is open to ap-
plications until December 2009. The grants are intended to allow businesses 
shaken by the crisis to reduce the working week of their employees and use 
the remaining time to provide in-service training. Currently there are gov-
ernment plans to create a 10 million forint fund and extend the programme 
to large businesses starting this autumn (Social Renewal Operational Pro-
gramme No. 2.3.3.B).
These intervention programmes are certainly not of a negligible scale. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that the policy they support is the most defen-
sive kind of strategy proposed by the EU: job preservation without any need 
for labour market flexibility. This contrasts with the risk taking nature of the 
locally funded New Prospects and, especially, the On to Work programmes. 
None of the grant schemes using the EU funds were aimed at improving flex-
ibility and only meagre support was available for job creation (such as the sup-
port offered to firms with high value added totalling 1.5 billion forints, or the 
480 million forint fund for job creation).
It is difficult to predict, however, how successful or efficient direct labour 
market interventions may turn out to be. Although the message sent by the 
Hungarian media in August 2009 is that the job preservation programme 
had helped save the jobs of 46 thousand employees, this figure in fact refers 
to the number of people participating in the programme. Grants of this kind 
are difficult to target with precision and thus they remain prone to operating 
with a substantial dead loss, i.e., the risk of supporting employers that could 
also have saved those jobs in the absence of support. This risk may be reduced 
in the Social Renewal Operational Programme No. 2.3.3, where a new tool 
– an assessment system modelled on the enterprise credit scoring system de-
veloped by the International Training Center for Bankers – was used to screen 
businesses which, while hit by the crisis, were nevertheless likely to survive 
without support. The effects of the programme will, once again, need to be 
evaluated in a comprehensive research study carefully comparing the develop-
ment of participating and non-participating companies at an aggregate and 
at an individual level.
3 http://www.nfu.hu/informaci-
os_nap_a_tamop_2_3_3_09_
munkahelymegorzo_tamoga-
tas_kepzessel_kombinalva_
palyazathoz_kapcsolodoan.
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The government resources allocated for business support programmes were 
substantially surpassed by the funds directly invested into public sector job 
creation. From 2007 onwards, a number of blueprints were worked out for 
the expansion of the public employment programme, which were then used 
to develop the Pathway to Work programme launched in the spring of 2009, 
scaled, in response to the crisis, even larger than originally planned. The pro-
gramme is an umbrella name for the reform package enacted in Act CVII of 
2008 revising the obligations of those participating in the regular social as-
sistance scheme. With respect to employment, the primary aim of the pro-
gramme is to identify those regular social assistance participants who have 
the physical capability of working, and transfer them to a work availability 
support scheme, where support is tied to an obligation to perform paid pub-
lic benefit work organised by their local governments. According to the fig-
ures for July 2009, around 70 thousand participants were working as part of 
the scheme: that is, a new sector of a size comparable to the workforce size 
of the entire Hungarian chemical or finance industry. As a direct effect, the 
programme decreases the number of the registered unemployed and also im-
proves the employment rate because the participants’ unemployed status is 
suspended for the period while they are performing public work. One im-
portant structural change is that the programme calls for closer co-operation 
between job centres and local governments, which work together in building 
a shared employment and welfare database containing all the relevant per-
sonal details of the participants.
Other effects of the programme triggered heated professional debates even 
before its launch. The participants employed within the Pathway to Work 
programme are not de facto participants in the country’s labour market. 
They are recruited from among the long-term unemployed population, most 
of them are uneducated and live in regions where work is difficult to come by 
in any event. It is the intended aim of the programme to help this long-term 
unemployed population to return to the open labour market, but an out-
come of this type has not been verified either by studies looking into similar 
programmes run in other countries or by the scattered experiences of previ-
ous Hungarian public employment schemes. The usual limitations of public 
employment programmes may be reduced as a result of a proposed modifica-
tion to the law4 introducing the requirement that each regular social assist-
ance claimant must contact their job centre before offering to perform public 
work. This way, those with a potential to find employment in the open labour 
market may have a better chance of doing so.
The positive impact of the programme on the crisis also appears to be of a 
superficial nature. Although it improves both employment and unemploy-
ment figures, it cannot improve the prospects of those recently becoming un-
employed since they will have to wait for quite a long period of time before 
4 Oral communication by Leó 
Lőrincz, head of the Employ-
ment and Service Development 
Department of the Hungar-
ian Employment and Welfare 
Agency.
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they can be eligible for the programme. Also, by reducing the number of ac-
tive job seekers, it constrains one of the basic mechanisms of labour market 
adaptability. The reason being that the more people are willing to work – at 
least temporarily – for lower than usual wages, the quicker the market will 
recover from the rising unemployment effected by the declining labour de-
mand and return to the original (or a higher) level of employment.5 And this 
willingness is likely to be greater if there are several competitors for each job. 
The artificial suppression of unemployment may therefore allay social ten-
sions but it also hinders recovery from the recession.
Finally, we should also mention the wage and tax policies of recent years, 
which in part were developed independently of crisis relief measures, but 
which may have played an important role in the development of the current 
employment figures and wages. Some of the most important issues are the level 
of the minimum wage, the tax and contribution brackets and the measures 
aimed at clamping down on the informal economy. The real value of the total 
cost of the minimum wage has decreased in 2009, as has the guaranteed wage 
minimum payable to skilled workers: this may mitigate the decline in labour 
demand (Figure 11). For the regular minimum wage, the primary cause of 
the decrease was the reduction of contributions put into effect in July, while 
for the qualified workers’ wage minimum, the decrease in real value can be 
attributed to its moderate, below-inflation increase.
Figure 11: real value of the total cost of employment at the minimum wage,  
1997–2009
Note: At 1997 forint value, in 2009 according to the last inflation projection of 4.5% 
estimated by the Hungarian National Bank (MNB, 2009b). The values for 2009 
were weighted to take the mid-year changes in contributions into account. The 
skilled worker wage minimum is the lowest wage payable for jobs requiring at least 
general or vocational secondary education (up till July 2009: the wage could be 
somewhat lower for employees with less than 2 years’ work experience).
The objectives of encouraging the less highly educated to work and of mod-
erating the negative effects of the financial crisis would easily justify bolder 
measures than that, such as nominally freezing the minimum wage, abolish-
5 As the current crisis originates 
in the financial market, the sig-
nificance of wage responsiveness 
is even greater than usual. The 
insecurity generated by the crisis 
leads to an increase in interest 
rates and in the relative price 
of capital, and thus the chances 
of capital-intensive growth and 
flexibility will be reduced. The 
lower the costs of labour become, 
the faster will adjustment and 
recovery occur.
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ing the skilled workers’ wage minimum, or relaxing some of the measures 
introduced at the end of 2006, especially the rule that set a minimum for the 
basis of compulsory social security contributions at twice the amount of the 
minimum wage.6 According to MNB (2008), the increase in the minimum 
wage payable to skilled workers may have contributed to the decline of em-
ployment in 2008, partly because the increase had a stronger effect on higher 
wage categories than expected (employers tried to preserve the relative propor-
tions within their wage scales). Kátay (2009) even proposes that the skilled 
workers’ wage minimum should be abolished altogether in order to improve 
wage flexibility and thus competitiveness.
In an effort to stimulate labour demand, a government decision was made 
to lower contribution rates as part of the crisis relief package: in July 2009 
standard health care and employers’ contributions were reduced from 32 to 27 
per cent of the portion of the wage up to twice the amount of the minimum 
wage, above which the rate of 32 per cent remains. The special employers’ con-
tribution rate was also reduced by 5 percentage points (also up to twice the 
amount of the minimum wage). This special rate applies to young first-time 
employees within the first two years of their careers, employees over the age of 
fifty returning to work from unemployment and employees returning to work 
after a period of child rearing or taking care of a relative, As shown in Figure 
12, these steps brought about a substantial decrease in the tax wedge, i.e., the 
tax burden on wages dropped to a lower percentage of the gross wages.
Figure 12: The tax wedge at the minimum wage and the average wage  
in manufacturing, 2008–2009 (per cent)
Note: Figures for Quarter 1, 2008: 137,931 forints per month before tax, Quarter 1, 
2009: 137,379 forints; projection for Quarter 2, 2009: 137,104 forints.
Source: Taxes and contributions from Hungarian Tax Authority data, gross wages 
from HCSO institutional data and the projections of the Hungarian National 
Bank, assuming slower wage decline in the second quarter.
The decrease in the tax wedge is somewhat smaller at the level of the mini-
mum wage because the upper threshold of tax credits has not been adjusted to 
follow the increases in the minimum wage since 2008, i.e., a little bit more of 
the once entirely tax-free minimum wage has been claimed back by the cen-
6 An employer may request ex-
emption from the rule of double 
contributions base. The request 
is assessed with reference to the 
firm’s profitability, that is, pay-
ing contributions after less than 
the double base considerably 
increases the risk of an extended 
audit by the tax authorities.
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tral budget each year. Further contribution reductions are planned for 2010, 
the most important of which is that the fixed health care contribution will 
be scrapped, which is expected to lower the tax wedge at the level of the min-
imum wage by about 2.7 percentage points. Some of the remaining changes 
will leave the low-wage segments of the population unaffected, while others 
may or may not affect them.7
The reduction of wage costs and especially the contributions burden on low 
wages has long been among the recommendations of both Hungarian and in-
ternational experts. This step is indisputably one of the wisest decisions the 
Hungarian government could choose to make. It could be a step not only to-
wards recovery from the global crisis but also towards recovery from the older 
internal structural crisis and towards dislodging the economy from the per-
sistently low level of employment.
3. Labour suPPLy
In Hungary the employment rates are especially low among the uneducated, 
the young and the old populations and among women rearing young children, 
while the employment rates of middle-aged and relatively highly educated 
people approach the EU average (Table 3). The size of these groups relative 
to the total population is primarily a function of demographic processes – 
the best that policies can do is exert their influence on the level of economic 
activity in each group.
Table 3: employment rate across various sub-groups in the Visegrád countries, 2008
Country
Aged 15–24 
(men and 
women)
Women 
aged  
25–39
Aged 55–64 
(men and 
women)
Uneducated 
aged 25–64
Aged 25–64 
(men and 
women)
Aged 15–64 
(men and 
women)
Hungary 20.0 63.6 31.4 38.7 64.7 56.7
Poland 27.3 72.2 31.6 43.0 67.5 59.2
Slovakia 26.2 67.9 39.2 32.3 72.1 62.3
Czech Republic 28.1 66.0 47.6 46.5 75.1 66.6
Slovenia 38.4 85.4 32.8 55.0 75.2 68.6
EU-15 41.0 72.4 47.4 57.9 72.9 67.3
Source: Eurostat on-line database.
Compared to demand, the supply of labour is in several respects shaped by 
slower and longer-term processes. It is grounded in demographic processes, 
which determine not only the size of the working-age population as a whole 
but also the sizes of age cohorts of special significance with respect to the la-
bour market. The age structure diagram of the Hungarian population in the 
first quarter of 2009 is displayed in Figure 13.
One of the most notable features of the age pyramid of the Hungarian pop-
ulation is the large number of so called Ratkó children of about 55 years of 
7 The decrease in contribu-
tions in effect from July 2009 
is planned to be extended to 
wages above the double of the 
minimum wage threshold from 
2010. There will also be changes 
in the rules of calculating the tax 
base of the personal income tax, 
which will be counterbalanced 
to some extent by adjustments to 
the tax rates and brackets
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age and Ratkó grandchildren of about 33 years of age.8 Both of these genera-
tions are close to life stages that have special significance in terms of labour 
market participation. The Ratkó grandchildren have just entered the best 
working age, which is, however, also the most active period of child bear-
ing. In the short run, the rising trend in the number of births beginning in 
2004 (the Ratkó great grandchildren) has the effect of lowering the activity 
of the working-age population. The youngest of the Ratkó children are about 
to reach the typical age of retiring with a disability pension while the oldest 
of the group are approaching the statutory old-age retirement age. On aver-
age more than 140 thousand people will reach the age of retirement between 
2009 and 2013 while there are only around 120 thousand 18–22 year olds 
likely to enter the labour market.
Figure 13: age structure of the hungarian population
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Survey data.
The temporarily negative population processes are somewhat counterbalanced 
by the improvement in educational attainment. The expansion of education 
in the 1960s has now reached the pre-retirement cohorts – the increase in 
the employment rate among those over 50 is to some extent explained by the 
higher activity rate of people having at least upper secondary qualifications. 
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8 The Ratkó period is named 
after Anna Ratkó, Hungar-
ian health secretary between 
1950 and 1953, and refers to 
the period between 1950 and 
1956 characterised by popula-
tion policies prohibiting abor-
tion and introducing a tax on 
childlessness. The generation of 
children born during this period 
are called the Ratkó children 
and their children are the Ratkó 
grandchildren.
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The expansion of higher education in the 1990s surfaces in a similar way 
when looking at the middle-aged cohorts. Among the total population, the 
percentage of 15–64 year-olds having at most primary education decreased 
from 33.5 per cent in 2000 to 25.8 per cent in 2008, while the percentage 
having tertiary education increased from 11.7 to 16.5 per cent over the same 
period. This is likely to account for the fact that as a result of changes in the 
composition of the population the average employment rate has increased 
since 2000 even though the employment rate of each individual educational 
group has decreased.
Table 4 also shows, however, that the positive influence of improved educa-
tion on employment is extremely slow. Moreover, notwithstanding the over-
all improvement in education, there still remains a large proportion of peo-
ple leaving the education system with only primary qualifications. That is, in 
the absence of competent government interventions, the Hungarian econo-
my is unlikely to grow out of the problem of low employment even among 
the uneducated.
Table 4: employment rates of 15–64 year-olds by educational attainment,  
2000–2008
Year
At most  
primary
Vocational 
secondary
General  
secondary Tertiary Total
2000 28.9 71.7 62.9 82.1 56.0
2001 29.1 71.8 62.5 82.2 56.2
2002 28.6 71.6 62.1 81.6 56.2
2003 28.4 70.5 62.9 82.0 57.0
2004 27.6 69.7 61.9 82.2 56.8
2005 28.0 68.7 61.7 82.5 56.9
2006 27.6 69.2 61.6 81.2 57.3
2007 27.3 68.6 61.6 80.0 57.3
2008 27.2 66.4 60.7 79.5 56.7
Source: authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Survey data.
The level of activity among individual groups is strongly influenced by trans-
fers. Welfare payments, pensions and generally any cash transfer not coming 
from work activities have the effect of lowering people’s inclination to work, 
as has been empirically confirmed in Hungarian studies.9 Recognising the 
significance of this phenomenon – and complying with the expectations of 
the European Union – Hungarian policies have undergone gradual changes 
over recent years: while immediately following the regime change the reduc-
tion of unemployment and the social tensions stemming from it was the first 
priority, in recent years increasingly more attention has been paid to the level 
of economic activity among the working-age population both in terms of ob-
jectives and in terms of measures.
9 For an overview of empirical 
studies in Hungary, see: Bódis 
et al (2005) on unemployment 
benefit schemes, and Cseres-
Gergely and Scharle (2007) on 
maternity benefits, pensions and 
social assistance.
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Maternity benefits
In Hungary, the employment rate among mothers caring for children under 
the age of six lags 35 percentage points behind the employment rate among 
women having older children or no children. The corresponding difference 
is 20 percentage points in Germany and 1.6 percentage points in Denmark. 
Mothers’ labour supply is discouraged both by the relatively generous cash 
transfers available to parents with young children and by the low accessibil-
ity and insufficient capacity of day care facilities.
In line with the shift in objectives, the development of children’s day care 
facilities returned to the government agenda in 2004: the maintenance re-
quirements imposed on local governments have been tightened, the funding 
rate per child has been increased for nursery schools, the regulations on start-
ing and running alternative day care facilities for under 3s (family day care, 
integrated kindergarten) have been simplified and more resources have been 
allocated for institutional investments. Attempts at expanding the capacity of 
nursery schools have remained at a modest level, however. As part of the crisis 
relief measures – but clearly not with the intention of short-term expenditure 
reduction – a decision was made to reduce the maximum period of claiming 
maternity benefit: the first generation affected by this decision will be those 
whose children have their second birthday in 2012.
Pension-type transfers
In Hungary one in three people among the 55–64 year-old population works, 
which is not an especially low figure in the Visegrád region but falls far behind 
the EU average of 47 per cent and even further behind the Lisbon objective 
of 50 per cent. The gap is, to some extent, attributable to the relatively poor 
general health of the Hungarian population but is mainly explained by the 
low statutory retirement age and the regulations on eligibility, which were 
relaxed after the regime change and still offer relatively favourable terms of 
early retirement.
These regulations have been tightened in recent years. The new reform of 
the disability pension scheme endorsed in July 2007 focused on improving 
employment odds and left the system of incentives determining the likelihood 
of claims essentially untouched. The new regulations state that each claim-
ant’s health and remaining work capability must be thoroughly assessed, and 
health, welfare and employment rehabilitation services are offered based on 
the results of the assessment. Claimants are entitled to a rehabilitation allow-
ance for the duration of the rehabilitation period, for a maximum of three 
years. The amount of the allowance matches, or slightly exceeds, the claim-
ant’s future pension but its payment is conditional on the claimant’s uninter-
rupted co-operation with the job centre. An amendment endorsed last year 
also specifies the obligation of co-operation for persons receiving regular so-
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cial assistance but judged to be ready for rehabilitation, although the require-
ment only applies to those having more than ten years before they reach the 
statutory retirement age. The tighter regulations on disability pension claims 
and the introduction of the rehabilitation allowance presumably accelerated 
the downward trend in early retirement beginning in 2002. This trend may 
come to a halt, however, as a result of the crisis – the rising number of claims 
seems to point in this direction, although up till now it has not been accom-
panied by an increase in the positively assessed claims of disability or simi-
lar allowance.
Looking at old-age pensions, the gradual increase of the statutory retire-
ment age to 62 years initiated by Act LXXXI of 1997 has been completed in 
2009. Although the option of early retirement with no loss of pension is still 
available provided that the required years of service have been completed, the 
increase in the statutory retirement age has made its contribution to the rise 
in economic activity over the past decade. In May 2009, taking advantage of 
the crisis, one of the first actions of the Bajnai government was to raise the 
retirement age in steps from 62 to 65 years over the period between 2012 and 
2017, and to increase the minimum service period required for full-pension 
early retirement to 40 years. While the effects of these measures are obviously 
unobservable in 2009, both are highly important and well calibrated since, 
although the decision to retire is influenced by a number of factors, the statu-
tory age is decisive (Cseres-Gergely, 2007).
The increase of the retirement age cannot, of course, have the intended posi-
tive effects unless the elderly remain not only active but also employed. Al-
though we have limited experiences in this area, the raise implemented after 
1997 suggests promising results. The Labour Survey results of the Hungar-
ian Central Statistical Office show that the employment rate among women 
aged 55–59 increased from 13.6 per cent in 1998 to 38.7 per cent in 2008, 
while their unemployment rate rose from 4.8 to only 5.5 per cent (the male 
population is characterised by a similar pattern although with less gain). The 
significance of these results is not limited to the age cohorts involved but ex-
tends to the entire population: the rise in employment over the past decade 
is to a considerable extent attributable to the increase of the retirement age, 
although the effect substantially faded after 2005 (Kátay, 2009). While an 
increase from 55 to 62 years is not at all equivalent to a change from 62 to 
65 years, the latter is also likely to be successful provided that suitable serv-
ices, working week regulations, training and incentives are available to assist 
the elderly in their continued employment, and that the unemployment pro-
grammes are prepared for this special group of customers.
A change of considerably smaller but still measurable impact was the revi-
sion of pension formulas coming into effect in January 2008, which increased 
inactivity in the same year. The change involved calculating with net rather 
the hungarian labour market...
35
than gross earnings, complete valorisation, the offer of extra premiums for 
retirement over the age of 40 and modifications to the regulations on large 
pensions. The first of these components encouraged a large group of people to 
retire at the end of 2007, before the changes took effect (Figure 5). Although 
the formula calculating the pension following early retirement remains flawed 
in terms of considerations of insurance mathematics, the revised formulas in 
combination with the raised retirement age create a fairer pension system.
Unemployment and unemployment benefits
Whatever indicator we look at, unemployment remains at a moderate level 
in Hungary: in the first decade of the century it remained under 5 per cent 
of the working-age population. As shown in Figure 14, from 2003 onwards 
the group of registered unemployed and the group of job seekers have been 
of about the same size among the total population. As was discussed before, 
this does not mean that all is well in the Hungarian labour market: the low 
level of unemployment is paired with a substantial inactivity rate and a low 
level of employment.
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Figure 14: size of various (partially overlapping) non-working groups  
relative to the 15–64 year-old population from 2000 by quarter  
(right axis: percentage of the inactive)
Source: HCSO Labour Survey.
In the Hungarian system a significant share of the working-age population 
receive welfare transfers not contingent on mandatory co-operation with job 
centres. In many cases the regulations may specify the condition of active job 
seeking but this requirement is rarely or inconsistently enforced. This phe-
nomenon is visualised in Figure 14. Analysing the results of the European 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), Bajnai, Hámori and Köllő (2008) found 
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that in this respect the Hungarian pattern deviated from the patterns ob-
served in other countries of the Visegrád region: while in Hungary, job cen-
tres have contact with a relatively small percentage of the non-working pop-
ulation and do not maintain an intensive relationship with the few who are 
registered, the Visegrád countries were, in contrast, characterised by high 
registration rates and close contact in 2005. Figure 15 displays the changes 
between 2005 and 2008: although the gap between the four Visegrád coun-
tries narrowed, this was due to a decline in the other countries rather than to 
an improvement in Hungary.
Figure 15: coverage and intensity of contact with the public employment services 
 in 2005 and 2008 in the Visegrád countries for the 15–64 year-old non-employed 
population (reference lines mark the average of the two indices)
Coverage, displayed on the horizontal axis, shows the ratio of the registered unem-
ployed to the total working-age non-employed population. Contact, displayed on 
the vertical axis, shows the percentage of those contacting their job centres within 
the two weeks preceding data collection. The figure differs from the graph in Baj-
nai, Hámori and Köllő (2008) in that those non-employed who are attending school 
are excluded here, as is the 59–64 year-old cohort. The latter exclusion has the 
drawback of leaving the effects of changes in the pension system uncontrolled for, 
but was a necessary decision as only aggregate Eurostat data are available for 2008.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Eurostat online database.
The high and rising level of long-term unemployment is explained by regula-
tions that do little to encourage economic activity and by the persistent prob-
lem of highly limited labour market prospects the uneducated have to face.10 
In Hungary the initiative of the largest scale aimed at tackling the problem of 
long-term unemployment is at present the Pathway to Work programme. As 
mentioned above, the official goal of the programme is to divide the popula-
tion of regular social assistance recipients into two groups, and provide serv-
ices and support better tailored to the needs of each in an effort to improve 
their economic activity. One of the groups is for those who are considered to 
be capable of work purely on account of their physical and intellectual abili-
ties, disregarding the question of the competition in the labour market, and 
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the other is for those who are not. The latter group continues to receive regular 
social assistance because the programme considers their position to be genu-
inely beyond help as regards employment. This presumably relatively small 
group is likely to remain persistently inactive. Participants aged under 35 and 
having less than eight completed years of schooling form a separate group: for 
them, the services focus on skills training, and they may satisfy the require-
ment of public work by attending training programmes. The potential merits 
of the Pathway to Work programme lie in the larger group of those capable 
of work, whose regular social assistance is replaced by work availability sup-
port, and who are required to accept the public work assigned to them for at 
least six hours a day in return for proper payment.
Public works are organised by local governments, but the administration 
of the move between different unemployment schemes, the transfer of pay-
ments and the task of sanctioning a refusal to co-operate are shared between 
the job centres and the local governments, which simplifies the maintenance 
of records accessible to both institutions.
It was already mentioned in connection with the crisis relief measures that 
although public work schemes are meant to assist the participants’ return to 
the labour market, their success in this task remains questionable. This is a 
closed market, which is free from the challenges of the real market, such as 
job search, self-assertion, convincing the employer, securing and keeping the 
job, and does not involve costs (of training or travelling). While the partici-
pants may thus return temporarily to the regular rhythm of a working life, 
the labour market skills mentioned above will not be developed. Previous ex-
periences suggest that the participants of public work schemes are less likely 
to be successful in the labour market than non-participants having the same 
observable abilities (Firle and Szabó, 2007).
The crisis relief tasks assigned to job centres are in harmony with the gov-
ernment’s line of policies as a whole, which is characterised by the pursuit of 
safe solutions, even at the expense of significant efficiency losses. Of the three 
approaches recommended by the EU, the Hungarian government has given 
priority to “job preservation” measures potentially involving an enormous 
dead loss, and fought to prevent the emergence of large-scale unemployment, a 
natural consequence of the crisis. Today, subsidised employment plays the role 
of the pension schemes that, a few years after the regime change, absorbed the 
large number of people losing their jobs – with the difference that the present 
solution also ensures the survival of potentially unfit enterprises. There is an 
important difference between the two situations, however: the resources de-
voted to tackling the current crisis are considerably smaller than the pension 
expenditure of the nineties, and they can be readily reallocated once the reces-
sion is over, since the beneficiaries of the support are not granted permanent 
entitlement. Although this approach is also propagated by the EU itself, the 
cseres-gergely & scharle
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Scandinavian countries and Great Britain, for instance, do not follow this line 
but relying on the purifying power of the crisis, choose to support employ-
ees leaving their unfit employers in finding another job and, thus, encourage 
labour market adaptability (EEO, 2009). In Hungary very little resources or 
attention have been devoted to this path of development, while the number 
of unemployed have risen sharply since the beginning of 2009.
In order to reveal the causes behind the substantial increase in unemploy-
ment in Hungary and to be able to respond to this problem with efficiently 
implemented policies, it is important to know the extent and direction of 
changes in the composition of the non-employed population: in what ways new 
entrants differ from previous groups of non-employed and unemployed.
Figure 16 clearly shows that in addition to the decrease in the inflow into 
inactivity, the probability of exiting unemployment in any direction also 
dropped by the first quarter of 2009. The share of the population entering 
inactivity has steadily decreased since 2004 and the figures for early 2009 
suggest that this trend has not been reversed by the global crisis (the figure 
displays the data for the male population only in order to avoid inactivity due 
to child bearing confounding the picture). These trends indicate a further rise 
in the probability of long-term unemployment.
Figure 16: Percentage of people moving from unemployment into employment  
or inactivity relative to the size of the unemployed population in the previous period; 
by quarterly periods, men aged 15–64, 1999–2009
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Survey panel data.
For the first quarter of 2009 no major changes in the composition of new un-
employment entrants are indicated by the Labour Survey figures. According 
to more recent data following unemployment registration up until June 2009, 
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the increase appears to be significant only among those having upper second-
ary qualifications (Figure 18). Among new labour market entrants, however, 
the size of both the group having vocational training and the group having up-
per secondary qualifications has increased (Figure 19). The conclusion drawn 
from these data is that if there are significant changes in the composition of 
the new unemployed population, they could only be revealed by finer-grain 
indicators measuring productivity and vocational skills.
Figure 17: The educational composition of the new unemployed population,  
2005–2009
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Survey data, four-
period moving averages.
Figure 18: The distribution of all unemployment registrations  
by educational attainment at monthly periods (per cent, total = 100)
Source: Hungarian Employment Service.
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Figure 19: The distribution of unemployment registration among new labour market 
entrants by educational attainment at monthly periods (per cent, total = 100)
Source: Hungarian Employment Service.
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Preface
In this year’s In Focus section we analyze labour market discrimination and 
segregation. Although the anti-discrimination legislature of developed coun-
tries theoretically ensures the equality of every demographic group based on 
the principle of equal treatment for all, there is a debate among researchers and 
in public forums regarding the extent of discrimination in the real world, the 
source of observed discriminatory phenomena, and the most effective ways 
of handling discrimination. Our goal is to present a summary of these ma-
jor unresolved issues, problems, and the most recent attempts aimed at their 
resolution, as well as to assess the current situation in the Hungarian labour 
market and place it in an international context.
In the first – introductory – chapter of the In Focus section, Anna Lovász 
and Álmos Telegdy summarize the different types of observable statisti-
cal differences between groups present in the labour market, introduce the 
standard economic models of labour market discrimination, and pay special 
attention to other, non-discriminatory phenomena which may also lead to 
between-group differences in the labour market. Among the different mod-
els of discrimination, the authors differentiate based on the source of the dis-
criminatory behaviour (taste-based or statistical discrimination), its outcome 
(in wages, employment, or occupation), and the stage of the life path that is 
affected (pre-labour market vs. labour market discrimination). After summa-
rizing the possible forms in which discrimination may appear, they outline 
the difficulties inherent in the measurement and assessment of labour mar-
ket discrimination. Finally, they introduce the widely used and some newer 
methods used in research on the topic, some of which the Reader will see ex-
amples of in the subsequent studies of the In Focus section.
We begin the assessment of the Hungarian situation with the analysis of 
the legal framework. Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky discusses the main concepts 
of European equal opportunity legislation and Hungarian regulatory prac-
tices, the tools available for enforcing the laws, and their practical fulfilment. 
The author points out that the current legal tools available in Hungary are 
not sufficient for ensuring the principle of equal treatment for all, since both 
the content of the norms, and practical enforcement are characterized by 
over-cautiousness. Despite these problems, the observable changes in legisla-
ture and practical enforcement can be viewed as encouraging, as they seem 
to reflect a clarification of social values, and an increase in knowledge regard-
ing the issue.
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Gábor Fleck and Vera Messing describe the next level in the realization of 
anti-discriminatory policy: the functioning of labour market programs aimed 
at aiding the Roma, their problems and deficiencies. The authors point out 
that the past years’ programs aimed at Roma employment were not able to 
successfully influence the level of Roma employment. The problems of the 
system can be linked to the definition of the target population, the goals and 
priorities, the indicators, and the procedures for grant applications, as well as 
the lack of monitoring and impact analysis. The authors list numerous aspects 
that could improve the effectiveness of employment policy.
The remaining chapters of the In Focus section present empirical results 
from Hungary that can be linked to the methodologies used in the newest 
international research described in the introduction. First, Gábor Kertesi and 
Gábor Kézdi examine one of the main pitfalls of Roma employment: the seg-
regation of the schooling system. The authors give a comprehensive picture 
of the extent of segregation between and within schools, the regional differ-
ences, and then analyze the determinants of the dispersion of city and town, 
and micro-regional segregation indexes, as well as the long term trends in the 
segregation of Roma students. Finally, they compare the Hungarian results 
to those of research conducted in the United States, and find that while the 
level of ethnic segregation in schools is lower in Hungary, an increase in the 
ratio of the most disadvantaged ethnic minorities increases segregation be-
tween schools in a similar way.
Endre Sik and Bori Simonovits attempt to determine the level of labour 
market discrimination based on research that uses several different empirical 
approaches. They compare data on the perceptions of people regarding the ex-
tent of discrimination in Hungary and other European countries, and then 
based on data from surveys conducted on representative samples of the pop-
ulation and minorities that are aimed at assessing the chances of becoming a 
victim. According to the studies, in Hungary, Roma ethnicity and migrant 
status increase the level of perception of discrimination. The authors then 
use the method of discrimination testing, based on controlled experiments, 
to measure the level of discrimination against various minority groups. This 
method is based on the analysis of job postings, as well as on tests conducted 
by phone, where they measure the frequency of rejection of applicants who 
share all the characteristics relevant to the experiment (to the job posting), 
but differ in regard to the single characteristic that is the focus of the test. 
Their results indicate that the occupations assessed are characterized by sig-
nificant gender segregation. The testing shows that young workers are more 
sought after than older workers.
In another study, Gábor Kertesi describes the employment situation of 
the Roma population, and analyzes whether there has been any significant 
changes in it since the dramatic fall in employment seen at the beginning of 
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the nineties. His results show that the level of Roma employment has stabi-
lized at a very low level – around 30 percent – and that the typically Roma 
workplaces are extremely unstable. These indicators are much worse than 
those of the average worker with comparable education levels: the employ-
ment rate of those with a maximum eighth grade education level is double 
the rate measured in the case of Roma workers, and their workplaces are, in 
addition, much more stable.
The situation of women in the Hungarian labour market is assessed in two 
studies using two different approaches. In the first study Anna Lovász ex-
amines whether the increased level of product market competition following 
the transition led to a fall in the unexplained wage gap (the wage gap that re-
mains after taking observable characteristics into account) between men and 
women. According to some models, if certain employers favour male workers 
over females with equal productivity, increased competition should force such 
behaviour out of the market, since firms have to behave more efficiently. The 
study finds a significant negative correlation between the level of competition 
and the wage gap. Based on the estimates, increased competition accounts for 
fifteen percent of the fall in the gender wage gap during this period.
In the last study of the In Focus section, Anna Lovász and Mariann Rigó 
estimate the relative productivity and relative wage of women compared to 
men based on firm level production functions and wage equations. The authors 
then compare these group level relative productivities and wages to assess the 
extent of wage discrimination against women. This method has the benefit 
over standard individual level wage equation estimation in that it can take un-
observed group level differences between the genders into account. The results 
indicate that the previously published estimates of the wage gap between the 
genders is not explained by the lower productivity of women, women not ap-
pearing to be significantly less productive than men in any specification. The 
study points out that the estimated level of discrimination depends greatly 
on the data, since the estimated difference between relative wages and pro-
ductivities differs according to the type of wage measure used.
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1. Labour market discrimination – tyPes, measurement 
issues, emPiricaL soLutions
Anna Lovász & Álmos Telegdy
Introduction
In the economic sense, discrimination occurs when equally productive mem-
bers of two different groups that can be differentiated based on some ob-
servable characteristic are treated differently. In other words, labour market 
discrimination means that the market attaches some value to a worker charac-
teristic that is not correlated with the workers’ individual productivity. Thus 
discrimination can occur based on any observable characteristic that causes 
the discriminating person to attach a lower value to a worker’s productive 
characteristics relative to other, equally productive workers.
Research on labour market discrimination usually focuses on the situation 
of a few specific demographic groups. Perhaps the most frequently analyzed 
among these – at least at the international level – is the disadvantage of female 
workers in the labour market (Blau–Kahn, 2000). Racial or ethnicity-based 
discrimination also has a broad literature in some countries and naturally 
studies focus on the ethnic minorities present in each region: in Europe, these 
focus mainly on the situation of the Roma, while in the United States, they as-
sess the situation of African-American, Asian, and Hispanic workers (Juhn et 
al, 1991, Arrow 1998, Charles–Guryan, 2007, DeVaro–Gosh–Zoghi, 2007). 
Many studies examine the phenomena of discrimination against the ever-in-
creasing number of immigrants as well (for example: Hersch, 2008). A sepa-
rate strain of research analyses labour market discrimination for or against the 
older age groups. Certain studies (Bendick–Jackson–Romero, 1996, Boglietti, 
1974, Lallemand–Rycx, 2009) show that employers prefer younger workers 
from among equally qualified applicants due to the older workers’ higher ex-
pected probability of health problems, lower perceived ability to carry a high 
workload, and lower ability to adjust to using new technology. On the other 
hand, some studies highlight the fact that older workers receive a higher wage 
than their productivity merits, so there is often a positive wage premium as-
sociated with older workers (Dostie, 2006, Neumark, 2008).
Besides gender, race, and age, there is a very colourful and interesting lit-
erature of discrimination based on other observable physical characteris-
tics. Among these are studies examining the situation of people who are 
short in height, have a disability, or are overweight, and the results usually 
clearly show these groups’ disadvantage in the labour market (Hersch, 2008, 
Rosenberg, 2009). Positive discrimination based on physical beauty has also 
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been documented (Hamermesh, 2004). Certain studies find that men who 
have a deeper voice, or who are tall are more successful in the labour market, 
and are promoted to leadership positions more easily than others (Tiedens–
Jimenez, 2003).
Of the non-physical attributes, there is research on discrimination based on 
workers’ religion and political views, and in Western Europe and the United 
States extensive work has been done assessing the situation of homosexual 
workers (Weichselbaumer, 2003). A worker’s family status may also be the 
basis of differential treatment: certain studies, for example, show that mar-
ried men (or those raising children) receive salary increases more often than 
unmarried men, while others have found that married young women are less 
likely to be hired into certain occupations, since employers expect them to 
have children soon, which may translate into lack of manpower and additional 
recruitment and training costs for the firm (Antonovics–Town, 2004).
In the European Union and in the developed countries in general – includ-
ing in Hungary – the legal framework theoretically ensures equal treatment 
and equal opportunities for all people in the labour market. Despite this, 
there are statistically significant differences between groups in all countries, 
and politicians and analysts believe that decreasing these differences is an im-
portant goal. For example, one of the main conclusions of the 2008 OECD 
analysis of the labour market (OECD, 2008) states that labour market dis-
crimination is still one of the biggest problems facing its member countries, 
and that they should do more to eliminate it. According to the report, women 
in the OECD countries earn 17 percent less than men, and 30 percent of this 
difference is due to labour market discrimination.
Are the observed differences in the labour market outcomes of minority 
and majority groups truly a consequence of discrimination?1 Although the 
concept of discrimination may seem simple, in real life it is very difficult to 
determine its prevalence and extent, since the observed differences in the la-
bour market situation of different groups may be due to several other factors 
as well. Public opinion is often shaped under the assumption that any wage 
and employment differences between groups are due to discrimination, but 
this is not nearly the case, as we would like to show in this study. For this rea-
son, as our starting point in this chapter we will describe the objective, sta-
tistically observable facts regarding the situation of different groups. We will 
then turn our attention to the possible causes of these differences, including 
– but not limited to – discrimination, and its various forms. Researchers at-
tempt to measure which of these effects are causing the observed phenomena, 
and to what extent each one contributes, using various methods that we will 
also summarize. We will discuss the theoretical and empirical difficulties of 
these methods, due to which the extent of discrimination – as opposed to the 
concrete statistical differences – remains only an estimated value.
1 In this study, we refer to the 
group that is the victim of dis-
crimination as the minority 
group, and the group who does 
not suffer from discrimination, 
or who is the discriminating 
party as the majority.
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Observable differences between groups in the labour market
In every labour market there are statistically significant differences between 
groups that can be clearly observed and these statistics and their trends are 
continuously reported on in international comparative analysis. These statis-
tics can be divided into two main groups: wage differentials, and differentials 
in the composition of workers. Figure 1.1. summarizes the types of between-
group differences that can be observed in the labour market.
figure 1.1: types of observed labour market differences
Virtually every country has certain demographic groups whose average wages 
are well below those of other groups. Analyses often compare female work-
ers’ average wages to male workers’ or different ethnic minority workers’ av-
erage wage to the majority’s for the full set of employed workers present in 
the labour market. This direct comparison of wages often does not take into 
account the proportion of each group within the labour market, the educa-
tion level of the workers, their occupation, or other characteristics that are 
relevant to the workers’ productivities, so a difference in the relative wages 
of the groups is not in itself proof of labour market discrimination. Despite 
this fact, the relative wages of different groups are important indicators for 
assessing the groups’ labour market situation, for analyzing trends over time, 
and for cross-country comparisons.
Compositional differences can be found at several different levels in the 
market. There are clear differences between groups in terms of participation 
in the labour market. At the first level, members of different demographic 
groups are present in the labour market to varying degrees; their labour mar-
ket participation is not the same. Minority groups are usually more likely to 
become discouraged from participating at all, and to permanently withdraw 
from the labour market (Köllő, 2005). In terms of becoming employed – if 
we look at those who would like to find work – minority groups are success-
ful at different rates, the ratio of unemployed is usually higher in the case of 
minority groups.
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The next level of compositional differences can be observed among the em-
ployed workers. In terms of the occupations of employed workers, it can be 
observed that certain groups are concentrated into specific occupations or 
industries. Finally, segregation can also be seen at the firm level: the propor-
tion of minority workers can differ significantly among firms, even within 
specific industries and regions.
The causes of labour market differences
One possible cause of the differences between demographic groups in terms 
of labour market outcomes is indeed discrimination. But the differences can-
not be unambiguously attributed to discriminatory behaviour; several other 
phenomena can lead to similar observed differences among the groups. We 
can only speak of discrimination in the labour market if the differences be-
tween the groups do not reflect differences in their productivity. One possible 
cause of such deviations in group level productivity may be the composition 
of the groups themselves. If the average productivities of the members of two 
groups differ due to, for example, the fact that they have different education 
levels, or because the cognitive abilities they acquired within their families 
or during their schooling are different, it is not surprising that they are not 
in the same situation once they enter the labour market.2
A measure which takes into account the effect of worker composition in 
terms of the observable productive characteristics is closer to the true level 
of discrimination, but even such a measure may show significant differences 
between groups that are not due to discrimination, since there are many fac-
tors that influence a worker’s productivity besides their observable charac-
teristics. If two groups differ systematically in terms of some characteristics 
that influence their productivity, then differences in wage, employment, and 
occupation can arise even when employers do not discriminate against any 
group. Since discrimination means that the relative wage of a group differs 
from the relative productivity of that group, we may overestimate the extent 
of discrimination if the observed characteristics do not measure the differ-
ences in the productivities of the groups accurately.3 Some studies point out 
that in the case of male-female differentials, such unobserved variables may 
include biologically determined differences in personality, which may also 
affect productivity.4
The extent of discrimination is also estimated inaccurately if there is error 
in the measurement of certain observable characteristics, and if this error is 
correlated with membership in the groups. The most commonly given exam-
ple of such measurement error is the lack of information on actual years of 
work experience, which is often approximated using estimated potential years 
of experience.5 Since women are on average absent from the labour market 
more than men due to childbearing, the estimated potential years of expe-
2 This does not mean that 
minority groups do not suffer 
disadvantages prior to their 
entry in the labour market in 
their schooling, or their family 
background, which later affect 
their opportunities in the labour 
market.
3 For example, suppose that 
women exert a lower level of 
effort in their jobs on average 
due to their other (domestic, 
child care) obligations outside 
their workplace, so women with 
equal education levels and years 
of experience tend to be less 
productive than men within 
their workplace (Becker, 1985). 
In this case we would overes-
timate the extent of discrimi-
nation against women based 
on the available data, since the 
employers observe the workers’ 
actual productivities, and set 
their wages accordingly, while 
the researcher can only use the 
variables included in the data, 
which do not usually include 
information on activities outside 
the workplace or effort level.
4 For example, Niederle (2008) 
finds that within the workplace, 
women are much less likely to 
volunteer to undertake diffi-
cult tasks, even though they are 
equally successful at completing 
them. Ichino–Moretti (2006) 
also study biological differenc-
es between the genders in the 
workplace. Gneezy–Niederle–
Rustichini (2003) analyze the 
behaviour of male and female 
workers in response to a highly 
competitive work environ-
ment.
5 Potential experience is fre-
quently estimated as: age – years 
of schooling – 6.
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rience systematically overestimates the work experience of female workers, 
and thus their estimated productivity, which leads to the overestimation of 
the extent of discrimination against women.6 Of course, there may be similar 
problems of measurement in the case of other minorities as well, if the mi-
nority differs from the majority in terms of a characteristic due to some cul-
tural or biological reason.
Besides differences in productive capabilities, workers may also differ from 
each other in terms of their preferences, of which there is also rarely any data 
available. In this case, the differences do not arise in the productivity of the 
worker groups, but rather in the groups’ demand for employment into certain 
occupations or firms. This is described in the theory of compensating wage 
differentials, in which workers are only willing to undertake certain jobs 
that have undesirable characteristics if they receive additional compensation 
compared to other, similar jobs that do not have the undesirable character-
istic. For example, workers receive a higher wage for filling jobs that involve 
a higher risk of physical injury, since they are willing to undertake the risk. 
On the other hand, certain workers may be willing to work for lower wages 
if a given job has non-wage characteristics that are beneficial to them. If these 
preferences towards occupations or firms differ systematically between the 
demographic groups, this also leads to wage differentials and differences in 
occupational composition, which may be attributed to discrimination if the 
job characteristics are not observed in the data. For example, women have a 
higher average preference for jobs that offer a more flexible work schedule or 
– though much less common in Hungary – for part time jobs (again due to 
non-workplace duties), and are willing to accept lower wages to hold such a 
position. Thus when comparing the wages of women to men, it is important 
to take into account the actual number of hours worked, and, if possible, the 
flexibility of the work schedule.
Finally, it is important to discuss the fact that the differences in productivity 
between groups in the labour market are largely due to the significant differences 
among them that already exist prior to their entry into the labour market. These 
can also be the consequence of discrimination that is outside the labour mar-
ket, for example, discrimination in terms of acceptance into schools, or of oth-
er causes, such as differences in family background. Cunha–Heckman (2009), 
summarizing the issue, reach the conclusion that cognitive and non-cognitive 
abilities greatly determine success in the labour market, and that these abili-
ties are mostly formed prior to schooling age within the family. The analysis of 
Neal–Johnson (1996) points out that in the United States, differences in abil-
ity level, measured in the teenage years, prior to entry into the labour market, 
can explain the majority of the wage differentials between groups in the labour 
market.7 Carneiro–Heckman–Masterov (2003) try to overcome this problem 
by measuring children’s ability level at an earlier age, as well as the expectations 
6 Hersch (2006) studies the deci-
sions of women regarding the 
time they spend at work and 
within the home.
7 One main criticism of the study 
was that the pre-labour market 
differences are not necessarily 
independent of labour market 
discrimination. Ahmed (2006) 
develops a model in which mem-
bers of certain groups apply for 
lower-wage jobs only due to their 
pessimistic expectations about 
the level of discrimination they 
face, and thus end up in a worse 
situation than the majority even 
if employers do not actually dis-
criminate against them. It is also 
possible, that minorities invest 
less in their human capital due to 
their pessimistic expectations, 
as we will discuss later.
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of the families in terms of labour market performance. The study highlights the 
importance of policies aimed at keeping children from being left behind at an 
early age, and gives some evidence regarding the important role that the fami-
lies’ negative attitudes play in making decisions about schooling.8
Discrimination models
Economic discrimination models can be classified into two main groups: mod-
els based on preferences or tastes, and statistical discrimination models, which 
study discriminative behaviour that is a consequence of insufficient informa-
tion. In the current section we will introduce these two main types, and, in 
addition, summarize the theory behind the phenomenon of segregation.
Taste-based discrimination
The main assumption of the first type of models is that some members of the 
majority group do not wish to work together with members of the minor-
ity group due to their personal preferences; they are prejudiced against the 
minority group. These preferences have no other rational or economic basis, 
except for the prejudiced personal tastes, so they occur even if the average 
marginal productivities of the worker groups are equal. This model was first 
introduced by Becker (1957, 1971), and has since become the basis of innu-
merable empirical studies as the most well-known model of discrimination.9 
Becker differentiated between three different types based on the identity of 
the discriminator: discrimination by the employer, other employees (co-work-
ers), or customers, of which the model of employer discrimination has been 
the subject of the most studies.
In the employer taste discrimination model, in addition to the wage cost, 
the employment of a minority worker imposes an additional psychological 
cost on the employer at the firm, so the employer’s utility function depends 
negatively on the number (or ratio) of minority workers employed in the firm. 
In this situation, employers who have discriminative tastes will only hire mi-
nority workers if their wages are lower than that of majority workers (assum-
ing that both groups’ marginal productivity is equal, so they are equally good 
at doing their job). A wage differential will arise between the groups in the 
market if the proportion of discriminatory employers is high enough so that 
at a wage equal to that of majority workers, demand for minority workers is 
less than supply. The more intensive the extent of prejudice against minority 
workers, and the higher the number of discriminatory employers, the greater 
the wage differential will be between the groups. Minority workers will be 
employed in the least discriminatory firms, which leads to segregation in the 
labour market. If we assume that the employers’ prejudicial tastes are related to 
occupation (for example, they don’t like to see minority workers in leadership 
positions), we will observe occupational segregation between the groups.
8 Lang–Manove (2006), and 
Hanna–Linden (2009) also 
study pre-labour market dis-
crimination.
9 See Altonji–Blank (1999) for 
a survey of the topic.
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A direct implication of Becker’s model is that discriminating firms will 
achieve lower levels of profit than those who do not discriminate, since in-
dulging discriminative preferences is costly: such employers do not employ 
the lower-wage minority workers at the cost of lower profits. If there is perfect 
competition in the product market, in the long-run, discriminating employers 
will be forced out of the market, and the wage differential between the groups 
will decrease, although there are certain cases in which product market com-
petition will not eliminate wage differentials. For example, if discriminating 
firms can cover their costs (so their short-term profits are positive), then they 
may be able to discriminate in the short-run even in a competitive environ-
ment – the cost will be that their long-term profits will not be positive.
Competition will also not curb discrimination if the source of the discrimi-
natory tastes is the other employees or the customers, since these tastes cannot 
be influenced by the employer. In these cases, the co-worker’s utility is lower, if 
they have to work alongside members of the minority group, or the customer’s 
utility is lower, if they have to buy the products from a minority worker.10
Discriminating customers are only willing to purchase a product from mi-
nority workers if they have to pay less for it, and thus the labour market value 
of minority workers (demand for their labour) is lower in occupations where 
they are in contact with customers. Customer taste discrimination will only 
lead to wage differentials between worker groups if there is an insufficient 
number of occupations available to minority workers in which they are not 
in direct contact with customers, or where they only have to serve minority 
customers (Holzer–Ihlanfeldt, 1998). Since firms themselves do not bear any 
additional costs in the case of customer discrimination – buyers are willing 
to pay more to purchase from majority workers – product market competi-
tion will not decrease this type of discrimination.
Employee discrimination will only lead to wage differentials between groups 
if job search is costly, and if the abilities and preferences of workers regarding 
the occupations are not equally distributed between the groups. If this is not 
the case, firms will simply hire the workers into segregated teams, and there 
would not be a wage differential. If, however, there are not enough highly 
trained workers in the minority group, for example, and the highly trained 
(skilled) majority workers are prejudiced, then all less skilled minority work-
ers will have to work together with the prejudiced majority workers, who will 
demand higher wages for working with them. In this case, the low-skilled mi-
nority workers will receive lower wages than the low-skilled majority workers. 
The return to acquiring skills in this case, however, will be higher in the case 
of minority workers. If there are no barriers to acquiring skills, over time, the 
differences between the two groups should decrease, and we will be able to 
observe segregation in the market, but no wage differentials.
10 This type of discrimination 
may also be symmetric, in which 
case members of the minority 
group discriminate as well, and 
have a distaste for working with 
or buying from members of the 
majority group.
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Statistical discrimination
In the models discussed so far, discrimination arose from the tastes of certain 
groups or individuals: due to some reason not specified in the model (exog-
enous), members of a certain group dislike members of another group, and 
therefore are only willing to be in contact with them if they are compensated 
for doing so. Another type of discrimination, statistical discrimination, does 
not arise from the preferences of the majority, but rather due to asymmetri-
cal information in the market (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). For example, in 
the case of hiring new workers, it is easy to imagine that the employer is not 
fully able to assess the productivity of the applicant. If the employer hires a 
worker who is not suited to the job, this will lead to extra costs – since the 
worker is not capable, the employer will have to fire him or her, and find a 
new employee, who will have to be trained, and be given sufficient time to 
adjust to the new environment. To avoid such extra costs, the employer may 
take into account characteristics of the applicants that are correlated with 
productivity, but are not perfect indicators of it. The gender or race of the 
applicant may be one such characteristic. If employers know (or think they 
know) that the average productivity of minority workers is lower than that 
of majority group employees, then they may use skin colour as additional in-
formation when they make their hiring decisions, and workers from groups 
that are less productive on average will be at a disadvantage. Since employers 
are not using individual level, but rather group level characteristics, they will 
discriminate against workers from the given minority group: they use the 
group level (expected) average productivity to assess the applicant’s individual 
productivity. It is worth noting that in this case, employers have no personal 
distaste against minority workers, they are only discriminating against them 
because on average, this will lead to lower costs. We should also notice that if 
employers were perfectly informed regarding the applicants’ productivities, 
they would not discriminate.
This type of discrimination is better than taste-based discrimination in 
the sense that theoretically no one is prejudiced against the minorities; they 
are simply minimizing their expected costs. So if it turns out that a minority 
worker is very productive, the employer will hire that worker or keep him at 
the firm, while this is not the case with taste-based discrimination. The ex-
tent of statistical discrimination can change depending on the information 
available to the employer. For example, if the employer can observe the pro-
ductivity of an employee, by hiring him or her for a trial period, then the de-
cision can be made based on their trial period, and not based on the average 
expectations regarding the worker’s race or gender (Altonji–Pierret, 2001). 
The previous work experience of the worker may also be useful information 
for the employer, and may decrease statistical discrimination. As a result, this 
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type of discrimination mainly occurs in the case of young applicants who are 
entering the market for the first time.
This type of discrimination is based on rational decisions (cost minimiza-
tion), and if the productivity of two groups is truly different on average, it is 
very difficult to eliminate it. For example, if a significant proportion of young 
female workers have a high probability of leaving their workplace within a 
few years to have children, this translates into high costs for the firm, and 
this will be taken into account both in hiring decisions, and in determining 
wages.11 In this case, it is the young women who do not want to take leave of 
absence to have children who are discriminated against.
So the problem is that employers do not set the wages equal to the worker’s 
individual productivity, but rather with their expected productivity. As a re-
sult, minority workers who are as equally productive as majority workers will 
be victims of unfair treatment.12
So far, we have assumed that the true or expected average productivity of 
minority and majority workers differs due to exogenous reasons. If we lift 
this restriction, the situation gets even worse. If the majority believes that the 
abilities of the minority workers are lower than those of the majority work-
ers, this may become a self-fulfilling prophecy if the negative opinion of the 
majority affects the costs of the minority and as a result, their behaviour as 
well, as the following examples illustrate.13
Let us assume that the majority is of the opinion that the minority is less 
careful on average, so they make more mistakes. An employer who is super-
vising workers being trained for a job does not know why the worker made a 
mistake (so he is not fully informed). Therefore he does not know whether the 
worker made a mistake because he does not make an effort to work carefully, 
or because he is simply having a bad day. If the worker belongs to the minor-
ity group, the employer’s prejudice regarding minority workers will lead him 
to think that the worker made a mistake because he is less careful. So the em-
ployer will reach a different conclusion in evaluating the same information 
– the number of mistakes made – in the case of a minority worker or a major-
ity worker, and will fire the minority worker for a lower number of mistakes. If 
the minority worker notices this, he will know that he has a lower probability 
of being allowed to stay on the job following the training period (which can be 
viewed as the reward for paying attention). Since he has a lower probability of 
achieving his goal by working carefully, the minority worker may decide that 
it is not worth while to be careful, since there is a good chance that he will be 
fired (since it is not possible to avoid making any mistakes at all). This will re-
sult in more mistakes being made by minority workers on average, since it is 
not worth their while to pay attention to their work. So, the employer’s preju-
dicial expectations are validated: he thought minority workers are less careful 
than others, and his experiences have proven this to be the case.14
11 It is also important to note 
that if every young woman were 
to go on child-care leave, we 
could not speak of discrimina-
tion against them, since this 
signal (the fact that they are 
young women) would predict 
the expected length of their 
employment perfectly.
12 The above thought process 
can also be applied to other areas 
of life: the market for loans, if 
banks assume that minorities 
have a greater probability of 
missing a payment, than those 
from the majority group, or in 
the market for rental apart-
ments, if the landlords assume, 
that minorities cause more dam-
age on average than others.
13 Loury (2006) discusses the 
effect of prejudice on the deci-
sions of the minority in detail. 
In the following we will sum-
marize the relevant sections of 
this book.
14 Another example: if a minor-
ity worker appears drunk on the 
job one day, and the employer 
is prejudiced against minority 
workers, he might take a single 
occurrence as proof that the 
worker is a drunkard. In the 
case of a majority worker, the 
employer might overlook a one-
time incident, assuming that the 
worker is having problems in the 
family, or celebrating someone’s 
birthday. Since the minority 
worker notices the prejudice 
against him, he will not think 
it is important for him to pay 
attention to not going to work 
drunk (unless he is perfectly ab-
stinent), since he will already be 
labelled as a drunkard the very 
first time this occurs. This, once 
again, reinforces the employer in 
his prejudice: minority workers 
get drunk more often – exactly 
as he expected.
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Not only negative, but positive discrimination can also lead to similar out-
comes. One of Loury’s examples pertains to affirmative action for black stu-
dents in applying to schools. If black students can get into a school with low-
er scores than white students, they will know that they don’t have to prepare 
as much for the exams as they do, since acceptance has been made easier for 
them. So they really will be accepted with lower scores, and the expectations 
of the majority will be validated.
It is important to note that this model fits into the paradigm of rational 
individuals maximizing their utility. The employer believes, for exogenous 
reasons, that the minority worker is less productive on average than the ma-
jority worker. This expectation influences his decisions, which in turn influ-
ences the minority worker’s decisions regarding his effort on the job, level of 
attention, or other characteristics that are related to his work that have per-
sonal costs. The minority worker changes these characteristics in a way that 
fulfils the employer’s expectations. Society reaches a bad, but stable equilib-
rium, in which the minority group faces prejudice, and this has a negative ef-
fect on their performance.
How can this self-fulfilling cycle be broken? If there are a large number of 
decision-makers, there is probably not much to be done, since it is in their 
interest that their decisions be upheld. If, however, decisions are made by an 
institution – for example, the government – then change is possible, since the 
decision-maker can take into account the effect of the majority’s prejudices on 
the behaviour of the minority, and can act against it (Coate–Loury, 1993).15 
This can be achieved if government representatives believe that the bad per-
formance of minorities is due to the negative feedback mechanism, and not 
some sort of exogenous difference, such as cultural differences (Loury, 2006). 
In this case government decision-makers do not accept differences in labour 
market activity and wages as unavoidable, and deem their elimination a wor-
thy task. If, however, the decision-makers themselves believe that the minor-
ity group is less productive on average than the majority, they do not feel that 
it is necessary to interfere, since the fact that minorities earn less on average 
fits into their worldview.16 Thus the government has a great responsibility in 
eliminating discrimination. The most important thing, however, is to change 
the situation of the minorities, so that there really will not be any basis for the 
prejudice against them. Here we are mainly thinking of segregation prior to 
their entrance in the labour market, for example in schools, and in the envi-
ronment where they are raised. For example, Heckman (1998) believes that 
this is a much more important task than the anti-discriminatory measures.
Segregation
Occupational segregation means that workers from minority groups are con-
centrated into certain occupations. This may be due to several different factors 
15 Under government coordina-
tion, statistical discrimination 
can be broken even in the case 
of a large number of decision-
makers, for example, this is the 
purpose of anti-discrimination 
legislature.
16 It is possible that the position 
of women in the labour market 
has changed relative to that of 
the blacks in the United States 
and the Roma in Central-East-
ern Europe due to the difference 
in the prejudice against them. 
While the situation of women 
has improved markedly in the 
last few decades, that of the eth-
nic minorities has not, and it is 
possible that this is due to the 
fact that the government and 
people do not believe that there 
are serious cultural differences 
between the genders, while there 
are between the ethnic groups.
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(Altonji–Blank, 1999): It’s possible that employer discrimination is stronger 
in certain occupations than others, so minority workers group into positions 
that are less discriminated against. It is also possible that there are differences 
between demographic groups in terms of which professions are more accepted 
socially, or members of a group may have a preference for certain occupations. 
The legal and institutional framework may in some cases also hinder the op-
portunities of certain groups in gaining access to certain positions. Finally, 
the differences between groups in terms of pre-labour market characteristics, 
which we have discussed, may give rise to different comparative advantages in 
the fulfilment of certain jobs. We emphasize that these differences in prefer-
ences and endowments prior to labour market entry may also be endogenous, 
and are not necessarily independent of labour market discrimination.
Empirical measurement of labour market discrimination
As we have shown, the existence of labour market differences in itself does not 
necessarily indicate that there is discrimination against minority groups, even 
if we take into account the effect of differences in the most important observ-
able characteristics between the groups. In this section we will introduce the 
methods used to measure discrimination, as well as their critique.
Traditional wage equation method, measurement of individual 
productivity
The most commonly used method for measuring discrimination in the labour 
market is the traditional wage equation approach. In this estimation, the vari-
ables used to explain variation in wages are the observable characteristics that 
determine workers’ productivity, such as level of education and labour mar-
ket experience. The wage equation specification also includes dummy vari-
ables indicating whether each worker belongs in a minority group. If we as-
sume that the observed worker characteristics measure productivity well, and 
that there are no systematic differences in productivity between the groups 
in addition to what is measured by these variables, the estimated coefficient 
of the minority group variables indicate the level of discrimination against 
those groups. However, this assumption – due to several reasons already men-
tioned in the section dealing with other causes of labour market differences 
– is too strong: it is very likely that there are unobserved differences between 
the groups that influence their productivity. In this case, workers that have 
the same observable characteristics are not really equally productive, and the 
lower wages of the less productive groups are also reflecting this difference, 
rather than discrimination against them.
Jarrell–Stanley (2004), Weichselbaumer–Winter-Ebmer (2005) and 
Kunze (2008) summarize studies that use the wage equation methodology 
to measure discrimination. These studies analyze the differences in the esti-
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mated level of discrimination due to the quality of data and the methodolo-
gy used based on a comparison of the results of international research on the 
topic. During the so-called meta-analysis the authors collect the estimated 
value of discrimination (or, to be exact, unexplained wage differentials) from 
the different studies, and they estimate how the choice of explanatory vari-
ables, data quality, estimation method used, and choice of samples affect the 
results, and what type of error they may lead to. The results of their analysis 
show the main pitfalls of estimating discrimination using the wage equation 
methodology.
The most important of these is the type of wage measure used: if the month-
ly wage is used instead of the hourly wage, we may overestimate the extent of 
discrimination, since women usually work fewer hours than men, and their 
monthly wage is thus lower. The lack of data on actual labour market experi-
ence may also lead to an overestimation of discrimination, since the level of 
experience of women is usually lower for a given age group than men’s.
The estimated measure of discrimination may also differ if the estimation 
is carried out on a subsample for some reason: several studies analyze the dif-
ferences between groups on a subsample of certain occupations, or only for 
nonmarried workers, or new entrants to the labour market. The effect of se-
lection into the labour market must also be considered, although Jarrell–
Stanley (2004) emphasizes that the error due to this selection has decreased 
over time. It is interesting that these studies find that the econometric method 
used to estimate the wage equation does not significantly influence the result; 
differences in the data have a much greater impact.
Finally, it is very interesting that the gender of the researchers carrying out 
the estimation also influences the results: studies written by only male re-
searchers tend to find a higher level of discrimination than those written by 
women only or by mixed gender groups. Jarrell–Stanley (2004) believe that 
this may be due to the fact that male researchers are so afraid of being preju-
diced, that they unknowingly try to find some evidence supporting the exist-
ence of discrimination against women.
Another great drawback of the wage equation methodology is that the esti-
mates may be biased due to the unobserved differences in productivity. Since 
this is one of the greatest problems, some studies seek to make use of certain 
situations in which there is data available on the individual productivity of 
workers. These studies are usually limited to a single firm or industry, so they 
cannot be directly interpreted as applying to the entire labour market. One 
such area studied analyzes the extent of discrimination in professional sports, 
since the success (productivity) of athletes can be measured quite easily. Kahn 
(1991) summarizes this field, and states that they generally find evidence sup-
porting the existence of discrimination: for example, the prizes of women’s 
tennis tournaments are lower than men’s, even though the statistics show 
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that women’s tennis attracts at least as many spectators and revenue, as men’s. 
Another set of studies examines the extent of discrimination in occupations 
where the productivity of workers can be directly measured by the number 
of pieces of a product they produce. Their results also support discrimination 
against women and groups with a lower social status.
Wolfers (2006) uses the expected value of firms’ stocks to examine discrim-
ination based on the gender of the CEO. If the market systematically un-
dervalues the abilities of female CEOs, the companies led by women should 
outperform expectations, however, the results of the study does not find any 
evidence of this occurring.
Donald–Hamermesh (2004) illustrate the problems of empirical measure-
ment of discrimination using data on the election results of the American Eco-
nomic Association and the nominees’ productivity, measured by their cita-
tion index. Based on the data, women have a greater chance of winning than 
men with similar citation indexes. Although this may at first glance seem to 
indicate that women are enjoying positive discrimination, the authors point 
out that there could be other reasons behind the result: the lack of data on 
other variables that may influence productivity (for example, women’s better 
communication or organizational skills, etc.) The set of factors that influence 
productivity are not obvious, and without their precise definition, it is impos-
sible to tell what part of the differences observed in a given situation are due 
to discrimination, and what part is due to missing information – even when 
productivity is relatively well-measured.
Biddle–Hamermesh (1994) solve the problem of measuring productiv-
ity by examining discrimination in a situation where it is only partially cor-
related with productivity. The study analyzes what effect human beauty has 
on wages. The benefit of the approach using this characteristic is that beau-
ty only has an effect on productivity in occupations where the worker is in 
contact with people (for example, if the worker sells something). Since this 
is relatively easily determined, the extent of discrimination can be measured 
relatively precisely. The authors find that there is a significant wage gap be-
tween people who are less attractive than the average, and those who are more 
attractive, around 12 percentage points. The estimated “beauty premium” 
does not depend on the gender of the worker. The study does not answer the 
question of what type of discrimination this is due to, taste-based or statis-
tical discrimination, although both are possible. People generally prefer to 
work together with attractive men and women, and it has also been shown 
that our brain often links good characteristics to each other for no rational 
reason: we instinctively believe that those who are beautiful are also produc-
tive. This false belief, and the positive treatment that goes along with it affects 
the people who are more attractive than the average, they have been shown 
to have more self-confidence than other people, which often translates into a 
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benefit in the labour market (this phenomena is similar to that discussed in 
the previous section, where the positive or negative prejudice influences the 
behaviour of the minority).17
The relationship between wages and the employer’s information set
As we have discussed in the theoretical introduction of statistical discrimi-
nation, this type of discrimination is dependent on the employer’s informa-
tion set. If the employer were perfectly informed regarding the productivity 
of workers, he would not use the signal of membership in a minority group 
(and consequently the group’s average productivity) to select workers. The 
analysis of Holzer et al (2006) is one of the first attempts at separating sta-
tistical discrimination from other effects that may also lead to wage differen-
tials between the minority and majority groups. Their idea was the following: 
if employers determine the wages of workers based on an easily observable 
characteristic that is not perfectly correlated with productivity when they are 
hired, then over time the effect of that characteristic should decrease as the 
employer becomes more familiar with the worker’s true productivity. Trans-
lating this to the language of regressions, this means that in the wage equation 
the effect of race should decrease over time if we also control for a variable 
that approximates productivity, but is not observable to the employer at the 
time of hiring, only over time. This method can resolve the basic empirical 
dilemma of discrimination: whether we find a correlation between minority 
status and wages because employers are discriminating, or because minor-
ity status is correlated with some characteristic that describes productivity, 
which the employers observe, but is unknown to the researcher. The authors 
analyze statistical discrimination in the case of black workers in the United 
States, and do not find evidence that employers are statistically discriminat-
ing against them.
Holzer et al (2006) also study the effect of additional information, but 
not on wages, but on the hiring strategies of firms. The authors examine how 
much it affects the employment of black workers if the employer has access to 
information regarding the criminal background of workers. Theoretically the 
question cannot be answered, since – as is the case so often in economic prob-
lems – two opposite effects are present simultaneously. Since black workers 
are relatively more likely to have been to jail, than white workers, information 
about their priors has a bigger effect on their employment than it does in the 
case of white workers. If, however, employers are selecting workers based on 
their skin colour – since this gives them some information about the proba-
bility that they have been to jail – then black workers who have never been in 
jail are also affected by the lack of information on applicants’ criminal back-
grounds. The results of the study show that in the case where the employer 
receives information about the worker’s background it is much more likely 
17 Mobius–Rosenblat (2006) 
separates these effects in an ex-
periment that is also studying 
the effect of beauty on wages. 
The author’s results indicate that 
beauty does not affect productiv-
ity, but it does positively affect 
wages, and the self-confidence of 
workers also has a positive effect 
on wages. So beautiful people are 
not only treated better, than the 
less beautiful ones, but beauty 
influences their behaviour in a 
way that further deepens the 
gap between beautiful and ugly 
people.
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that he will hire black workers. On the one hand, this means that employers 
do make use of skin colour to estimate workers’ productivities when there is 
no information available on their background (for example, how aggressive 
they may be, or how likely they may be to steal). But it also means that they 
are not using taste-based discrimination, because once they have informa-
tion on the worker’s true productivity, the employment probabilities of black 
workers increase.18
Decomposition of the wage gap
The estimation of wage equations is closely tied to Oaxaca’s (1973) method 
of decomposition, in which the overall wage gap between minority and ma-
jority workers can be broken into two parts: the part that can be explained by 
differences in the characteristics of workers, and the part that remains unex-
plained. A part of the overall wage gap is due to the fact that the two groups 
differ from each other in their endowment of observable characteristics. The 
part of the wage gap that is due to these differences is not due to discrimina-
tion. Based on the average difference in observed human capital variables be-
tween the two groups we can calculate what part of the overall gap is explained. 
For this, the prices (coefficients) of the characteristics need to be estimated. 
These estimates are usually derived from the estimated wage equation coef-
ficients from a regression run on the sample of majority workers: this means 
we assume that in the absence of discrimination, all workers would receive the 
prices that the majority workers receive for their skills.19 The product of the 
average difference in skills between the groups and the non-discriminatory 
prices gives the part of the overall wage gap that is not due to discrimination, 
but rather the existing differences in the skills of the two groups. If we sub-
tract this from the overall wage gap, we get the part that is not explained by 
the differences in the worker’s human capital endowment.20
This remaining part is often interpreted as the discrimination component. 
This, however, can be very misleading, since it actually contains other things 
as well. If the explanatory variables included in the wage equation do not 
measure the workers’ productivities accurately (as is usually the case), the 
unexplained part of the wage gap will also contain all the effects that influ-
ence the workers’ wages, but are not known to the researcher. For example, 
as in the previously outlined case when women with equivalent observable 
characteristics (education level, experience, etc.) are less productive than men 
because they put less effort into their work for various reasons (other obliga-
tions, lower confidence, etc.), then the unexplained portion of the wage gap 
will also contain this difference, and it is greater than the true value of dis-
crimination. The unexplained component contains unobserved differences 
in productivity, as well as unobserved differences in preferences. This method 
also does not take into consideration the possibility that the perceptions of 
18 Autor–Scarborough (2008) 
analyze the effect of precise es-
timation of individual produc-
tivity on the probability of em-
ployment, and find that it does 
not affect the chances of black 
workers in gaining employment, 
but it does positively influence 
firm level productivity.
19 The choice of non-discrimi-
natory prices is not obvious since 
it is possible that the majority 
group receives higher wages than 
if there was no discrimination 
present, so their prices may also 
not be the best suited for this 
purpose. The results of the de-
composition depend on which 
prices we use as a reference.
20 Grimshaw–Rubery (2002) 
summarize the various meth-
ods of decomposition and their 
problems.
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workers regarding the existence of discrimination affect their decisions about 
investment in training, and thus their observed characteristics. If a member 
of the minority group believes that the return to acquiring new skills is lower 
for him than it is for a majority group worker, it is possible that he chooses 
not to invest in acquiring those skills. From the point of view of wage equa-
tion estimation, this means that education level is an endogenous variable, 
and this may also bias the estimated level of discrimination.
Another serious problem of the wage equation and decomposition meth-
odology is the estimation bias due to selection into the labour market. Dif-
ferent groups are not equally likely to choose entry into the labour market, 
so the sample of employees used in estimating wage equations is not repre-
sentative of the entire population. In most countries, low-skilled women are 
more likely to leave the labour market than members of other groups. Since 
during the analysis of wage gaps we are interested in the wages that the entire 
population of men and women receive in the market, the estimation carried 
out on the sample of workers may be misleading.21
The decomposition technique introduced by Juhn–Murphy–Pierce (1991) 
is the most often used alternative of the Oaxaca method, which is also a use-
ful tool for the international comparisons of wage gaps and for studying their 
trends over time. The Oaxaca decomposition method does not take into con-
sideration the effect of the changes in wage distributions over time on wage 
differentials in the case when the return to some characteristic changes. For 
example, women usually have less work experience, and they tend to work in 
certain industries. If the market return to experience increases, or the between-
industry wage differential increases, this can lead to an increase in the gen-
der wage gap. Juhn et al separate this effect out as well, and divide the overall 
wage gap into four components. The first part measures the effect of changes 
in the observable characteristics of workers. The second measures the effect 
of changes in the prices of observable characteristics. The third accounts for 
changes in unobservable characteristics, and finally, the fourth part is the 
unobserved price effect. Compared to previous methods the new element is 
the division into the final two parts, in which we can measure the effect of 
changes in the unobserved characteristics. Unfortunately this method is also 
subject to the general problems of decomposition methodologies.
Measurement of labour market segregation
The measurement of labour market segregation is usually done at the industry, 
firm, or occupation level. During the estimation of wage equations, there are 
usually two methods used to account for segregation. The first is to estimate 
within industry, firm, or occupational effects instead of between effects. For 
example, when a wage equation includes industry fixed effects, then the coef-
ficient of the female dummy variable measures the gender gap within indus-
21 Hunt (2002) illustrates the 
importance of accounting for 
labour market selection: the 
ten percentage point fall in the 
gender wage gap may sound like 
a positive development, but it is 
actually largely due to the fact 
that low-skilled women exited 
the labour market in a higher 
proportion than other groups.
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tries. If women tend to work in industries with lower wages, and this is why 
their average wage is lower than men’s, this method can be used to account 
for the industry level compositional effect. The estimated female coefficient 
then reflects how much women’s wages differ within a given industry. An im-
portant question in this case is whether we really want to take out the effect 
of selection if we are interested in measuring discrimination. If women are 
selecting into the lower-wage industries by choice (for example, because these 
jobs offer more flexibility), then we should take the part of the wage gap due 
to this selection out of our discrimination estimate. But if the employers are 
the ones who refuse to hire women in the better-paying industries, and that’s 
why women receive lower wages, then this is due to discrimination (in hir-
ing), and we may not want to filter out this effect.
The second method for measuring segregation is to include the ratio of 
women working in the given industry, firm, or occupation in the wage equa-
tion. This method can be used to check how it affects the wage gap if a cer-
tain occupation becomes female dominated. For example, Groshen (1991) 
uses this method on data from the United States, and finds that the fact that 
certain occupations are “female occupations” explains the majority of the 
gender wage gap. Gupta–Rothstein (2001) analyze the effect of segregation 
at the industry, firm, and occupation levels on wage gaps in Denmark using 
a linked employer-employee dataset. The study finds that occupational segre-
gation has the greatest effect on gender wage differentials, while industry and 
firm level segregation have only a slight effect. They find that there remains 
a significant wage gap between men and women even after taking segrega-
tion at these three levels into account, which is in line with the existence of 
wage discrimination.
In analyzing occupational segregation, it is important to separate the ef-
fects of employer discrimination, preferences, education, and social pressures 
(Johnson–Stafford, 1998). When estimating the relationship between wages 
and specific occupations, this means that besides the worker characteristics, 
the explanatory variables should also include the characteristics of the oc-
cupations, as well as variables describing the preferences of workers. Taking 
these variables into account significantly decreases the measured differenc-
es between female and male jobs in the United States and Canada (Baker–
Fortin, 2001).
Segregation following the Hungarian transition was studied by Csillag 
(2006). His results indicate that while during late socialism the composition 
of occupations by gender explained a significant portion of the wage gap, fol-
lowing the transition occupational segregation decreased significantly, and the 
wage gap seen today is no longer explained by it. Jurajda–Harmgart (2004) 
compare the effect of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap in East-
ern and Western Germany, and they find that while the wages of both men 
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and women were higher in female occupations in Eastern Germany, in West-
ern Germany there was no observable difference between occupations.22
Analysis of tests
The other main approach for measuring discrimination is the testing of job 
applications. Applicants who are carefully chosen from the minority and ma-
jority groups to be similar in every other respect apply to advertised job open-
ings, and researchers determine whether discriminative practices exist based 
on the level of asymmetry in the distribution of successful applications. The 
method has many variations: researchers may send trained actors to the firms 
with job openings, which allows them to observe every stage of the applica-
tion process. Another method is the monitoring of phone interviews, or the 
analysis of the number of responses to written applications. A benefit of the 
testing method is that researchers can change the observable characteristics 
as necessary during the experiment, so they can observe their effect.
Literature on the topic has emphasized several drawbacks of the method. 
The main problem may be that applicants may actually differ in more ways 
than their group status, since in the real world it is difficult to ensure that all 
other characteristics are the same that affect the workers’ productivities, and 
the employer’s opinion. For example, workers may differ in the level of social 
capital or communication abilities they signal to employers during the inter-
view. In order to avoid this problem, some studies make all other character-
istics invisible. For example, Goldin–Rouse (2000) measure discrimination 
against women applying for positions in orchestras by comparing the number 
of call-backs following interviews where the employers can see the applicants 
(and so are aware of their gender), and in the case when applicants play their 
instruments sitting behind a screen, so they can only be heard, not seen. Their 
results show that the use of screens during the interviews increased the chances 
of women being accepted into the orchestras, and increased the ratio of women 
in orchestras by decreasing prejudicial behaviour towards them.
Studies using testing methods usually show higher levels of discrimination 
than research that uses other methods. Heckman (1998) argues the validity 
and relevance of discrimination testing. He points out that although it is pos-
sible to find several firms that discriminate using this method this is however 
not the same as observing discrimination in the entire labour market. The 
level of discrimination in the labour market is not determined by the firms 
with the most discriminatory tastes, but rather by firms that actually employ 
the minority workers. So it is possible that there are discriminating firms in 
the market yet we can still not speak of labour market discrimination, be-
cause minorities do not work at them, so there is no effect on their wages. 
Test analysis cannot be used to determine whether we are only witnessing 
special cases, which may explain the discrepancy between the results of this 
22 Regarding racial segregation 
see Hirsch–Macpherson (2004), 
Bertrand–Hallock (2001) and 
Bettio (2002).
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type of research and those that are examining the entire labour market. Ap-
plicants in tests are theoretically similar other than their group membership, 
but Heckman emphasizes that they still may differ in terms of their unob-
servable characteristics, which may influence their productivity and thus the 
level of discrimination estimated based on this method.
Another problem may be that the applicants are aware of the purpose of 
the research, and knowingly or unknowingly may influence the behaviour 
of employers (Blank, 1991). Finally, many question the representativeness of 
such studies in terms of the economy as a whole. Since carrying them out is 
very costly, they are usually limited to narrow occupations, regions, or just a 
few firms, and often to workers with a specific education level.
Research based on written applications can successfully avoid some of these 
problems. In these, researchers can truly control the experiment so that based 
on their curriculum vitae, applicants really only differ from each other in the 
demographic characteristic studied. Usually they use names to signal the gen-
der or ethnicity of the applicant to prospective employers, or, in the case of 
immigrants, they use the place of birth. Since sending out curriculum vitae 
has a much lower cost than training actors, written tests can be carried out on 
much larger samples. In this case, the level of discrimination is not measured 
based on the number of job offers, but rather based on the number of call-
backs and invitations to interviews, which may give a different result if these 
differ at the group level. Of these studies, the one by Bertrand–Mullainathan 
(2004) has become widely known, in which they examine the success rates of 
applicants with typically white names (Emily and Greg), and those with typi-
cally black names (Laquisha and Jamal). The results suggest that there is still 
significant discrimination against blacks in the labour market in the United 
States, those with typical white names were called back one and a half times 
as often as those with black names.23
Using the economic and corporate environment to analyze 
discrimination
Due to the lack of availability of individual level productivity data some stud-
ies seek to measure group level differences in productivities, and compare these 
with group level wage differentials (Hellerstein–Neumark, 1999). The meth-
od is closely related to the fact that linked employer-employee datasets have 
become more prevalent, since the firm level estimation used in this method 
requires not only firm variables, but also the demographic composition of 
workers at the firm level. The group level relative productivities are estimat-
ed from firm level production functions, where the workforce is divided into 
worker groups that may differ in terms of their productivity. This method al-
lows us to estimate a firm level relative productivity measure for each worker 
group (compared to a reference group).
23 Carlsson–Rooth (2006), 
Arai–Thoursie (2009), Moreno 
et al (2004), Bravo–Sanhueza–
Urzua (2008) also carried out 
similar studies.
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If there is perfect competition in a market and employers are maximizing 
profits, the relative wage of each worker group would be equal to their rela-
tive productivity. Hellerstein and Neumark estimate the relative wages at the 
firm level as well (alternatively, it can be estimated from individual level wage 
equations), so they can directly test the equality of relative wages and produc-
tivities. This method usually gives a lower estimate of discrimination than the 
traditional wage equation method, which suggests that there are unobserved 
differences in the groups’ productivities, which can be accounted for using 
this methodology. Results for numerous countries also support this: for ex-
ample, Dostie (2006) for France, Van Biesebroeck (2007) for four African 
countries, and Kawaguchi (2007) for Japan also use this method, and they 
find a much lower level of discrimination, or no significant difference between 
relative wages and productivities.
The method of estimating group level relative productivities poses several 
problems. All the problems outlined in the literature on estimating produc-
tion functions apply here as well, and these can greatly influence the relative 
productivity estimates. The proper specification of the equation is very im-
portant, as well as the measurement of the inputs and the handling of bias 
due to unobserved shocks in demand. If the shocks are correlated with un-
observed inputs, this will lead to a bias in the production function estima-
tion.24 Another possible econometric issue may arise because we don’t know 
anything about why firms choose different proportions of worker groups, and 
this may be correlated with production technology. Despite these problems, 
the method of comparing the estimated relative productivities and wages of 
worker groups remains an important future area of research, because it allows 
us to measure the unobserved differences between groups, and their analysis 
can be carried out at the level of the entire labour market.
Finally, numerous studies attempt to test for the existence of discrimina-
tion in the labour market indirectly. In this case, they estimate the effect of 
an exogenous change, which theoretically should only be correlated with 
discrimination, thus influencing the labour market. Of these, the most fre-
quently analyzed relationship is that between the level of competition in the 
product market and employer taste discrimination, as we mentioned in the 
section describing the Becker model.25 The assumption is that if the wage and 
employment differentials between worker groups decrease due to an increase 
in competition, this is indirect proof of the existence of discrimination in the 
labour market. This relationship has been tested using various methodologies. 
Starting in the seventies numerous studies tested the relationship between 
market concentration and wage differentials (for example, see Ashenfelter–
Hannan, 1986). One of the shortcomings of these studies is that the use of 
concentration as a measure of competition has become highly debated. These 
studies mostly tested the relationship using a single year of cross-section data, 
24 To alleviate this problem, 
researchers may include firm 
fixed effects, or use econometric 
methods such as the one de-
veloped by Levinsohn–Petrin, 
(2003).
25 See Frijters et al (2003) on the 
measurement of discrimination 
due to employee tastes.
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so a further problem was the possibility of unobserved differences between 
the industries. If these are somehow correlated with the level of competition 
in the product market, their effect may mistakenly be attributed to compe-
tition.26
We are able to measure the effect more precisely if there is some exogenous 
change in the level of competition. This may be due to various events. Some 
studies measure the effect of competition that increased due to the deregula-
tion of certain sectors. For example, Black–Strahan (2001) use the liberali-
zation of the financial sector in the United States by comparing states where 
it happened to states where the rules did not change. Their results show that 
the increase in competition decreased the wage gaps in the states that were 
liberalized. Others study the effect of increased trade due to globalization. 
For example, Black–Brainerd (2004) demonstrates the effect of increased 
imports on wage differentials. In Hungary, Campos–Jolliffe (2005) analyses 
show that the residual gender wage gap – referred to as a measure of discrim-
ination – decreased following the transition. Although they take selection 
effects into consideration, they do not directly test the relationship between 
wage differentials and product market competition.
Several studies examine the effect of competition on wage gaps using inter-
national comparisons, making use of differences in the legal and economic 
environments. For example, Weichselbaumer–Winter-Ebmer (2007) study 
the residual gender wage gap (that is left after controlling for observed differ-
ences in worker characteristics) for numerous countries as a function of the 
countries’ market structure and their anti-discrimination laws. They find that 
both an increase in the level of competition, and the acceptance of interna-
tional guidelines for ensuring equal opportunities decrease the wage gap. The 
authors also emphasize that wage gaps should be interpreted as a measure of 
discrimination with caution: for example, the fact that in OECD countries 
competition seems to have a smaller effect on wage gaps is due to the fact that 
in these countries, the differentials most likely reflect differences in prefer-
ences and productivity, and not labour market discrimination.
Closing thoughts
Discrimination against minorities is the topic of numerous scientific studies, 
but it is also a popular topic in political and social discussions. In this chapter, 
we defined how discrimination is interpreted in economic literature, and then 
introduced its types and the methods used for its measurement. Our most 
important conclusion is that it is very difficult (if not impossible) to prove the 
existence of discrimination in the labour market, since the productivity of 
workers is not known, and the variables available in databases do not describe 
it fully. But, in our opinion, important social phenomena need to be studied 
even if we can only do so imperfectly. In the other seven studies of the In Fo-
26 One example of this may be 
if higher market competition is 
correlated with a more stressful 
work environment, and low-
skilled women tend to avoid 
such jobs, while more productive 
women stay in them, because 
they do not mind stress as much 
(they are more dedicated to their 
career). In this case, an increase 
in competition may decrease the 
gender wage gap, since less pro-
ductive women will leave their 
jobs, which leads to an increase 
in their average wage. However, 
this fall in the wage gap is not 
due to a fall in discrimination 
due to competitive pressures.
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cus section the authors attempt to measure discrimination and segregation 
to the best of their knowledge with respect to the situation of women and 
Roma in Hungary. Although the topic does not give us much to be cheerful 
about, we hope you will find them an interesting read.
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2. LegaL instruments guaranteeing equaL treatment in the 
Wake of accession to the euroPean union
Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky
Introduction
The current system of legal norms on equal treatment is originating basically 
from two sources: the post-transition Hungarian law and the European legal 
system guaranteeing equality that began to dynamically develop from the be-
ginning of this century. However, duality can be clearly detected in the pre-
accession situation.
The system of norms is based primarily and evidently on the constitutional 
grounds that were laid down following the political and economic transition. 
Secondly, the circumspect observation of formal equality and the uneasiness 
about taking into consideration economic-social inequality indicates that 
there is an underlying repercussion-effect from the pre-transition period that 
was characterized by open discrimination on grounds of political beliefs, ideo-
logical views and family origin in the name of alleged ‘social equality’. It also 
reflects the impact of the value-crisis immediately following the changes that 
had only one safe orientation: to reject the past and look for its opposite.1
The paper first introduces the construction of European equality law, fol-
lowed by an introduction to the constitutional grounds of current Hungar-
ian law. Subsequent to this introduction, the terms and concepts of the law 
in force will be presented together with their interpretation. Following the 
overview of the legal framework some details will be presented through the 
case law, with occasional critical remarks.
European and Hungarian foundations
Equal treatment in the European Union
The European Economic Community was established as a supranational or-
ganization principally with economic goals. Thus, there was no role in the 
founding documents either for the human rights’ principle of prohibition of 
discrimination originating from the spirit of protecting human rights, or for 
social provisions. Nevertheless, the obligation of equal treatment was already 
present in the 1957 Rome Treaty in two provisions. The first one is the pro-
hibition of differential treatment on the ground of nationality between citi-
zens of Member States (obviously covering economic organizations as well)2 
– a principle belonging to the very substance of the Community. The second 
1 The period right after the po-
litical shift was characterized by 
this “repercussion syndrome” in 
almost all areas of life: the sharp 
rejection of learning Russian, 
approaching Otto Habsburg 
to undertake candidacy for the 
position of the President of the 
country, looking on victims of 
communist tyranny automati-
cally as national heroes, even 
if they were eventually seen as 
criminals. A more humorous ele-
ment is the court case initiated 
for the removal of the red-star 
from the label of Heineken beer.) 
The world of labour was particu-
larly affected by this syndrome. 
(Lehoczkyné Kollonay, 2007).
2 This issue will not be dis-
cussed here; it is dealt with in a 
detailed and thorough way by 
Király (1998).
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provision was Article 119 of the Treaty, obliging Member States to change 
their law and to lay down an obligation to pay equal pay for equal work.3 The 
inclusion of this norm – in spite of the considerable debates – was motivated 
by purely economic (market) goals, and not by justice and human rights: it was 
aimed at eliminating the competitive disadvantage of countries which already 
had at that time a domestic law prohibiting gender based wage differentials.
The equal pay requirement is illusory without the opportunity of equal 
access to occupation, employment, and promotion as well as to equality of 
working conditions. Thus, the implementation of the equal pay provision was 
soon leading to the overall prohibition of sex-based discrimination in the area 
of occupational training employment, working conditions and promotion by 
Council Directive 76/207/EEC. This directive of historic importance was 
followed by numerous others that, together with the case law of the Europe-
an Court of Justice, growing large and sophisticated over the course of time, 
succeeded in expanding the coverage of equal treatment and to develop and 
modernize the very concept of equal treatment. Thus, from a formal, narrow-
ly worded provision with a view to equal competition the principle of equal 
treatment has became an effective, overall principle guaranteeing equality of 
opportunities and belonging to the foundations of the European Union.4
The next step, extending the concept of equal treatment beyond gender and 
beyond employment was made by Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty. This 
provision authorized the legislative powers of the European Community to 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or eth-
nic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. This provi-
sion opened the way for obliging Member States to adopt anti-discrimination 
norms. In line with expectations, the process accelerated and, on the grounds 
of Article 13, the equality directives of the EU have been adopted.
Equality in the Constitution of Hungary
Section 70/A of the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic declares, that 
“[the] Republic of Hungary guarantees for all persons in its territory human 
and civil rights without any discrimination, namely without any difference 
with regard to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” This constitutional 
provision is based on the classic, formal concept of equal treatment, requir-
ing the equal application of laws to everyone. The interpretation developed by 
the Constitutional Court also gives precedence to such a formal meaning, in 
spite of broadening the material and personal scope of the equality provision. 
Firstly, it declared that Section 70/A is applicable not only to fundamental 
human and citizens’ rights, instead, it is an overall principle of the whole le-
gal system, to apply in respect of any right.5 Secondly, it used the “open end-
ed list” of prohibited grounds of Section 70/A (ending with “other status”) 
3 This provision, with a renewed 
text, is Article 141 in the consid-
erably amended and re-num-
bered Amsterdam Treaty.
4 The development of the con-
cept of equal treatment is prima-
rily a result of a series of nota-
ble, progressive decisions of the 
European Court of Justice that 
declared, among others, that dis-
crimination on the grounds of 
pregnancy is sex discrimination, 
independently from the compa-
rator similarly to discrimination 
on the grounds of changing the 
sex by way of surgery. Further-
more, the decisions of the Court 
have clarified the concept of in-
direct discrimination, made ef-
forts to reduce the disadvantages 
deriving from traditional gender 
roles, and elaborated a model of 
positive action compatible with 
the principle of equal treatment. 
From among the relevant direc-
tives Directive 97/80/EC on the 
reversal of the burden of proof, 
Directive 96/34/EC on parental 
leave and Directive 92/85/EEC 
on protection during pregnancy 
and after childbirth can be men-
tioned as contributions to the 
conceptual development.
5 Resolution 61/1992 (XI. 20.) 
AB.
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to broaden the protected persons and attributes to a practically infinite level, 
not distinguishing between real, long term social disadvantage and the tem-
porary disadvantage in an actual legal situation.
At the same time, and exactly for the same reason, the interpretation given by 
the Constitutional Court remained relatively narrow and formal. It qualifies 
any departure from the formally equal application of the norm as discrimina-
tion that might be maintained as constitutional only in the case of meeting 
the fairly vague prerequisites laid down by the Constitutional Court and to 
date not clarified.6 By constituting and using the tautological phrase of “posi-
tive discrimination”, it declares all differences unconstitutional – including 
the differentiation paying attention to social inequalities. The acceptance as 
constitutional of such a ‘positive discrimination’ depends on the unclear ‘con-
stitutionality test’. Albeit the differentiation qualifies as discrimination only 
in the case of persons belonging to a “homogenous group”, heterogeneous 
groups are created by the legal construct and not by the social situation.7 The 
text of the decisions that define the conceptual framework of equal treatment 
reflects the ambivalence towards the acknowledgement of social inequalities 
and social disadvantages as grounds for differential (preferential) treatment, 
sometimes coupled with perceivable reference to the past, and not always con-
stitutionally correct, treatment of such social differences.8
The further two paragraphs of Article 70/A foresees “strict punishment” 
for those violating the prohibition of discrimination as well as “adoption of 
measures decreasing inequality of opportunities”. The punishment of those 
violating equal treatment is illusory and regarding the provision foreseeing 
measures decreasing inequality, the Constitutional Court declared that it 
“does not establish any concrete obligation”.9
The requirements of equal treatment on the grounds of 
European law
The concept of equality of the European Union is characterized by the endeav-
our to exceed the formalist-minimalist approach of equal treatment. The ac-
quis communautaire resulting from a development of more than thirty years 
requires, both in its spirit and words, the guarantee of equality. It creates a 
legal framework that aims for the promotion of substantive equality and, in 
order to achieve this, requires positive steps, not only as an “exception”. This 
was the legal framework which the accession countries, including Hungary, 
needed to transpose and adopt. Hungarian legislation has accomplished this 
duty by Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of equal 
opportunities (Equality Act) that entered into force in January 2004, exactly 
on the threshold of the May 1 accession.
The Act, was prepared somewhat in a hurry, and, due to a lack of time and 
adequate background knowledge, the drafters relied mainly on the texts of 
6 In the case of “fundamental 
rights”, it phrased the “neces-
sity and proportionality” re-
quirement as a precondition of 
constitutionality. In the case of 
other (not fundamental) rights, 
according to the Constitutional 
Court the differentiation is non-
constitutional if it is “arbitrary” 
and violates human dignity. The 
provision is “arbitrary” if it has 
no “reasonable”, “constitutional” 
justification. The somewhat cir-
cling explanation does not help 
much in clarifying the concepts 
and terminology.
7 Two illustrative examples: the 
court considers pregnant women 
and women in the post-natal 
period and absent workers on 
other grounds (except sickness) a 
homogenous group and consid-
ers payment during maternity 
leave as positive discrimination. 
Second, considering employers 
and employees a homogenous 
group, it held the employers’ 
obligation to give justification 
of a notice as positive discrimi-
nation of the employees against 
employers. In an up-to-date, 
European approach to equality, 
both situations are considered 
rather as the realization and 
effectuation of equal treatment 
and not a departure from it.
8 The closing sentence of deci-
sion no. 9/1990 (IV. 25) AB first 
defining the concept of “posi-
tive discrimination” signals, 
even if in the nebulous way of 
the whole passage, the conflict 
that is decisive for equality law 
in Hungary: “Although social 
equality as a goal, as social in-
terest, may precede individual 
interests, it cannot precede the 
constitutional rights of the in-
dividual”.
9 Recently: decision 624/B/2000 
AB adopted in February 2009, 
that referred to the confirmation 
of this earlier statement in deci-
sion 13/2008 (II. 21) AB.
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the Constitutional Court decisions, giving to them priority even over the EC 
Directives (the text of the Act is a recital of the decisions). Thus, even after 
several adjustments10 of the text there has remained a slight tension, a gentle 
mismatch between the European requirements of equality and the require-
ments of equal treatment in Hungary. In spite of these deficiencies the Equal-
ity Act and the progress in the wake of its adoption has evidently made the 
first steps in building up the legal instruments guaranteeing equal treatment. 
The strong prejudice permeating the social mind in Hungary, the eroded trust 
in the constitutional guarantees of the protection of rights puts a limitation 
on the use of such legal instruments.
The violation of equal treatment – direct discrimination
Section 1 of the Equality Act – attempting to adjust itself to the European 
spirit and the phrasing of the Constitutional court – uses a broad wording: 
“all private individuals, their groups as well as legal entities and organizations 
without legal entity shall be treated with equal respect and deliberation, with 
equal consideration given to individual aspects.”
The central concept of the Act is the violation of equal treatment, that is 
defined as upper category in Section 7, consisted of sub-categories such as di-
rect and indirect disparate treatment, harassment, unlawful segregation, re-
taliation, and instruction to all of these. (Although the latter four kinds of 
conduct are also forms of disparate treatment, too, they are distinct forms of 
it and for a long while they were considered improper, but not discrimina-
tory conduct.)
Chapter III of the Act gives a detailed regulation on the subject areas where 
discrimination is prohibited in areas that are considered important, such as 
employment, social security, health care, housing, education, services, and the 
trading of goods. The (sometimes long) lists of subject matters11 would follow 
anyway from the Act without such listing. The word ‘particularly’ starting 
each list indicates the exemplifying character of them.
Direct discrimination is committed when a person or a group “is treated 
less favourably than another person or group is, was, or would be treated in a 
comparable situation” on the grounds of a so-called protected attribute listed 
in the act (sex, race, religion, age, family status etc.). Thus, discrimination has 
two substantial elements: less favourable treatment that is a disadvantage, and 
a so-called protected attribute serving as a ground for the measure causing 
disadvantage. Both of these elements will be discussed in details below.
Disadvantage. The disadvantage might be either a damage (e.g. wage dif-
ferential), or a legal disadvantage (e.g. the termination of employment), loss 
of an advantage (e.g. being left out of training or travel opportunities, social 
events), unfavourable conditions of work (such as office room, work sched-
ule) and any other material or moral disadvantage; it does however, need to 
10 In September 2009 the text 
in force was the 13th. version 
since January 2004,
11 E.g. in the field of employ-
ment the listed subject matters 
are: advertisement of vacancies, 
the selection procedure, hiring, 
terms of employment, training, 
payment and fringe benefits, 
promotion system, liability and 
trade union rights.
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be evidenced. For example security checks at the entrance to court buildings 
was considered a disadvantage by the Supreme Court and it was considered 
unlawful that lawyers working as legal counsel were exposed to such a check 
while other lawyers (private attorneys, public attorneys, and prosecutors) 
were only required to show their identification. (Decision number LB Kfv. 
III. 37.365/2007/9).
Discretionary power. Frequent misunderstanding necessitates emphasiz-
ing that the employer’s action may cause disadvantage – and the violation of 
equal treatment thereby – without any law-infringing conduct. Rather, dis-
crimination occurs typically in cases of decisions falling within discretion-
ary managerial prerogative. When an employer’s action is regulated by law, 
collective agreement or the employment contract, the employer has no right 
to deliberate the issue and if its action goes against the applicable provision 
or terms it is a violation of law and not discrimination. To give an example: 
giving notice to an employee without adequate justification is against the La-
bour Code, and for this reason unlawful. The termination will be unlawful 
for discrimination if, in the case of a redundancy on reasonable grounds (just 
reason of termination) the employer selects redundant employees within his 
discretion in such a way that the sex, age, ethnic background, or family sta-
tus of the employee plays a role. Thus, one may question the frequent expla-
nation to be read in court decisions, that there was no discrimination found 
because the employer (or other defendant) made its decision within discre-
tionary power, it could “freely” deliberate the decision. (Supreme Court, no.s 
Mfv. I. 10. 961/2007/5. and Pfv. IV. 21. 938/2007/6.)
Other court judgments express, to the contrary, that the “the fact that an 
employer’s decision was made within its discretionary power (the selection 
of persons affected by redundancy) cannot preclude its review in a judicial 
procedure.”12 A progressive decision was the one which, disregarding the oth-
erwise free option of the employer, found violation of equal treatment by an 
employer’s refusal to prolong the fixed term contract with an employee who 
notified him of her pregnancy while at the same time a short-period fixed-
time contract was concluded with another employee. In this case the Equal 
Treatment Authority has explicitly referred to the decision of the European 
Court of Justice that saw the same violation in a non-prolongation of the fixed 
term contract as in the case of a termination of employment or the rejection of 
an employment contract during pregnancy. (http://www.egyenlobanasmod.
hu/zanza/zanza2jan.pdf). Similarly, the Equal Treatment Authority found 
unlawful discrimination when the employment of a public servant serving 
her probationary period was terminated following the announcement of her 
pregnancy in spite of the positive result of her comprehensive mid-term eval-
uation. The Equal Treatment Authority did not see a determining problem 
in the freedom of the employer to decide over termination during the proba-
12 Supreme Court decision, no 
Mfv. I. 11. 018/2006/5. Section 
199, § 4 of the Labour Code stip-
ulates clearly that the decision 
of the employer that was made 
within its discretionary power 
can be taken to the court if the 
employer has exceeded the limits 
set by the provisions relevant 
to its decision. Such provisions 
are typically the principles of 
exercising rights – such as the 
principle of bona fide acting, the 
reasonability and, not in the last 
rank, the provisions requiring 
non-discrimination with respect 
to the decisions within the em-
ployer’s prerogatives.
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tionary period. (Decisions of the Equal Treatment Authority, EBH further 
on, no. 1201/2008).
Comparison. Finding a disadvantage requires comparison: the disadvan-
tage has to occur in comparison to someone or some ones. The person of the 
comparator, the actor who serves as a yardstick is decisive for finding or not 
finding a disadvantage. The current text of the Equality Act (“who is treated, 
was treated or would be treated”) lays down a broad range of possible compa-
rators, in compliance with EU law. It makes possible the comparison not only 
between those present at the same time but also to sanction the disadvantage 
in comparison to an employee who worked in the same or similar job in the 
past, furthermore, it makes the merely hypothetical comparison possible, too. 
E.g. discrimination was found in the case when the employer rejected the hir-
ing of a child-caring woman with reference to the “weak constitution” of her 
body even if finally no one was hired for the position. (EBH no. 310/2007).
The disputes over the equality of pay constitute not only the most frequent 
but also the most difficult group of cases, among others due to the difficulties 
with respect to the choice of the comparator. In the first rank, he can be chosen 
from among the employees working at the same workplace, in the same job. In 
this respect Section 142/A requires the consideration of “the nature, quality, 
quantity of the work performed, the working conditions, the required profes-
sional skill, physical or intellectual effort, experience, and responsibility”.
Defining the concept of pay, the quoted provision of Section 142/A orders, 
too, that for the purpose of comparison pay means “any cash or in-kind (so-
cial) provision, received by the employee directly or indirectly, with respect to 
his employment”. Social provisions might consist of contribution to a private 
insurance fund, food-tickets, the use of sport or other facilities etc. However, 
the court could not see a “pay” in the loan granted to the female employee 
and referred to by the employer as compensation for the unjustified wage dif-
ferential to the disadvantage of the employee. The rejection of such a defence 
was not based on the nature of the loan, rather on the fact that such a loan 
was available for anyone, regardless of the level of their wages, furthermore on 
the lack of evidence regarding the financial benefit resulting from the loan, 
whether it was suitable to compensate for the loss in wages. (Supreme Court, 
no. Kfv. IV. 37. 332/2007/5.) In cases, when the employer has multiple estab-
lishments, the employees engaged at the different establishments are consid-
ered to be in a comparable situation. Thus, differences in wages between such 
workers might constitute discrimination unless the employer can reasonably 
explain the difference. Norms in force at present do not permit challenge to 
the long criticized, so-called “occupational wage discrimination”: in the typi-
cal female occupations and sectors (such as health care, education, lower level 
public administration) wages characteristically lag behind the wages of em-
ployees performing similar work in other branches.
in focus
74
Protected Attribute. The second criterion is the connection between the 
disparate treatment and a protected attribute of the person. The Equality 
Act enumerates 19 attributes that must not be grounds for differentiation 
between persons (protected attributes). These are: a) sex, b) race, c) colour, d) 
nationality, e) belonging to a national or ethnic minority, f) mother tongue, 
g) disability, h) state of health, i) religious or ideological conviction, j) political 
or other opinion, k) family status, l) motherhood (including pregnancy) and 
fatherhood, m) sexual orientation, n) sexual identity, o) age p) social origin, 
q) financial situation, r) part-time or fixed-term employment, s) belonging to 
an interest representative organization. This list is completed by a twentieth, 
general element: under the most often referred sub-section t) prohibiting dif-
ferential treatment on the grounds of any other characteristic, too.
Such an extensive list that is, in addition, using an “open ended” enumera-
tion undeniably broadens the effect of the prohibition of discrimination. On 
the other hand it is opportune to water down the concept of protected at-
tributes. Employment as well as other areas of life hold plenty of differences. 
There is no safe “compass” available to help in finding the criterion that de-
termines whether a differentiation qualifies as discrimination and therefore 
allows exposure to legal scrutiny. This lack of clarity has already resulted in 
irrational cases. A more crucial problem is, however, that the boundless and 
loose list dilutes the difference between the protected attributes and this might 
prevent the elimination of the disadvantage and exclusion originating from 
the most pervasive forms of discrimination.13
Discrimination is an objective state of facts. The differentiation on the 
grounds of the given attribute is sufficient for its occurrence; it is not depend-
ent on the discriminatory or exclusionary motive guiding the actor against 
the discriminated group. The violation is completed merely by the disadvan-
tage originating from the differentiation. Typical of such cases are when the 
employer who has no prejudice or even belongs to the same group engages in 
discriminatory practices motivated by the real or supposed prejudice of guests, 
clients patients or fellow employees, (E.g. when the employer who provides 
the cleaning services for a shopping centre does not hire Roma cleaners be-
cause the shop-owners object to their presence, or when the temporary labour 
agency does not post Roma employees to the user company that had indicated 
that they accept “only Hungarians”. Unlawful discrimination is carried out 
merely by making the decision on the grounds of the Roma origin of the em-
ployee, independently of the fact that the employer evidenced lack of preju-
dice. (EBH 271/2007.)
Indirect Discrimination
Indirect discrimination is a relatively new concept, adopted by the EU anti-
discrimination law only in the second half of the 1980s.14 In correspondence 
13 There is a difference between 
attributes that are, on the one 
hand an inherent part of the 
identity, that are a visible, inborn 
attribute, indicating the belong-
ing to a subordinate (mostly 
minority) status in a society, 
that is rooted in systemic, long, 
historic discrimination, coupled 
with social disadvantage and 
also couples with social stere-
otypes (such as race, colour, sex, 
sexual orientation) and, on the 
other hand, a protected attribute 
without such characteristics (e.g. 
the fixed term or part time form 
of employment, or trade union 
membership).
14 The decision made on May 13, 
1986 in the case Bilka-Kaufhaus 
GmbH versus Karin Weber von 
Hartz (C-170/84) has laid down 
the concept of indirect discrimi-
nation declaring that the prin-
ciple of equal treatment might 
be violated by a measure that 
granted occupational pension to 
employees with at least twenty 
years of service provided that 
at least fifteen years out of the 
twenty was spent in full time 
employment.
legal instruments...
75
with the acquis communautaire, according to the Equal Treatment Act, in-
direct discrimination is an apparently neutral provision that puts persons or 
groups having a protected attribute into a position of significant disadvan-
tage. (Equality Act, Section 9). Typically such provisions affect predominantly 
women, for example differential treatment based on family obligations (ab-
sence from work). Prior to the creation of the concept such differentiation 
did not violate equal treatment unless there was evidence of an underlying 
discriminatory intention.15
The difference between the two forms of discrimination is relative and 
much criticized. While originally it was meant for extending the prohibition 
of discrimination to a situation not prohibited before, in practice it provides a 
loophole for escaping the consequences of unlawful discrimination. The dif-
ferentiation leads to a more lenient acceptance of defence, satisfied frequently 
by the simple presentation of the financial consideration.
For example the court accepted the defence of an employer who excluded 
those employees from bonuses and wage-rises who were absent due to sick-
ness for more than 15 days per year. The provision, obviously disadvantaging 
parents with small children, was challenged at the court by one of the parents 
affected. The court accepted the explanation given by the employer that keep-
ing costs low makes it impossible to employ more staff than utterly necessary, 
at the same time they have to deliver car parts to their car-producer customers 
with an accuracy of minutes under the threat of paying a huge “penalty”, since 
the delay of a single part might interrupt the operation of a whole assembly 
line. The court considered this a “reasonable” defence and did not find a vio-
lation of equal treatment. (Collection of Court Decisions, 208/253.)
It is also a violation of the principle of equal treatment if the opportunity of 
equal access to the exercise of rights is not guaranteed. This happens to per-
sons who – with respect to a protected attribute – need either assistance or 
the appropriate adjustment of their environment in order to be able to exer-
cise their fundamental rights. Primarily disability is such a quality, however, 
it can also be sickness, pregnancy, motherhood or age. Failure to provide the 
equal conditions for the exercise of rights is also discrimination. The Equality 
Act has not denoted the failure to adjust the environment as a “special form” 
of discrimination. Even though such a conduct might be sanctioned under a 
correct interpretation of the Equality Act taken together with the provisions 
of Act XXVI of 1998 on the rights of the disabled and on the guarantee of 
their equal opportunity – in reality such sanctions are impeded by concep-
tual obscurities regarding the concept of equality.
In one case two persons with a visual handicap complained about being un-
able to use their ATM cards due to the total lack of ATM machines installed 
with Braille script or aural communication although they were paying an 
identical service fee based on their contract as others were. The first instance 
15 For example in the case Jenkins 
versus Kingsgate (C-96/80 of 
March 31, 1981) where the issue 
was whether the lower hourly 
wages paid to the predominantly 
female part timer employees was 
a violation of the equal pay rule. 
The Court found no discrimina-
tion except when the measure is 
motivated by the intention to 
pay less to women.
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court correctly found direct discrimination and ordered the installation of 
a number of properly adjusted ATM machines. This decision was annulled 
by the High Court of Appeal Budapest, and this decision was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court. The upper courts saw indirect discrimination: the fail-
ure to install special ATM machines was a neutral decision that brought the 
plaintiffs into a disadvantage. The decisions found that such a violation of 
equal treatment could be “reasonably” explained by the interest of avoiding 
the costs of the change to the ATM machines. A standard equality analysis 
shows that the measure brings each person with a visual disability (i.e. each 
member of a group with a given attribute) to a disadvantage while not bring-
ing anyone to a disadvantage from the opposite group and therefore was a 
direct discrimination. The case clearly illustrates the difficulty of the dis-
tinction between the two groups, and that the courts see the distinction as a 
facilitation of defence.16
Harassment and Sexual Harassment
Harassment as one form of discrimination means conduct violating human 
dignity with the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, hu-
miliating, degrading or offensive environment against a person or a group in 
connection with a protected attribute. (Equality Act, Section 10, § (1). Har-
assment can be perpetrated in numerous forms: unpleasant comments, ag-
gressive or mocking gestures, displaying offensive pictures, schemes or objects 
in the common working area (e.g. obscene, pornographic graphics or objects, 
pictures or objects mocking religious symbols etc.).17 Such behaviour signifi-
cantly influences the workplace disposition and performance of the target-
ed person(s), that is, it creates more disadvantageous working conditions for 
them, compared to others. By affecting work performance it affects the pro-
motion opportunities of the employee and frequently results in their quitting 
the workplace, i.e. the loss of the job.
The Equality Act does not regulate sexual harassment that can be commit-
ted in the form of claiming sexual advances.18 The reluctance of the drafters 
manifests itself by the struggle to squeeze into one definition two different 
situations, regulated separately in the EU Directive. The reflected ambiva-
lence of the legislature at the same time weakens the protection aimed at by 
the EU norms.19
The qualification of harassment as a form of discrimination was achieved 
relatively late. Earlier it was considered an individual disposition of the per-
petrator and not as a discrimination for which the employer is liable, except 
when it was occasioned by an executive exercising the employer’s power, act-
ing in the “gown” of the employer. Based on today’s norms any form of har-
assment by any (i.e. non-superior) employee may establish the liability of the 
employer. Tolerating such conduct in the workplace is in contravention of the 
16 High Court of Appeal Buda-
pest, no. 2. Pf. 21.073/2007/4 
and Supreme Court no. Pfv. IV. 
21.144/2008/7. Section 7, § (2) of 
the Equality Act is not about the 
reasonability criterion of equal 
treatment without costs, instead 
it is about a “reasonable cause 
directly related to the given legal 
relationship” (that might be, for 
example, that the installation 
of such machines would hinder 
the reasonable operation of the 
bank, or causes a serious security 
risk etc.) There are further state-
ments in the decision that will 
be referred to below. Interest-
ingly the same panel of the High 
Court of Appeal Budapest in a 
decision several months earlier 
not only found discrimination 
upon a claim launched for lack 
of accessibility by a customer 
using a wheelchair but also used 
a totally different language, a 
more “empathic” set of terms 
both in respect of turning down 
the justification given by the 
defendant and in respect of the 
distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination – and 
all these used with reference 
to the Act on the rights of the 
disabled. (See: High Court of 
Appeal Budapest, no. 2. Pf. 
20.531/2007/4.).
17 E.g. the visible display of the 
notorious “Mohammed-cari-
catures” at a workplace where 
persons belonging to the Mus-
lim religion would constitute 
harassment.
18 Even after an explicit warning 
from the European Union only 
a moderate change of the text 
of the Equality Act followed: 
adding the words “or of sexual 
nature” to the definition. How-
ever, this means discrimination 
with respect to the sex of some-
one but does not mean sexual 
harassment.
19 According to Directive 
2006/54 /EC, finding sexual 
harassment is not conditional 
upon the intimidating, hostile, 
humiliating environment; such 
result might rather be an ag-
gravating factor. (Article 2, § 
1, subsection d.)
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duty of the employer to create healthy working conditions, and establishing 
and maintaining a workplace climate that does not endanger either spiritual 
or physical health. The risk of becoming liable can be significantly decreased 
by the employer through the constitution of an internal code of conduct and 
its dissemination through training (merely by this already promoting a work-
place atmosphere condemning harassment), by establishing forums where 
complaints can be submitted and last but not least by effective sanctions ap-
plied in cases of harassment.
Due to the legal uncertainties regarding the concept, the lack of relevant 
knowledge, and barriers in social attitude the enforcement of the prohibition 
is in its infancy in Hungary.
Unlawful segregation, retaliation and instruction to discriminate
In contrary to the concept of direct and indirect discrimination and harass-
ment, the following forms may lack either the disadvantage or the protected 
attribute, nevertheless they constitute a violation of equal treatment.
The prohibition of unlawful segregation was motivated by the unlawful 
practices of segregating Roma and non-Roma pupils followed in some schools 
in Hungary. This is a specific Hungarian provision, not regulated in the EU 
norms. Under the law, unlawful segregation is defined as a conduct that sepa-
rates certain persons or groups from other, similarly situated persons or groups 
devoid of an explicit permission by the law. Unlawful segregation is independ-
ent of the quality of facilities: it is perpetrated regardless to the equal or even 
better quality of the conditions provided for the segregated group compared 
to the comparator group.
Retaliation is a conduct that causes (or is intended to cause or threatens to 
cause) a violation of the rights of a person who stood up (raised objection, in-
itiated procedure or co-operated in a procedure) against discrimination. Re-
taliation therefore may be directed against a person without any protected 
attribute in the event of raising a voice against discrimination or participat-
ing in such a procedure.
Instruction to commit discrimination is an autonomous form of discrimi-
nation. This means that issuing such instruction in itself creates discrimina-
tion regardless of whether the instruction is realized. It also means that the 
instructed person may lawfully refuse to perform the instruction.20 (Conse-
quently, if the employer consequently bears a liability for damages from such 
an instruction – thereby causing a loss to the employer – the employer may 
oblige the instructing superior and also the subordinate performing the in-
struction to remedy the losses they caused to their employer (obviously to 
a different extent, proportionate to their position and responsibility in the 
organization). If the subordinate refuses to carry out the instruction he is 
protected not only by the labour law norms, but also by the provision of the 
20 Labour Code, Article 104, § 
2, “The employee has no duty 
to carry out an instruction that 
would be ….against the law.”
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Equality Act, mentioned in the previous paragraph, that qualifies such retali-
ation as sui generis discrimination.
Exception (Defence)
There are situations when a legal relationship can fulfil its function only by 
differentiating between persons on the grounds of a protected attribute (i.e. 
when a certain job can be fulfilled only by a person belonging to one sex, na-
tionality or religion). Such, extremely rare situations can be dictated by im-
portant public interest (such as public safety, public order, public health) or 
respect for the fundamental rights of individuals.21
The Equality Act lays down general and special preconditions for excep-
tions. The general preconditions reciting the terms used by the Constitution-
al Court lay down the so-called “necessity and proportionality” test as well 
as the “reasonability” requirement, distinguishing between the violations of 
fundamental or non-fundamental rights and attempting to adjust the text to 
the various “tests” of the Constitutional Court.22
The special exception for employment relationships has more clarity, but is 
too large a well. There is no violation of equal treatment by a provision that 
is justified by the characteristic or nature of the work, is proportionate and 
is based on all relevant and legitimate conditions.” This text takes over, inac-
curately, the original Section 5 of the Labour Code (“There is no discrimina-
tion in the case of a differentiation that follows unequivocally from the char-
acteristic or nature of the work”). This is combined with the proportionality 
requirement of the EU directive, however here the Act also drops the most 
important words, namely, that the given attribute must be a genuine and de-
termining occupational requirement.
The Court found the sex of the employee determining and decisive when, 
for example, the bath-management wanted to hire only female guards for the 
female baths. (Supreme Court, no. Mfv. I. 11. 160/2000, Collection of Court 
Decisions, no. BH 2003/86.)
Less convincing is the decisive role of the sex-criterion in another case when 
the female applicant was told that the so-called “other administrator” job was 
“rather for men”. Even if four women were invited for interview, a man was 
finally hired. The Equal Treatment Authority accepted the explanation by 
the employer referring in general to the physical work (maintenance, repair, 
moving heavy objects) to be done during the major part of the working day, 
and did not even touch on the issue of the individual suitability of the appli-
cant, or the concurrence of her physical capacities to the actual job require-
ments. (EBH 441/2008.).23
The broadly drawn exceptions are topped by the Equality Act with the ex-
ception established for religious, ethnic-cultural and similar organizations 
with an exception permitted if it is “directly flowing from the spirit” of the 
21 For example prescribing age 
or physical requirements pre-
scribed for jobs connected to 
public order and public safety, 
or belonging to a given sex in the 
case of health care and various 
personal services.
22 Thus, there is no violation of 
the principle of equal treatment 
when a provision limits the fun-
damental right of a party in or-
der to promote the enforcement 
of another fundamental right in 
unavoidable cases provided that 
the limitation is suitable and 
proportionate. In case of the 
limitation of non-fundamental 
rights, differential treatment 
is permitted, “if there is an ob-
jective and reasonable ground” 
that is “directly related to the 
particular relationship”. The 
Act – rightly – excludes race, 
nationality, and ethnic origin 
from the cases of justified ex-
ceptions, which means that no 
reason may justify distinction 
on such grounds.
23 The stereotypic attitude be-
hind the employer’s conduct is 
evident and the stricter require-
ments of exceptions than it is 
in the current Hungarian law 
would have the role to prevent 
the perpetuation of such stere-
otypes.
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organization. On these grounds the court found the removal of a protestant 
theology student from the higher education institution after the student had 
revealed his homosexuality to his professor in a confidential conversation24 
to be lawful.
The successful defence (proving the exception) means that in the given case 
– in spite of classifying on the grounds of a protected attribute – the principle 
of equal treatment was not violated. It is important to emphasize this conclu-
sion, because the text of the Equal Treatment Act on the burden of proof (“was 
not obliged to observe the principle of equal treatment…in the context of the 
given legal relationship”) may lead to mistaken conclusions. E.g. according to 
the court decision already cited (in footnote 16) “the defendant had a reason-
able cause, thus the defendant was not obliged to observe the principle of equal 
treatment”. This statement is mistaken. The exception is not authorizing the 
violation of equal treatment, instead, it qualifies the use of the given criterion 
as being in correspondence with the principle of equal treatment.
The enforcement of the principle of equal treatment
Actors obliged to observe equal treatment
The Equality Act provides for detailed norms regarding the group of subjects 
bound by the order of equal treatment. This detailed regulation has been mo-
tivated by the post-transition liberties, primarily by the cautious respect for 
“privacy” and private property and as a result it binds a narrower group of 
subjects than would be dictated by EU principles and norms.
Actors of the public sphere – the Hungarian State, the local self-govern-
ments, their organs, therefore the organizations financed from the public 
budget – are naturally bound. Furthermore also obliged are the public foun-
dations, public bodies and, from October 2009, the interest representative or-
gans of employees and employers. A further large group are the organizations 
providing public services (providing energy, water, heating, public sanitation, 
mail and public transportation. etc.), the educational, social, child-protection, 
public culture institutions, health care providers, private pension funds and 
voluntary mutual insurance funds. Political parties are also obliged to observe 
equal treatment, excepting differentiation on the ground of political views.
Independently from the type of the organization (the subject) a further 
four categories are covered by the Act: 1. one who is making an offer or call 
for an offer for the “public” (for an undefined group of persons, 2. one who 
is providing a service or selling goods at premises for open turnover; 3. one 
who is using public subsidies (the prohibition of discrimination binds such 
a subject only in legal relationships established in the course of utilizing the 
public support); 4. the employer and the person entitled to issue instructions 
in other relationships established for performing work as well as in respect 
of legal relations connected to them.
24 According to the explana-
tion given by the Supreme Court 
religious training is inseparably 
connected to the articles of faith 
of the given church that cannot 
be reviewed by the institutions 
of the state, and therefore the 
disparate treatment (removal 
from the university in this case) 
on the ground of sexual orienta-
tion is not in contravention with 
the law. (Supreme Court, no. 
Pfv. IV. 20. 678/2005., Collec-
tion of Court Decisions BH no. 
2006. 14.).
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Albeit the exact list implicitly excludes everyone else from the coverage of 
the Act, the legislature felt necessary to add four explicit exception areas that 
exclude the subject that would be otherwise covered by the Act. These are: a) 
family law relationships, b) relationships between relatives, c) the relations of 
clerical legal persons connected to the religious faith, finally d) in the case of 
public actors enumerated in Section 4 membership issues are qualified private 
and exempted from the observation of equal treatment provided that they have 
membership. Public bodies and labour market representations, on the other 
hand are not exempted with regard to the establishment and termination of 
membership as well as the exercise of membership rights.25
Procedures available in case of the violation of equal treatment
There are several ways to remedy the infringement and to sanction unlawful 
behaviour in the event of the violation of equal treatment: public procedure, 
civil litigation and the – still relatively unknown – conciliation with the as-
sistance of a mediator. In the case of opting for legal enforcement, taking the 
public administration path is faster and less complicated; on the other hand, 
the court procedure is able to provide real remedies. The public administration 
path means the procedure of the Equal Treatment Authority, and in princi-
ple offers enforcement through the help of the labour market inspection,26 
however, in practice it does not extend to equal treatment.
Equal Treatment Authority. The EU norms put an increased emphasis on 
the effective implementation of the principle of equal treatment. The direc-
tives on gender and racial equality expect the governments to establish bodies 
that provide concrete assistance to victims of discrimination on the one hand, 
and promote the achievement of equal treatment through surveys, analysis and 
proposals on the other. The Equality Act – going beyond the requirements of 
the European Union – set up the Equal Treatment Authority as an organ of 
public administration authorized to proceed upon request and to apply sanc-
tions in discrimination cases. As the most serious sanction the Authority may 
inflict a fine of a maximum of six million Forints (about 22 thousand Euros), 
in addition it may order the termination of the unlawful situation and pro-
hibit such conduct for the future. These, however, with regard to the admin-
istrative type of the procedure, cannot provide a remedy to the victim of the 
discrimination,27 which can be claimed only through the court. Publicizing 
the violation for a period might contribute to prevention and so is the effect 
of putting employers whose liability was established on a list of employers not 
having “orderly labour relations” thus making them ineligible to apply for state 
subsidies for two years from the date of the final and binding decision.28 The 
Equal Treatment Authority may launch a court case by its own imitative as 
well (this has not happened yet) and, besides its role in individual cases, it car-
ries out surveys, and fulfils a consultative role in governmental issues.
25 With regard to the private 
nature of the advertising foun-
dation, the publicly announced 
competition for a scholarship 
offered only to male law stu-
dents was found lawful. (EBH 
no. 531/2005. http://www.
egyenlobanasmod.hu/zanza/
zanza4jan.pdf).
26 Act LXXV of 1996 on labour 
inspection, Section 3, § 1, subsec-
tion d.) also extends to the obser-
vation of equal treatment.
27 For example, the decision on 
“bringing the situation contra-
vening the law to an end” does 
not include the reinstatement of 
the employment of an employee 
dismissed by discrimination. 
If the employer voluntarily 
reinstates the employment, it 
might significantly inf luence 
the infliction of the fine.
28 Act XXXVIII of 1992 on the 
State budget, Section 15, § (6), 
subsection c).
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With regard to the fast and cheap (free) character of the procedure, the cases 
brought to the Authority have grown rapidly since its setting up in 2004. In 
contrast to the few dozens of claimants in the first year, they had 491 claims 
in 2005 and in 2008 there were 1153 claimants turning to the Authority due 
to real or imagined discrimination.
Court Procedure. Article 5 of the Labour Code was a differentiated and 
up-to-date equality provision for labour relations;29 nevertheless the consider-
able existing workplace discrimination remained mostly hidden. Apart from 
the causes in social attitude significant hindrance is found in the difficulties 
of enforcement through court procedure.
The greatest room for development in the wake of the European accession 
has been therefore in promoting effective enforcement. There are four ele-
ments in the EU norms targeting more effectiveness in the implementation 
of equal treatment: 1. the reversal of the burden of proof, 2. remedies that are 
sufficiently dissuasive and grant adequate compensation for damages caused, 
3. the extension of the right to launch a procedure (the introduction a kind 
of actio popularis as well as granting the procedural standing of non-govern-
mental organizations) and 4. enhancing the role of social partners primarily 
in prevention.
The right to take a case to the court has been broadened by the Equality 
Act through the introduction of the public interest litigation, that, in addi-
tion to the affected person and the Equal Treatment Authority, extended the 
right to initiate a lawsuit to the public attorney as well as to civil and interest 
representative organizations having, as a goal in their constitution, the pro-
tection of the equal opportunity of disadvantaged groups and of human and 
civil rights. The two preconditions of the right to start the court procedure 
are: first, that the discrimination took place on grounds that are an essential 
attribute of a person and secondly, the infringement or its imminent danger 
affects an undetermined larger group of persons. The inherent limitations 
built into these rights prevented public interest litigation from becoming a 
serious instrument of the protection of rights.
A serious setback was in rights’ enforcement – including discrimination 
cases – the abolishment of the exemption of labour litigation from proce-
dural charges. Litigation bears considerable risks for subordinate employees 
even if they win the case, now coupled with the risk of a further, serious fi-
nancial burden.
The burden of proof
The classic principle of evidence – that everyone has to prove what he/she as-
serts – would bring the victims of discrimination cases into a hopeless position 
since they have to prove internal consideration that has no external evidence. 
The Equality Act provides for rules on this subject that correspond with the 
29 It not only prohibited dis-
crimination but also positively 
ordered the guarantee of equal 
opportunities in promotion, 
reversed the burden of proof 
and had a clearer norm for ex-
ceptions permitting it in a nar-
rower scale.
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European and international criteria. It sets up the presumption that if a person 
with a protected attribute suffered a disadvantage in comparison to others it 
is a result of discrimination, and puts the burden of the counter-evidence, i.e. 
the lack of discrimination, onto the person taking the disputed measure.
If therefore a person having a protected attribute can present the likelihood 
of suffering a disadvantage, the opposite party has to prove that the disad-
vantage was in no connection with the protected attribute, or that there was 
a connection but, since it was a permitted exception, it did not violate the 
principle of equal treatment, since classification on grounds of the protected 
attribute is a determining requirement in the given relationship.30
Notwithstanding the fact that the spreading application of the provisions 
on the burden of proof and the Equal Treatment Authority also pay atten-
tion to its observance, regrettably there are still court sentences that expect 
the plaintiffs to prove, beyond the disadvantage itself, the evidence of the 
“differential treatment”.31
Conclusions
Legal instruments available in Hungary today are insufficient for the guar-
antee of this fundamental human rights’ principle. Even though there was a 
degree of progress, resulting from the legislative steps transposing the com-
munity law as a condition of accession to the European Union, towards the 
creation of the framework of a modern equality law, both the legislation and 
the judicial case law is permeated by an over-cautiousness reluctant to inter-
vene into the fundamental civil and economic rights re-gained by the political 
transition. The barriers to enforce rights, the available compensation – quite 
modest, certainly so by international comparison – rather divert the victims 
from legal steps and do not stimulate a more courageous practice that would 
discourage perpetrators. At the same time the amendments of the Equality 
Act and the obvious progress of the fluctuating case law give the hope that the 
growing experience and knowledge, leaving the past behind, and the clarifica-
tion of social values will lead to the achievement of a legal framework and legal 
instruments that promote substantive equality at a more up-to-date level.
30 Section 22, § (2) subsection 
b). Both on logical-principal 
grounds and on the grounds 
of the text of section 5, the evi-
dence of not being “obliged to 
observe the principle of equal 
treatment…in the context of 
the given legal relationship” is 
possible only for those who are 
excluded from the coverage of 
the Act.
31 Supreme Court, no. Mfv. 
I. 10. 842/2007/3: “the asser-
tion by the plaintiff that he was 
dismissed for the deterioration 
of the state of his health and 
for his age was not proved. The 
burden of proof regarding these 
facts was on the plaintiff and 
the defendant has to prove his 
statement of defence only if the 
fact of discrimination is main-
tained.”
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3. transformations of roma emPLoyment PoLicies
Gábor Fleck & Vera Messing
Introduction
As researchers doing fieldwork, we are made constantly aware that Roma 
people are rejected by employers even when they meet all the criteria related 
to education, training and whatever the specifications are in job advertise-
ments. Our Roma interviewees have given accounts of a broad scale of racial 
discrimination, almost independently from the settlement and region they 
come from, or whenever our conversation took place over the past 8–10 years. 
Governments have long failed to take ethnic discrimination seriously, or at 
least not treated it as a problem which calls for governmental intervention. 
At the same time, many recently published studies have provided substantial 
evidence supporting the fact that negative discrimination is a widespread 
phenomenon in Hungary.
A part of these studies establish, by examining national employment statis-
tics, that the low employment rates of Roma can not be explained merely by 
their low educational level and unfavourable residential patterns. In analyz-
ing the impact of various factors using econometric methods, Gábor Kertesi 
concludes that “the depression of local economy represents a much more seri-
ous plight for Roma than for non-Roma of the same gender, age, educational 
level and family conditions. […] It would be hard to interpret this situation 
as something else than the sign of employment discrimination.” (Kertesi, 
2000a, p. 440., italics in the original). Kertesi’s calculations made five years 
later imply the same conclusion: “their employment opportunities amount to 
less than half of those characterizing the control group [employment seekers 
of the same level of education]…” (Kertesi, 2005, p. 191.).
Many investigations conducted in recent years examine discrimination in 
a direct manner, with unanimously disappointing results. According to the 
empirical studies done by Ferenc Babusik regarding Hungarian enterprises, 
80 per cent of employers “not only do not employ Roma but are also unwill-
ing to do so, even in the case where their educational level is satisfactory” 
(Babusik, 2006, p. 3.). A study commissioned by the European Roma Rights 
Center (ERRC) in 2005 gives an overview of the discriminatory practices 
employed by employers and other actors in the labour market, establishing 
the following: “The most important outcome of the research is that discrim-
ination is present in all segments of the labour market. As a result, the vast 
majority of working-age Roma becomes excluded from the labour market” 
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(ERRC, 2007). In spite of anti-discrimination legislation, Roma are exclud-
ed from employment already at the point of entry to the labour market, i.e. 
during hiring procedures. It is a common experience, evidenced by both re-
search studies, that employers reject applicants merely on the basis of their 
presumed Roma origin: 29 per cent of respondents in the ERRC survey said 
employers had explicitly told them that the reason for refusal had been their 
Roma origin. This phenomenon is also revealed by the complaints submit-
ted to, and investigations conducted by, the authorities in charge of enforc-
ing equal treatment: reports of the Equal Treatment Authority, the Roma 
Anti-discrimination Service Network of the Ministry of Justice and Police, 
the Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities and the om-
budsman for minorities all refer to similar cases.
As indicated by several studies, Roma are discriminated against not only by 
employers but, indirectly, also by employment agents and public employment 
centres that take employers’ preferences with respect to ethnic membership 
into account. Employment centres treating this type of request by employers 
in a lenient or even accepting manner have been encountered during our re-
search1 as well as that of the ERRC.2 A frequent justification for this illegal 
practice given by offices is that employers would refuse to employ Roma even 
in the event that they insisted on it – this would lead nowhere but rather make 
employers avoid employment centres in filling vacancies (OTKA research No. 
67898). Thus it is legitimate to raise the question: once the state is unable to 
prevent racial discrimination (even in its own institutions), what does it do in 
order to, at least, mitigate its consequences? The significance of this question 
is underlined in the 2008 annual report of the State Audit Office exploring 
this state of affairs (ÁSZ, 2008, p. 37.):
“Allowances promoting employment have played a determining part in the fund-
ing of Roma integration. Resources dedicated to this purpose are allocated by 
different ministries (Ministry of Economy /later Ministry of Economy and 
Trade/, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, and 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water Management). These re-
sources have altogether exceeded 3.6 billion HUF in 2002, 10.4 in 2004, 18.4 
in 2005 and 17.6 in 2006. The amount of support invested in enhanced em-
ployment, reintegration of people excluded from the labour market, the devel-
opment of networks organizing such initiatives, and the promotion of Roma 
enterprises and enterprises employing Roma, has increased every year. Esti-
mated data suggest that overall 74.7 billion HUF was spent on such objectives 
between 1997 and 2006.”
As indicated in the quote, these numbers are based on estimations. It could 
not be otherwise, indeed, since they mostly refer to the budget of programs not 
targeting the Roma. In most cases, ministries and organizations managing pro-
grams have no idea concerning how much of the budget of their programs has 
been invested in helping the Roma. At the same time, in satisfying the demand 
1 Szegény családok megélhetési 
stratégiái regionális és etnikai 
metszetben. [Subsistence strate-
gies of poor families in regional 
and ethnic breakdown.] OTKA 
687898. Research. Head of re-
search: Vera Messing.
2 A Hungarian case study shows 
how this is done in practice: jobs 
for which employers indicated 
they did not want to employ 
Roma were marked by the letter 
R in the computer system of the 
employment agency. (ERRC, 
2007, p. 41.).
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for accountability, they make efforts to assess the size of the Roma populations 
concerned as well as the amounts invested in them. However, the validity of these 
estimations can be challenged in several respects. Moreover, to date no profes-
sional means have been developed, unfortunately, to monitor programs.3
In the following, we classify the types of governmental frameworks deter-
mining relevant policies during the past decade. However, given primarily 
the inaccessibility of data and the lack of professional monitoring and impact 
assessment that otherwise form unavoidable parts of such programs, our op-
portunities in evaluating these policies are fairly limited. Although drawing 
on all available sources, we have only been able to draft a mosaic-like sketch 
full of gaps. Thus one of the main conclusions of this study can already be set 
forth in the introductory part: it makes no sense to launch policies to combat 
discrimination and mitigate its effects without collecting data concerning the 
programs, or planning and carrying out impact assessments. Or to be more 
direct: not a single penny should be spent from public monies without plan-
ning an impact assessment beforehand.
Colour conscious policies
Until the early 2000s, governments tried to enhance the employment of Roma 
and compensate for the effects of the labour market discrimination which they 
face, primarily by implementing Roma (i.e. ethnically targeted) employment 
programs. The effects of Roma employment programs are analyzed in an un-
published study based on an investigation commissioned by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour which we carried out in 2005 (Fleck–Messing–
Mike, 2005). During this research, we contacted institutions that had intro-
duced programs between 1998 and 2003 enabling the employment of Roma 
in Hungary. Since no other investigations analyzing the effects of ethnically 
targeted programs have been conducted since, the section of the present study 
discussing Roma employment programs will be primarily based on this work.4 
Besides the analysis of the documentation and partially available statistics, the 
main body of this research is based on interviews with tendering institutions, 
applicant organizations, and employees participating in the programs.
Roma employment programs, managed by various organizations, were run-
ning parallel in the early 2000s. These organizations – such as the National 
Employment Fund (NEF), the European Social Fund-Phare, or the Roma 
Enterprise Support Program of the Széchenyi Program – were usually man-
aged or funded by the government. Significant civil organizations active in 
this field include the Autonomy Foundation and the (semi-civil) Public Foun-
dation for the Hungarian Roma that coordinated programs promoting en-
trepreneurship and the subsistence of Roma.
Given their immense differences – especially regarding accessible resources5 
but also in terms of their scope of influence and, often, objectives – it is virtu-
3 Dilemmas regarding monitor-
ing will be discussed below.
4 A research project carried 
out by Autonómia Alapítvány 
[Autonomy Foundation] deals 
with a similar subject matter, 
however, that study refers to 
an even earlier period (Lukács, 
2005).
5 During their period of opera-
tion (which varied from between 
1 and 3 years), the financing of 
these programs looked as fol-
lows: the overall budget of the 3 
programs (labour market train-
ing of Roma, Roma small plant 
program, Roma community 
program) run by the Autonomy 
Foundation was 37.5 million 
HUF; the Roma employment 
program of the NEF used 120 
million HUF, 5 billion HUF was 
spent by the ESF (European So-
cial Fund) on its program called 
‘Struggle against exclusion from 
the Labor Market’, while the 
amount spent on programs tar-
geting Roma or “disadvantaged 
population with particular at-
tention to Roma” is unknown, 
though estimated at 5 billion 
HUF at least by the organizing 
employment centres. The annual 
budget of the programs promot-
ing entrepreneurship and the 
subsistence of Roma, organ-
ized by the Public Foundation 
for Hungarian Roma, was 200 
million HUF, and the Roma 
Enterprise Support Program also 
had 200 million HUF per year 
at its disposal.
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ally impossible to compare these programs. At the same time, strictly speak-
ing, the comparative evaluation of active employment programs is feasible, in 
fact, based on their primary objectives, i.e. considering the extent to which 
they are able to reach target groups, or increase opportunities of employment 
(that is, if they succeed in reintegrating the permanently unemployed in the 
primary labour market), as well as by examining whether they entail unin-
tended and harmful side effects, or how they can be characterized in terms 
of a cost/benefit ratio.
As for this latter aspect, we had no possibility to analyze the programs be-
cause of the unavailability of input data concerning investments and other 
types of information (such as the number of participants). Thus the assess-
ment of benefits was not even attempted.6 The first three aspects, in turn, were 
successfully investigated in our research.
“Who is Roma?”
One of the most disputed aspects of the programs supporting Roma is repre-
sented by the challenge of reaching the target group. Tendering organizations 
face the problem of defining the target group even at the commencement. 
Supporting organizations have found different ways to resolve the dilemma 
of “who is Roma?” One solution was prescribing Roma affiliation for appli-
cant civil organizations, while not using ethnic criteria with respect to partici-
pant employees. As a result, though the tendered organizations were Roma, 
a significant proportion of the employees was not. Tendering organizations 
adopting this method were under the presumption (later proving to be false) 
that Roma organizations would employ Roma people. Another part of the 
organizations tried to reach unemployed Roma people by requesting recom-
mendation by, or cooperation with, local Roma minority self-governments in 
realizing Roma employment programs. Although there are no reliable data 
concerning the ethnicity of participants in the programs – i.e. it is unknown 
to what extent ethnically targeted employment programs succeed in reaching 
their target group – the interviews made with employers suggest that, accord-
ing to estimates by the tendering/employing organizations, less than half of 
the employees were Roma. Differences in this respect were enormous (Roma 
participation varied between 20 and 80 per cent). Nevertheless, it can be es-
tablished that the more complex (i.e. involving training, employment and the 
provision of other services) and long-term the program, the lower the rate of 
Roma among participants.
Are employment opportunities improved by programs?
In other words: have programs contributed to the reintegration of the per-
manently unemployed in the primary labour market? Employment programs 
should be functional in increasing the employment chances of participants 
6 Our study (Fleck–Messing–
Mike, 2005) affirms: “There are 
no indicators of success in the 
case of the Autonomy Foun-
dation, employment centres, 
the PFHR and Széchenyi Pro-
gram and, to the extent they 
are formulated, expectations 
of success are over-generalized. 
Although the Phare program 
defines outcome goals, these 
are impracticable. The NEF 
did not elaborate indicators, 
nevertheless, the viability and 
profitability of enterprises oper-
ated by applicant organizations, 
as well as the extent to which 
they had been able to reach their 
original goals, were thoroughly 
inspected during re-application 
phases every 3 years.”
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following the end of the program and ensuring their employment at least in 
the mid-term. Only 3 of the programs under investigation attempted to track 
the employment situation following the end of the program: those run by the 
European Social Fund-Phare, the Employment Center and the National Em-
ployment Fund – the latter being able to provide just one piece of fairly vague 
data concerning the rate of further employment. However, no numeric indi-
cators have been employed so far by any organizations.
As revealed by our empirical research, even in the case of tenders that report 
on using relatively convincing means to ensure further employment, solutions 
of this problem are often rather illusory (Fleck–Messing–Mike, 2005). Here 
are a few typical cases:
–  participants were not really unemployed, or they were unemployed only 
on paper. The program, in fact, provided a means for companies to legal-
ize the employment of previously illegally employed workers;
– in successful programs (with a higher than 50 per cent rate of further 
employment), the percentage of Roma among participants was insig-
nificant;
– further employment generally lasts strictly for the prescribed compulsory 
period, after which participants are immediately dismissed.
After the end of the program, an element of the participants started work-
ing in the framework of another one; thus their further employment was 
apparently realized and the program could demonstrate success on paper, 
while the labour market situation of the concerned target group remained 
absolutely unchanged.
A frequent impediment of further employment consists in the wrong choice 
of program, including related education or training. We often came across en-
terprises obviously doomed to failure given the lack of support in the given 
region.7 Hardly any of the programs we encountered were adjusted to the ac-
tual labour market opportunities in the given area, that is to say, where the 
subsequent employment of the unemployed people participating in the pro-
gram was really taken into account.
Functional defects of Roma employment programs
In the course of our investigation, we did not encounter any programs that 
could be considered exemplary in every respect. In many cases, initiatives were 
not only ineffective but, in fact, also counter-effective. In other words, con-
trary to the proposed objectives, they contributed to the welfare-dependence 
and defencelessness of the permanently unemployed, reinforced the existing 
patron-client system in local communities, and further deteriorated the stere-
otypical view of unemployed Roma people by the majority society.
Below, we provide a list summarizing the problems that greatly contributed 
to the failure of the Roma programs analyzed here.
7 Training dressmakers and 
creating a dressmakers’ shop 
in a small region where, due to 
cheap Chinese imports, 3 active 
dressmakers’ shops went bank-
rupt in one year; training and 
employment of lumber workers 
in an area where no woods were 
nearby; training park-keepers 
and petrol mower operators in 
places where more than a hun-
dred – presently unemployed – 
people were trained in the same 
professions.
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Tendering system. In the case of most programs, available resources were 
distributed via tenders. The grave problem of counter-selection follows from 
the tendering system itself: the most potent organizations and communities, 
with extensive experience in application for tenders and maintaining wide-
spread social relationships, are the most likely to obtain resources, thus ine-
qualities become even greater and the factors determining the disadvantaged 
situation of the most dependent population mutually reinforce one another. 
Increasing inequalities and the incalculability of the system even in the mid-
term raise fundamental doubts regarding the usefulness of the above meth-
ods of financial support in this field.
Administration. The realization or implementation of programs – particu-
larly when the applicant employer is a civil organization – entails administra-
tive difficulties that only potent organizations, with massive experience, are 
able to cope with. This intensifies counter-selective mechanisms that already 
emerge at the application stage. Regions and organizations already struggling 
with the most handicaps have meagre chances to successfully implement pro-
grams. Difficulties of administration, default payments that are months or 
even years overdue but fail to reach their destination due to the late arrival of 
excuses and requests to fill in gaps, not only cause the failure of projects, but 
also drive implementing organizations into bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the 
following example is not exceptional: all of the enterprises interviewed men-
tioned that very significant amounts – often multiples of ten million HUF – 
drawn from other sources had to be advanced.
“The practice [of the tendering authority] of taking several months in evalu-
ating the periodic reports and financial accounts related to projects that were 
financed from advanced payments, and withholding the next instalment until 
the approval of accounts, fundamentally threatened the foundation. In prac-
tice, this meant that the second instalment of the financial support (about 30 
million HUF) arrived at the time when the program was already closing be-
cause, given that the period of evaluation lasted for several months, the ap-
proval of periodic reports took this long. In other words, the foundation had to 
credit 30 million HUF from its own pocket.” (Fleck–Messing–Mike, 2005.)
Professional preparedness of the implementing organization. Profession-
ally unprepared tendering organizations supported several projects doomed 
to failure from the start because, lacking any professionals, they were unable 
to estimate the economic-professional viability of the given application.
“Neither the promotion of enterprises, nor employment belong to the profile 
of tendering organizations, therefore, they keep supporting activities without 
professional considerations, which drives beneficiaries into bankruptcy. […] 
Due to the lack of appropriate preparations and professional assistance, sup-
ported applications often result in disaster as supported enterprises run into 
debts or go bankrupt (they are required to specify a mortgage or a guarantor 
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of cash in the contract), thus becoming the subjects of legal proceedings…” 
(Fleck–Messing–Mike, 2005.)
With the exception of those of the Autonomy Foundation and NEF, all of 
the programs under investigation struggled with the lack of efficient profes-
sional support: for the duration of the programs, fundamentally untrained 
applicants/employers did not receive any help in accomplishing tasks related 
to accounting and financing, or any assistance regarding legal and adminis-
trative matters. In the absence of such support, even the most well-meaning 
and thoroughly prepared projects are destined to fail. A significant part of the 
projects were devised without professional expertise, only to meet the basic re-
quirements prescribed in the tender. “A poorly designed program, indeed, must 
be implemented poorly”, said an experienced applicant we interviewed.
The formal nature or total absence of monitoring and professional sup-
port. In the period under investigation, primarily projects financed from 
European Union funds were monitored. However, monitoring even in these 
cases was rather formal and technical in nature, mostly lacking professional 
considerations and the implementation of professional criteria. “Monitoring 
involves only ascertaining that financial, procedural and legal requirements 
are fulfilled. As long as appropriate documentation is provided, silly things 
get easily accepted, while when a successfully accomplished project is poorly 
documented, it will fail at the monitoring stage,” this is how the situation was 
described by an expert dealing with tenders at one of the ministries. Without 
monitoring, not only the results of the program remain obscure, but partici-
pants feel abandoned and tend to assume that any serious investments in the 
project would be in vain.
Colour-blind policies
Considering the problems related to the Roma employment programs dis-
cussed above, the question emerges whether “colour-blind” or “colour-con-
scious” policies are more effective, i.e. stipulations regarding ethnic belonging 
should be weighed carefully. When departing from the claim that the em-
ployment situation is basically unrelated to ethnicity but has to do, rather, 
with educational, residential and regional issues, the support of people suf-
fering disadvantages in the labour market appears to be more justified. Every 
problem should be addressed where they emerge: problems of employment 
arising from a disadvantaged situation ought to be remedied by reducing dis-
advantages, instead of turning them into issues of ethnicity. Difficulties char-
acterizing the majority of Roma are fairly complex in nature: their situation is 
determined by a low educational level, discrimination, socio-economic exclu-
sion, territorial isolation and the conjugate effects of all these factors. Thus it 
seems to be appropriate to resolve the situation by treating all the problems 
manifesting in a particular crisis zone in a comprehensive manner, i.e. by pri-
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oritizing compound methods that are relevant for each problem suffered by 
the specific target group.
Public policies seemed to have developed in this direction after 2002, when 
efforts were made to reach marginalized populations that were overwhelm-
ingly, though not entirely, Roma. Although populations truly in need may be 
accurately defined by territorial, social and educational traits taken together, 
this practice nevertheless failed to produce the expected results. Apparently, 
the agents implementing the programs prepared by various ministries con-
sidered such definitions too narrow, as their proposals contain simplified cat-
egories such as ‘the unemployed’, those ‘having a large family’, or with a ‘low 
educational level’, even though the intersection of all these categories would 
have represented the group of those truly in need. As a consequence, the sup-
ported group shifted upwards in relation to populations occupying the lowest 
social status, and the more the circle of beneficiaries was expanded in prac-
tice, the more those at the bottom of the social hierarchy became marginal-
ized. At the same time, (in connection with the socio-economic situation of 
the Hungarian Roma population) this state of affairs also resulted in the pro-
grams implemented by different ministries being much less able to reach the 
Roma population than originally planned. In the absence of surveys, specific 
research or investigations, it is obviously impossible to back this claim by fac-
tual evidence. Nevertheless, this conclusion, also supported by our fieldwork 
experiences, is suggested by the logic implied in the modus operandi.
A part of the operative programs of the National Development Plan8 de-
fines people in a disadvantaged situation as a group to be supported without, 
however, attaching a specific definition to this category. In other programs, 
equality of opportunities represents a horizontal (general) principle.9 Ethnic 
belonging was also defined as a horizontal principle in all of these programs. 
This approach, again, is theoretically capable of resolving the problem. How-
ever, practical experience reveals that, unfortunately, horizontal requirements 
can be easily satisfied by a few resounding phrases at the stage of evaluating 
applications, while they are pushed to the background during the implemen-
tation of projects. Posterior evaluation of programs covers only compliance 
with formal requirements and financial performance, while disregarding the 
professional and content-related aspects of the projects. In this way, consid-
erations that should permeate operative programs, from planning to closing, 
mostly become meaningless decorative elements in practice (Bernát et al., 
2007). In its brochure evaluating the Regional Operative Program, the Na-
tional Development Agency says the following about the enforcement of the 
principle of equal opportunities.
“Available information does not allow us to take effects related to the equality 
of opportunities into account, or this can be done only by rough estimation as 
no impact analyses regarding equal opportunities were prepared during the 
8 Social Renewal Operative 
Program, Social Infrastructure 
Operative Program, Regional 
Operative Program.
9 The announcement of tenders 
says the following in this respect: 
“…independently from its nature 
and theme, each project should 
contribute to improving the 
equal opportunities of women, 
Roma and the disabled… The 
entire project, from its design 
to posterior evaluation, should 
be governed by considerations 
regarding equal opportuni-
ties. The equality of opportu-
nities as a goal must be taken 
into account by the applicant, 
both in performing everyday 
organizational activities and 
in the course of realizing the 
project.” (http://www.nfu.hu/
rop_ertekelesek.)
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planning phase and thus “bases of comparison” are unavailable. Besides, the 
majority of project managers were unable to provide useful information for 
an objective impact assessment.” (http://www.nfu.hu/rop_ertekelesek.)
Another type of the programs attempts to reach those in need by using ter-
ritorial determinants. For instance, the Catch-up program for the most disad-
vantaged small regions was conceived based on the following recognition:
“The uneven development of small regions produces social injustices handed 
down from generation to generation. A number of small regions still struggle 
with increasing poverty, unemployment, the absence of active enterprises and 
quality public services and the lack of opportunities. The Roma population is 
especially affected by these processes.” (http://www.nfu.hu/lhh.)
In order to improve the situation, the government designated the 33 most 
disadvantaged regions on the basis of statistical data. A portion of the tenders 
announced in the framework of the Catch-up program of the most disad-
vantaged small regions addressed the especially disadvantaged small regions, 
while concerning the rest of the tenders, applications arriving from the most 
disadvantaged small regions were given priority in the course of evaluation. 
Overall, a budget of 157 billion HUF was determined to be invested in the 
33 most disadvantaged small regions, which sum was distributed among op-
erative programs in the following manner.10
– A lump sum of 97 billion HUF to finance expenditures that may be 
planned by small regions (distributed among Regional Operative Program: 
66.4 billion HUF, Social Renewal Operative Program: 26.6 billion HUF, 
and Social Infrastructure Operative Program: 4 billion HUF).
– A lump sum of 60 billion HUF held for small regions to cover additional 
costs (distributed between the Economic Development Operative Program: 
25 billion HUF and the New Hungary Rural Program: 35 billion HUF).
Considerations based on territoriality can also be justified since the country 
is characterized by serious regional inequalities and the concentration of the 
population afflicted by deep poverty is increasing in disadvantaged regions. 
Moreover, the territorially based marginalization of poor groups due to eth-
nicity is growing. However, the program is capable of tackling, again, only one 
segment of this complex problem; what is more, it does so at the level of an 
intermediary territorial unit, i.e. small regions. As a consequence, inequalities 
within small regions will probably grow, given that the centres of these small 
units appropriate the majority of resources. Thus only the centres of the pe-
riphery will become reinforced, while marginalized small villages will remain 
excluded from resources and opportunities. Besides, the relevance of the eth-
nicity-oriented approach, as a horizontal principle, can be detected here, too, 
only at the same level as in the case of implementing operative programs in 
general: the mere appearance of cooperation with Roma organizations proved 
to be sufficient for obtaining support. At the same time, the mass of mostly 
Roma families living in deep poverty, increasingly deprived of opportunities 
10 Guide on the development 
program of the 33 most disad-
vantaged small regions: www.
nfu.hu/lhh.
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and lacking any trained and active earners, becomes ever more concentrated 
in increasingly marginalized villages and areas.
Therefore, in theory, it would be possible to reach unemployed Roma in 
significant proportions by using territorial, economic, and social categories, 
such as disadvantaged region, small region or settlement (applying indicators 
such as the size of settlement, GDP per capita, level of education) without 
necessarily conferring ethnic framing to the support program. However, the 
programs fail to accomplish their goals and reach the most deprived when 
these dimensions are not taken into account simultaneously. In this case, the 
group of beneficiaries “shifts upwards” by a few social layers and moves fur-
ther by a few kilometres, thus reinforcing the already severe social and ter-
ritorial inequalities.
“Away from labour”
Previous attempts to enhance the employment of Roma (among others) – that 
were more problematic than successful – were replaced by a new “paradigm” 
in the past year. On December 15, 2008, Parliament adopted a legal modifi-
cation that radically changed the provisions concerning the beneficiaries of 
regular social assistance. The underlying aim of the modification was to real-
ize the program called Path toward labour the conception of which was ap-
plauded by the majority of local and national politicians, while eliciting am-
bivalent reactions among experts. This new paradigm removes the concept 
and practice of social assistance from the context framed by the principle of 
neediness, reframing it in terms of abilities: henceforward, eligibility is de-
termined by merits gained on account of hard work.11
Our reason for discussing the program Path toward labour in this arti-
cle is that this seems unavoidable when dealing with government programs 
compensating for the exclusion of Roma from the labour market. While not 
using ethnicity explicitly as the basis of targeting, it must be noted neverthe-
less that the initiative is regarded by those conceiving and implementing it, 
as well as in public opinion and the media, as the framework employment 
program for Roma living on welfare. The previous Minister of Social Affairs 
referred to “Roma”, “disadvantaged” and “people with a low level of educa-
tion permanently excluded from the labour market” alternatively in his/her 
communiqué at the time of announcing the program (Szűcs, 2008), and ar-
ticles and statements of major actors treating the group of eligible people and 
the permanently unemployed Roma as equivalent categories are abundant in 
the media.
County-level data provided by the National Employment Service also lead 
to the conclusion that one of the most important target groups of the pro-
gram is represented by the Roma population that has permanently been ex-
cluded from the formal labour market. Considering their distribution with-
11 The program Path toward 
labour was commented on by the 
Minister of Social Affairs in this 
way: “Those unfit for work may 
be assisted by financial aid, how-
ever, those able to work should 
receive jobs.” (Szűcs, 2009.)
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in the unemployed population (and, specifically, among the permanently 
unemployed), the ratio of the subjects of the Path towards labour program, 
that is, of those eligible for disposition assistance,12 is in direct relation to the 
percentage of Roma in the respective counties. Thus 35–40 per cent of the 
unemployed received disposition assistance, i.e. they were obliged to perform 
public work, in counties with a large Roma population (Borsod-Abaúj-Zem-
plén, Szabolcs-Szatmár, Baranya, Somogy, Nógrád, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok), 
while this rate varied between 10 and 20 per cent only in counties scarcely 
populated by Roma.13
In the view of several experts, the program had many ambiguous side ef-
fects. Economists claim that linking social assistance and employment in this 
way is miscarrying in the economic sense, since there is either no demand 
for the labour performed in jobs that were created in this manner, or, when 
such demand is present, the program exerts a drive-out influence: jobs real-
ized in terms of public employment tend to be extracted from the primary 
labour market. The drive-out influence of public employment will become 
especially problematic in the event that the presently proposed legal modi-
fication enters into force, making actors of the market able to participate in 
the Path toward labour program as employers.14 While acknowledging its 
good intentions – concerning the gradual reintegration of people excluded 
from jobs in the labour market – it is hard to assess the distorting effects this 
proposal might have once it becomes reality: currently 95 per cent of the 
wages and contributions of employees participating in the Path toward la-
bour program is covered by the state, while employers are obliged to pay only 
5 per cent of the costs.
The state presently spends an estimated 120 billion HUF on public employ-
ment15 knowing that, among policies supporting active employment, this in-
strument has absolutely no positive bearing on the employability of the people 
concerned.16 Instead of supporting integration in the primary labour market, 
public employment even hinders this process: as a result of taking temporary 
and short-term jobs, closely linked to receiving social assistance, employment 
becomes highly instable, and people hovering between public employment 
and welfare are increasingly helpless (Kertesi, 2005). In analyzing the life 
history database of the National Employment Service, Tardos (2006) draws 
the following conclusion:
“…registering these people as »temporarily employed unemployed« would 
much more correspond to reality. (…) It is as if employment centres have »giv-
en up« on helping these people get back to the primary labour market by us-
ing the rest of the means supporting active employment.”
Objections against the proposition were raised by scholars of this subject 
matter claiming that it could reinforce the already strong ethnic character of 
public employment and increase the defencelessness of permanently unem-
12 The new unemployment benefit 
system that was introduced in 
2008 targets long term unem-
ployed inactive people in the so-
cial welfare system. This scheme 
– called ’benefit for those who are 
at disposal’, shortly ’disposition 
benefit’ – prescribes compulsory 
public employment for those on 
welfare.
13 National Employment Service, 
May 2009. http://www.afsz.hu/
engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_
stat_telepules_adatok_2009
14 “Erika Szűcs says that, in its 
present state, the Path towards la-
bour program needs several correc-
tions to be accomplished by means 
of the legal modifications taking 
place in the fall. […] On the side 
of employers, private companies 
would also be represented along-
side local governments. http://
www.origo.hu/itthon/20090801-
ut-a-munkahoz-program-a-
munkakeresokon-segit-a-tartos-
munkanelkulieken.html.
15 According to the statistics dis-
played on the homepage of the 
National Employment Service, 
the number of beneficiaries of 
the assistance for those being at 
disposal is almost double previous 
estimations.
16 According to the impact as-
sessment of the National Employ-
ment Service, with the exception of 
public employment, all the means 
supporting active employment are 
capable of redirecting a significant 
part of those concerned by these 
policies to the primary labour mar-
ket: every other person participat-
ing in labour market training found 
employment after the end of the 
program; two thirds of the people 
receiving subsidized wages for a 
period of time had their contract 
finalized afterwards; three thirds 
of the beneficiaries of assistance for 
first-time entrepreneurs managed 
to stay in the market even after 
they stopped receiving this kind of 
support. Only public employment 
has no positive effects whatso-
ever: in 2008, 0.7 per cent of the 
participants in the program were 
able to find a job after the period 
of supported employment – this 
rate is lower even compared with 
the employment opportunities of 
those who did not receive this type 
of support (Tajti, 2008).
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ployed Roma people vis a vis institutions. It is presumed by respected experts 
of Hungarian social policies that the proposition contributes to the ethniciza-
tion of public employment, the division of the poor into groups deserving and 
not deserving social assistance, the control of the permanently unemployed 
by local authorities (and potentates) and their defencelessness vis a vis insti-
tutions (Ferge, 2008, Szalai, 2009).
The fact that circumstantial criteria – short period of employment, lack of 
training, absence of appropriate jobs – were included in legislation indicates 
that the creators of the program did not really mean to promote the objective 
of reintegration into the labour market. We had an opportunity to observe 
the way in which the Path toward labour program isolates the permanently 
unemployed, creating a ghetto even within this population, whilst doing field-
work related to other inquiries. Apart from a few minor exceptions, workers 
participating in the Path toward labour program were employed by two em-
ployers: the local government of the town (more precisely, its affiliated compa-
ny dealing with urban economy) and the minority self-government. One does 
not need an extraordinary imagination to picture the ethnic distribution of 
employees. At the same time, instead of providing employment to all the un-
employed Roma living in urban areas, Roma minority self-governments gave 
jobs only to those living in problematic neighbourhoods, i.e. ghettos. It did 
not take long (only a few months) until institutionalized ethnic-social ghettos 
developed within the population of public employees: the local government 
and its affiliated companies got rid of the constraint of employing problematic 
and “undeserving” Roma living in the urban ghetto who were too difficult to 
handle. This task was delegated to Roma minority self-governments.
It should have been already obvious at the stage of devising that the Path 
toward labour program did not ensure a path toward labour, instead, it es-
tranged people from the labour market by perpetuating and stabilizing wel-
fare-dependence and providing an opportunity to ghettoize participants, i.e. 
create an ethnic divide between them. In analyzing the documentations of 
the program, Júlia Szalai argues that this prospect already represented a theo-
retic possibility when the program was being planned.
“In my opinion, [the act] represents a milestone with regard to the ethniciza-
tion of poverty and the institutionalization of ethnicized poverty. The signifi-
cance of this development lies in the fact that […] the first act was born that 
explicitly and legally ensures a clear, organizational and procedural separa-
tion of the local Roma ghettos of social policies from the support system of 
poor people belonging to the majority”. This is accomplished by “dividing the 
permanently unemployed into two groups, in the case of one the conferring of 
public money in the form of welfare is still regarded as justified, while those 
belonging to the other one, seen as »habitual slackers«, are subjected to com-
pulsory employment controlled by authorities.” (Szalai 2009.)
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In view of all the above, the Path toward labour program does not lead to 
employment or encourage value-generating activities but realizes a kind of 
compulsory employment that fails to increase welfare, either at individual 
or social level. Why do we think this is so? First, in practice, public employ-
ment shows no differences from occasional labour in terms of the content 
of the job and its temporary character as well as the dependence implied in 
these conditions.
Second, illegal workers are persecuted severely: anyone caught doing unre-
ported work loses eligibility for any type of social assistance – even though 
illegal work, in fact, is a type of value-generating activity since there is de-
mand for it. The reason why it is illegal is that the low qualified workforce 
employed in such jobs does not produce related contributions and other public 
costs. At the level of the individual, the program drives people concerned to 
develop false assumptions and hide facts, since it is as clear as day for anyone 
familiar with the situation of people living in deep poverty and permanently 
dependent on welfare that social assistance, in itself, is insufficient to ensure 
a basic livelihood and thus it must always be complemented by income com-
ing from other sources.
Our third contention regarding the Path towards labour program is that 
it encloses the permanently welfare-dependent population into a negative cy-
cle of social assistance and public employment that is virtually impossible to 
abandon, since employment policies hardly, if at all, promote any way out.
The fourth problem is that in many settlements – especially in villages 
characterized by a high unemployment rate – self-governments are simply 
unable to provide reasonable employment to all inhabitants receiving dispo-
sition assistance.17 The most critical aspect of the program, in our opinion, 
is that it stigmatizes those on welfare by dividing the socially needy popula-
tion into two groups: one required to work and another one eligible for wel-
fare: i.e. people in public employment do not deserve social assistance unless 
they work for it.
Concluding remarks
Reviewing the series of employment policies implemented during recent years, 
the situation appears to be rather disappointing. The way of thinking con-
cerning social assistance has changed several times during this period, each 
approach having some justifiable elements. However, none of these schemes 
have managed to influence the indicators of employment concerning the Roma 
population, whether in an absolute or a relative sense. The system is character-
ized by a host of problems, ranging from the definition of target groups, objec-
tives and priorities, to determining indicators and the methods of tendering, 
or organizing the system of monitoring and impact assessment.
17 “I can’t have our single street 
swept three times a day, or the 
cemetery cleaned every day. 
This village can give jobs to 3 
or 4 people, while there are 40 
on welfare. All I can do is have 
more than enough people do 
one job, which makes no sense 
at all”, said the major of a dead-
end village with a high rate of 
unemployment. (Kint és bent 
háromszor. [In and out three 
times.] OTKA 73015. Head of 
research: Éva Kovács).
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An important task when devising programs consists in the accurate defini-
tion of the target group. In trying to avoid supporting people who are not truly 
in need, the hosts of programs (governments and governmental institutions 
or large civil organizations) often commit the error of not paying enough at-
tention to ensuring that those in need have access to assistance.
Impact assessment, too, represents a challenge that must be faced in order 
to enable the successful functioning of programs. Ever since support programs 
have appeared in Hungary, the absence of pre-planning studies, monitoring to 
trace the process, and subsequent evaluation, or the effectively formal nature of 
such exercises, represent notorious problems. Evaluation and monitoring – if 
undertaken at all – tend to refer only to the formal (legal or administrative) 
and financial aspects of implementation, while failing to indicate the extent 
to which the programs have been able to realize the intended objectives. In 
fact, not a single penny should be spent from public monies without provid-
ing accurate data concerning end results. This is a crucial condition not only 
regarding the evaluation of the program in question but also with respect to 
devising further programs.
The report of the State Audit Office cited above underlines the lack of a 
unified monitoring system. Although there have been governmental initia-
tives to make up for this deficiency,18 these were exhausted, as endeavours of 
this kind often are, well before producing actual results. With reference to, 
among other documents, the statements of several European Union organi-
zations and the 2005 annual report of the State Commissioner of Minority 
Rights,19 the report of the State Audit Office adopts an unambiguous stance 
with regard to the usefulness of collecting ethnic data in resolving this prob-
lem. As for our part, we recommend a much more cautious approach to this 
issue. Although it is legally possible, the collection of ethnic data raises a lot 
of ethical and methodological concerns. First, who would be responsible for 
classifying clients according to ethnic membership in offices and institutions, 
and according to what criteria would this be done? Whether such a system of 
classification is based on ascription or self-identification in determining ethnic 
belonging, it is unclear how one should conceive of those defined as Roma, 
as long as one accepts the thesis that ethnic categorization is by no way an 
objective category – what is more, ascription as well as self-identification are 
largely determined by particular situations. Besides, in the present national 
context (wide-spread anti-Roma attitudes and deficiencies of data protection), 
the question whether the collection and maintenance of such data by institu-
tions should be permitted poses a serious dilemma. Thus the reliability of this 
method is highly questionable, while it involves severe social risks.
Taking the fact that ethnic belonging is a horizontal principle in operative 
programs as a starting point, the consideration that impact assessments should 
include the access of programs by the Roma population is a legitimate prop-
18 “The Monitoring Office 
started its operations in April 
2004. As a first step, coordina-
tion was established between the 
Monitoring Office, belonging 
first to the Government Office 
of Equal Opportunities and then 
its legal successor, the Ministry 
of Family, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities, and the 
other ministries, to manage the 
planning and regular evaluation 
of programs related to the pro-
posed measures. The methodol-
ogy of operating the monitoring 
system and devising indicators 
has been elaborated. In modify-
ing the governmental resolution, 
questionnaires to be used for 
the purpose of unified profes-
sional and financial reporting 
have been introduced. However, 
the monitoring system has not 
been instituted in full measure. 
The Monitoring Office operated 
at the ministry responsible for 
governmental coordination un-
til mid-2006, and subsequently 
it ceased functioning.” (ÁSZ, 
2008. p. 56.)
19 “According to the dominant 
point of view, the collection and 
handling of ethnic data is in-
dispensable, both with regard 
of the protection of minorities 
and enforcing equal opportuni-
ties; without creating appropri-
ate databases, it is impossible 
to establish truly efficient and 
adequate systems of minority 
protection, or develop policies 
and legal institutions to com-
bat discrimination. (…) The 
characteristic fields where the 
collection of ethnic data has 
relevance are the following: 
employment, education, health 
care, jurisdiction, immigration, 
housing and personnel employed 
in administration.” (Introduc-
tion of the 2005 annual report 
of the State Commissioner of 
Minority Rights. Quoted in ÁSZ 
(2008) p. 57.)
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osition. However, this does not necessarily presume the collection of ethnic 
data by governmental offices and implementing organizations. Besides, the 
realization of two, independent evaluations also seems to be more reasonable 
from a methodological point of view.
1) The inspection of the administrative requirements in proposed fields may 
be realized using data collected by organizations implementing the programs, 
in a unified system of reporting, by applying well-defined indicators.
2) However, it is more justified to employ researchers who are independent 
from the organizations implementing the programs in order to examine the 
enforcement of equal opportunities as a horizontal principle and the access 
of programs by, and their impacts on, the Roma population. In recent times, 
there have been a number of research studies that, independently of one an-
other, attempted to describe the situation of Roma in Hungary. These projects, 
having significant merits themselves, used different methodologies and defini-
tions of ethnicity in selecting their sample – yet, by making cross-references, 
they tried to draft a tendentious image of the transformation of the conditions 
of the Roma population. Thus a reliable and professionally sound impact as-
sessment should be based on regularly repeated panel surveys using identical 
methods, definitions of Roma, and ways of selecting the sample.
The most fundamental issue, however, is represented by a dilemma beyond 
the scope of this article: the problem whether the current paradigm of employ-
ment politics can be maintained. Hungarian employment politics, at present, 
is based on state support, that is, it consists in forms of employment financed 
from the central budget that are barely connected with the competitive sec-
tor. At the same time, the interests of the unemployed (and society at large) 
would be served by enabling as many people as possible to find jobs useful in 
generating values. The potential use of employment policies in promoting 
this goal can be tackled here by setting forth a few ideas, not intended to be 
exhaustive, with the aim of initiating a debate.
1) The employment of people with a low educational level should be pro-
moted even at the cost of granting significant exemptions from paying con-
tributions and tax allowances to employers, since it is a well-known fact that 
the opportunities of people occupying this social stratum in finding legal 
and permanent employment are especially meagre. This solution would also 
be useful in “whitening” the massive illegal employment of people in such a 
situation.
2) The transition from supported employment (or social assistance) to the 
primary labour market should be made gradual. Countries that are successful 
in the field of employment policies have introduced support systems in which 
social assistance is gradually diminished as permanently unemployed benefi-
ciaries become reintegrated into the labour market. This approach would be 
especially relevant in Hungary where, due to high rates and taxes, low-skilled 
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workers are hardly ever employed on a permanent basis. Few people are willing 
to give up the apparently stable social assistance for some insecure job.
3) The mobility of the workforce should be promoted. A significant pro-
portion of the permanently unemployed live in settlements that are difficult 
and expensive to access by public transport. Employment policies could have 
an important role in resolving this problem, both regarding the reduction of 
costs, and the reorganization of transport.
4) The functions of enforcing agencies should be reconsidered as well. The 
key actors in this field are represented by employment organizations, including 
the National Employment Service and its employment centres at county and 
small regional levels. At present, these organizations operate much more like 
authorities (dealing with the registration of the unemployed and determin-
ing their eligibility for allowances, taking record of the needs of employers, 
granting and recording employment allowances) than like service providers 
offering individualized assistance to those in need. A feasible solution would 
be the separation of functions to those appropriate for authorities and others 
suitable for service providers, since the former obviously suppress the latter and 
also require the development of another kind of relationship with clients.
5) The provision of services to clients by employment organizations must be 
fundamentally changed. According to the interior statistics of the National 
Employment Service, an average of 5 to 8 minutes are warranted to clients, 
which is obviously insufficient for helping a client who has been out of work 
for a relatively long time to find a job: beyond registration, at best, he or she 
will be offered a few telephone numbers. However, all the involved actors 
know perfectly well that such a service is unsatisfactory. A client lacking fun-
damental abilities and expertise in finding a job needs personalized assistance. 
The reinforcement of service providing functions involves securing the physi-
cal proximity of services and clients. While centres are located in the centres 
of small regions, clients characteristically come from distant villages that are 
expensive and time consuming to access by means of public transport. At 
present, clients are expected to reach centres, instead of having the personnel 
of centres, driving a service car and equipped with a laptop, receive clients in 
certain hours at various settlements belonging to the centre.20
If employment policies managed to adopt these terms of procedure, probably 
a great number of permanently unemployed people – including many Roma 
– could be successfully reintegrated into the labour market; a lot more than 
in the strongly paternalistic practice that currently prevails.
20 We know of only one instance 
where this has been done: the 
employment centre of Komló 
operates a mobile office.
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4. segregation of Primary schooLs in hungary. a descriPtive 
study using data from the nationaL assessment of basic 
comPetences of 20061
Gábor Kertesi and Gábor Kézdi
Introduction
This study looks at segregation in the Hungarian primary school system 
(primary schools in Hungary cover grades one through eight). Segregation is 
understood to be the separation of students of different family background 
between schools or, within each school, between classes. We focus on segrega-
tion by ethnicity (Roma versus non-Roma students) and social disadvantage 
(using two measures, one income-based and one based on parental education). 
We use data from the National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM: 
Orszagos Kompetenciameres) of year 2006. The OKM is a yearly national 
assessment test that covers all schools, and within each school, all eight grad-
ers (as well as some other grades). Our main contribution is descriptive: our 
data covers all primary schools in Hungary, and thus we are able to provide a 
national description. While a few excellent studies analyzed school segrega-
tion in certain cities or regions, this is the first complete description in post-
communist Hungary.
The next section introduces the data and the measurement methods. We 
turn to the descriptive analysis afterwards. We show statistics of segregation 
between schools and between classes within schools; in addition to national 
averages, we show regional differences and establish long-term trends. We 
also estimate reduced-form regressions to shed some light on the factors that 
may affect the level of segregation. Finally we compare our findings to those 
from the United States.
Data
We use data from an administrative dataset with national coverage, the Na-
tional Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM) of 2006. This was the first 
of the Hungarian student assessments that covered entire cohorts of students. 
Besides the tests themselves, the data also includes supplementary informa-
tion collected from school principals and from the students (and their fami-
lies). We use data from those supplementary questionnaires to measure the 
background of students within schools and classes.
The OKM has tested students in standardized ways since 2001. Typically, 
two tests are administered to students of grades 6, 8, and 10; one in reading 
1 The authors thank Nándor 
Németh for his help in drawing 
the maps and Győző Gyöngyösi 
for his excellent research as-
sistantship. Funding from 
NFÜ (project 267/2008) and 
the Jedlik Ányos program (B2-
2006-0016), as well as from 
OTKA (68523K) is gratefully 
acknowledged.
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comprehension and one in mathematics. Participation in the assessment is 
compulsory. The assessment is run by the National Education Office (Oktatasi 
Hivatal). Similarly to the widely known PISA tests, the OKM aims at meas-
uring working knowledge (“competence”) as opposed to textbook knowledge. 
Testing takes place in May; additional individual data is collected at the time 
of testing, while school-level data is collected in the preceding fall.
All education institutions with students between grades 1 and 12 partici-
pate in the assessment (with some exceptions; see later). Starting with the 
school year of 2005/6, all students in certain grades (4 and 8 in 2005/6) are 
covered. As well as the tests themselves the OKM collects school-level infor-
mation from principals and student-level information from the families of the 
students. Students and their families fill out the family background question-
naire at home and hand those in to the school in sealed envelopes. The goal of 
the supplementary data is to assess the performance of schools and students 
conditional on various characteristics. The school-level questionnaire is filled 
out by the school principals. Some institutions have two or more units under 
different addresses that may be quite far from each other.2 The information is 
collected not only at the level of the institution but also its units. We analyze 
unit-level information in this study as opposed to institution-level information 
because the possibility of physical contact between students is an important 
element in the measurement of segregation. From that point of view, differ-
ent units of the same institution are de facto different schools. Throughout 
the entire study we use the word “school” to denote such a unit. We use both 
school-level and student-level data from the year 2006 assessment.
The school-level questionnaire includes the number of students by grade. 
Among many other questions, it asks the school principal to estimate the frac-
tion of students in various categories, including ethnicity (Roma) and receipt 
of child support from the municipality (one of the official measures of social 
disadvantage). As a result we can estimate the number of students in each cate-
gory. These fractions are asked for students in “primary school” and in “second-
ary school,” separately. The Hungarian system is somewhat eclectic in the sense 
that while most primary schools cover grades 1 through 8 and most secondary 
schools cover grades 9 through 12, some secondary schools admit students in 
grade 7 and some as early as grade 5. 8th graders in secondary schools are con-
sidered as a strongly selected group of students with higher achievement levels 
and richer family. As a result, not all 8th graders are in primary schools. It is also 
true that not all primary schools cover all eight grades. In order to impose con-
sistency on our estimates, we excluded all secondary schools from the analysis. 
This is likely to lead to a downward bias in measured segregation as the excluded 
secondary schools have very few Roma or disadvantaged students.
Our measures of between-class segregation within schools are based on 
student-level variables of 8th graders, from the family background question-
2 86 per cent of the primary 
schools in our final sample have 
one unit, 11.4 per cent have two 
units, 2 per cent three and less 
then one per cent more than 
three.
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naire, aggregated up to the class level. Two variables are used: whether the 
student’s family received child support from the municipality (the same in-
dicator of social disadvantage that is used at the school level), and whether 
the student’s mother has 0–8 grades of education. Table 4.1 summarizes the 
definitions and data sources
table 4.1: data definitions and sourcesa
Level of segregation
Data definitions
Roma ethnicity
Disadvantaged 
(those who receive child support 
transfers “rendszeres gyermek­
vedelmi tamogatas”)
Mother’s education 
(mothers with 0 to 8 grades  
of education)
Between-school separation 
school = unit with a single post-
al address (analysis restricted 
to towns and cities)
source: OKM school question­
naire 
questions: According to your 
assessment, what is the per­
centage share of Roma students 
among primary school stu­
dents? 
respondent: school principal or 
head of the unit 
content of the variable: the 
estimated fraction of Roma 
students among all primary 
school students
source: OKM school question­
naire 
questions: According to your 
assessment, what is the per­
centage share of students who 
receive child support from the 
municipality (“rendszeres gyer­
mekvedelmi tamogatas”) among 
primary school students? 
respondent: school principal or 
head of the unit 
content of the variable: the 
estimated fraction of disadvan­
taged students among all pri­
mary school students
Within-school (unit), between-
class separation (analysis re­
stricted to schools with at least 
two classes in grade 8)
source: OKM family background 
questionnaire 
questions: Does your family 
receive child support (“rendsz­
eres gyermekvedelmi tamoga­
tas”) from the municipality? 
respondent: student together 
with family 
content of the variable: at the 
individual level: whether the 
student’s family receives child 
support from municipality (bi­
nary variable); at the class level: 
the fraction of such students
source: OKM family background 
questionnaire 
questions: What is the highest 
level of educational attainment 
of your mother or step­mother? 
respondent: student together 
with family 
content of the variable: at the 
individual level: whether the 
student’s mother has 0–8 
grades of education (binary 
variable) at the class level: the 
fraction of such students
a OKM = National Assessment of Basic Competences of 2006 (referring to school year 
2005/6).
Despite having the aim of national coverage, the actual coverage of the OKM 
is incomplete in several ways. The school-level data is missing from 60 schools. 
Students of “special educational needs” (SNI in Hungarian abbreviation) do 
not participate in the assessment and thus their family background informa-
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tion is also missing. 20 of the 60 schools with completely missing data have 
SNI students only. Since Roma and disadvantaged students are significantly 
overrepresented in such schools, their omission is likely to lead to an underes-
timation of between-school segregation. Item non-response on the fraction of 
Roma and of disadvantaged students is small but non-negligible: it is around 
7 per cent overall but well above 10 per cent in the big cities. Individual data 
is missing for students that were absent on the day of the assessments or did 
not hand in their family questionnaire. Some 90 per cent of all students in 
the target grades took the test, and around 85 per cent of them handed in the 
family background questionnaire. We conducted some simulations in order to 
see the effect of missing data on the segregation measures we use. The results 
of those simulations suggest that the average measures are likely to be slightly 
downward biased. However, the measures for individual towns or regions can 
be severely biased (likely downward). Therefore, our estimates should not be 
used at the town or regional level.
Quite naturally, segregation between schools is defined in regional units 
with at least two schools. Since only a handful of the villages satisfy this cri-
terion, we dropped those and restricted the analysis to towns and cities. Simi-
larly, segregation between classes of eight-graders within schools is defined in 
schools with at least two classes in grade eight. The next section introduces 
the measures of segregation we use.
Measurement
Following the literature (e.g. Clotfelter, 2004), we measure segregation with 
the help of the following three indices: exposure of majority students to the 
minority (ET), exposure of minority students to the majority (EK), and the 
standardized version of these indices, called here as the segregation index (S). 
In order to define and interpret these indices, let’s work with the following 
notation (we consider between-school segregation in towns; segregation at 
other levels are measured in analogous ways).
Nji is the number of students in town j in school i,
Mji is the number of minority students in town j in school i,
Nj is the number of students in town j,
Mj is the number of minority students in town j,
pji is the fraction of the minority students among all students in town j in 
school i,
pj is the fraction of the minority students among all students in town j,
(1 – pji) is the fraction of the majority students among all students in town 
j in school i,
(1 – pj) is the fraction of the majority students among all students in town 
j,
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(Nji – Mji)/(Nj – Mj) the fraction of majority students in school i among all 
majority students in town j,
Mji/Mj the fraction of minority students in school i among all minority 
students in town j,
Index EjT measures the exposure of an average (a randomly chosen) majority 
student in town j to the possibility of meeting minority students.3 EjT  is equal 
to the fraction of minority students in each school, averaged over schools, 
where the average is taken with weights that are equal to the share of majority 
students in the school in all majority students in the town. Formally:
, so that   .
The minimum value of the exposure index is zero: in such a case no contact 
is possible between minority and majority students within the schools be-
cause the schools are either all-majority (and so pji=0) or all-minority (when 
Nji–Mji=0). The maximum value of exposure is when the fraction of minority 
students in each school is equal to the fraction in the town: pji= pj. In order 
for (EjK) to make sense, we need 0 < pj < 1, i.e. there must be both majority 
and minority students in town j.
The exposure of minority students to the majority (EjK) is analogous: it 
measures the exposure of an average (a randomly chosen) minority student 
in town j to the possibility of meeting majority students. EjK is equal to the 
fraction of majority students in each school averaged over schools, where the 
average is taken with weights that are equal to the share of minority students 
in the school in all minority students in the town. Formally:
, so that   .
The minimum value of this exposure index is zero, too and EjK = 0 exactly 
when EjT  = 0. No contact is possible amount minority and majority students 
within the schools because the schools are either all-minority (1–pji=0) or all-
majority (Mji=0). The maximum value of minority exposure is when the frac-
tion of majority students in each school is equal to the fraction in the town: 
1–pji=1–pj, and this is achieved again exactly when EjT   is at its maximum. 
The two indices are intimately related:
Despite their intuitive content, the exposure indices are rarely used. The 
reason is that their value depends on the overall fraction of minority students, 
which poses a severe constraint on their use in comparing segregation across 
3 “Minority” here is defined as 
minority at the national level 
(e.g. Roma or disadvantaged 
students). In a particular school 
(or even in a particular town) 
the national minority may be 
the majority.
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time or geographic units. It is the segregation index that is intended to solve 
this problem. It is a normalized version of the exposure indices, and thus it 
retains their information content, albeit in a less intuitive way. The normaliza-
tion amounts to comparing exposure to its attainable maximum; there is also 
a reversal of sign so that higher levels of the index indicate higher levels of seg-
regation (less exposure). Intuitively, the segregation index shows the fraction 
of contact possibilities that are made impossible by segregation. Formally:
The maximum value of the index is one: segregation is at its maximum when 
the exposure is zero. The minimum value is zero: it is attained at maximum ex-
posure, when the fraction of minority students is the same in every school.
A key question in analyzing between-school segregation is within what 
geographical unit we choose for comparing its schools (i.e. what we choose 
for index j to denote). Educational policy can make the choice of compari-
son nontrivial even in the case of no school choice (i.e. when students from 
a neighbourhood have to go to a particular school). Municipalities with 
multiple schools may define admission districts in ways that can either in-
crease or decrease between-school segregation.4 School mergers or closures 
can also affect the level of segregation. Finally, small municipalities are free 
to form any coalition to manage a single common school. However, the most 
important problem behind the choice of the geographic unit in Hungary is 
the system of free school choice. In Hungary, students are free to apply to 
any school even at the primary level, and schools are free to admit students 
from anywhere after they have admitted all applicants from their own des-
ignated admission area. In principle, students can go to any school in the 
country. In practice, of course, commuting costs limit the set of attainable 
schools for each family.
The ideal geographic units of analysis are areas that are practically closed in 
terms of daily commuting to schools, i.e. areas in which (almost) all students 
that live there go to the schools that are within the area. Defining such areas 
is beyond the scope of this study. Instead we consider two alternatives: towns 
(and cities), and micro-regions. Towns and cities5 are likely too narrow an al-
ternative as a considerable amount of commuting is known to take place from 
neighbouring villages to schools in the towns or vice versa. Micro-regions6 are 
likely too wide: they cover larger distances than most families are willing to 
travel for schooling. Using micro-regions for the analysis results in covering 
the entire country, including all villages as well as towns and cities. That is a 
clear advantage over restricting the analysis to towns and cities.
For segregation between classes within schools, the natural units of meas-
urement are the schools themselves. We consider all schools with two or more 
4 The vast majority of Hungarian 
primary schools are managed by 
municipalities. Larger munici-
palities manage more schools; 
the most important decisions 
(including admission numbers 
and jobs) are at the municipal 
level. The smallest municipali-
ties (small villages) often jointly 
manage a single school.
5 193 towns or cities are consid-
ered in this study (174 towns, 18 
county centres and Budapest). 
An additional 9 towns were 
dropped from the analysis: each 
has two schools but one or both 
of them provided no data for all 
the questions used here.
6 There are 168 micro-regions 
in the country; those are the 
NUTS4 regions in terms of Eu-
ropean classification. They are 
defined by the Hungarian Sta-
tistical Office in such a way that 
much of the economic activity 
is supposed to take within the 
micro-regions (e.g. they are the 
closest definitions to local labour 
markets). Typical micro-regions 
include one town or city as the 
centre and the surrounding vil-
lages (18 of them on average).
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classes in grade eight in the school year of 2005/6. There are 1,555 schools 
in the analysis.
Results: the extent of school segregation in Hungary, 2006
Average levels of segregation between and within schools in Hungary are 
presented in Table 4.2. Between-school indices are calculated for towns and 
cities, as well as for all micro-regions. Within-school indices are calculated 
for all schools with at least two classes in grade eight. National averages are 
calculated using the number of students as weights (in the micro-region, the 
town or city, or the school). Weighted averages can be interpreted as the seg-
regation experienced by a randomly chosen student.
table 4.2: between-school segregation in towns/cities and micro-regions, and 
between-class segregation within schools. average values of the segregation 
indices (weighted by the total number of students). hungary, 2006
Indices
Level of segregation
between schools
between classes 
within schoolbwithin towns  
and citiesa
within micro­ 
regions
Exposure index of the 
majority (ET)
Roma students 0.07 0.10 –
disadvantaged students 0.20 0.26 0.18
uneducated mothers – – 0.15
Exposure index of the 
minority (EK)
Roma students 0.71 0.67 –
disadvantaged students 0.67 0.58 0.76
uneducated mothers – – 0.71
Segregation index (S) Roma students 0.21 0.23 –
disadvantaged students 0.12 0.16 0.06
uneducated mothers – – 0.07
a Budapest, 18 county centres and 174 other towns.
b 1,555 schools (school units with a unique postal address) with two or more classes in 
grade eight.
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
The main conclusions are the following. Between-school segregation (meas-
ured by S) is significantly stronger than between-class segregation within 
schools. Between-school segregation (measured again by S) is stronger in the 
micro-regions than in the towns and cities. That is quite natural as micro-
regions include all the villages, and thus school segregation, as measured 
here, includes inequality across those villages as well. On the other hand, 
the difference is relatively small. Perhaps the most interesting result is that 
ethnic segregation is significantly stronger than segregation by social dis-
advantage.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the average of the segregation indices (S), disag-
gregated by towns/city type and by larger (NUTS2) regions.
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table 4.3: average segregation indices (S) in cities, towns, and villages, 2006
Between schools Between classes within school
Roma students Disadvantaged students
Disadvantaged 
students
Uneducated  
mothers
Budapest 0.28 0.14 0.06 0.07
County centres 0.23 0.15 0.05 0.06
Other towns 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.08
Villages – – 0.04 0.06
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
Between-school segregation is stronger the larger the town. This is true both 
for segregation by ethnicity and social disadvantage. Similarly to the national 
average, ethnic segregation is significantly stronger than segregation by social 
disadvantage in all categories. In Budapest, the difference is twofold. No pat-
tern is found for between-class segregation within schools.
table 4.4: average segregation indices (S) in the large regions of hungary, 2006
Between schools Between classes
   within towns and cities within micro­regions within schools
Roma  
students
Disadvantaged 
students
Roma  
students
Disadvantaged 
students
Disadvantaged 
students
Uneducated 
mothers
Central Hungary 0.22 0.12 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.07
Central Transdanubia 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.07
Western Transdanubia 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.05
Southern Transdanubia 0.22 0.13 0.24 0.20 0.05 0.07
Northern Hungary 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.06 0.08
Northern Plains 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.08
Southern Plains 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.06
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
Regional differences in between-school segregation are significant. Segrega-
tion is strongest in Southern Transdanubia (South-West), Northern Hungary 
(North-East) and Northern Plains (East). These are the areas with the largest 
fraction of Roma and disadvantaged families. Similarly to what we found be-
fore, within-school segregation shows no similar patterns.
Segregation in towns and cities is of special interest. First, most have many 
schools7 within short distances, providing opportunities for different social 
groups to mix – or separate from each other. Secondly, they are subject to a 
single educational policy determined at the city halls. As a result, segregation 
is a result of different policies as well as residential patterns. Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 show the 193 towns and cities in our analysis on the map of Hungary, 
indicating the strength of school segregation by ethnicity and social disad-
vantage respectively.
7 Budapest has 297 schools 
(units with a unique postal 
address). The average number 
of schools in county centres is 
20 (standard deviation is 10, 
minimum is 8, maximum 37); 
the average in other towns is 5 
(standard deviation is 3, mini-
mum is 2, maximum is 14).
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figure 4.1: roma – non-roma segregation between schools  
in the towns and cities of hungary,a 2006
figure 4.2: disadvantaged – non-disadvantaged segregation between schools  
in the towns and cities of hungary,a 2006
a Of the 202 towns and cities, 9 are excluded due to missing data. These towns and all 
villages are left blank.
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006. Maps by Pannon 
Elemző Iroda.
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Individual data on the maps are rough approximations. As we noted above, 
our results are likely to be accurate on average, but they can be very inaccu-
rate at the level of individual towns and cities, due to missing data and other 
data problems.
The maps show stronger segregation in the Eastern regions of Hungary, 
both in terms of ethnicity and social disadvantage. At the same time, there is 
substantial heterogeneity within regions as well: even neighbouring cities can 
show very different levels of segregation. Besides potential measurement error, 
city-level educational policies may be responsible for those differences.
table 4.5: towns and cities where ethnic segregation is the strongest (s>0.3)  
or virtually zero (s<0.05), by the major regions of hungary, 2006
Region
Ethnic segregation between schools. Segregation index (S)
S>0.3a S<0.05
Central Hungary 1 15
Central Transdanubia 4 10
Western Transdanubia 2 9
Southern Transdanubia 7 8
Northern Hungary 8 5
Northern Plains 8 12
Southern Plains 5 11
All 35 70
a Mean is 0.46, standard deviation is 0.12, minimum is 0.31, maximum is 0.80.
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
Table 4.5 shows the number of towns and cities with strong ethnic segrega-
tion, with S>0.3 (there is 35 of them) and negligible segregation with S<0.05 
(there are 70 of them). Two thirds of the towns or cities in the strongest group 
are in the North-East, North or South-West regions of Hungary where the 
fraction of the Roma population is highest. At the same time, there are 25 
towns in the same regions with virtually zero segregation. This strengthens 
the assumption that local policies have a significant role in shaping segrega-
tion outcomes.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the estimates of between-school segregation by eth-
nicity and social disadvantage for the micro-regions of Hungary. Since micro-
regions are larger than towns or cities (they include the surrounding villages 
as well), measures of segregation are likely to be more accurate at their level.
The patterns are similar to those on Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Ethnic segrega-
tion is the strongest in North-East Hungary, ethnic segregation is stronger 
than segregation by social disadvantage, and there is substantial heterogene-
ity within regions as well.
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figure 4.3: roma – non-roma segregation between schools  
in the micro-regions of hungary,a 2006
figure 4.4: disadvantaged – non-disadvantaged segregation  
between schools in the micro-regions of hungary,a 2006
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006. Maps by Pannon 
Elemző Iroda.
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Determinants of segregation: some correlations
The results of Table 4.3 (segregation is stronger in larger cities) suggest that 
more schools or more students in a town may induce more segregation. More 
schools can, in principle, lead to both weaker and stronger segregation. Educa-
tion policy may make use of the larger supply of schools to induce more mix-
ing among students than that which residential segregation could allow (an 
example is school busing in some districts of the United States). Free school 
choice, on the other hand, is likely to lead to stronger segregation when more 
schools are available. Students of disadvantaged minorities are less likely to 
commute to distance schools, because of informational disadvantages, the 
larger burden of commuting costs on the family budget, or because of fear of 
the unknown. Table 4.6 shows the fraction of students who go to a school 
that is not the closest one to their home, by town type as well as the educa-
tional attainment of the mother.
table 4.6: the fraction (per cent) of students who go to a more distant school  
in grade 8, by the educational attainment of the mother  
and the type of the village/town/city
Education of the mother
Residence of the student
All
Budapest county centre other town village
0–8 grades 35 37 16 12 17
Vocational training 39 39 19 15 22
Secondary school 48 46 24 22 31
College 57 59 30 31 42
All 48 47 22 18 27
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
The figure excludes eight graders of secondary schools.
The table shows a substantial and fairly monotonic increase in the fraction 
of commuters with the increase of the mother’s education and the size of 
the town/city. While only 12 per cent of the children of the least educated 
mothers in the villages commute to a more distant school, the same fraction 
for the most educated mothers is 31 per cent in the villages and 57 per cent 
in Budapest.
Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between the (log) number of schools and 
the fraction of students in the schools of the geographic unit (town, city, or 
micro-region) who commute from outside the given school’s admission area. 
The figure shows results from two nonparametric regressions, one taken over 
all towns and cities, the other one taken over all micro-regions (Budapest is 
excluded from both).
Note that while Table 4.6 shows the probability of commuting by the loca-
tion of the residence of the student, Figure 4.5 shows the same probability by 
the location of the school. While the first approach is more intuitive from the 
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viewpoint of family choices, the second one is more relevant for school seg-
regation. Since virtually all commuting takes place within the boundaries of 
micro-regions, the question there is empirically irrelevant. At the same time, it 
is likely very relevant for towns and cities, as a substantial part of commuting 
from villages aims at schools in towns and cities, but a lot less the other way 
round. As we see, however, the qualitative results are very similar. The results 
of figure 4.5 show a strong positive correlation between the number of avail-
able schools and the fraction of students who commute. The relationship is 
strong and monotonically positive both among towns and cities, and among 
micro-regions. Moreover, there is no sign of diminishing effects: if anything, 
the relationship seems to be convex among micro-regions.
figure 4.5: the number of schools and the fraction of students who commute  
from outside the school’s admission area  
(nonparametric regressions, budapest excluded)
a) Within towns and cities b) Within micro­regions
Besides the number of available schools, segregation is likely to be correlat-
ed with the size of schools as well as other characteristics of the local “edu-
cational markets.” The smaller the schools on average, or the larger the size 
inequality across schools, the larger the number of small schools. Since it 
is easier for minority students to form dominant clusters in small schools 
than in large ones, the number of small schools is likely positively correlated 
with between-school segregation (this is seen most easily from the viewpoint 
of the exposure of minority students to the majority). The fraction of mi-
norities within the geographic unit may also influence the level of between-
school segregation. In principle, the relationship may be positive as well as 
negative: a larger fraction of minorities may make majority families more 
hostile or more tolerant, leading to greater or lesser demand for segregation, 
respectively, on their part. Recall that our previous results suggest stronger 
ethnic segregation in regions characterized by larger fractions of Roma in-
habitants. Therefore we expect that the relationship is positive: a larger frac-
tion of minority students in the geographic unit is associated with stronger 
between-school segregation.
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We estimate linear regressions in order to check the statistical significance 
and the magnitudes of those associations. Table 4.7 shows the summary sta-
tistics of the variables of the regressions. Table 4.8 shows the regression es-
timates with the ethnic segregation (Sroma) as the dependent variable. Table 
4.9 shows the estimates with the segregation of disadvantaged students (Sdis) 
as the dependent variable. For each dependent variable, we estimated two 
basic specifications. In one specification the right-hand side variables include 
the (log) number of schools, the average school size, and the (log) standard 
deviation of school size. The alternative specification does not include those 
three variables. Instead, it includes the fraction of students who commute 
from outside the school’s admission area. Having all four on the right-hand 
side results in strong multicollinearity and makes partial correlations impos-
sible to estimate with appropriate precision. All regressions include the frac-
tion of Roma students and the fraction of disadvantaged students. In some 
of the regressions the control variables include binary variables for Budapest 
and the major regions of Hungary.
table 4.7: summary statistics of variables used in the regressions
Variables Observations Mean
Standard  
deviation Minimum Maximum
Towns/cities
Sroma 192 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.80
Sdis 192 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.56
logI 192 2.92 1.62 0.69 5.69
N/I (in 100s) 192 3.36 0.72 0.71 7.67
Standard deviation of logN 192 0.74 0.29 0.04 2.77
Percent of commuters 192 0.42 0.16 0.00 0.63
proma 192 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.52
pdis 192 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.77
Micro-regions
Sroma 168 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.57
Sdis 168 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.43
logI 168 3.40 1.02 1.61 5.69
N/I (100 persons) 168 2.53 0.67 0.68 3.95
Standard deviation of logN 168 0.82 0.18 0.38 1.55
Percent of commuters 168 0.26 0.16 0.00 0.55
proma 168 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.54
pdis 168 0.32 0.17 0.09 0.82
Sroma = Segregation index of Roma versus non-Roma students, Sdis = Segregation in-
dex of disadvantaged versus non-disadvantaged students, I = number of schools, 
N/I = average number of students, Standard deviation of logN = standard deviation 
of the number of students in the schools. proma, pdis= the overall fraction of Roma 
and disadvantaged students, respectively, in the geographic unit.
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table 4.8: between-school segregation of roma and non-roma students. regression results
Variablesa
Towns and cities Micro­regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
logI
0.042 0.070 0,035 0,040
(5.74)** (3.86)** (3,94)** (2,03)*
N/I (in 100s)
0.002 –0.008 0,019 0,007
(0.14) (0.69) (1,27) (0,41)
Std.Dev. of logN
0.049 0.044 0,035 0,016
(1.59) (1.52) (0,78) (0,32)
Percent of commuters
0.375 0.266 0,347 0,278
(4.60)** (2.92)** (6,92)** (2,85)**
Fraction of Roma (%)
0.551 0.670 0.563 0.585 0,425 0,459 0,382 0,393
(3.79)** (4.50)** (4.03)** (3.98)** (3,79)** (4,46)** (2,91)** (3,11)**
Fraction of disadvantaged (%)
0.105 0.076 0.023 0.012 –0,010 0,059 –0,187 –0,070
(1.03) (0.70) (0.21) (0.10) (0,12) (0,73) (1,75)+ (0,67)
Budapest and region dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 193 192 193 192 168 168 168 168
R2 0.26 0.19 0.32 0.26 0,20 0,24 0,26 0,27
a See the notes of table 4.7 for the content of the variables.
Weighted least squares regressions; standard error estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity. + significant at 10 per 
cent, * 5 per cent, ** 1 per cent.
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
table 4.9: between-school segregation of disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students. regression results
Variablesa
Towns and cities Micro­regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
logI
0.018 0.045 0,012 0,042
(3.08)** (5.30)** (1,40) (4,68)**
N/I (in 100s)
0.002 –0.007 –0,009 –0,026
(0.29) (0.81) (0,93) (2,88)**
Std.Dev. of logN
0.009 0.002 0,029 –0,003
(0.55) (0.13) (1,03) (0,13)
Percent of commuters
0.229 0,192 0,078 0,066
(5.81)** (3,97)** (1,57) (1,22)
Fraction of Roma (%)
0.400 0.448 0.366 0,374 0,467 0,498 0,432 0,439
(3.45)** (4.06)** (3.42)** (3,28)** (6,69)** (7,22)** (5,32)** (5,18)**
Fraction of disadvantaged (%)
0.000 0.033 –0.027 –0,012 –0,078 –0,062 –0,227 –0,176
(0.00) (0.66) (0.47) (0,18) (1,63) (1,28) (3,80)** (2,59)*
Budapest and region dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 192 191 192 191 168 168 168 168
R2 0.23 0.28 0.38 0,32 0,35 0,34 0,51 0,44
a See the notes of Table 4.7 for the content of the variables.
Weighted least squares regressions; standard error estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity. + significant at 10 per 
cent, * 5 per cent, ** 1 per cent.
Source: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006.
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The results are qualitatively similar for segregation by ethnicity and social dis-
advantage, but the magnitudes are substantially larger when ethnic segregation 
is the dependent variable (Table 4.8). Controlling for regional dummies does 
not lead to systematic and significant changes in the other coefficients.
The number of available schools is positively associated with segregation in 
all specifications. A ten per cent increase in the number of available schools 
is associated with an increase of 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in the segrega-
tion index by ethnicity and 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points in the segregation in-
dex by social disadvantage. Average school size does not seem to be related to 
the level segregation (holding other right-hand side variables constant). The 
standard deviation of (log) school size is positively related to ethnic segrega-
tion in the sample but the relationship is statistically insignificant; it is also 
practically zero in the sample for the segregation of disadvantaged students. 
The percentage of commuting (out-of admission area) students is strongly as-
sociated with segregation. One percentage point increase in the fraction of 
such students at the schools is associated with stronger segregation by ethnic-
ity, by 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points. The association with segregation by dis-
advantage is weaker, to the extent that it becomes statistically insignificant 
in the micro-regions.
The strongest and perhaps most interesting relationship is with the ethnic 
and social composition of the geographic units. Ethnic segregation is strong-
ly associated with the fraction of Roma students in the area. A one per cent 
higher fraction of Roma students in towns or cities corresponds to half a per 
cent higher segregation. Comparing two towns, one with the fraction of Roma 
students at 5 per cent and the other one at 15 per cent (the 25th percentile and 
the 75th percentile, respectively, with the difference being equal to the stand-
ard deviation), the second town is expected to have 6 percentage points higher 
segregation index, which is almost half of its standard deviation. The same as-
sociation is 0.4 when the unit in comparison is the micro-region, a similarly 
strong relationship. The magnitude of this coefficient is virtually the same in 
all four specifications of the rest of the right-hand side variables.
The fraction of disadvantaged students does not seem to be related to ethnic 
segregation (once the fraction of Roma students is controlled for). Perhaps even 
more interestingly, the fraction of disadvantaged students is not related to the 
segregation of disadvantaged students either, once ethnic composition is con-
trolled for. It is again the fraction of Roma students that is strongly associated 
with the level of segregation, by a magnitude comparable to its relationship 
with ethnic segregation. While the two fractions are strongly correlated (by a 
coefficient of 0.51 across towns and 0.74 across micro-regions), it is ethnicity 
that contains the more important information for both segregation indices. 
While we refrain from drawing strong conclusions from these reduced-form 
regressions, we have some ideas that may rationalize this difference. The meas-
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ure of social disadvantage is likely noisier than the measure of ethnicity in our 
data, and the extra measurement error may in part be responsible for our find-
ings. Note however that social disadvantage is harder to infer than ethnicity 
for most decision makers themselves. As a result, it is possible that ethnicity is 
the more important signal and the more important basis for separation. The 
thorough analysis of the question is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Trends in ethnic segregation between primary schools, 1980–2006
The Hungarian Ministry of Education has collected data on all schools for 
decades. Its current data collection system is called KIR-STAT. Up to 1992, 
the data included the number of Roma students in each school (by grade). 
Since the practice of collecting such data involved marking each Roma stu-
dent in the school registry, the collection of this data was abolished after 1992 
as unconstitutional. Since no alternative measure was collected until 2006, 
the time trends of ethnic segregation can be analyzed with a jump between 
1992 and 2006.8
Figure 4.6 shows national averages of the ethnic segregation index between 
Hungarian primary schools in years 1980, 1989, 1992 and 2006. Part a) shows 
the average across towns/cities9 and across micro-regions (all appropriately 
weighted), as well as a single national index which treats the entire country 
as the geographical unit for school segregation.
figure 4.6: ethnic segregation between hungarian primary schools, 1980 to 2006. 
the time series of the average segregation indices (Sj)  
defined over various geographic units
a) National index, and average of city/town 
indices and micro­regional indices
b) Budapest, county centres and other towns
Naturally, the national index includes all regional inequalities in residential 
patterns. Its inclusion serves a benchmark purpose: trends in segregation with-
in towns/cities or micro-regions can be compared to the trend in the national 
index in order to assess the magnitude of increased regional inequalities. Part 
b) shows the segregation index for Budapest, and the average index of county 
centres (bigger cities) and other towns.
8 In and before 1992 the data 
was not collected separately for 
units with separate postal ad-
dresses. However, most such 
units that belong to the same 
legal school in 2006 had been 
separate schools before the mid-
1990s. As a result, school-level 
segregation in and before 1992 
is comparable to the unit-level 
segregation in 2006 without 
substantial bias.
9 Towns and cities were defined 
using the 1992 definitions.
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According to the figures, ethnic segregation was somewhat constant be-
tween 1980 and 1989, with the notable exception of Budapest which saw a 
significant rise. Starting in 1989, though, ethnic segregation between Hun-
garian schools increased substantially. For most geographic units, the rate of 
increase between 1989 and 1992 was similar to the rate after 1992. The index 
of ethnic segregation between primary schools increased from 0.07 in cities 
and towns to 0.21 by 2006, a threefold increase. In micro-regions the 1989 
level was 0.10 to increase to 0.23 by 2006. The national index rose more than 
the average index of cities/towns or micro-regions, indicating an increase 
in residential inequality. Panel b) shows that the trends in bigger cities and 
smaller towns are similar, but Budapest saw a steeper increase. The index of 
ethnic segregation in Budapest increased from 0.05 in 1989 to 0.09 by 1989 
and further to 0.27 by 2006.
Our data cannot indicate the timing of the large increase within the 1992 
to 2006 interval, but large increases in all likelihood took place at an early 
stage. The Education Act of 1993 codified the right to free school choice (fi-
nanced by the state), by then a widespread practice in Budapest and other cit-
ies. Free school choice most likely lead to large gradual increases in segregation 
(as it affected newer cohorts more than those already in school). However, the 
trends of ethnic segregation coincide with the trends of the fraction of Roma 
students in primary schools. Figure 4.7 shows the trends in the fraction of 
Roma students nationally (it is also the weighted average of micro-regional 
fractions), within cities/towns, and, in panel b) separately for Budapest, the 
county centres and other towns.
figure 4.7: the fraction of roma students in the primary schools of hungary,  
1980–2006
a) National fraction and average fraction  
in cities and towns
b) Budapest, county centres and other towns
Recall that we documented a strong cross-sectional correlation between the frac-
tion of Roma students in a geographic unit and the level of ethnic segregation 
there. A similar correlation is seen between the time trends on Figure 4.7.
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Comparing Hungarian results with school segregation in the 
United States
Whether school segregation in Hungary is small or large is perhaps best as-
sessed through international comparison. Extensive international comparisons 
are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we compare our results to those 
from the United States. The American figures were calculated by Charles T. 
Clotfelter for 331 metropolitan areas (Clotfelter, 1999). Clotfelter uses the 
segregation index (S), and he considers segregation of non-whites and whites. 
In addition to comparing the level of segregation, we also look at how segre-
gation varies with various city characteristics in Hungary and the U.S. When 
comparing school segregation in these two countries, one has to keep in mind 
that while Hungary is characterized by free school choice, the U.S. is not. At 
the same time, residential mobility is significantly higher in the U.S.
Clotfelter’s analysis is restricted to public (state) schools, omitting private 
schools. Such an omission is likely to lead to a downward bias in measured 
segregation, similarly to the effect of our omission of secondary schools that 
have students in the relevant grades. The American Metropolitan Areas are 
substantially larger than the Hungarian towns and cities. While Budapest 
would be in the upper third of the size distribution of the American cities 
considered here, the next largest Hungarian city would be in the bottom 
third.10 As we have seen above, the size of the city is in all likelihood strong-
ly associated with the level of segregation so that the large asymmetry limits 
comparisons. We compare the level of segregation of Budapest with the large 
metropolitan areas, but we use all the Hungarian towns and cities when we 
estimate the relationship of segregation and city characteristics.
Ethnic segregation between primary schools in Budapest is characterized 
by the segregation index of 0.28. This level is comparable to the segregation of 
white and non-white students in the following American metropolitan areas: 
San Diego (0.28), Phoenix (0.31) or Los Angeles (0.33). These are not among 
the most segregated American cities: the segregation index in New York City 
is 0.45, in Chicago 0.57, and the most segregated metropolitan area is that of 
Detroit (0.71, se Clotfelter, 1999, p. 494). In sum, the largest metropolitan 
areas in the U.S. are characterized by stronger segregation than Budapest, but 
a few of them have comparable levels.
In addition to their size, American metropolitan areas are different from 
Hungarian towns and cities in a number of other dimensions. Regressions 
can help in analyzing the segregation differences between the two countries 
after controlling for some of those characteristics, and they can shed light on 
whether the correlations are similar. Table 4.10 replicates the results of the 
regression of Clotfelter (1999) on the 331 metropolitan areas in the U.S. For 
comparison, we estimated the same specification on all Hungarian towns and 
10 The distribution of the 
American metropolitan areas, 
in terms of enrolled students, is 
the following. 183 have less than 
50 thousand students, 91 be-
tween 50 and 100 thousand, 39 
between 150 and 350 thousand, 
and 18 more than this (Clotfelter, 
1999, p. 393). The corresponding 
distribution of the Hungarian 
towns and cities: 78 less than 
one thousand, 68 between 1 and 
2 thousand, 33 between 2 and 
5 thousand, 9 between 10 and 
20 thousand, and one above 20 
thousand (Budapest with 96 
thousand students).
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cities (as well as without the very small towns). The dependent variable of the 
Hungarian regressions is the ethnic segregation index (Roma versus non-Roma 
students). The dependent variable in the U.S. regression is the index of segrega-
tion of whites and non-whites. The right-hand side variables include the (log) 
size of the geographic unit in terms of students, the (log of the) average size of 
schools (of school districts in the U.S.), and the fraction of Roma students in 
Hungary and fraction of Hispanic and other non-white students.
table 4.10: the association between school segregation and characteristics  
of the local schooling markets. regression results for hungarian towns and cities 
and american metropolitan areas
Right­hand side variable
Hungary, 2006 United States, 1994
Towns  
and cities
Towns and cities with 
1000 students or more
Metropolitan  
areas
segregation of Roma  
and non­Roma students
segregation of  
non­white and  
white students
Log of number of students 0,056 (6,02)**
0,045 
(4,79)**
0,074 
(11,3)*
Log of average school size –0,057 (1,79)
–0,055 
(1,16) –
Log of average size of school 
district – –
–0,041 
(5,3)*
Per cent of Roma students 0,483 (3,95)**
0,749 
(4,23)** –
Per cent of African American 
students – –
0,667 
(10,6)*
Per cent of Hispanic students – – 0,089 (2,1)*
Per cent of other non­white 
students – –
–0,280 
(1,6)
Constant 0,011 (0,06)
0,078 
(0,29)
–0,259 
(3,4)*
Observations 193 115 331
R2 0,24 0,33 0,59
Notes: Additional control variables are regional dummies (seven NUTS-2 regions in 
Hungary, six census regions in the U.S.). All regressions are weighted by the square 
root of the number of students.
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-values in parentheses. * significant at 5 per cent, ** 1 per 
cent.
Sources. Hungary: National Assessment of Basic Competences (OKM), 2006. U.S.: 
Clotfelter (1999) p. 501.
The coefficients on the number of students in the area show the relationship 
between segregation and the size of the local schooling market. The estimat-
ed coefficients are comparable and quite precisely estimated. Areas that are 
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ten per cent larger tend to be about half a percentage point more segregated 
both in Hungary and the U.S. Average school size is weakly negatively asso-
ciated with segregation, and while the coefficients are again comparable in 
magnitude, the relationship is statistically significant in the U.S. only. Areas 
where schools are ten per cent larger on average tend to be half a percentage 
point less segregated.
Perhaps most interestingly, the association between the fraction of the most 
disadvantaged minorities (the Roma in Hungary and African Americans in 
the U.S.) is strongly positively associated with school segregation in both coun-
tries, and the magnitudes are again very similar. Areas where the fraction of 
the minority is one per cent larger tend to be half a per cent more segregated 
both in Hungary and the U.S. The relationship in Hungary seems weaker than 
in the U.S. when all towns and cities are considered, but it is stronger when 
the smallest towns are dropped from the sample. Finally, the constant in the 
Hungarian regressions is larger (insignificant positive) than in the U.S. (signifi-
cant negative). While the magnitudes are meaningless themselves (segregation 
with zero per cent minorities and practically zero students), their comparison 
reveals that holding other things constant, school segregation in Hungarian 
cities is stronger than in the U.S. According to this result, it is the differences 
in those other elements (size of the schooling markets and size of minorities) 
that make school segregation stronger in U.S. metropolitan areas.
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5. measuring discrimination: questionnaires and tests
Endre Sik & Bori Simonovits
Introduction
In the broadest sense of the word, discrimination is defined as a process lead-
ing to a group of people suffering disadvantages for unjustifiable reasons. In 
countries where there are laws against it, discrimination can be simply defined 
as an infringement of these laws.
In Hungary, discrimination is likely to be everyday practice despite the 
facts that since the adoption of the directives of the European Union accom-
panying the country’s accession, the regulations – especially the law of equal 
treatment and promotion of equality of opportunity in effect as of January 
20041 – have guaranteed equal rights for minorities, and that since the Equal 
Treatment Commission (ETC) was set up in February 2005, the victims of 
discrimination may turn not only to civic organisations but also to govern-
ment institutions for justice and compensation.
This paper surveys the available research evidence on negative discrimina-
tion experienced in the labour market in Hungary. The aim of the study is 
to establish the extent of labour market discrimination or, more precisely, to 
estimate its extent relying on the results of various approaches using distinct 
methodologies.
Methods
Since the extent of labour market discrimination cannot be characterised by 
a single figure and there is not even an all-encompassing method that could 
provide a reliable estimate of the extent of discrimination,2 our analysis makes 
use of the results of several studies relying on different methods.
The first method assesses the perception of discrimination. The most im-
portant drawback of this approach is that perceptions are determined by three 
inseparable factors (the probability of discrimination, the sensitivity of the 
society and the political and legal institutional environment).
The second technique assesses the likelihood of falling victim to discrimina-
tion by surveying either the population of potential targets or a representative 
population sample. The downside of this approach is that the possibility of 
under- or overestimating the extent of discrimination based on the responses 
cannot be excluded. It may be underestimated if respondents are inclined to 
1 See Chapter 2 of In Focus on 
Act CXXV of 2003 on equal 
treatment and the promotion of 
equality of opportunity effective 
as of January 2004.
2 A further complication is that 
labour market discrimination 
tends to follow from (and at 
the same time precondition) 
educational and residential dis-
crimination, the assessment of 
which is beyond the scope of 
labour market research.
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bury their grievances, and it may be overestimated if they cannot forget old 
injustices and are keen to bring them up.
The third approach relies on the controlled experimental method of discrim-
ination testing, which poses the problem that the generalisation of the results 
of even the most carefully designed tests is not a straightforward matter.
Perceptions of labour market discrimination
In a survey of vulnerable groups – the Roma population of Hungary in our 
case – 90 per cent of respondents perceived major discrimination on the 
grounds of their ethnic origins, which is the second highest value (topped 
only by the North African population of Italy) among the 45 minorities 
– on average two in each of the EU-27 countries – participating in the sur-
vey (EU-MIDIS, 2009a). This markedly high value cannot be directly com-
pared to other indicators of labour market discrimination since the answers 
by respondents sensitive to discrimination apply to general experiences of 
discrimination in the various areas of everyday life and are not restricted to 
labour market perceptions.3
Looking at the total population, as the presumed reason for discrimination 
when looking for paid work4 Hungarians were more likely than the EU aver-
age to mention skin colour (65 per cent versus 42 per cent: +23 per cent), age 
(67 per cent: +22 per cent), gender (29 per cent: +7 per cent), a disability (50 
per cent: +9 per cent) and smoking (25 per cent: +7 per cent) (Discrimina-
tion in the European Union, 2008). The criteria mentioned with less than 
average frequency were the name of the candidate, accent, religion and ap-
pearance (such as height and weight). These figures give a direct indication of 
the perceived extent of labour market discrimination, but they have limited 
coverage as they apply to only one specific point in the labour market proc-
ess. The results suggest that skin colour and age may play a major role in la-
bour market discrimination since age-based discrimination is more likely to 
be perceived in Hungary than in any other country of the European Union 
(Sik and Simonovits, 2008).
Labour market discrimination experiences
Perceived discrimination experiences among vulnerable groups were exam-
ined by the EU MIDIS project. In each country, the groups most likely to 
fall victim to discrimination were selected on the basis of expert analysis. In 
seven of the countries, including Hungary, the survey looked into the evolu-
tion of the perceived discrimination experiences of the Roma minority over 
the past 12 months (EU-MIDIS, 2009b). When looking for paid work, one 
in three Hungarian Roma felt that they were discriminated against, which is 
the highest probability (shared with the Czech Roma) among the countries 
surveyed (see Figure 5.1).
3 In the summer of 2008 dis-
criminative behaviour was as-
sessed in nine situations (buy-
ing or renting property, health 
care, services, loan applications, 
purchases, schools, hospital-
ity services, labour hiring and 
workplace) based on a sample 
of five hundred respondents in 
Budapest and Miskolc.
4 The question was: When a 
company wants to hire some-
one and has the choice between 
two candidates with equal skills 
and qualifications, which of the 
following criteria may, in your 
opinion, put one candidate at a 
disadvantage?
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figure 5.1: Percentage of roma perceiving discrimination when looking for paid work
Source: EU-MIDIS (2009b).
Another research project compared the probability of discrimination expe-
riences among three immigrant groups resident in Hungary with the likeli-
hood of such experiences among the native population of Budapest in vari-
ous situations. The three groups were persons of Hungarian ethnicity arriving 
from any of the neighbouring countries, Chinese immigrants (from Taiwan 
or any part of the diaspora) and Muslims, most of whom were of Arabic or 
Turkish ethnicity.
As revealed in Table 5.1, immigrant status tends to increase the perceptions 
of discrimination, but this could be explained by over-sensitivity. The differ-
ence between the target groups and the control group (the majority group) 
may still not disappear, however, if over-sensitivity is controlled for. Workplace 
discrimination is substantially more likely to be perceived by each of the three 
immigrant groups than by the control group (who nevertheless perceive the 
highest level of discrimination against them in the workplace and in hiring). 
A similar pattern is observed in connection with looking for paid work with 
the difference that the Chinese group perceive less discrimination, presum-
ably because they rarely enter the majority labour market.
The population’s perceived experiences of labour market discrimination 
were also assessed in a side-survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
Labour Survey (KSH, 2008). The survey investigated whether 19–64 year old 
respondents felt discriminated against on the grounds of ethnic origins, edu-
cational attainment, health, gender, age or family status in two labour market 
situations: hiring and dismissals or layoffs.5 Looking at job applications, 16.1 
per cent of respondents felt discriminated against (for at least one reason), 
and the corresponding figure was 7.8 per cent for the scenario of dismissal. 
For both scenarios, the most frequently cited presumed causes of discrimina-
5 As no time period was specified 
in the question, respondents may 
have interpreted it as applying 
to experiences of discrimination 
over their lifetimes.
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tion were age (6.4 and 2.9 per cent) and marital status (4.1 and 1.7 per cent). 
Men were more likely than average to mention ethnic origins as the grounds 
of perceived discrimination when looking for a job, while women mentioned 
family status and age with higher than average probability.
table 5.1: Perceived experiences of discrimination in various “situations”  
among budapest natives (the control group) and three immigrant groups (per cent)
Budapest 
natives
Hungarians from 
other countries Chinese Muslim
N 600 300 300 300
Looking for work 14 30 13 47
Workplace 9 28 32 38
School 6 28 17 12
Health service 2 24 21 15
Immigration office 1 34 27 17
Police 7 9 26 10
Church 0 0 4 5
Restaurant, bar 7 9 34 20
Street 5 9 51 21
Neighbours 2 8 14 9
Shop 4 5 33 19
Public transport 3 6 38 27
Cumulated perception of discrimination 17 71 88 65
Source: Sik (2009).
A very recent project by Tárki, completed in April 2009, looked at the extent 
of perceived labour market discrimination among the active – 18–62 year-old, 
non-retired, non-student – population. For the correct interpretation of the 
data, it should be noted that as the survey questions referred to events related 
to labour hiring/dismissal and workplace experiences during the 12 months 
preceding the interview, the responses must have been affected by the ongo-
ing crisis. This is also indicated by the fact that 16 per cent of respondents 
had lost their jobs and 28 per cent of the active population had looked for a 
job at some time during the target period.
Labour market discrimination is assessed in this paper by combining the 
results of several questions into three aggregate indicators (see the section “In-
dicators of labour market discrimination” in Appendix 5). The first indicator 
is the probability of discrimination perception in labour hiring and dismissal 
among the active population (Table 5.2). This variable is labelled discrimi-
nation perceptions in labour market transition, and its cumulative value is 6 
per cent. Looking at the two directions of transition individually, the value is 
higher for hiring and lower for dismissal (5 and 2 per cent respectively).6 The 
second indicator applies to the employed population and amalgamates the 
questions related to experiences of discrimination in wage policies, promotion 
6 The considerably lower prob-
ability of perceived discrimina-
tion here compared to the OCSH 
survey is due to the fact that this 
question referred to the year 
preceding the interview.
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policies and working conditions. This variable is labelled discrimination per-
ceptions in the workplace, and its value is 9 per cent. 6 per cent of respondents 
perceived discrimination in terms of lower pay, 3 per cent mentioned a lower 
position and 2 per cent mentioned poorer working conditions.
table 5.2: Perception of discrimination among major labour market groups (per cent)
Discrimination perceptions in la­
bour market transition (active age)
Discrimination perceptions in the 
workplace (employed)
Overall discrimination  
perceptions (employed)
N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage
Total 603 6 405 9 405 11
Gender
Men 310 5 217 8 217 10
Women 293 8 188 11 188 12
Significance (χ2) 0.128 0.329 0.410
Age
18–27 years 84 15 X X X X
28–37 years 213 7 141 11 140 13
38–47 years 154 5 114 5 114 6
48–62 years 154 3 110 7 110 8
Significance (χ2) 0.002 0.025 0.014
Educational attainment
Primary 84 13 X X X X
Vocational training 209 6 150 9 149 11
Upper secondary 202 7 134 11 135 13
Tertiary 110 2 87 7 88 8
Significance (χ2) 0.016 0.662 0.743
Ethnic origins
Roma 50 12 X X X X
Non­Roma 551 6 386 10 386 11
Significance (χ2) 0.085 0.194 0.496
Settlement type
Budapest 115 4 90 18 90 20
County seat 102 9 68 4 68 7
Town 213 6 143 10 142 11
Village 174 7 104 5 105 6
Significance (χ2) 0.507 0.007 0.009
Region
Central Hungary 182 6 139 16 139 17
Northwest 71 6 53 9 53 9
West border 60 3 X X X X
Southwest 56 7 X X X X
Northern Hungary 68 6 X X X X
Northeast 92 9 X X X X
Southeast 76 7 53 2 53 2
Significance (χ2) 0.923 0.031 0.052
Note: Statistically significant values of χ2 are marked in italics, X = low cell count.
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Finally, an aggregate likelihood indicator of perceived discrimination experi-
ences in any of the five scenarios was calculated for the employed population. 
This variable is labelled overall labour market discrimination perceptions, and 
its value is 11 per cent. Its likelihood was 3 per cent for labour hiring and 1 
per cent for dismissal.
Summarising the aggregate indicators of the perception of labour market 
discrimination, the following observations can be made:7
– gender alone does not give rise to discrimination;
– age has a strong effect among both the active and the employed popula-
tions: the youngest cohorts (18–27 year olds) of both the active and the 
employed populations face a high probability of discrimination;
– educational attainment only plays a significant role in hiring and dis-
missal: respondents having primary education are twice as likely than 
average to perceive discrimination, while higher education graduates are 
three times less likely than average;
– Roma ethnicity increases the perception of discrimination in entering 
the labour market as well as in exiting it;
– settlement type, in contrast, only has an effect among the employed: Bu-
dapest residents are twice as likely than average to perceive discrimina-
tion, while the corresponding probabilities are just over half of the aver-
age for county seats and villages;
– the effects of geographical region on the perception of discrimination are 
also limited to the employed population: Central Hungary is character-
ised by twice the average probability of perceiving discrimination in the 
workplace, while only a fraction of the average value is observed in the 
Southeast and the Southwest.
It is worth adding two qualifications to the above analysis. 1) The figures 
are likely to overestimate the extent of discrimination, since employers may 
be more discriminative in a crisis-generated supply market. 2) The extent of 
discrimination tends to be underestimated in categories where there is a high 
proportion of people previously excluded from the labour market or having 
no labour market experience at all (see the low cell counts for the Roma, the 
young and the uneducated in Table 5.2), since these values apply to a pre-se-
lected group screened before entering the labour market.
Three models have been constructed to examine the effects of worker char-
acteristics on the perception of discrimination (see the section “Models of the 
perception of labour market discrimination” in Appendix 5 for the details of 
the dependent and independent variables). The results indicate that with all 
other variables controlled for, the following groups are prone to discrimina-
tion perception (Table 5.3):
7 Among the active population, 
the reasons most frequently cited 
for experiences of discrimina-
tion in labour market transition 
were firstly, having young chil-
dren (36 per cent), followed by 
age (14 per cent each for young 
and old age), and Roma ethnicity 
(14 per cent). In the workplace, 
in contrast, the most frequent 
presumed reason was young age 
(44 per cent), followed by female 
gender (29 per cent).
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table 5.3: factors affecting discrimination perceptions (logistic regression)
Discrimination perceptions in 
labour market transition, active  
(N = 602)
Discrimination perceptions  
in the workplace, employed  
(N = 399)
Overall discrimination  
perceptions, employed  
(N = 399)
Wald  
test
Signifi­
cance
Odds  
ratio
Wald  
test
Signifi­
cance
Odds 
ratio
Wald  
test
Signifi­
cance
Odds 
ratio
Gender: female/(male) 2.610 0.106 1.912 0.398 0.528 1.247 0.481 0.488 1.300
Ethnic origin: Non­Roma/(Roma) 0.000 0.991 1.007 0.215 0.643 1.737 0.000 0.998 0.000
Education (tertiary) 2.958 0.398 2.607 0.456 1.396 0.706
– Primary 2.907 0.088 5.365 2.317 0.128 3.116 0.434 0.510 1.803
– Vocational training 2.031 0.154 3.694 1.614 0.204 2.006 1.246 0.264 1.923
– Upper secondary 2.217 0.136 3.790 1.062 0.303 1.734 1.143 0.285 1.833
Age (38–47 years) 7.762 0.051 12.167 0.007 7.785 0.051
– 18–27 years 3.193 0.074 2.700 10.802 0.001 7.009 7.277 0.007 5.502
– 28–37 years 1.987 0.159 2.104 2.818 0.093 2.243 1.659 0.198 1.946
– 48–62 years 0.593 0.441 0.598 0.511 0.475 1.475 0.609 0.435 1.564
Settlement type (village) 4.410 0.220 4.276 0.233 5.134 0.162
– Budapest 0.798 0.372 0.513 3.624 0.057 3.800 2.981 0.084 3.595
– County seat 2.561 0.110 2.501 0.089 0.766 1.236 0.271 0.603 0.648
– Town 0.029 0.864 0.920 3.047 0.081 2.685 3.225 0.073 3.032
Region (Southeast) 6.993 0.321 4.573 0.600 6.574 0.362
– Central Hungary 2.716 0.099 3.495 2.536 0.111 7.036 2.179 0.140 6.076
– Northwest 0.426 0.514 0.587 2.341 0.126 6.952 3.306 0.069 10.419
– West border 0.268 0.605 0.604 1.261 0.261 4.276 0.776 0.378 3.291
– Southwest 0.051 0.821 0.837 1.009 0.315 3.755 0.002 0.968 0.936
– North Hungary 0.331 0.565 0.632 0.570 0.450 2.787 0.558 0.455 2.764
– Northeast 0.032 0.858 1.129 2.759 0.097 7.548 1.869 0.172 5.516
Employment (employed) 23.967 0.000 – – – – – –
– Self­employed, entrepreneur 0.000 0.997 0.000 – – – – – –
– Temporary work 3.229 0.072 4.682 – – – – – –
– Unemployed 21.311 0.000 8.470 – – – – – –
– Maternity leave 0.041 0.840 0.842 – – – – – –
Employment (other) – – – 0.015 0.993 0.610 0.737
– Public servant, public sector em­
ployee – – – 0.002 0.965 1.026 0.027 0.869 1.102
– Government, local government 
employee – – – 0.015 0.904 1.058 0.508 0.476 0.672
Constant 19.209 0.000 0.003 13.730 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.998 0.000
Note: Statistically significant values (Wald test level of significance is smaller than 
0.05) are marked in italics; reference categories are shown in brackets.
– women feel they are discriminated against when changing labour mar-
ket positions;
– activity status has a significant effect when changing labour market posi-
tions: the unemployed are eight times more likely to perceive discrimina-
tion than are those in employment;
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– age has a decisive effect (as has been indicated by earlier data) both among 
the active and the employed populations: among the youngest respond-
ents (18–27 year olds) the probability of perceiving discrimination in the 
workplace is seven times higher and the overall probability of perceiving 
labour market discrimination is five times higher than among the mid-
dle-aged (38–47 year olds);
– educational attainment, position, Roma ethnicity, settlement type and 
region do not have a significant effect.
We also wanted to find out whether the perception of labour market dis-
crimination had an income reducing effect after controlling for the variables 
customarily used in regression models analysing income (Table 5.4). 
table 5.4: factors explaining income differences among the active and the employed populations,  
least squares estimation
Active Employed
Discrimination perceptions  
in labour market transition
Discrimination perceptions  
in the workplace
Overall discriminations  
perception
β t Signifi­cance β t
Signifi­
cance β t
Signifi­
cance
Gender (male = 1, female = 0) 0.169 4.712 0.000 0.260 5.310 0.000 0.259 5.303 0.000
Age 0.224 0.873 0.383 –0.131 –0.344 0.731 –0.188 –0.493 0.622
Age –0.169 –0.662 0.508 0.206 0.544 0.587 0.259 0.680 0.497
Roma (Roma = 1, non­Roma = 0) –0.031 –0.869 0.385 –0.109 –2.249 0.025 –0.109 –2.245 0.025
Primary –0.364 –7.668 0.000 –0.355 –6.304 0.000 –0.350 –6.216 0.000
Vocational training –0.478 –9.735 0.000 –0.557 –8.447 0.000 –0.555 –8.429 0.000
Upper secondary –0.358 –7.630 0.000 –0.406 –6.362 0.000 –0.405 –6.354 0.000
Budapest 0.051 1.254 0.210 0.101 1.701 0.090 0.108 1.813 0.071
County seat –0.008 –0.203 0.839 0.001 0.023 0.981 0.003 0.046 0.963
Town –0.017 –0.421 0.674 0.007 0.111 0.912 0.010 0.175 0.861
Self­employed 0.080 2.323 0.021 – – – – – –
Unemployed –0.392 –10.210 0.000 – – – – – –
Maternity leave –0.139 –3.876 0.000 – – – – – –
Discrimination (yes = 1, no = 0) –0.021 –0.608 0.544 –0.041 –0.819 0.413 –0.069 –1.381 0.168
Constant 3.953 0.000 3.572 0.000 3.715 0.000
R2 0.457 0.270 0.273
* Statistically significant values (t test level of significance is smaller than 0.05) are 
marked in italics, reference categories: tertiary education, village, employee.
The expected control effects clearly emerge in the models: men’s incomes are 
higher than women’s, and each of low educational attainment, Roma eth-
nicity, unemployment and maternity leave8 reduces income to a statistically 
significant extent. Perceived discrimination, however, has no observable ef-
fect, i.e., the fact that someone has experienced negative discrimination in 
the process of hiring or dismissal, or in the workplace is not accompanied by 
a reduction in incomes.
8 The effects of activity status 
could only be analysed in the 
model of labour market transi-
tions, as the other two models 
were restricted to the employed 
population.
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Discounting the flawed solutions (the “infinity” of the time period and the 
poorly defined list of protected characteristics) contaminating the HCSO sur-
vey results, the approach relying on the perception of discrimination is likely 
to overestimate the extent of discrimination on the assumption that oversen-
sitivity may have a stronger effect than a desire to pass over incidents.
Discrimination tests among vulnerable labour market groups
Discrimination field experiments involve testing employers’ hiring behaviour 
in ordinary “real-life” situations. Since too many processes are involved in “real 
life” to be able to identify discriminative behaviour with sufficient confidence, 
the testing is carried out under controlled conditions and with carefully se-
lected tester characteristics. In this experimental setup pairs of testers are 
matched for all important characteristics relevant to the goals of the experi-
ment except for one protected characteristic tested in the experiment.9
The latest experimental data on discrimination in Hungary are provided 
by the Hungarian Bureau for Ethnic Minority Rights research project con-
ducted between February and May 2009.10 During the project period, job 
vacancy advertisements were monitored for discriminative and fair content, 
and 68 advertisers were contacted by phone in Budapest and in a county in 
the Northeast of Hungary. A trial was classed as successful provided that the 
vacancy was still available, the person answering the phone had the authority 
to answer the questions asked by the tester, all three testers – one having con-
trol and two having protected characteristics – could talk to the employer or 
the employer’s representative, and information was successfully gathered on 
both the control characteristic and each of the protected characteristics.
Similarly to previous research by Tárki (and to the majority of labour mar-
ket experiments carried out in other countries), the experiment focused on 
jobs not requiring special qualifications.11 The telephone interviews tested the 
probability of discrimination on the grounds of four protected labour market 
characteristics: social gender (male), ethnicity (Roma), family status (having 
young children) and age (45–54 year olds). The different combinations of test 
characteristics (Roma man, Roma woman, woman with young child, middle-
aged woman and middle-aged man) and the control group (non-Roma wom-
an) were presented at the job interviews by thoroughly trained testers. The job 
advertisements were selected from the electronic and printed press.
The composition of the job pool included in the experiment reflected the 
distribution of advertisements appearing in the selected papers during the 
period of data collection. About a third of the employers contacted had ad-
vertised for shop assistants, almost a fifth sought counter assistants, and the 
remaining jobs were security guards (10 per cent), telemarketing (7 per cent), 
salespeople (7 per cent), florists (6 per cent) and office assistants and secretar-
ies (5 per cent).12
9 See also Sik and Simonovits 
(2006) on the technique, and 
Otlakán (2007a 2007b), Pálosi, 
Sik and Simonovits, (2007) and 
Sik and Simonovits (2008) for 
the details of the methodology 
used in earlier field experiments 
on discrimination.
10 Macro programme 2006/018-
176.03.01, Civil Organisations 
and the Delivery of the Anti-
discrimination Act, is supported 
by the National Development 
Agency. The project runs un-
der the title of “Exploring the 
manifestations of labour market 
discrimination by monitoring 
job advertisements, testing and 
realising public demands; pav-
ing the way for fair job advertis-
ing and labour hiring.”
11 Shop assistant, cashier, sec-
retary, office assistant, door 
keeper, maintenance worker, 
counter assistant/waiting staff, 
store assistant, telemarketing 
agent, clerk, salesperson, florist, 
agricultural worker, construc-
tion worker, security guard, 
seamstress and ironing assist-
ant).
12 During the data collection 
period of the Tárki survey of 
2006, the most frequent jobs 
advertised with telephone con-
tact details were the follow-
ing: salesperson (27 per cent), 
shop assistant (15 per cent), bar 
counter assistant (17 per cent), 
telemarketing agent (18 per 
cent). Other jobs included in 
the experiments were: clerk (8 
per cent) secretary (5 per cent), 
office assistant (2 per cent), store 
assistant (3 per cent), mainte-
nance worker (2 per cent) and 
cashier (2 per cent).
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The goal of the experiments was to assess the extent of discrimination. The 
unit of analysis for our comparison must therefore be the workplace repre-
sented by the advertisements. That is, what we are interested in is which of 
the tester applicants (or which protected characteristics) were rejected and 
which of them were not. Looking at the net discrimination indicator, for the 
jobs under analysis male gender and old age unequivocally present a disad-
vantage (Table 5.5).
table 5.5: Probability of discrimination by gender, ethnic origins, age and family status
Successful trials 
(number of pairs) 
(1)
No  
discrimination  
(2)
Discrimination 
against minority 
(3)
Discrimination 
against majority  
(4)
Net  
discrimination  
(per cent)  
(5)
Male–female 54 31 16 7 17
Roma–non­Roma 46 31 8 7 2
Middle­aged–young 43 25 13 5 19
Young children–no 
children 23 18 2 3 –4
(1) Where we have information on the outcome of the interviews for all three testers 
(two protected characteristics and the control) and at least one of the three appli-
cants was not rejected.
(2) The testers with the protected characteristics and the control received equivalent 
treatment (all were rejected, or all were given a positive response, i.e., invited for an 
interview, asked to call again later or invited to submit a curriculum vitae).
(3) Only the male, Roma, middle-aged or child rearing applicant was rejected.
(4) Only the female, non-Roma, young or childless applicant was rejected.
(5) Net discrimination = [(discrimination against minority) – (discrimination against 
majority)]/(successful trials) × 100.
The interpretation of the results must take into account that the scope of the 
discrimination experiment was limited to a specific segment of the labour 
market and, within that, to the initial phase of the labour hiring process 
not involving face-to-face contact. The results therefore cannot be general-
ised either to the entire labour market or to the overall process of labour hir-
ing. Within these limits, we may conclude that for the jobs included in the 
research, women are more in demand than men, and younger applicants are 
more welcome than older applicants. In partial disagreement with the results 
of the discrimination tests of 2006 (Sik and Simonovits, 2008), no signifi-
cant discrimination against the Roma can be observed at this phase of the 
job application process.
A second analysis of the experimental data looks at the effects of the various 
combinations of protected characteristics on the employment odds of the ap-
plicants.13 As shown in Table 5.6, non-Roma and Roma women and women 
with young children were the most likely to be invited for a face-to-face in-
terview, while women over the age of 45 and Roma men were asked to send 
a curriculum vitae or to call back later with higher than average probability. 
13 In this analysis non-test char-
acteristics are not controlled for, 
i.e., the probabilities of rejecting 
control applicants versus appli-
cants with protected character-
istics are not compared on the 
basis of matched pairs.
in focus
130
The only group facing a prominently high likelihood of rejection is the group 
of men over the age of 45.
table 5.6: outcome of telephone interviews by applicant characteristics (per cent)
Face­to­face 
interview
Call again, submit 
CV, database Rejection Total
Non­Roma women (N = 68) 61 18 21 100
Roma women (N = 26) 62 15 23 100
Roma men (N = 25) 44 32 24 100
Women with young children (N = 23) 57 26 17 100
Women over 45 (N = 21) 52 33 14 100
Men over 45 (N = 25) 38 15 46 100
Total (N = 188) 54 22 24 100
Significance (χ2) = 0.195.
Separating the overt and covert manifestations of discriminative behaviour 
results in a considerably more varied picture (Table 5.7). Explicit rejection is 
defined as an unequivocal statement by the employer that the test character-
istic is the reason for the rejection (see Question 18 in the extract from the 
questionnaire shown in Appendix 5). A rejection is classed as implicit, in con-
trast, if the employer cited a reason other than the protected characteristics or 
avoided giving a specific reason but there was a change in their behaviour, e.g., 
in their intonation, tone of voice or manner of speaking or there was a sigh or 
pause before uttering their reply (see Questions 16 and 18 in the extract from 
the questionnaire shown in Appendix 5). Female testers with young children 
did not encounter implicit rejection at all, and the probabilities of implicit 
rejection display little variation across the testers representing the remaining 
characterisitcs. The probability of explicit rejection was very high for men over 
the age of 45 – almost three times higher than average. This result is, to some 
extent, contrary to the results of the 2006 experiment, in which employment 
odds in a similar domain of the labour market were examined with reference 
to ethnic origins and gender, and explicit rejection was given to Roma men 
with the highest probability (one and a half times the average), while Roma 
women were the most likely to face implicit rejection (Table 5.8).
The most important conclusions learnt from the 2009 tests are that in the 
labour market segment studied there is a higher demand for women than for 
men, and for young than for older workers, and that middle-aged men are the 
most likely to meet open rejection when applying for a job.
Risking the charge of repetitiousness, we must point out again that, simi-
larly to even the most sophisticated techniques of discrimination testing, our 
results are also subject to the problem that they cannot be generalised in time, 
space or to the overall process of labour market hiring. While it is a fact that 
women have better odds of employment than men, using this phenomenon to 
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conclude that men are discriminated against in the Hungarian labour market 
would have as much validity as using the low activity rate among the Roma 
population to infer that the Roma drive the non-Roma into the labour mar-
ket. In other words, based on qualitative and quantitative research data and 
on analyses of the wage differentials between men and women, the possibil-
ity of labour market discrimination against men may only arise in the sense 
that women exclude unfortunate men from low-wage, essentially dead-end 
segments of the labour market. This interpretation is, however, difficult to 
reconcile with the definition of discrimination discussed in the introduction 
to this chapter, which contends that for a group to be the victim of discrimi-
nation, it must suffer disadvantages of some kind.
table 5.7: outcome of telephone interviews by applicant characteristics  
in 2009 (per cent)
Face­to­face 
interview
Call again/
CV
Implicit 
rejection
Explicit 
rejection Total
Non­Roma women (N = 68) 61 18 15 6 100
Roma women (N = 26) 62 15 15 8 100
Roma men (N = 25) 44 32 16 8 100
Women with young children (N = 23) 57 26 0 17 100
Women over 45 (N = 21) 52 33 10 5 100
Men over 45 (N = 25) 38 15 12 35 100
Total (N = 188) 54 22 12 12 100
Significance (χ2) = 0.036.
table 5.8: outcome of interviews by applicant ethnicity and gender  
in 2006 (per cent)
Face­to­face 
interview
Asked to call 
again
Implicit 
rejection
Explicit  
rejection Total
Roma men (N = 88) 59 9 14 18 100
Non­Roma men (N = 88) 65 10 11 14 100
Roma women (N = 88) 57 11 21 11 100
Non­Roma women (N = 87) 69 9 16 6 100
Total (N = 351) 62 10 15 12 100
Source: Otlakán et al, 2006.
Conclusions
A clear conclusion drawn from the international comparative surveys discussed 
above is that in Hungary Roma origins and immigrant status significantly 
increase the extent of discrimination perceptions in the labour market, in 
education and in various services (e.g., health care, hospitality services, access 
to bank loans). Focusing on the perception of discrimination in the labour 
market, the unanimous message of Tárki and HCSO research is that age, es-
pecially a young age, is seen as a disadvantage both in the process of finding 
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employment and then in the workplace. The Tárki results put the probabil-
ity of in-service discrimination perceptions among the youngest cohort (18–
27 year-olds) at seven times the corresponding probability among the mid-
dle-aged (38–47 year olds), and the gap between the two groups for overall 
discrimination perception was fivefold. The HCSO data further reveal that 
ethnicity was mentioned with higher than average probability by men and 
family status by women as the primary grounds for negative discrimination. 
The Tárki results, on the other hand, suggest that Roma origins and educa-
tional attainment only increased discrimination perceptions in the process 
of entering and in the process of exiting the labour market.
Employers’ attitudes were examined with respect to the first phase of labour 
hiring in a specific segment of the labour market. The most important lessons 
emerging from the research are that most of the jobs under analysis are char-
acterised by a pronounced gender preference: there is a substantially higher 
demand for female than male counter assistants, waitresses, cashiers, shop 
assistants, seamstresses and florists, telemarketing and sales agents; and that 
in telephone job inquiries in the domains included in the research, younger 
applicants are preferred to older applicants.
Distinguishing overt and covert manifestations of rejection, it was found 
that middle-aged men were the most likely to meet overt rejection, while 
there was no significant difference between the various testers in terms of 
the likelihood of covert rejection with the exception of women with young 
children, who did not experience implicit forms of rejection at all. The data, 
however, must be interpreted with its limitations kept in mind: the pattern 
of discrimination measured by the experiment applies to a specific segment 
of the labour market and to the initial phase of the path to employment, i.e., 
the results cannot be generalised to either the entire labour market or the 
overall process of labour hiring.
aPPendix 5
Indicators of labour market discrimination
table f5.1: the scope and composition of the three variables of discrimination perceptions, 18–62 year-olds
1. Labour market 
transition 2. Workplace
3. Overall  
labour market
discrimination perceptions
Active Employed Employed
1. Whether experienced discrimination when looking for a job X X
2. Whether lost their job because of discrimination X X
3. Whether has lower income than colleagues in equivalent position X X
4. Whether has lower position than colleagues with equivalent qualifications X X
5. Whether has poorer working conditions than colleagues X X
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Models of the perception of labour market discrimination
1. Discrimination perceptions in labour market transition: the depend-
ent variable of the model is the dummy variable (0, 1) of discrimination 
experiences in labour hiring or dismissal.
2. Discrimination perceptions in the workplace: the dependent variable 
of the model is the dummy variable (0, 1) of workplace discrimination 
perceptions among the employed population.
3. Overall labour market discrimination perceptions: the dependent vari-
able of the model is the dummy variable (0, 1) of the overall perceived ex-
periences of discrimination in the labour market.
table f5.2: explanatory variables and values of the regression models analysing 
labour market discrimination perceptions, with reference categories in brackets
Variable Values Scope Models including it
Gender 1. (Male)  
0. Female Active age population 1., 2., 3.
Age 18–27 years  
28–37 years  
48–62 years  
(38–47 years)
Active age population 1., 2., 3.
Educational attainment 1. Primary  
2. Vocational training  
3. Upper­secondary  
4. (Tertiary)
Active age population 1., 2., 3.
Ethnic origins 1. (Roma)  
0. Non­Roma
Settlement type 1. Budapest  
2. County seat  
3. Town  
4. (Village)
Active age population 1., 2., 3.
Region 1. Central Hungary  
2. Northwest  
3. West border  
4. Southwest  
5. Northern Hungary  
6. Northeast (Southeast)
Active age population 1., 2., 3.
Employment type 1. Public servant, public sector 
employee  
2. Government or local govern­
ment employee  
3. (Other)
Employed population 2., 3.
Economic activity status 1. (Employee)  
2. Self­employed, entrepreneur 
3. Temporary jobs  
4. Maternity leave  
5. Unemployed
Active age population 1.
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Extract from questionnaire
(Telephone testing, 2009 – Hungarian Bureau for Ethnic Minority Rights)
15. What was the employer’s or their representative’s reaction to the given 
characteristic (Roma ethnicity, disability, age, children)?
1 – (Probably) not a problem
2 – (Probably) a problem
3 – Unidentifiable
16. What words or other means of conveying their opinion were used? Please 
cite the words used, if any, and select the code most appropriate to the re-
action.
...................................................................
1 – Said: why should it be a problem?
2 – Sighed
3 – Paused
4 – There was a change in their tone of voice or manner of speaking
5 – Hung up
6 – Other, please specify: .....................................   
17. What was the outcome of the interview?
1 – Rejection
2 – Invitation for face-to-face interview
3 – Job offer
4 – Request to call again later
5 – Request to send CV
6 – Registering caller in their database
7 – Other, please specify: .....................................
If ReJeCTed
18. Was there a reason given for the rejection?
NO 1 – No unequivocal reason
  2 – Said goodbye without giving reason
  3 – Hung up without giving reason or saying goodbye
  4 – Other: .......................................
YeS 5 – Position has been filled
  6 – No applications are accepted at present, caller should inquire later
  7 – Applicant’s unsuitability because of a certain characteristic.
What was this characteristic?
01 – Inadequate qualifications: ..........................
02 – Lack of experience:................................
03 – Lack of foreign language skills: ...................
04 – Lack of computing skills: .........................
05 – Lack of required documents: .......................
06 – ethnicity
07 – Age
08 – Marital status
09 – Something related to having children
10 – Something related to having children in the future
11 – Place of residence
12 – Smoking habits
13 – Gender
MULTIPLe ANSWeRS ALLOWed
MULTIPLe ANSWeRS ALLOWed
MULTIPLe ANSWeRS ALLOWed
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6. roma emPLoyment at the turn of the miLLennium.  
an anaLysis of the nationWide rePresentative roma survey 
of 2003
Gábor Kertesi
The five years of the economic transition brought about the dramatic collapse 
of the employment of the Roma population. By 1993, half of the Roma who 
were in employment before the economic transition had lost their jobs, and 
there was little indication of either those excluded from the labour market or 
the new generations of labour market entrants being able to reverse this proc-
ess. Although the transitional period has long passed, the structural changes 
in employment have not favoured that strata of the population at the lower 
end of the educational scale: the employment rate among the uneducated 
(those having no more than primary education) has undergone a substantial 
decline. Has the Roma population of Hungary been able to establish a foot-
hold on this increasingly steep slope? This paper undertakes to analyse the 
results of the nationwide Representative Roma Survey of 20031 in order to re-
veal whether the labour market position of the Roma population of Hungary 
has undergone any notable changes since the early 1990s. In what position did 
the Roma find themselves as the Hungarian labour market stabilised towards 
the end of the millennium? How does their situation compare to that of the 
average Hungarian worker having comparable qualifications?
The analysis focuses on the 15–49 year old age group. Combining the retro-
spective labour history data of the 1993 survey with the cross-sectional data 
of the 2003 survey, we undertake to turn the highly fragmented evidence 
available into a reasonably reliable picture of the situation characterising the 
first years of the new millennium.
The persistence of the low employment rate
The basic facts indicating the decline of employment are summarised in Ta-
ble 6.1. The observed processes suggest that the erosion of Roma employment 
started during the years preceding the economic transition: between 1984 
and 1989 the proportion of those in employment among the 15–49 year-old 
Roma population dropped by no less than 10 per cent. During the dramatic 
years of the economic transition, this drop was followed by a sweeping wave of 
job losses. More than 35 per cent of those in employment (45 per cent of men 
and 30 per cent of women) became excluded from the labour market. We can 
only speculate about what exactly happened between 1993 and 2003. What 
1 This is the latest available 
source of nationwide representa-
tive data on the Roma.
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we know for a fact, however, is that the exceptionally low employment rates 
that had evolved during the years around 1993 were essentially unchanged 
at the turn of the millennium. In 2003 Roma workers were approximately as 
likely to be in employment as they had been ten years previously.
table 6.1: Percentage of the employed 
among the 15–49 year-old roma 
population between 1984 and 2003
Year Men Women Total
1984 95 61 77
1989 85 53 67
1993 39 23 31
2003 38 20 29
Note: Full-time students and pensioners 
are excluded from the reference groups.
Source: Representative Roma Surveys of 
1993 and 2003.
A further empirically verified aspect of the story is that early retirement – see 
Table 6.2 – was a major component in the decline of Roma employment (Ker-
tesi, 2000, pp. 425–428). Around the time of the economic transition and 
during the years leading up to the economic transition, the phenomenon of 
early retirement among the Roma bloated to astonishing proportions. This 
is clearly indicated by the figures for 1993 in Table 6.2. 
table 6.2: Percentage of pensioners among the roma population  
below the retirement age (15–49 years) in 1993 and 2003
Cohort 
(years)
Men Women
1993 2003 (2003) – (1993) 1993 2003 (2003) – (1993)
15–19 1.4 0.9 –0.5 0.8 0.0 –0.8
20–24 3.3 2.2 –1.1 1.3 3.9 +2.6
25–29 3.2 4.7 +1.5 2.5 4.7 +2.2
30–34 8.5 7.7 –0.8 7.5 5.0 –2.5
35–39 10.3 9.6 –0.7 13.3 5.3 –8.0
40–44 16.9 17.6 +0.7 18.4 12.9 –5.5
45–49 35.3 26.7 –8.6 35.4 29.2 –6.2
15–49 8.7 9.3 + 0.6 8.7 7.9 –1.2
Note: Full-time students are excluded from the reference groups.
Source: Representative Roma Surveys of 1993 and 2003.
Looking at the data for the turn of the millennium, that trend does not ap-
pear to have been reversed. Although the substantially more than 30 per cent 
likelihood of early retirement among the 45–49 year-old cohort had decreased 
to a considerable extent (especially among men), the proportion of pensioners 
had increased among some of the younger (and larger) cohorts. The two ef-
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fects had essentially cancelled each other out and thus for the 15–49 year-old 
population as a whole, early retirement was as frequent as in 2003 as it had 
been in 1993. The probability of early retirement has stabilised: the pension 
system continues to admit approximately 9 per cent of men and 8 per cent of 
women below the retirement age. In what follows, the problem of early retire-
ment will be put aside, and our analyses will focus on the employment situa-
tion of the 15–49 year-old non-pensioner population.
An analysis of employment by age and educational attainment reveals simi-
larly little change over the period in question (Figure 6.1). Following the ma-
jor decline observed between 1989 and 1993, time appears to have stopped. 
Another notable feature of the graphs is that the employment gradient by 
education has become steeper (especially for men). The Roma population 
clearly follows the overall nationwide trend in this respect: a gap has emerged 
between the employment odds of workers at the lower and at the higher ends 
of the educational scale.
figure 6.1: employment rates among the roma population  
by age and educational attainment, 1984, 1989, 1993, 2003
Men Women
Note: Full-time students and pensioners are excluded from the reference groups.
Source: Representative Roma Surveys of 1993 and 2003.
The lasting shock of the economic transition
The labour history block of the 1993 Roma survey allows us to reconstruct 
the fate of those young workers (aged 20–39 in 1984) whose careers were cut 
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short by the economic transition (Kertesi, 2000, pp. 418–422). The life his-
tory of this cohort can then be followed based on the data provided by the 
survey of 2003.2 Their results can be compared to a control group character-
ised by a quasi-longitudinal age cohort based database created from a series of 
large-scale cross-sectional surveys covering the total population.3 The control 
group was created before the turn of the millennium but has been updated 
to include data from 2003.4
figure 6.2: evolution of employment between 1984 and 2003 among the generation 
aged 20–39 in 1984 (percentage of the cohort in employment in each year)
Men Women
Source: Representative Roma Surveys of 1993 and 2003, total population: quasi-longi-
tudinal age cohort based database created from the large-scale nationwide surveys 
specified in Footnotes 3 and 4.
Summarising the data on these two populations, Figure 6.2 displays the pro-
portions of those in this generation – of Roma and of the total population – 
who successfully retained their employment over the years.
So was there a way back in the nineties for those who had dropped out of 
the labour market in the great wave of job losses between 1989 and 1993? 
There clearly was not. The Roma cohort of 20–39 year olds in 1984 irrevoca-
bly carried with them the disadvantage accumulated during the years of the 
economic transition relative to their earlier position and relative to the over-
all situation of the population.
Younger generations of the Roma are in no better position. As can be seen 
in Table 6.3, in terms of employment there is an even larger gap between the 
group of young Roma men aged 20–39 in 2003 and the group of age- and edu-
cation-matched representatives of the total population than there was between 
the two equivalent groups twenty years previously. The disadvantage of 20–39 
year-old Roma women is comparable to the disadvantage of the equivalent co-
hort twenty years previously. That is, the young generation appears to recreate 
the fate of the generation driven into long-term unemployment at the time of 
the economic transition. The employment shock of the economic transition 
has proved to be a lasting shock for all successive Roma generations.
2 Using retrospective labour 
history information, in the sur-
vey of 1993–1994 a snapshot 
was taken of each respondent 
recording the respondent’s ac-
tivity status at the end of each 
year between 1984 and 1994. 
This database was expanded to 
include the age-aligned cohort 
of the 2003 survey thus creating 
a quasi time series sample for 
the first cohort (the group aged 
20–39 in 1984). Figure 6.2 was 
drawn using the figures of this 
database.
3 The samples used were from 
the Micro Census of 1984, the 
HCSO Household Panel of 1987 
and 1989, the Census of 1990, 
the HCSO Household Panel 
of 1991 and the HCSO Labour 
Surveys of 1992 and 1994. See 
Kertesi (2000) pp. 417–418 for 
the details of the method of 
calculations.
4 The third quarterly wave of the 
OCSH Labour Survey of 2003 
was used here.
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table 6.3: comparative employment rates among the roma population,  
by cohort in 2003 (per cent) (full-time students are excluded)
Cohort/difference in 
difference
Primary education Vocational training or vocational secondary education
Overall  
population (n) Roma (r)
diff:  
(n) – (r)
Overall  
population (n) Roma (r)
diff:  
(n) – (r)
Men
20–39 (1) 65.8 36.9 28.9 86.3 44.6 41.7
39–58 (2) 56.0 31.9 24.1 72.6 38.6 34.0
Diff: (1) – (2) 9.8 5.0 4.8 13.7 6.0 7.7
Diff in diff* (per cent) – – 18.1 – – 20.3
Women
(1) 20–39 39.4 17.9 21.5 59.7 35.9 23.8
(2) 39–58 49.3 27.9 21.4 65.1 40.9 24.8
Diff: (1) – (2) –9.9 –10.0 0.1 –5.4 –5.0 –1.0
Diff in diff* (per cent) – – 0.5 – – –4.1
* Diff: Diff in diff = 100 × [(1) – (2)]/[(d1 + d2)/2] where d1 stands for [(n) – (r)] for the 
20–39-old cohort and d2 stands for [(n) – (r)] for the 39–58-old cohort.
Note: Pensioners are included in the non-employed population.
Source: Representative Roma Survey of 2003 (Roma data) and Quarter 3 of HCSO 
Labour Survey of 2003 (national data).
Indications of employment instability
What could be the mechanisms underlying the recurrence of the low employ-
ment rate? For a statistical explanation, the following questions need to be 
clarified. If the current state is regarded as a permanent state (a big “if ”), it is 
supported by a balance between exits from unemployment and entries into 
employment. The two kinds of event may occur with equally high or equally 
low probabilities (Hall, 1972, Marston, 1976). If both the exit and the entry 
rates are low, there will be a low turnover combined with long employment 
periods. In this case the level of employment remains low but stable. In an-
other scenario, the low employment rate is coupled with high exit and en-
try rates.5 In this case there will be a high turnover of labour combined with 
short periods of employment. That is, employment remains not only at a low 
level but also markedly unstable. The following paragraphs attempt to dem-
onstrate that it is the latter scenario that describes Roma employment at the 
turn of the millennium.
A situation of this kind may develop as a result of either demand or supply 
factors. Unstable employment will be regenerated by demand factors if the la-
bour opportunities open to a given population are markedly unstable: if jobs 
are created and shed at a rapid rate, and thus the positions themselves have a 
very brief existence. If the problem is rooted in demand factors, it is because 
a population may have a lifestyle or alternative options that are better served 
by irregular employment even though other – more stable – forms of employ-
5 The rates of exit from employ-
ment and entry into employment 
are the ratios of exits and entries 
to the employed population in 
the base period; they measure 
annual changes.
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ment would also be accessible. An example for this situation are the seasonal-
ly engaged smallholder workers of the seventies and eighties, who, exploiting 
the excess demand for labour characterising the period, followed a strategy of 
frequent exit and entry. However, for the period following the economic tran-
sition, when the demand for unqualified workers was steadily declining, this 
labour supply-driven employment instability is difficult to envisage. Our next 
task is thus to gather all the evidence suggesting that the Roma are faced with 
extreme employment instability and that this instability is essentially ground-
ed in demand factors. Among these demand factors, a prominently important 
role is fulfilled by the solidified operating practices characterising the Hungar-
ian welfare regime. The underlying mechanisms corner Roma workers into a 
clearly delineated low-level segment of the labour market.
The following characteristics of Roma employment will be put under scru-
tiny: job loss probabilities, the specifics of employment structure, and the con-
tribution, value and significance of the jobs available to the Roma through 
the informal sector of the economy or the welfare system.
One of the symptoms of employment instability is an employment pattern 
indicating that a random selection of workers are in employment at any one 
time: if the population found without a job at one period were observed at 
an another period, many of them would be in employment, and, conversely, 
if those in employment at one point were observed again at another point, 
many of them would turn out to be jobless. Although in the absence of lon-
gitudinal data we have no means of implementing this thought experiment, 
the available retrospective employment histories (or their various components) 
allow us to map some parts of the problem. The data displayed in Tables 6.4 
and 6.5 provide some evidence that – at least as regards the exit rates – the 
above description seems to fit the situation in question. The figures in Table 
6.4 show that a large share of the jobless had been employed at some stage 
before the interview, while it is clear from the data in Table 6.5 that this em-
ployment – especially in the case of men – had ended in the recent past. This 
means that a substantial share of those recently in employment had lost their 
jobs. That is, there are high exit rates.
Let us make some rough calculations. Take the 30–39 year-old cohort of 
men. As shown in Table 6.4, at the time of the interview (February-March 
2003), 42 per cent of those having primary education were in employment 
and 51 per cent were without a job at that point but had had previous work 
experience. Looking at Table 6.5 – where the data are not broken down to 
educational groups because of low cell counts – we can tell that about every 
third male respondent of a similar age not currently in employment but hav-
ing work experience had lost his job sometime in 2002 or at the very begin-
ning of 2003. If this ratio of 33 per cent is projected onto the group size of 51 
per cent, the result is that 16.8 per cent of the 30–39 year old primary-school 
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educated male population had been in employment sometime during 2002 
(or in January 2003). 
table 6.4: distribution of the 20–39 year-old roma population*  
according to employment status in 2003, and distribution of the jobless subgroup 
according to previous employment status
Education Gender Age
Had job in 
2003
Jobless in 2003
TotalHad worked 
before
Had never 
worked
Primary Men 20–29 38.4 38.0 23.6 100.0
30–39 41.7 51.3 7.0 100.0
Women 20–29 12.7 31.3 56.0 100.0
30–39 27.0 48.8 24.2 100.0
Vocational 
training
Men 20–29 44.0 44.0 12.0 100.0
30–39 55.7 37.2 7.1 100.0
Women 20–29 37.3 41.0 21.7 100.0
30–39 39.5 52.6 7.9 100.0
* Excluding those in early retirement.
Source: Representative Roma Survey of 2003.
table 6.5: time of termination of last employment and the average duration of last 
employment among the 20–39 year-old roma population having a job history  
but not in employment at the time of the interview (february-march 2003)
Age
Percentage of persons whose employment 
ended during the following periods*
Average duration of last job (months)**  
as a function of the recency of the last job
–2000 2001 2002–2003 –2000 2001 2002–2003 All
Men
20–24 16–21 11–15 47–63 .. .. 13 13
25–29 37–48 9–12 31–40 29 .. 16 26
30–34 37–43 19–22 30–35 52 .. 13 42
35–39 55–64 3–3 28–33 78 .. 61 71
20–39 37–45 10–13 34–42 55 41 25 43
Women
20–24 33–47 16–23 20–30 . .. .. 22
25–29 63–71 11–13 14–16 24 .. .. 25
30–34 79–83 4–4 12–13 43 .. .. 40
35–39 79–85 3–4 10–11 71 .. .. 70
20–39 66–75 8–9 14–16 45 33 29 42
* Some of the respondents did not specify the duration of their last employment. The 
distribution was calculated both with and without the missing cases. The cells 
therefore show low-high values (rounded).
** Rounded to the nearest number of months. Cells with low case counts are left blank.
Source: Representative Roma Survey of 2003.
As these terminated employment periods had an average duration of at least 
13 months, there is a high probability that had they been asked in February 
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or March 2002, this 16.8 per cent segment of the population would have re-
ported being in employment.6 They are therefore likely to be included in the 
count of the employed population for spring 2002. Assuming that the size of 
the employed population was more or less constant during the years at the turn 
of the millennium – the steady state assumption –, the proportion of those in 
employment among the primary school-educated population must have also 
been around 42 per cent a year before data collection (in February-March 
2002). The annual job loss rate7 between 2002 and 2003 must therefore be 
around 40 per cent (0.4 = 16.8/42) among the 30–39 year-old primary school-
educated population. The annual exit rate thus defined8 can also be estimated 
for 30–39 year-old men having vocational training. Using the same method 
of calculation, their exit rate comes to 22 per cent. Looking at the population 
of men aged 20–29 in either educational group, the exit rates are estimated to 
be 43 per cent. The corresponding figures are somewhat lower for women: for 
the group having primary education, 48 per cent among 20–29 year olds and 
22 per cent among 30–39 year olds; for the group with vocational training, 18 
per cent among the younger cohort and 14 per cent among the older cohort.9
Given these figures, we cannot be too far from the truth if we estimate the 
annual job loss rate (exit rate) at the least as 25–30 per cent on average.10
The instability of Roma employment can also be measured on another scale: 
the characteristic structure of their employment (Table 6.6). 40 per cent of the 
Roma are employed in jobs – see the first two groups of occupations – where 
workers can be freely replaced without significant loss to the employer. Fur-
thermore, employers engaging large numbers of workers in these occupations 
tend to run their entire businesses under unstable conditions,11 which is bound 
to introduce a considerable degree of instability into their workers’ lives.
table 6.6: nature of work at the time of observation  
among the 15–49 year-old working roma population
Nature of job Percentage
1. Unskilled farmworkers, unskilled labourers and labourers trained on the job in 
forestry, day­labourers, temporary workers 4.8
2. Unskilled construction labourers, material movers, freight movers, cleaners, 
housekeeping cleaners, maids, unskilled service­sector workers, office hands 35.3
3. Labourers trained on the job in industry, mining, metallurgy or agriculture, ma­
chine operators 24.5
4. Vehicle drivers 2.1
5. Skilled labourers in industry, mining, metallurgy, construction, agriculture or food 
industry, skilled service­sector workers 23.6
6. Public­sector employees, members of the armed forces, other white­collar workers 7.2
7. Self­employed entrepreneurs, farmers 2.5
Total 100.0
Source: Representative Roma Survey of 2003.
6 With the exception of those 
who happened to lose their job 
in January 2002.
7 This indicator cannot measure 
short-term employment periods. 
The annual exit rate, therefore, 
underestimates the extent of 
employment instability.
8 Annual job loss and new job 
rates (or annual exit and entry 
rates) are calculated by choosing 
the two points of observation 
of an individual’s employment 
status (and its changes) at a pre-
cisely one year interval.
9 The data in Table 6.5 were 
aggregated to 10-year cohorts 
assuming that 43 per cent of 
20–29 year-old and 33 per cent 
of 30–39 year old men (and 20 
and 10 percent of women of the 
same ages) lost their jobs in 2002 
or at the beginning of 2003.
10 Men and workers having pri-
mary education typically char-
acterised by higher exit rates 
are in the majority among the 
employed population.
11 This has not always been the 
case. Before the economic transi-
tion, the Roma could count on 
long-term employment at the 
large state-owned construction 
firms.
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The third, major, source of instability in Roma employment is the ever increas-
ing availability of government funded “welfare” employment (public works 
schemes of various types) and the heavy role they play role in Roma employ-
ment in Hungary. The latest data available in connection with these schemes 
are summarised in Table 6.7. These figures are needed because – due to the 
method of personal interviews – the results of the Roma Survey of 2003 are 
likely to underestimate the contribution of welfare works schemes to the em-
ployment rate of the Roma population. The problem is that respondents can-
not reliably distinguish the entities giving them the job (the local government, 
local school or, say, a construction firm engaging them in roadworks) from the 
budget sources supplying their pay. In a survey relying on population inter-
views, therefore, some of these “welfare” jobs may have been miscategorised 
as “regular” jobs, and thus regular employment may have been overestimated 
and welfare employment underestimated.
Table 6.7 was constructed in an effort to avoid this mistake. Three kinds 
of information can be seen in the Table: the annual amount of resources al-
located for these schemes from the government budget, the size of the popu-
lation participating in the schemes (including new entrants for the year and 
those retained from previous years), and an estimate of the average period of 
support, i.e., the duration of the public works engagement. Notably, the lat-
ter set of figures tend to be rather small: on average, Scheme A offers four to 
four and a half months’, Scheme B four to five months’ and Scheme C only 
one month’s employment. A heavy presence of these forms of engagement in 
the working lives of a social group is bound to have an impact on the stabil-
ity of their employment. This is exactly what we find in the case of the Roma 
population.
To be able to assess the role of these schemes in Roma employment, two 
problems must be overcome. First, the figures showing the number of partici-
pants including those carried over from the previous year must be converted 
into an indicator showing the size of the population employed in the given 
scheme measured on any randomly selected day of the given year, because 
it is this figure that can be compared to the employment figures of the Rep-
resentative Roma Survey. Second, we must determine the number of Roma 
within the estimated number of public works scheme participants at any giv-
en time. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 6.8. The prob-
lem of aggregation can be solved if we assume that the employment periods 
in the given year are equally distributed and of equal duration,12 while the 
ratio of the Roma can be estimated with the help of a survey specifically cre-
ated for this purpose.
12 The expected number of par-
ticipants for a randomly selected 
day of a given year (L) was esti-
mated as follows: L = number of 
participants for the year × [(av-
erage support period)/12].
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table 6.7: annual government spending on the various types  
of welfare employment schemes and the number of participants  
(including those carried over from previous year)
Welfare schemes 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Costs, billion forints (current rate)f
Scheme A 8.6 11.6 11.9 11.9 8.9
Scheme B – – 5.6 4.9 4.4
Scheme C 1.2 5.9 9.4 12.1 14.4
Total – – 26.9 28.9 27.7
Number of participants (thousand people)
Scheme Aa 93.4 80.7 84.5 76.9 64.0
Scheme Bb – – 13.6d 9.5 10.0
Scheme Cc – 112.4 147.2 182.7 212.6
Total – – 245.3 269.1 286.6
Average monthly costs (forints/person)
Scheme Ce – 52,498 63,859 66,229 67,733
Minimum wage with 
contributions (×1,32) 33,660 52,800 66,000 66,000 69,960
a Community services assigned by job centres. Number of participants = number of 
participants on 1st January of the reference year (carried over from previous year) + 
number of new entrants. Average duration of participation: four to four and a half 
months. The value of 4.5 months will be used in future calculations.
b Work organised by companies winning public works tenders. The number of par-
ticipants (none carried over from previous year). Average duration of participation: 
four months in 2002, five months in 2003 and 2004.
c Jobs assigned by local governments. The number of participants (none carried over 
from previous year). Estimated value of average duration of employment: one 
month (see note below on the method of estimation).
d Estimation. The average costs per person can be calculated for 2003–2004 (assum-
ing an average support period of five months): 2003 = 103 thousand forints, 2004 
= 88 thousand forints. Assuming that the average monthly cost was also 103 thou-
sand forints in 2002 and the average duration of participation was four months, 
13600 people are estimated to participate.
e Total expenditure/total number of participants. Since the average costs per person 
almost exactly equal the amount of the monthly minimum wage augmented by the 
amount of employer’s contributions, the average support period must be around 
one month. The regulations applying to Scheme C do not allow an employment 
period of less than 30 days.
f At the time of writing, the exchange rate is about 250 HUF to the Euro.
Source: Scheme A (costs), Scheme B (participants): Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour; Scheme A (participants): Employment Service; Scheme C (costs and par-
ticipants): Ministry of Home Affairs. The table was constructed by Ildikó Varga 
(Labour Market Fund).
In the first quarter of 2001, the Autonomy Foundation in collaboration with 
the Hungarian Employment Service carried out a survey covering all job cen-
tres in the country (N = 171). The survey measured the size of the population 
affected by the active and passive tools of labour policies, and the proportion 
of Roma workers participating in the programmes at that time.13 The number 
13 A detailed discussion of the 
survey can be found in Lukács 
(2003).
roma employment...
145
of Roma participating in the above employment schemes in the years between 
2001 and 2004 was calculated based on these 171 independent estimates us-
ing the nationwide data shown in Table 6.7. 
table 6.8: estimated number of roma employed in welfare employment schemes  
not specifically targeting the roma
Welfare schemes 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Scheme A 8,721 7,535 7,890 7,180 5,976
Scheme B – – 2,543 2,220 2,338
Scheme C – 2,454 3,214 3,989 4,642
Total – 9,989 13,647 13,389 12,956
Total (Autonomy survey) – 13,880 – – –
Estimation method: The expected number of participants for a randomly selected day 
of a given year (L) was estimated as follows: L = number of participants for the year 
× [(average support period)/12] × percentage of Roma among the participants. The 
average size of the population between 2001 and 2004 was estimated to be 13,468 
people ≈ 13 500 people.
Source: Number of participants for the year, average support period: Table 6.7. Aver-
age support period: Scheme A: four and a half months, Scheme B: four months 
in 2002 and five months in 2003 and 2004, Scheme C: one month. Percentage of 
Roma among participants: Employment Service-Autonomy Foundation survey, 
2001. Data providers: every local job centre in Hungary (N = 171), fourth quarter 
of 2001; the number of Roma calculated with reference to the estimated percent-
age of the Roma among the participants of the given scheme, weighted by quarterly 
participant numbers. Estimated Roma ratios: 24.9 per cent for Scheme A, 56.1 per 
cent for Scheme B and 26.1 per cent for Scheme C.
Since the resulting four figures for the four years were very close to each other, 
their arithmetic mean (rounded to hundreds) was taken as the most likely es-
timate for the turn of the millennium (13,500 people) (Table 6.8).14 The Em-
ployment Service-Autonomy Foundation survey of 2001 also gathered data 
on participant numbers in employment programmes specifically targeting the 
Roma population offered by various organisations.15 The results estimate this 
figure at 2,500 people. The two values add up to 16,000, which is the figure 
taken here to describe the size of the population in “welfare programme em-
ployment.” The absolute figures and distributions estimated from the Repre-
sentative Roma Survey of 2003 were corrected by this value (Table 6.9).
Table 6.9 summarises the aggregated results of estimates derived from the 
various sources. The figures reveal that unstable forms of employment – cas-
ual work offered by the informal economy and short-term jobs provided by 
the welfare system – are represented in a very high proportion (reaching 38–
40 per cent).16
In summary, the following facts have been revealed in connection with the 
issue of employment instability among the Roma population. 1. About 40 per 
cent of the Roma in employment have markedly unstable jobs. 2. The annual 
job loss rates are extremely high: 25–30 per cent of those in employment in 
14 In some countries the Roma 
are especially highly represented 
among welfare programme par-
ticipants (Schemes A, B, C and 
weighted total, percentage): in 
Borsod county (respectively 40, 
39, 77 and 43 per cent), in Heves 
county (48, 59, 59 and 51 per 
cent), and in Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok county (41, 39, 73 and 
45 per cent).
15 Nat iona l Employment 
Foundation, Hungarian Public 
Foundation for the Roma, Soros 
Foundation, Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labour, Regional 
Development Council, local gov-
ernments, local Roma minority 
governments, National Roma 
Self-Government, Autonomy 
Foundation.
16 With specifically Roma-tar-
geted programmes disregarded, 
the share of welfare employment 
comes to 17 per cent.
in focus
146
one year will be without a job a year later. Since the employment rate appears 
to have stabilized by the turn of the millennium, the only explanation for 
these high exit rates is that entry rates must be similarly high. 3. These high 
entry rates are likely to be a consequence of the persistently17 high propor-
tion of short-term welfare employment (17–20 per cent), which ensures a large 
number of transitions from joblessness to employment year after year.
table 6.9: employment among the 15–74 year-old roma population in 2003  
(full-time students excluded)
Has a job? Activity status or employment type
Estimated 
number of 
people
Distribution (per cent)
No Pensioners 57,000 18.2 – –
Non­pensioners 176,000 56.2 68.7 –
Total 233,000 74.4 – –
Yes Employees, entrepreneursa 47,000* 15.0* 18.4* 59.0*
Welfare programmeb participants 16,000* 5.1* 6.3* 20.0*
Casual workersc 17,000 5.4 6.6 21.0
Total 80,000 25.6 31.3 100.0
Total 313,000 100.0 – –
Total excluding pensioners 256,000 – 100.0 –
a Employees, entrepreneurs, and company members.
b Welfare programmes: 1. employment schemes not specifically targeting the Roma 
(Schemes A, B and C) = 13,500 people (see Table 6.8); 2. specifically Roma employ-
ment schemes = 2,500 people (see Lukács, 2003, p. 59). Their respective ratios to the 
employed population are 15 + 3 = 20 per cent.
c Temporary workers and helpers, family helpers, other workers.
Source: Representative Roma Survey of 2003. Figures marked with an asterisk have 
been corrected based on the Employment Service-Autonomy Foundation survey of 
2001 and on the welfare employment data displayed in Tables 6.7 and 6.8.
The Roma and the non-Roma
Starting our analysis with the period up to 1993, changes in the employment 
situation of the Roma population can be reconstructed from the detailed la-
bour history of a large-scale sample18 tracking labour market transitions on 
a yearly basis. The database allows us to follow the evolution of employment 
rates and of the flows both out of and into employment. These processes have 
been analysed in greater detail in an earlier study by the author of this chap-
ter (Kertesi, 2000, pp. 408–415). For the period between 1993 and 2003 no 
factual data are available. However, we can sketch a picture of the unobserved 
processes taking place during this period by making an imaginary connec-
tion between the known characteristics of the decade up to 1993 and the 
features of the state of employment just revealed for 2003. This connection 
is illustrated in Figure 6.3.
17 Remaining high in every year 
during the period between 2001 
and 2004.
18 The labour histories of 5,800 
adults were recorded in the 1993 
survey.
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figure 6.3: the employment situation of the 15–49 year-old roma population 
between 1984 and 2003 (persons taking early-retirement  
and full-time students are excluded)
Exit rate, entry rate: The ratios of entries into employment and exits from employ-
ment to the total employed population in the reference year. Observed figures: 
1985–1993. Hypothetical figures: 1994–2003 (heavy grey and black lines). Source 
of observed figures: Labour history data from the Roma Survey of 1993 (see Kertesi, 
2000, pp. 408–414). Figures recalculated for the 15–49 year-old non-pensioner 
population.
Employment rate: The ratio of the employed to the reference population. Observed 
figures: 1984–1993, 2003. Hypothetical figures: 1995–2002 (dotted line). Source of 
observed figures: Labour history data from the Roma Survey of 1993 (see Kertesi, 
2000, pp. 408–414), and the Roma Survey of 2003. Figures recalculated for the 
15–49 year-old non-pensioner population.
The graph on the right in Figure 6.3 shows the gradual exclusion of the Roma 
from the labour market starting in the mid-eighties and continuing until the 
early nineties. The end point of the process is marked by its state in 2003, which 
is not significantly different from the state observed in 1993–1994. The dot-
ted line connecting the data points for 1993 and 2003 shows a possible – and 
plausible – scenario. The graph on the left of the figure displays the processes 
leading to the transitions. The curves representing the exit and entry rates be-
tween 1984 and 1993 are based on observed data. The heavy grey and black 
lines, however, describe a possible scenario, which, of all possible scenarios, 
is the one that appears to be the most plausible given the evidence revealed 
above with respect to the instability of Roma employment.
The enduringly high – 25–30 per cent – exit rates were estimated with ref-
erence to the data shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The similarly high entry rate 
is suggested by the high share of welfare employment together with the high 
share of casual jobs. We have no reason to posit an increasing trend in the 
probability of casual work.19 It is a fact, however, that the likelihood of wel-
fare employment displayed an increasing trend over the decade. While the 
number of workers employed in one of these public works schemes, Scheme 
A, was more or less constant throughout the nineties,20 the introduction of 
the other two non-Roma-specific schemes was followed by the rapid expan-
sion of welfare employment starting at the turn of the millennium. While 
these schemes must have cost the central budget less than 10 billion forints (at 
19 The qualitative analyses we 
are aware of report a persistently 
high percentage of casual jobs: 
Tóth (1997), Szuhay (1999), pp. 
53–75, Fleck, Orsós and Virág 
(2000) pp. 99–102, Kemény 
(2000a) pp. 30–32.
20 Fazekas and Varga (eds.), 
2004, Table 5.10, p. 253.
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current rates) a year during the last years of the millennium, in 2002–2004 
the programme bloated into some sort of “welfare mass production” costing 
three times as much, 30 billion forints a year.21 Since the Roma are grossly 
overrepresented in these employment schemes relative to their proportion in 
the country’s population, this institutional change must have raised the en-
try rates among the Roma to a higher level. The continuing high entry rates 
are robustly sustained by the government injections ensuring the financial vi-
ability of these short-term – for the Roma, lasting 3.5 months on average22 – 
employment contracts. (The short employment periods also take care of the 
sustainment of high exit rates, of course.)
In summary, the employment situation of the Roma population at the turn 
of the millennium can be characterised as follows: the employment rate had 
stabilized at a prominently low (about 30 per cent) level, which was coupled 
with an outstandingly high (about 25–30 per cent) turnover rate, typical of 
third world economies. A share of the responsibility for this level of employ-
ment instability is borne by Hungarian labour policies investing serious re-
sources into maintaining support programmes that keep regenerating this 
situation year after year.
One may wonder whether this employment pattern is characteristic of the 
entire relatively uneducated population of Hungary. The answer is that it is 
not. The most important evidence supporting our claim is summarised in Fig-
ure 6.4. The figures displayed in the graphs are based on the micro level data 
of all quarterly waves of the HCSO Labour Survey between 1992 and 2003 
(a total of 48 large-scale surveys). For reasons of comparability,23 the 15–49 
year-old, non-student, non-pensioner population having primary education 
was selected as the reference population.
The figure displays the evolution of three important employment indicators 
between 1992 and 2003, broken down by gender: a) men’s and women’s em-
ployment24 rates; and two indicators measuring the stability of employment: 
b) the proportion among the employed population of those being in employ-
ment for four consecutive quarterly periods without interruption, and c) and 
d) the annual probabilities of job losses and new starts – exit and entry rates 
– by gender. The latter indicator was calculated by comparing the figures for 
each quarter to the figures measured three quarterly periods later. The values 
of entry and exit rates display substantial seasonal fluctuations. These fluc-
tuations were smoothed by applying a ±4 quarter moving average filter. The 
resulting trends are shown in Graphs c) and d) in Figure 6.4. Indicators a), c) 
and d) are directly comparable to the Roma data discussed above.
Compared to the state of employment among the Roma population, Fig-
ure 6.4 reveals an astonishingly different picture. Overall employment is at 
more than twice the level of Roma employment. Jobs are fairly stable: for both 
21 See Szalai (2004–2005) for 
a general discussion.
22 Assuming four and a half 
months’ duration for Schemes A 
and B, one month’s duration for 
Scheme C, weighted by the aver-
age Roma employment rate for 
2002–2004 (see Table 6.8).
23 With respect to educational 
attainment this appears to be a 
reasonable basis for comparison. 
Although the probability of not 
completing primary education 
is higher among the Roma than 
among the total population of 
the country, about 20 per cent 
of the Roma have higher than 
primary education (vocational 
training: 16 per cent, higher 
than vocational training: 4 per 
cent). The countrywide control 
group does not include persons 
having higher than primary 
education.
24 An individual is classed as 
being employed according to the 
ILO-OECD definition: a labour 
survey respondent is employed 
provided that they performed at 
least one hour’s paid work in the 
week preceding their interview. 
The criterion of one hour is not 
particularly restrictive in actual 
practice. Only 0.32 per cent of 
the employed thus defined work 
less than 10 hours in a regular 
week. The proportion of those 
working less than 30 hours in a 
regular week is still not particu-
larly high (5.6 per cent) (fourth 
quarter of the HCSO Labour 
Survey of 2003).
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men and women, the proportion of jobs retained for at least a whole year had 
reached 90 per cent by the turn of the millennium (1999–2003). 
figure 6.4: employment among the at most primary-school educated  
15–49 year-old population in hungary between 1993 and 2003 (persons in early 
retirement and full-time students are excluded from the reference population)
a) b)
c) Férfiak d) Nők
a) Employment rate (quarterly figures).
b) The proportion of workers in employment for four consecutive quarters without 
interruption among the employed population.
c) and d) The ratio of entries into employment and exits from employment to the em-
ployed population in the reference quarter (yearly changes, trends). Method of cal-
culation: Exits or Entries in Quarter t+3 divided by the size of the employed popula-
tion in Quarter t. Trends: estimated using a ±4 quarter moving average filter.
Source: Calculations based on the HCSO quarterly labour survey data.
Given a low educational attainment among the reference population, the exit 
and entry rates are relatively high (there is a high turnover) but compared to 
the Roma figures, a striking gap can be seen. Looking at the data for the first 
years of the new millennium once again, the values of the exit and entry rates 
measuring the employment instability of the average uneducated Hungarian 
population are both found below the 10 per cent level. The corresponding 
indicator for the Roma population is, in contrast, estimated to be two and a 
half to three times higher (25–30 per cent) for the same years.25 The gap be-
tween the Roma and the similarly uneducated average Hungarian popula-
25 Following the procedure used 
to calculate the annual exit rates 
among the Roma based on Ta-
bles 4 and 5 – maintaining the 
steady state assumption –, a 
similarly large gap is revealed 
between the Roma and the 
total population based on the 
fourth quarter figures of the 
Labour Survey of 2003. Let us 
take the group of the control 
population corresponding to 
the Roma group selected as an 
example earlier in this chapter 
(page 6): 30–39 year old men 
with primary education. 85% 
were in employment in the giv-
en quarter, 1% never had a job 
and 14% had a job in the past 
(these figures were calculated 
by exactly the same method as 
the figures characterising the 
Roma population shown in 
Table 4). 37% of this 14% must 
have had a job the year before 
(the method of calculating the 
figures characterising the Roma 
shown in Table 5 is applied here). 
Thus, reproducing the reason-
ing discussed earlier, the exit 
rate between 2002 and 2003 
comes to 6% ((14*0.37)/85 = 
0.06) for the given subgroup of 
the total population, which is 
about seven times smaller than 
the corresponding value calcu-
lated for the Roma subgroup of 
equivalent age and education 
(40%).
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tion is not limited to the fact that the employment odds of the former are less 
than half of the odds enjoyed by the latter, but also emerges in the sense that 
a typical Roma job is almost three times less stable than a job in which an av-
erage Hungarian worker with similar education is employed. Let me repeat 
what I wrote five years ago in connection with the fossilisation of this sort of 
employment pattern. “The spread of unstable employment has led to social 
disintegration extending to a substantial share of even those in employment: 
the lack of regular work brings with it a lack of regularity in everyday life, 
basic subsistence problems, and lower levels of public social security support 
and corporate social services or, in some cases, the complete loss of entitle-
ment to these services.” (Kertesi, 2000, p. 414)
The identification of the causes underlying these striking differences is a far-
reaching issue. A discussion of this problem would stretch beyond the scope 
of this paper. Further meticulous research is needed to reveal the contribu-
tion of the geographical position of the Roma population to this gap, i.e., the 
fact that they live in regions with far less favourable employment prospects 
than the regions inhabited by the non-Roma population; the contribution 
of the disproportionately high probability of markedly short-lived and in-
herently unstable employment among the Roma population financed from 
welfare funds; and finally, the contribution of labour market discrimination 
putting the Roma at a disadvantage and a thousand other manifestations of 
their social exclusion.
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7. the effect of comPetition on the gender Wage gaP  
in hungary 1986–2003
Anna Lovász
Introduction
Of the economic models of discrimination, perhaps the most well-known is 
the preference-based discrimination model developed by Becker (1971), in 
which employers (or alternatively, employees or customers) have a distaste 
for a particular minority group, so employing them (or being in contact with 
them) affects their utility negatively. One of the well-known implications of 
the model is that product market competition decreases the level of this type 
of discrimination in the long-run, since discriminating employers are not be-
having efficiently, and competition forces them out of the market: discriminat-
ing employers pay majority workers a higher wage than a minority worker of 
equal productivity, so they face extra costs. According to Becker’s reasoning, 
only firms that have a positive economic profit are able to behave this way, so 
they must be monopolistic firms or those in a market that is restricted in the 
level of competition. If competition increases in a market for some reason, dis-
criminating employers are forced out or are forced to change their prejudicial 
behaviour, since the profit needed to indulge their tastes decreases.
The implied negative relationship between market competition and dis-
crimination does not hold in many cases, as summarized in Heywood (1998). 
In the case of customer discrimination the prejudicial behaviour of employ-
ers is profit-maximizing: it is more efficient to hire workers from the majority 
group into occupations where there is contact with buyers, since buyers are 
willing to pay more to buy from such workers. In the case of employee (co-
worker) discrimination, the employer is also not able to change the level of 
discrimination, as this is beyond his control, so competition does not affect 
this type of discrimination in the way described above. The magnitude of the 
effect of employer discrimination on wages depends greatly on the industry 
level elasticity of labour demand and supply, so the effect of competition may 
be different under different market conditions. Finally, in cases where the in-
terests of firm managers and owners diverge, and the manager is the one with 
prejudicial tastes while the latter is motivated by profit alone, Becker’s impli-
cation will only hold if owners lack sufficient control over managers to stop 
their discriminatory behaviour.
Keeping these caveats in mind, it is clear that competition does not neces-
sarily decrease discrimination in all cases. Empirical studies show that wage 
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differentials between minority and majority groups can exist in the long-
run, although these may be due to differences in the average productivity of 
the groups. Despite this fact, the implication has been a popular empirical 
research question since the introduction of the model, and is often cited by 
parties arguing the pros and cons of globalization and market competition. 
Although increased competition only explains a small part of the decrease in 
labour market differences seen in recent decades, studies usually find a sig-
nificant correlation between the two, so it seems that competition does have 
a positive effect on labour markets in this respect.
The majority of empirical studies on the topic have tested Becker’s implica-
tion on data from the United States, but there are results for numerous other 
countries as well. During testing, some of the most important questions are 
how we measure the level of competition, and how we identify the effect of 
competition. Some studies compare markets that differ in the level of com-
petition to assess how much wage differentials depend on market character-
istics. Since markets may differ along numerous other dimensions, and this 
may influence estimation of the effect, estimation based on changes in the 
level of competition over time within industries provides stronger proof. The 
exogenous change needed in such estimation may be the result of various phe-
nomena. For example, Black–Strahan (2001) study the effect of the deregu-
lation of the banking sector, and their results support the idea that increased 
competition decreased discrimination against women in the labour market.1 
The newest research on the topic often measures the changes in the relative 
situation of different groups in the labour market that are due to increased 
competitive pressure due to international trade. Hazarika–Otero (2004) 
show that competition decreased discrimination in Mexico, while Dutta–
Reilly (2005) do not find a significant correlation between industry level gen-
der wage gaps and the level of international trade in India.2 Black–Brainerd 
(2004) study the United States and emphasize that although international 
trade increased the inequality between workers with different skill levels, it 
did, at the same time, decrease the prejudicial behaviour of firms.
The broad changes in Hungary following the transition pose an excellent 
opportunity for the analysis of the relationship between competition and the 
labour market differences between men and women. Since the first year of 
the Hungarian Wage Survey, 1986, the level of competition in Hungarian 
markets increased significantly both due to the entry of new domestic firms 
following the liberalization of markets and also due to the increase in inter-
national trade. During this same time period the wage gap between men and 
women fell significantly: from 31 percent at the end of the eighties to 15 per-
cent by 2003. Although the decrease in the wage gap may be due to numer-
ous other factors, a question that arises naturally is whether increased com-
petition had a role in it as well.
1 Ashenfelter–Hannan (1986) 
also study the banking sector 
of the United States.
2 Berik (2003), on the other 
hand, also studies the effect of 
increased competition due to 
trade in East Asia, and finds a 
significant negative correlation 
between the level of competition 
and wage differentials.
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Analyzing the effect of competition on labour market discrimination on 
data from other countries remains an important research task, since the dif-
ferences between countries provide an experiment-like setting for testing the 
relationship.3 The question has not lost its importance, since if it is true that 
certain characteristics of markets determine the extent of discrimination, 
policies targeted at the industry level may be more effective than more gen-
eral principles and attempts made to enforce them. The goal of this chapter 
is to extend the research, testing the implication for Hungary, making use of 
the rapid and broad changes in product markets that can be seen in the years 
following the transition.4 Since to my knowledge empirical analysis has not 
been carried out on data from transitional countries, the estimation results are 
an important contribution to the analysis of the effects of competition. The 
study also provides new indirect evidence on the existence of discrimination: 
the fact that in those industries that experienced an increase in competition 
we can also observe a decrease in the wage gap between men and women sug-
gests that some level of discrimination must have existed, though this meth-
odology does not give an estimate of its magnitude.
Wage differentials and their changes in transitional countries
Previous studies suggest that the gender wage gap decreased significantly in 
Central-Eastern European countries following the transition. Brainerd (2000) 
and Newell–Reilly (2001) document this trend, while in the former Soviet 
countries the opposite trend was observed (Ogloblin, 1999, Reilly, 1999). 
Several parallel phenomena may be behind the fall in differences. First, the 
training of female employees has improved due to their increased involve-
ment in higher education. The increase in women’s human capital causes an 
increase in their average relative wages. If the average education level of wom-
en in the labour market increases their relative wage increases as well because 
lower-skilled women are forced out of the labour market – and this occurred 
in a higher proportion for women than men. Hunt (2002) emphasized the 
importance of this selection effect, and shows that the ten percentage point 
fall in the gender wage gap in East Germany is mostly due to the exit of low-
skilled women from the labour market, which increased the average wage of 
women compared to men, but cannot be interpreted as an unambiguously 
positive development.
In Hungary, the decrease in wage differentials occurred relatively rapidly 
during the few years following the transition (Galasi, 2000). Kertesi–Köllő 
(1998) show that the wage differential between men and women was 15 per-
cent lower in 1994 compared to 1986. They suggest that the phenomena is 
mainly due to two major factors: the value of intellectual work increased, 
and this type of work typically characterizes women, and at the same time, 
the wages of men in certain failing industries that mostly employ low-skilled 
3 Heywood–Peoples (2006) is a 
collection of studies on the ef-
fect of competition in the labour 
market, and the editors state 
that testing in other countries 
is an important goal. Weichsel-
baumer–Winter-Ebmer (2007) 
measure the effect of competi-
tion on the gender wage gap 
using data from various coun-
tries. Their results suggest that 
increased competition decreases 
the gap.
4 Némethné (2000) analyzes the 
main changes in the Hungarian 
labour market.
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workers fell relative to the wages of women. Frey (1998) emphasizes the im-
portance of the increased education level of women and the fact that low-
skilled women were forced out of the labour market in the case of Hungary 
as well.
Campos–Jolliffe (2005) analyze the relationship between the transition 
and the gender wage gap in Hungary. The authors subtract the part of the 
overall wage gap that is due to differences in the observable characteristics of 
the two groups. They take the workers’ human capital variables into account, 
including their education level and labour market experience,5 as well as fur-
ther explanatory variables that determine wages (the size, ownership type, 
county, and industry of their place of employment), and they also account for 
the selection of workers into the labour market (changes in the composition 
of the workforce). Their results suggest that observable characteristics only 
explain a small part of the fall in the overall gender wage gap. The remaining 
unexplained difference can be viewed as the upper-bound estimate of dis-
crimination6 – its significant decrease explains most of the fall in the wage 
gap. Although the authors conclude that this is evidence that the increase in 
competition led to a fall in discrimination, they do not directly measure the 
relationship between the two. A more complex empirical method is necessary 
to determine the effect of competition.
Methodology and data
We use a two step method to estimate the effect of competition on the wage 
gap.7 The empirical analysis is carried out using the Hungarian Wage Sur-
vey, which includes a random sample of the employees of all double-book-
keeping firms with at least 20 workers, data on their wages and other char-
acteristics, as well as some characteristics of the firm of their employment. 
Since we are actually interested in the possible changes in discrimination, in 
the first step we use the decomposition method (Oaxaca, 1973) also used in 
Campos–Jolliffe (2005) to calculate the so-called residual wage gap between 
men and women, which is the part of the overall wage gap not explained by 
the observable characteristics of the workers. This is calculated separately for 
each firm, so we obtain the within-firm residual wage gap that remains after 
taking workers’ education levels and estimated years of experience into ac-
count.8 Figure 7.1. shows the overall gender wage gap, and the residual wage 
gap calculated using this method for the years 1986–2003. The figure clearly 
shows that changes in the observable characteristics do not explain most of 
the fall of the overall gap.
The second step provides the test for Becker’s implication regarding the effect 
of competition. The dependent variable is the residual wage gap calculated in 
the first step, and we use regression methods to assess how it depends on the 
level of competition, which is measured using several different variables.
5 Unfortunately, actual labour 
market experience is not avail-
able in a lot of datasets, even 
though it is commonly known 
that women usually have less 
experience than men of similar 
age due to child-bearing. The 
use of their estimated poten-
tial experience overstates their 
human capital, and leads to 
overestimation of the level of 
discrimination.
6 The unexplained wage gap 
is often interpreted as the dis-
criminational component. This, 
however, is not an accurate in-
terpretation, since wage dis-
crimination only applies to a 
gap between the productivity 
and wage of workers. Based on 
the observable characteristics, 
we do not estimate the pro-
ductivity of individual work-
ers accurately, and if certain 
unobserved characteristics are 
systematically different for men 
and women, this may lead to a 
bias in the estimated level of 
discrimination.
7 Meng–Meurs (2004) use a 
similar two step methodology 
using data from France and 
Australia.
8 Practically this is calculated 
by estimating a separate wage 
equation for each firm, where 
the explanatory variables are 
the level of education and the 
potential experience of workers. 
Then we subtract from the wage 
of each worker the coefficient-
weighted sum of the education 
and experience variables, so we 
get the part of the wage of each 
worker that is not explained by 
their characteristics. Finally, 
we subtract the average residual 
wage of women from that of the 
men for each firm.
the effect of competition...
155
The estimated equation is of the form:
 Bjt = α + β1 × Vkt + β2 × Xjt + ejt,
where Bjt represents the firm level residual wage gap in year t, Vkt the level of 
competition in industry k in year t, and Xjt includes other firm characteristics, 
and dummy variables for each year. If competition decreases discrimination, 
the estimated coefficient of the competition variable will be negative: < 0.
The equation is estimated using various methods and samples. First we es-
timate using ordinary least squares, which measures the between-industry 
effect, then we take industry fixed effects into account, so we measure the 
relationship between the level of competition and wage differentials within 
industries. This means that we control for all industry characteristics that 
are constant over time. Coefficients estimated in this way reflect the effect of 
changes within industries over time, so this helps us avoid estimation bias that 
may arise from unobserved differences between industries (including selection 
bias). The estimation is carried out on the full sample of industries, as well 
as on a sample restricted to manufacturing industries. We estimate the latter 
separately as well because it is easier to measure the level of trade for firms in 
manufacturing than it is in the much less tangible services sector.
figure 7.1: the overall gender wage gap and the residual wage gap in hungary, 
1986–2003
One of the main empirical issues is the correct measurement of the level of 
competition in the markets. Since in Hungary competition increased both as 
a result of the entry of new Hungarian firms as well as due to the expansion of 
international trade, it is important to take the effects of both into account.
It is also important to determine the correct level of industrial aggregation 
for measuring the level of competition (the relevant market), since the deci-
sions of employers are only influenced by the market in which they sell their 
products. Ideally, we would determine their markets based on data on the 
products each firm produces, as well as geographical considerations, but un-
in focus
156
fortunately we do not have such data available. So we determine the firms’ 
markets based on their three digit industrial classification (Teaor codes). In 
this way, we obtain 180 industrial categories. The level of domestic competi-
tion is measured by the HHI concentration ratio (Hirschmann–Herfindahl-
index).9 This takes on a value of 1 if the market is monopolistic, and 0 if it is 
perfectly competitive. Figure 7.2. shows the changes in the concentration ra-
tios during the time period.
figure 7.2: changes of the industrial concentration ratio between 1989 and 1998
The horizontal axis displays the values of the concentration ratios in 1989, 
while the vertical axis shows the values in 1998. Each point represents a three 
digit industry. The 45 degree line shown on the figure indicates the location of 
industries where the concentration ratio did not change between the two years. 
The figure clearly shows that the industries underwent significant change in 
terms of competition. Many industries are located below the 45 degree line, 
which means that the concentration ratio decreased in these markets, so the 
level of competition increased. This is important for our analysis, because we 
want to identify the effect of changes in competition, for which some varia-
tion in the concentration ratio is needed.
International trade increases the number of competitors that firms face 
both via exports and imports, and forces them to behave more efficiently. The 
relevant market of companies that export includes all international compa-
nies that sell the same product, so such firms face greater competition. This 
effect is measured using the industry level export share variable in the regres-
sions.10 We measure the level of imports for each industry similarly using the 
import penetration ratio,11 since imports mean direct competition for domes-
tic firms. Both trade variables take on values between 0 and 1, the values in-
creasing with the level of competition. The concentration ratio, export share, 
and import penetration ratio together measure competition in our regression 
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9 The Hirschmann–Herfindahl-
index of a given sector is calcu-
lated as the sum of the square 
of each firm’s market share in 
that sector. The concentration 
ratio does not always measure 
the actual level of competition 
accurately. Boone–van Ours–van 
der Viel (2007) and Bikker–Haaf 
(2002) summarize the relevant 
literature on this topic. Despite 
these problems, it is still often 
used in empirical research be-
cause there are no easily ob-
tainable alternative measures 
available.
10 Export share is calculated 
by dividing the export revenue 
of the three digit industry by 
total revenue.
11 The import penetration ratio 
is calculated according to the 
following formula at the three 
digit industry level: imports/
(revenue – exports + imports).
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equations, so we combine the different competition measures used in previ-
ous literature on the topic.
Results
Table 7.1. presents the estimated coefficients of the regressions for the dif-
ferent specifications outlined above. Instead of the HHI concentration ratio, 
we substitute 1 – HHI as the explanatory variable, which makes interpreta-
tion of the results easier, because in this way all three competition measures 
increase if the level of competition increases – as was previously specified in 
the estimation equation. The Becker implication states that the estimated co-
efficients should be negative if competition really decreases discrimination, 
and through it, the residual wage gaps that we observe.
table 7.1: regression results
Full sample Manufacturing
1 2 3 4 5
1 – HHI –0.051
** 
(0.019)
–0.062** 
(0.021)
–0.058** 
(0.021)
–0.108** 
(0.040)
–0.093** 
(0.031)
Import ratio – 0.029  (0.026)
–0.082** 
(0.019)
–0.018  
(0.020)
–0.035  
(0.022)
Export share – –0.059
* 
(0.022)
–0.121** 
(0.038)
–0.038  
(0.031)
–0.163** 
(0.039)
Industry fixed effects no no yes no yes
Number of observations (N) 7752 7752 7752 3696 3696
Notes: We control for year fixed effects in all of the regressions. Standard errors of the 
estimates are presented in parentheses.
** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level.
In the first column, we only look at the effect of the concentration ratio with-
out imports or exports. The estimated coefficient is –0.05, and it is signifi-
cant. This is in line with our expectation based on the Becker hypothesis, 
since a negative coefficient means that if a given industry has higher levels of 
competition (lower concentration ratio), then the residual gender wage gap 
is smaller. Based on this coefficient estimate, if a market changed from mo-
nopolistic to perfectly competitive, the residual gender wage gap would de-
crease by 5 percentage points. This sounds like a significant change compared 
to the current 0.15 overall wage gap, but of course such a drastic change rarely 
occurs in real life.
The second column also includes the variables measuring international 
trade. The effect of the concentration ratio remains significant, and rose to 
6 percentage points. The estimated coefficient of the export share is also sig-
nificant, and of similar magnitude as the concentration ratio. Based on this 
result, if an industry switched from producing solely for the domestic market 
to producing only for export (if the export share increased from 0 to 1), the 
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gender wage gap would decrease by 6 percentage points. The estimated coef-
ficient of the import ratio is not significantly different from 0 in this speci-
fication, which means that changes in import penetration do not affect the 
wage gap. However, this changes in the results of the next column, underlin-
ing the importance of industry level selection.
The third column adds industry fixed effects to the previous specification, 
so the estimated coefficients measure the within-industry effects, or the effects 
without industry level selection. In this case we are testing how a change in 
the level of competition within a given industry over time affects the within-
firm residual wage gaps. We include all three competition measures as controls 
here as well, and the results indicate that all three measures have a significant 
negative effect on the wage gap. The estimated effect of the concentration ra-
tio remains stable around the –0.6 seen so far. The import penetration ratio 
also has a significant effect – if it were to increase from 0 to 1, the gender wage 
gap would fall by 0.8 percentage points. The effect of exports is even higher: 
the estimated coefficient is –0.12. Looking at the within-industry results, we 
can say that an increase in competition has a negative effect on the residual 
gender wage gap, which supports the Becker implication, and suggests that 
in Hungary, the observed fall in the gender wage gap may be partially due to 
the efficiency-enhancing effect of increased competition, and the fall in dis-
crimination against women.
To determine how much of the observed fall in the overall gap is due to the 
increase in competition, we look at the estimated coefficients and the average 
changes of the competition measures during the period. The concentration 
ratio decreased by 0.2 on average during the time period, while the residual 
gender wage gap fell by 0.18. According to the results, if the concentration ra-
tio increased by 1, the wage gap would fall by 0.06. Based on these numbers, 
the observed change in the concentration ratio explains about 7 percent of 
the fall in the wage gap. Based on a similar calculation, the average change of 
the export share also led to a 7 percent fall, while the change in imports ex-
plains 1 percent of the change. Of course, some industries underwent larger, 
and some underwent smaller changes of the competitive environment, so the 
effect on wage differentials is also different by industry. We can see however 
that competition does have some effect on wage gaps, although it does not 
explain most of the observed change in the gaps.
The last two columns present the results of the estimation limited to the 
sample of manufacturing firms. The effect of competition is negative in each 
case, though in the case of imports it is not statistically significant. A decrease 
in the concentration ratio (increase in competition) still decreases the wage 
gaps: the estimated effect is larger in the manufacturing sector, around –0.1. 
The within-industry results suggest that the average change in concentra-
tion can explain 11 percent of the observed fall in the wage gap. In the case 
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of exports, the estimated coefficient is –0.16, and this can explain about 21 
percent of the fall in the wage gap in the manufacturing sector. These results 
all support the notion that competition decreases discrimination and wage 
differentials between men and women.
To check the robustness of these results, we also run the regressions with 
an alternative dependent variable. The Becker model suggests that discrimi-
nating firms not only pay lower wages to minority employees, but they also 
hire a lower than profit-maximizing ratio of minority workers. If the level of 
competition in a given market increases, and this leads to more efficient be-
haviour of the firms in that market, we expect the ratio of female workers to 
increase. To test this, we calculate the ratio of women employed at each firm, 
and estimate an equation similar to the previous ones, with the same com-
petition measures. In this case, based on the Becker model we would expect 
the coefficients of the competition measures to be positive, since an increase 
in competition should increase the ratio of women employed at firms. The 
results of these regressions are presented in Table 7.2.
table 7.2: the effect of competition on the ratio of female workers
1 2 3
1 – HHI 0.377
**  
(0.106)
0.581**  
(0.153)
0.056*  
(0.021)
Import ratio – 0.001  (0.000)
0.001  
(0.001)
Export share – 0.569
**  
(0.143)
0.408*  
(0.161)
Industry fixed effects no no yes
Number of observations (N) 7752 7752 7752
Notes: We control for year fixed effects in all of the regressions. Standard errors of the 
estimates are presented in parentheses.
** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level.
The first column again presents the effect of the concentration ratio alone, 
without industry fixed effects. The ratio of women depends positively on the 
level of market competition, with a coefficient estimate of 0.38. This means 
that if the concentration rate decreased from 1 to 0, the ratio of female work-
ers would increase by 38 percent. This result is not easy to interpret, but tak-
ing the average change in concentration as before, this translates into a 7.5 
percent increase in the ratio of female workers. The effect of the concentra-
tion ratio remains significant in the within-industry specification (column 
3), but it is significantly lower: within a given industry, the estimated effect 
of an increase in competition (a change of the concentration ratio from 1 to 
0) is 0.06. The import ratio does not have a significant effect on the ratio of 
women in either specification, but the export share has a strong positive ef-
fect in each case. Overall, these results are also in line with the implication of 
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the Becker model, and they suggest that some level of discrimination against 
women must have existed in the labour market, and this decreased as a result 
of increased competition following the transition.
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to assess the relationship between product market 
competition and the residual gender wage gap between men and women (an 
upper bound for the level of discrimination), and to determine what part of 
the fall in the wage gap following the transition was due to increased com-
petitive pressure on firms. We measure competition using the industry con-
centration ratio, and international trade using the export share and import 
penetration ratio, and we estimated how the changes of these variables over 
time affected the residual gender wage gap within firms.
The results are in line with the Becker model’s implication: they show a sig-
nificant negative relationship between the level of competition and the wage 
gap, suggesting that increased competition decreased employer discrimina-
tion against women. The magnitude of the effect, however, can only explain a 
small part of the observed decrease in the wage gap: based on the actual average 
changes of the variables, market concentration explains 7, the import ratio 1, 
and the growth of export shares explains 7 percent of the fall in the gap. We 
also document a positive relationship between the level of competition and 
the ratio of women employed in firms, which also suggests that competition 
forced employers to behave more efficiently, since discriminating employers 
hire a lower than profit-maximizing ratio of female workers.
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8. estimation of the reLative Productivity and Wage of 
Women comPared to men in hungary
Anna Lovász & Mariann Rigó
Introduction
The average gross wage of women is usually between 60–94 percent of the av-
erage wage of men.1 In Hungary, women’s wages are roughly 15 percent lower 
than men’s (Fazekas–Bálint, 2008). Only a small part of this difference can 
be explained by the observable characteristics of workers, such as education 
level, experience, occupation, etc. According to our calculations, the unex-
plained wage gap is around 14 percent, which can be viewed as an upper bound 
estimate of the level of discrimination against women in the labour market.2 
The estimation of wage returns to characteristics is usually done via wage 
equations, where researchers include observable worker characteristics (such 
as gender, experience, and education) and firm characteristics (such as indus-
try, size, and ownership type) as explanatory variables. In this specification, 
the estimated coefficient of the female dummy variable represents the wage 
gap of women compared to men. A wage gap estimated using this method 
is only a precise measure of wage discrimination if we are able to control for 
all relevant characteristics of the workers and their workplace. If this is not 
the case, the negative coefficient of the gender dummy variable may be due to 
unobserved lower productivity of women (for example, if women spend less 
time in the workplace than men or are less motivated in their careers due to 
obligations outside their workplace, and this is not observed in the data), or 
to differences in the characteristics of the jobs of men and women (flexible 
schedule, less health risk, etc.).3 The increasing availability of datasets that 
follow firms over time (panel data) may overcome the latter by allowing the 
estimation of firm level fixed effects, or occupation level effects, but data on 
the individual productivity of workers is rarely available, as was discussed in 
the first chapter of the In Focus section.
One possible solution to the problem may be the use of alternative vari-
ables that signal the individual productivity of workers. Several studies use 
IQ or AFQT test scores4 as additional controls. These studies, for example 
Griliches–Mason (1972), Griliches (1977), and Neal–Johnson (1996), use 
test scores to approximate the unobserved abilities of workers that determine 
their productivity. It is a well known problem in the estimation of returns 
to education that ability is missing from the traditional wage equations, 
since it is difficult or impossible to measure. But it is likely to be correlated 
1 OECD (2006). Of the OECD 
countries, the relative wage of 
women is the lowest in Korea (60 
percent), and the highest in New 
Zealand (94 percent). Brainerd 
(2000) and Newell–Reilly (2001) 
study the changes in the gen-
der wage gaps of transitional 
countries. Reilly (1999) analyzes 
the wage gap in Russia, while 
Blau–Kahn (2000) do so for the 
United States. In Hungary, Csil-
lag (2006), Frey (1998), Galasi 
(2000), Kertesi–Köllő (1998), 
Linderné (2007), and Koncz 
(2008) all analyze the male-
female wage differential.
2 After taking the control varia-
bles into account, the remaining 
wage differential was calculated 
using data from the Wage Survey 
of the Hungarian Employment 
Office for the year 2003.
3 The model of compensating 
wage differentials was intro-
duced by Rosen (1986). In this 
model specific occupations dif-
fer in terms of some character-
istics that workers care about 
(for example in f lexibility of 
hours, risks, effect on health), 
and workers who are willing to 
undertake less appealing jobs 
receive higher wages for doing 
so. Thaler–Rosen (1975), Bid-
dle–Zarkin (1988) and Gupta 
et al (2003) also study worker 
preferences for job character-
istics and their effect on wage 
differentials.
4 Armed Forces Qualification 
Test: a test used to filter ap-
plicants to the United States 
military.
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with the workers’ education levels, and this may lead to a bias in the esti-
mation of the returns. These studies attempt to avoid the bias by taking the 
workers’ test scores into account. Unfortunately, this approach does not 
provide a widely applicable solution to the problem, since such data is only 
available for a small fraction of workers, and are not representative of the 
entire population.
Another possible solution may be the use of data that follows both workers 
and firms over time, which allows for the inclusion of both individual and firm 
level effects that are constant over time. Abowd–Kramarz–Margolis (1999) 
develop a measure of human capital that incorporates the observable charac-
teristics of workers (education, experience, gender, etc.) and their unobserv-
able characteristics (ability, quality of schooling, social capital, and effort on 
the job). This can be carried out using datasets that follow workers and firms 
over time (panel data), so we are able to measure both worker and firm fixed 
effects (characteristics that do not change over time). With this method, we are 
able to take not only workers’ observable human capital, but also their skills 
that are stable over time and affect productivity into account when estimat-
ing workers’ individual productivities. The method has been used in numer-
ous studies since, including Abowd–Lengerman–McKinney (2003), Haskel–
Hawkes–Pereira (2005), and Iranzo–Schivardi–Tosetti (2006). Since it can 
only be applied when worker level panel data is available, and these exist only 
in a few countries, researchers often have to use other methods to more accu-
rately measure individual or group level productivity.
In our study we will follow an alternative methodology: we will estimate 
the relative productivities of different worker groups at the firm level using 
production functions. The measure of group level productivity derived in this 
manner can be compared to the relative wage of each group, which is estimat-
ed from wage equations, so that we can assess whether the wage gap between 
men and women is due to a difference in the productivity of the two groups, 
or some other phenomenon, such as discrimination. This method was first 
developed based on the work of Griliches (1960) by Hellerstein–Neumark–
Troske (1999), who were the first to use it to test the relationship between the 
productivities and wages of different demographic groups. The estimation is 
carried out in two steps. In the first step, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function that is expanded to include the worker composition of each 
firm, to gain estimates of the relative productivities of each group. In the sec-
ond step, we estimate wage equations at the firm level using the same worker 
groups to get a measure of their relative wages, using various wage measures. 
We then compare the relative productivity and wage of women compared to 
men and assess the difference between the two. Since our relative productiv-
ity measure is estimated independently of wages, and this measure should in-
clude group level unobservable differences in productivity, this comparison 
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may give us new information regarding the male-female wage differential that 
could not be derived from the traditional wage equation method.
We carry out the estimation using wage survey data for 2000–2005. The 
database – both in terms of representativeness and the availability of detailed 
worker and firm characteristics – is very well suited to this methodology. At 
the worker level, we have information on the age, gender, occupation, educa-
tion, and place of employment for each individual. Linked to this informa-
tion are the firm level characteristics of each worker’s employer: we know the 
firms’ industries and the major variables needed for estimating production 
functions. The dataset contains data on all firms with at least twenty employ-
ees and double bookkeeping,5 and for each firm a roughly 10 percent sample 
of its workers and their characteristics. Another strength of the dataset is that 
it is a panel dataset at the firm level, which allows us to track firms over time, 
and to take firm fixed effects into account. This allows us to separate out the 
part of the difference between worker groups that is truly due to differences 
in worker characteristics, and the part that is due to the selection of workers 
at the firm level (crowding into better or worse firms).
Estimation method and previous research6
In the first step, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function with three 
inputs – capital, labour, and material costs – in which the term that describes 
the use of labour contains the average employment of each firm (L) weighted 
by the different worker groups’ productivities. Workers are divided into groups 
based on gender, age (whether the worker was of working age before the tran-
sition or not), and education level (university or lower), under the assumption 
that the relative productivity and ratio of women is equal within each age and 
education category. This gives us a production function of the form:
 (8.1)
In the above equation Yjt represents the revenue of firm j in year t, Kjt the 
stock of capital, Mjt the material cost, and Ljt the average employment of firm 
j during the year t. The different worker groups are represented as follows: F 
refers to female workers, O the group that was of working age prior to the tran-
sition, and U stands for those with a university degree. The matrix Z contains 
other control variables – the ownership (state, domestic, or foreign), industry, 
and region of the firm, year dummies, and dummies for each firm (firm fixed 
5 In the later years of the data, 
firms with fewer employees were 
also included in the sample, but 
we will carry out our estimation 
on the sample of those with at 
least twenty employees, and we 
restrict our sample further to 
those firms that have enough 
male and female workers in the 
sample to estimate group level 
differences between them.
6 The methodology is discussed 
in greater detail in the appen-
dix.
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effects). The relative productivity of various worker groups is represented by 
the parameter φ. In this simplified model we estimate an average relative pro-
ductivity: φF represents the relative productivity of women compared to men 
in all age and education groups.
Besides this average parameter, it may also be interesting to see whether 
there is a difference between the relative productivity of women of different 
ages and education levels. So we also estimate an unrestricted model in which 
we allow the relative productivity of all seven detailed worker groups to vary 
compared to the reference group of younger (those who only have work expe-
rience after 1989) low-skilled male workers. A more general form of the pro-
duction function for n = 0, 1, …, N worker groups is the following:
 (8.2)
The relative productivity parameters are estimated using the method of non-
linear least squares (NLS). We first carry out the estimation using only the 
observed characteristics as controls; in this case parameters are identified from 
variation between firms. In the next specification, we take into account firm 
level effects that are not observable but are constant over time by using firm 
fixed effects estimation. These are controlled for using firm dummy variables, 
and the parameters of the production function are estimated in first differ-
enced form using nonlinear least squares estimation (FD).7 In this specifica-
tion, the relative productivity of women is identified from changes in worker 
composition within firms over time. Thus we are able to filter out the effect of 
systematic selection of men and women. This is necessary because it is possible 
that women are employed at lower productivity firms (those with less effective 
management, less capital, etc.), which lowers their measured group level pro-
ductivity, but they actually perform just as well as, or even better than men 
within a given firm. In this case, we would estimate φF to be less than one in 
the NLS specification that only controls for observable firm characteristics, 
and closer to or even greater than 1 in the FD specification.
In the second step, we determine the relative wage using firm level wage 
equations. We prefer to aggregate to the firm level rather than estimate at 
the individual level for two reasons. First, at the firm level, we have two dif-
ferent wage measures available: the wage bill of the firm, which includes all 
wage-related expenses paid by the firm, and an aggregated variable calculated 
from the individual wages of workers. Second, at the firm level, the production 
function and the wage equation can be estimated together using the method 
of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), which allows for the correlation 
of the error terms of the two equations, and makes hypothesis testing of the 
7 The estimation was also carried 
out using the method suggested 
by Levinsohn–Petrin (2003), in 
which material costs are used 
to control for unobserved pro-
ductivity shocks. Our results 
remained robust in both the NLS 
and FD specifications.
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equality of relative wages and productivities straightforward. The firm level 
wage equation is actually a definitional equation derived from the aggregation 
of the individual level wage equations, which can be written in the following 
form to include the control variables also used in the production function:
 (8.3)
In equation (8.3) w represents firm level wage costs, and  λn/λ0 represents the 
relative wage of various worker groups. The relative wages, as in the case of the 
production functions, are estimated in both the restricted and unrestricted 
models, and we test their deviation from the relative productivities.
The methodology developed for estimating relative productivities and wages 
has been employed in several studies to estimate the level of discrimination 
in a new way. The results usually indicate that women receive a lower relative 
wage than their relative productivity, which suggests that there is some wage 
discrimination in the market, but the magnitude is much smaller than that of 
estimates based on the traditional wage equation methodology. The research 
results indicate that a higher ratio of female workers is associated with lower 
firm level productivity; the relative productivity of women is usually estimat-
ed to be around 0.7–0.9. Their wages are usually 15–40 percent lower than 
men’s. The deviation of wages and productivities does not necessarily signify 
discrimination, for example, there may still be unobserved differences in the 
characteristics of workplaces (dangerous, involves traveling, etc.), which may 
be the reason for the higher wage men receive. But this method does allevi-
ate one important problem of traditional wage equation-based estimates of 
discrimination: it decreases the bias due to unobserved differences in pro-
ductivity. The fact that studies that use this methodology find lower levels of 
discrimination is not surprising, since we suspected that the productivity of 
women was overestimated based on the observable characteristics, for exam-
ple, due to the lack of information on actual labour market experience, or to 
lower effort on the job due to other responsibilities.
According to Hellerstein–Neumark–Troske (1999), who were the first to 
use this methodology, the productivity of women is 85 percent of men’s in 
the United States, and their wages are 68 percent of men’s. This means that 
there is a significant negative wage gap between men and women that can-
not be explained by differences in their productivity of around 17 percent. 
Of course this does not prove the existence of discrimination against women, 
but it does provide new evidence in support of it. In other countries, however, 
estimation results suggest a much smaller or insignificant unexplained wage 
gap. Although Hellerstein–Neumark (1999) estimates on Israeli data, and 
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Dong–Zhang (2009) on Chinese data that women’s productivity is around 
75–80 percent of men’s, the relative wage does not differ significantly from 
this in the private sector. In the Chinese public sector, low-skilled women 
actually receive a higher wage than their productivity would justify, and this 
wage premium decreases the overall gender wage gap. The study emphasizes 
the importance of separating groups by level of education, since their results 
are completely different in the case of skilled and unskilled women. Dostie 
(2006) uses the method on Canadian data. The results suggest that the rela-
tive wage of women is 0.85 compared to men, while their relative productiv-
ity is somewhere between 0.8 and 0.9 depending on the specification of the 
production function. This also suggests that discrimination is overestimated 
by the traditional wage equation method.
Kawaguchi (2007) examines the relationship between relative wages and 
productivity using Japanese data, and points out the importance of selection 
at the firm level. Without the inclusion of firm fixed effects, the estimated 
productivity of women is 44 percent of men’s, and their wage is 31 percent of 
men’s, but in the within firm estimates, which take selection into better or 
worse firms into account, both are around 50 percent. Kawaguchi concludes 
that there is discrimination against women in hiring practices, but once they 
are employed they are not treated unequally. Ilmakunnas–Maliranta (2003) 
and Van Biesebroeck (2007) also emphasize the importance of proper specifi-
cation. The former estimates on Finnish, and the latter on African data, and 
their conclusion is that using this estimation method, they do not find evi-
dence of discrimination. Finally, Deniau–Perez-Duarte (2003) also find no 
significant deviation between relative wages and productivities in France.
In Hungary, Kertesi–Köllő (2002) used a similar estimation strategy to 
analyze wages and productivity. Their research focuses on the analysis of the 
decrease in the value of knowledge gained prior to the transition using wage 
equation estimation. They also estimate the effect of the composition of firms’ 
workforces on firm level productivity to examine how much the return to ed-
ucation and experience reflect their effects on productivity. Although their 
main goal is not to analyze the situation of women, they do separate the worker 
groups based on gender. The study also underlines the importance of divid-
ing the gender groups further by education level, since their findings indicate 
that the situation of women differs by skill level. In our study, we consider 
this possibility in the unrestricted specification, where we estimate relative 
productivities and wages of more detailed worker groups. We study the level 
of discrimination only for the years 2000–2005, so we are not attempting to 
analyze the changes following the transition; our goal is to paint a picture of 
the current situation of women in the labour market.
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Estimation results
The parameter estimates of the restricted model can be seen in Table 8.1. In 
these specifications, we do not differentiate between the relative productivi-
ties and wages of women by education level or age, the estimates reflecting the 
average differences. If we compare the NLS and FD specifications, we do not 
see evidence of a high level of selection: the estimated productivity and wage 
parameters are very similar in both cases. For this reason, during our discus-
sion of the estimation results we will focus on the FD specification, which 
we believe is the best suited for our purposes, since our goal is to analyze the 
level of discrimination within firms.
table 8.1: Parameter estimates of the restricted model  
(hypothesis: relative productivity = relative wage)
Specification
Relative  
productivity
Relative wage 
(wage cost) p­value
Firm wage bill
NLS 1.065 1.039
(0.053) (0.012)
FD 1.092 1.034 0.135
(0.040) (0.012)
Aggregated individual wages
NLS 1.065 0.863
(0.053) (0.012)
FD 1.090 0.786 0.000
(0.040) (0.020)
Note: Parameters that do not differ significantly from 1 are italicized. Standard errors 
of the estimates are in parentheses.
Within firms, the estimated productivity of women is somewhat higher than 
that of men, the relative productivity of women compared to men is 1.09 at 
the group level. Compared to previous international results, it is surprising 
to see a relative productivity that is greater than 1, which would mean that a 
higher ratio of women within a firm will increase its productivity. One pos-
sible explanation for this curious result may be that in the last few years, the 
typically “female” services sector has become more important.
The results for relative wages are different when using the two different 
wage measures: the firm level wage bill from their accounting records, or 
the weighted sum of the wages of individual workers of the firm. When esti-
mating with the wage bill as the dependent variable, the results suggest that 
the wages of females are somewhat higher than the wages of males, so their 
wages are in line with their estimated productivity. On the other hand, the 
aggregated wage variable results indicate a wage gap of about 20 percent; the 
relative wage is well below the relative productivity. One possible explana-
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tion for this difference in the results may be that women receive non-wage 
benefits to a greater degree than men, and these are only reflected in the wage 
bill variable. However, a more precise explanation of the difference requires 
more future exploration. The volatility of the results does highlight the fact 
that one must take great care when attempting to measure discrimination: 
both the choice of the wage variable and the estimation method may affect 
the results significantly.
We can gain more insight on the relative productivities and wages of wom-
en by estimating the unrestricted parameter model. As can be seen in Table 
8.2, the NLS and FD parameters differ significantly in several cases, which 
suggests that in the case of more detailed worker groups, certain worker types 
tend to group into certain types of firms, for example, those with lower pro-
ductivity. This selection effect is especially visible in the case of skilled and 
unskilled workers. Unskilled workers – especially the older unskilled work-
ers – tend to work in lower productivity firms, while the skilled – especially 
the younger group – tend to work in highly productive firms. For example, 
the relative productivity of older unskilled women is 0.53 in the NLS speci-
fication, suggesting that they are half as productive as young unskilled men. 
However, in the FD specification, where effects are identified from changes 
within firms over time, we can see that their productivity does not differ sig-
nificantly from that of the reference group, it is near one. In the case of skilled 
workers the relationship is exactly the opposite: their relative productivity in 
the NLS specification is 2.8, within firms, however, we can see that they are 
also not significantly different from one. This suggests that skilled workers 
tend to be employed at highly productive firms, while unskilled workers work 
at less productive firms, but if we account for this selection effect, the average 
productivity of the two groups does not differ significantly.
This result is in line with previous international experiences. For example, 
Haltiwanger–Lane–Spletzer (1999) analyze data from the United States 
and found that most firms employ either mainly skilled or mainly unskilled 
workers, so there are “high-skilled” firms and “low-skilled” firms. Malm-
berg–Lindh–Halvarsson (2005) studied the relationship between the age 
composition of a firm’s workforce and its productivity using Swedish data, 
and found similar selection effects: older workers tend to work in older firms 
with less capital, while the younger workers tend to be employed in younger, 
more productive firms.
There is also a significant selection effect in the case of relative wage es-
timates. We can see strong positive selection in the skilled categories, and 
weaker positive selection in the unskilled categories. The two different wage 
measures give different results in the unrestricted specifications as well. When 
using the wage bill (in the top portion of Table 8.2.), relative wages do not 
differ significantly from one for any category, and the relative wages and rela-
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tive productivities of all four female worker groups are equal at the 5 percent 
significance level. 
table 8.2: estimation results of the unrestricted parameter model  
(hypothesis: relative productivity = relative wage)
NLS FD
relative 
productivity
relative wage 
(wage bill)
relative 
productivity
relative wage 
(wage bill) p­value
Firm wage bill
Male, unskilled, pre­1989 0.401 1.430 0.978 0.984 0.902
(0.033) (0.036) (0.050) (0.015)
Male, skilled, post­1989 4.210 3.734 1.099 0.994 0.303
(0.387) (0.119) (0.105) (0.029)
Male, skilled, pre­1989 2.050 2.887 1.182 1.023 0.066
(0.171) (0.080) (0.089) (0.024)
Female, unskilled, post­1989 0.905 1.012 1.099 1.031 0.368
(0.095) (0.037) (0.077) (0.022)
Female, unskilled, pre­1989 0.529 1.461 1.077 1.021 0.341
(0.040) (0.036) (0.061) (0.017)
Female, skilled, post­1989 2.816 3.126 1.223 1.003 0.067
(0.339) (0.119) (0.124) (0.033)
Female, skilled, pre­1989 1.345 3.379 1.164 1.056 0.345
(0.187) (0.112) (0.117) (0.033)
Aggregated individual wages
Male, unskilled, pre­1989 0.401 1.404 0.978 1.075 0.109
(0.033) (0.042) (0.050) (0.035)
Male, skilled, post­1989 4.210 3.634 1.099 1.211 0.371
(0.387) (0.141) (0.105) (0.071)
Male, skilled, pre­1989 2.050 3.280 1.184 1.308 0.243
(0.171) (0.106) (0.089) (0.062)
Female, unskilled, post­1989 0.905 0.942 1.097 0.741 0.000
(0.095) (0.041) (0.077) (0.039)
Female, unskilled, pre­1989 0.529 1.183 1.076 0.843 0.001
(0.040) (0.035) (0.061) (0.032)
Female, skilled, post­1989 2.816 2.521 1.223 0.932 0.038
(0.339) (0.126) (0.124) (0.070)
Female, skilled, pre­1989 1.345 3.077 1.166 1.206 0.771
(0.187) (0.125) (0.118) (0.076)
Number of observations 29,123 19,237
Note: In the worker categories “pre-1989” refers to workers who were of working age 
prior to the transition, while “post-1989” refers to those who could only have ac-
quired work experience after the transition based on their age. Parameters that do 
not differ significantly from 1 are italicized. Standard errors of the estimates are in 
parentheses. The reference worker group is: male, unskilled, post-1989 category.
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Based on these results we do not find evidence supporting the existence of 
discrimination. Only in the case of the younger skilled group can the wage 
be shown to be lower than productivity, however, even these two parameters 
only differ at the 10 percent significance level. This result is in line with pre-
vious studies that suggest that the wage gap is higher for skilled women than 
it is for unskilled women (Fazekas–Bálint, 2008).
Using the aggregated wage variable, the average wage of women is 22 percent 
lower than the wage of men. Separating the workers into more detailed groups 
(Table 8.2. lower portion), we can see that the difference between productivity 
and wage varies by age group and skill level. For skilled and unskilled young-
er workers, the wage gap is near the average,8 but in the skilled older group it 
is lower, here we find a wage gap of around 10 percent. In this specification, 
this is the only demographic group where we observe that women are paid ac-
cording to their productivity. The wages of the skilled and unskilled younger 
groups are lower than their productivity, which is in line with discrimination 
against women, but in the unrestricted estimation we can see that the results 
are different when using the firm wage bill as our wage measure: although in 
the case of the female groups relative productivity is higher than relative wage, 
the difference between the two is not statistically significant.
Summarizing the results, we can say that the roughly 15 percent gender wage 
gap seen in previous literature using the individual level wage equation meth-
od cannot be explained by the lower productivity of women. Women do not 
have a lower productivity than men using any estimation method. When we 
estimate the relative wages using the wage measure aggregated from individ-
ual wages, we get similar average wage gaps of around 10–30 percent between 
male and female workers, which is not explained by the lower productivity 
of women. However, when we use the firm level wage bill variable (which in-
cludes all wage-related costs of the firm), we do not find a significant gap be-
tween the wages of men and women, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
relative wage equals relative productivity at the 5 percent significance level. 
In order to decide what may be behind these seemingly contradictory results, 
more careful study of the wage variables is needed. One possible explanation 
may be that women choose non-wage compensation in a higher ratio than 
men, for example, food stamps and travel imbursements, which are included 
in the firm level wage bill, but not in the individual wages or the firm level 
wage measure aggregated from them.
The results of this study underline the fact that the determination of the ex-
istence and extent of discrimination is a complex task, and results are highly 
dependent on the data used and the estimation method. If we are able to take 
the unobserved differences in the productivity of various worker groups into 
account, the estimated level of discrimination is significantly lower than what 
previous results based on traditional wage equations suggest.
8 The wage gap is compared 
to the same worker group cat-
egory. For example, in the case of 
skilled older workers the male-
female wage gap is 10 percent 
(1.3 – 1.2).
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Conclusion
In our study, we estimate the level of discrimination using a new method 
instead of traditional individual level wage equations: we estimate relative 
productivities at the group level, by seeing how the ratio of a given group in a 
firm affects the firm’s revenue. We estimate firm level production functions, 
in which we allow the marginal productivity of different worker groups to 
vary. We compare the relative productivities that we estimate from firm pro-
duction data with wage gaps that are also estimated at the firm level: if there 
is discrimination against women in the labour market, the two should differ 
significantly, since women would not be rewarded according to their relative 
productivity. The method we employ has the benefit that the relative pro-
ductivities estimated at the group level measure the differences between men 
and women more precisely than based on observable worker characteristics 
(education, age) alone, so our estimate of discrimination is lower than what 
is usually found by wage equation methods.
Our results suggest that the productivity of women is not lower than that of 
men, and the individual wage results show that they are underpaid relative to 
men, which suggests discrimination against them. In our case, though, we also 
see that when we use the firm level wage bill to estimate relative productivi-
ties, the difference between male and female wages is lower than when based 
on individual wage data. Exploring the reasons behind these results remains 
an important task for future research.
aPPendix 8
Estimation of the production function
During the estimation of the relative productivities of worker groups we start 
out from a Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs: capital, 
material cost, and labour. Capital is measured by the annual average capital 
stock, material cost is the firm’s material costs in the given year, and labour is 
measured using the worker group-weighted average annual employment (L) 
of the firm, the quality of labour, or QL variable. The workers are grouped 
into n = N + 1 categories, where the productivity of the n-th group is repre-
sented by φn, and the number of workers in the n-th group is represented by 
Ln in the following way:
 (F8.1)
in focus
172
Plugging this into the production function we get:
 (F8.2)
The matrix Z contains various other controls: year, industry, region, owner-
ship type, and firm dummies. The relative productivity of workers compared 
to the n = 0 reference group is φn/ φ0, which we estimate using the method 
of nonlinear least squares. Since the number of worker categories is relatively 
large even when we differentiate along only a few demographic characteristics 
(for example, if we use gender, three age groups, and three education levels we 
have 18 groups), most studies use certain restrictions on the productivity and 
composition of the worker groups. Assuming that the relative productivity 
and ratio of women is the same within all age groups and education levels, the 
production function based on the previous example is the following:
 (F8.3)
In this simplified model we estimate the average relative productivity of 
women compared to men in all age groups and education categories (φF). On 
the other hand, in the unrestricted model we allow the relative productivity 
of women to differ for the various age and education categories.
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IntroductIon
The year 2009 has so far been dominated by the economic downturn and cri-
sis management in Hungary as well as in Europe. This has put labour markets 
and employment policies at the centre of political debates both at the level 
of the European Union and in the individual Member States. Views have 
clashed around questions such as: “Is the sharp increase of unemployment 
avoidable?” or “What is the most effective way of increasing employment?” 
and “How can the short-term and the long-term objectives of employment 
policy be combined?” The economic crisis has overwritten the priorities of 
employment policies and has triggered emergency measures including the re-
allocation of resources to stabilise jobs and mitigate social tensions. The first 
chapter gives an overview of the characteristics of international responses to 
the economic crisis including policies and their implementation. The second 
chapter presents Hungary’s responses to the economic downturn.
The economic crisis has also made it more difficult to successfully tackle the 
largest challenge of Hungarian employment policy, namely the labour-market 
reintegration of an increasing number of long-term unemployed. Neverthe-
less, the integration of the administration of social benefits into the public 
employment service and the implementation of the “Pathway to Work” pro-
gramme started on January 1, 2009 and several new implementing rules came 
into force as well. This will be discussed in Chapter 3 including measures such 
as the preparation of Public Work Plans, the tasks of the Public Work Co-
ordinators, a new cash benefit to persons of working age, the creation of the 
Employment and Social Database and the revised obligations of social benefit 
claimants towards the local offices of the public employment service.
Practically all public works resources were reallocated from the Public Em-
ployment Service (PES) to local governments in the “Pathway to Work” pro-
gramme. Two thirds of the money allocated to regions from the Employment 
Fund – excluding commitments from the previous year – was earmarked for 
crisis management. There was therefore hardly any funding available for new 
active measures in the midst of rapidly increasing unemployment. The gap 
was filled with European Social Fund (ESF) resources (EU Programmes, Start 
Plus, Start Extra cards) however considering the labour market situation, this 
was only partly successful.
1. responses to the downturn In the european unIon
Unemployment fell considerably in Europe between 2005 and 2008. The fi-
nancial crisis which started in the autumn of 2008 hardly showed any effect 
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on the labour market until the end of the year. Employment increased over-
all by 0.9% during 2008 and unemployment in January 2009 was only 0.8% 
higher than a year earlier. (CEC, 2009.) The reasons for this were the delayed 
reactions of labour markets in general, and the increasing use of internal nu-
merical flexibility measures (introduction of shorter working time, temporary 
suspension of production etc.) The recession has however deepened since the 
beginning of 2009 and this prompted the European Commission to draft an 
amendment to the Lisbon Strategy outlining short-term actions to address 
the downturn. As a result the document “From financial crisis to recovery: 
A European framework for action” (CEC, 2008) was released in November 
2008 suggesting the following actions.
– Increasing investment in R&D innovation and education.
– Promoting combined flexibility and security measures (flexicurity) as a way 
of protecting and equipping people rather than specific jobs.
– Supporting businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), to build markets at home and internationally.
– Enhancing European competitiveness by continuing to green the economy 
as a way of creating new jobs and technologies that also contribute to over-
coming energy security constraints and achieving environmental goals.
With regard to the employment and social impact of the downturn, the 
European Commission suggested the following actions.
– To counter the effects of unemployment the European Commission of-
fered Member States the possibility of reallocating funds under the Euro-
pean Social Fund to support measures to quickly reintegrate unemployed 
people into the labour market.
– Reviewing the effectiveness of the Globalisation Adjustment Fund and its 
possible use to mitigate the impact of the crisis.
– Helping unemployed people to start up a new business quickly and inex-
pensively.
– Monitoring the impact of the crisis on different sectors affected by structural 
adjustments and, where appropriate, provide timely, targeted, and tempo-
rary support using the scope offered by the State Aid regime.
– Pursuing flexicurity, in particular active labour market policy measures, tax 
and benefit reform, and reinforced matching of skills and jobs. The situa-
tion is likely to be especially difficult at the lower end of the labour market, 
making it particularly important to ease the unavoidable restructuring and 
provide income and targeted social protection support.
The European Commission released the European Economic Recovery 
Plan on November 26, 2008. This Plan has two key pillars and an underly-
ing principle:
1) A major injection of purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand 
and stimulate confidence.
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2) Direct and short-term action to reinforce Europe’s competitiveness in the 
long-term.
3) The fundamental principle of solidarity and social justice.
The European Economic Recovery Plan proposes a set of actions to help 
recovery from the crisis. These actions range from supporting small enter-
prises through to investment in innovation and the green economy, and in-
creasing employment.
The Commission proposed to simplify criteria for ESF support and step up 
advance payments from early 2009, so that Member States have earlier access 
to up to 1.8 billion euros that can be used to:
– As part of flexicurity strategies, rapidly reinforce activation schemes, in 
particular for the low-skilled, involving personalised counselling, intensive 
training and up-skilling of workers, apprenticeships, subsidised employment 
as well as grants for self-employment, business start-up.
– Refocus programmes to concentrate support on the most disadvantaged, 
and where necessary with full Community financing of projects.
– Improve the monitoring and matching of vocational skills development 
with existing and anticipated job vacancies; this must be implemented in 
close cooperation with social partners, public employment services and 
also universities.
The Commission proposed to re-programme ESF expenditure to ensure ad-
equate allocation of financial resources to crisis interventions. Furthermore 
the Commission initiated the revision of the rules of the European Globali-
sation Adjustment Fund so that it can be utilised to intervene more rapidly 
in key sectors, either to co-finance training and job placements for workers 
who are made redundant or to keep in the labour market skilled workers 
who will be needed once the economy starts to recover.
On May 7, 2009 the tri-partite European Employment Summit was held 
in Prague. The aim of the meeting was to assess the impact of the financial 
and economic crisis on employment, to identify good practices and to stimu-
late coordination between the social partners of Member States. The Summit 
also provided input towards the European Council meeting in June. (CEC, 
2009a.)
The participants emphasised the importance of working in partnership to 
alleviate the detrimental effects of the crisis and turning it into an opportu-
nity to transform Europe into a competitive, inclusive, innovative and eco-
efficient economy with a high potential for future growth, employment and 
social protection. Even at a time of economic downturn those policies must 
be pursued that help deliver these ambitious goals. While taking into account 
the individual circumstances of each Member State, the EU’s response to the 
crisis is guided by the following principles.
The launch of a 
major European 
employment support 
initiative
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– It should be based on a coordinated approach combining economic, em-
ployment and social policies at all levels and preventing protectionism both 
inside and outside the EU.
– It should lead to sustainable recovery, through the steady implementation 
of necessary structural reforms, including balanced flexicurity strategies 
aimed at strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and growth potential and 
modernising social protection systems.
– It should be consistent with the long-term objectives of the EU, such as 
high levels of employment and quality jobs and the long-term sustainabil-
ity of public finances, while respecting the principles of the single market 
and the European social model.
– It should mobilise all available national and Community instruments and 
fully integrate growth, employment, solidarity, social protection and in-
clusion strategies.
– It should systematically monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of short-term 
measures, ensure the implementation of all agreed measures, and promote 
mutual learning, dissemination of good practices and social innovation.
The post-2010 Lisbon strategy should be focused on well-defined goals that 
are relevant to European citizens and should deliver sustainable growth, so-
cial cohesion and more and better jobs, ensuring long-term sustainability of 
public finances and modern social protection systems.
In the difficult economic context, the EU must especially endeavour to:
– maintain employment and create jobs;
– improve access to jobs, particularly for young people;
– upgrade skills and improve matching with labour market needs, promote 
mobility.
The participants of the Employment Summit reached common ground on 
10 specific actions, which could help alleviate the employment and social con-
sequences of the crisis and put the EU in a better position when the economy 
recovers. These actions are as follows.
1) Member States and social partners must take actions that are aimed at 
maintaining as many jobs as possible. To this end, a temporary reduction 
of working hours can be an effective option for businesses, which is also sup-
ported by the European Social Fund. This can also be an opportunity for 
re-training to facilitate internal job transfers, restructuring or transitions to 
other companies in line with flexicurity.
2) Further efforts are needed to create a friendly environment for entrepre-
neurship and job creation, for example by lowering non-wage labour costs, 
investing in research and infrastructure, reducing administrative burdens, 
better regulation and addressing rigidities in the labour market in line with 
the EU’s flexicurity strategy. Particular attention should be paid to small- and 
At national level
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medium-sized enterprises for example by ensuring that the re-training of their 
personnel is affordable and targeted.
3) The efficiency of national employment services must be improved. Early 
active labour market measures should be tailored to individual needs and fo-
cus on avoiding long-term unemployment and social exclusion. For this rea-
son in the first weeks and months of unemployment, measures should provide 
intensive counselling, training and job search. Every jobseeker and person 
who has lost their job should receive support as quickly as possible to return 
to the labour market or enter training. Unemployed young people aged un-
der 24 years should receive particular attention.
4) Member States and social partners should agree to significantly increase 
the number of high quality apprenticeship places available by the end of 
2009.
5) Member States, the social partners and the Commission should jointly 
focus on increasing the labour supply by promoting more inclusive labour 
markets and increasing access to jobs. This should be done by ensuring strong 
work incentives, effective active labour market policies and modernisation 
of social protection systems in line with the common principles of social in-
clusion.
6) Member States should step up action to upgrade skills at all levels, in-
cluding the training of low-skilled and disadvantaged people, and to prevent 
young people leaving school without the necessary skills.
7) Better labour mobility will improve matching labour demand and supply 
and enable people to fully use their potential. The free movement of workers 
contributes to economic growth without negative impacts on labour markets 
and the social cohesion of receiving countries. Professional mobility should 
be strengthened by combining flexibility with income and employment se-
curity in order to make relocation pay.
8) The Commission in partnership with Member States and social part-
ners will attempt to identify job opportunities and emerging skills require-
ments across Europe, and improve skills forecasting, in line with the agenda 
of “New Skills for New Jobs”. (CEC, 2008a.)
9) Innovative approaches to support unemployed and young people in 
starting their own business on a sustainable basis (for example, by provid-
ing entrepreneurship training, starting capital, or by lowering or eliminat-
ing taxation on new businesses). The ESF, the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund and the European Investment Bank’s financial resources should 
be used for this purpose.
10) Promoting mutual learning and the exchange of good practice on the 
anticipation and management of restructuring. This can be implemented 
within the existing legal framework.
At the Community level
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1.1 What happened so far?
The European Employment Observatory provides a comprehensive overview 
of governments’ responses to the economic crisis in the Member States of the 
EU. (Vogler-Ludwig, Kurt, 2009, p. 7) Table 1 gives a summary of these.
table 1: responses to the economic crisis in the member states of the eu, by april 2009
Country
General support 
measures/guar-
antees/tax-cuts
Sector-specific 
subsidies/
guarantees
Infrastructure 
spending
Training and 
employment 
subsidies
Unemployment assist-
ance/Public work/
Flexible work contracts
Austria x + x + x
Belgium* + + +
Bulgaria x +
Cyprus x + +
Czech Republic* x +
Denmark x + +
Estonia x +
United Kingdom x + + +
Finland x x + x
France x + +
Greece x + + +
Ireland +
Netherlands + x + +
Poland x +
Latvia x +
Lithuania x +
Luxembourg x + + +
Hungary x +
Malta* + + +
Germany x + + + x
Italy + + x
Portugal + x + +
Romania + + x
Spain + + x +
Sweden + x x + +
Slovakia* + + + +
Slovenia x + + +
+ Adopted or planned measures.
x High-profile measures (in terms of financial allocation).
* No information available on financial allocation.
Source: European Employment Observatory; Economix, cited by: Vogler-Ludwig, 
Kurt, 2009, p. 7.
– Two thirds of Member States increased infrastructure spending in the ar-
eas of transport, housing and education. These are typically combined with 
funding from the EU’s Structural Funds.
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– In addition, sector-specific programmes were launched for example in the 
construction industry (Cyprus, Spain, Lithuania), in the car industry (Ger-
many, France, Italy, Austria, Spain, Portugal), in transport and tourism 
(Cyprus, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Portugal) and in the steel indus-
try (Luxembourg).
– Half of the Member States provide state guarantees (non-financial) to busi-
nesses or lower business tax rates. Germany for example introduced a 100-
million-euro guarantee scheme for SMEs. Hungary and Slovenia have sim-
ilar schemes. Elsewhere, Member States provide tax discounts, subsidised 
loans or direct subsidies for SMEs or start-up businesses. Lastly, Austria 
lowered the personal income tax rate for all taxpayers, the United Kingdom 
and Denmark reduced the rate of the value-added tax (VAT). Italy offers a 
full exemption of business taxation for companies increasing production.
– Investment in skills training is less common; only one third of Member 
States used this measure. These include on the one hand support towards 
the establishment of apprenticeship places (Austria, United Kingdom), 
training of redundant workers (France, Cyprus, Finland, Netherlands, Por-
tugal), or the development of the adult education system in general (Hun-
gary, Germany, Slovenia).
– The restructuring of the workforce is supported by measures such as the re-
training of redundant workers, or the creation of “re-employment pools” 
(Belgium), or the “Professional Transition Contracts” (France).
– The flexibility of work contracts is generally achieved by the expansion 
of short-time work (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Spain), or reduced working hours. The maximum period of short-time 
work was extended to 18 months in some countries (Austria, Germany). 
Elsewhere the assistance available during short-time work was increased 
(Hungary), or workers were exempted from paying Social Insurance con-
tributions (Germany).
– As regards subsidies to private households, people on low-income or unem-
ployed young people (France, Italy), or families with children (Germany) 
receive assistance. In Spain households are eligible for housing support, and 
in Denmark people in need can withdraw their savings from the compul-
sory pension fund.
– The amount of unemployment assistance was increased (Belgium, France, 
United Kingdom), there was accelerated payment (Spain), and employment 
services reinforced (Lithuania, Malta, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom).
These measures are used in different combinations, but three common pat-
terns can be identified.
– The state-oriented approach: this is characteristic of France for example, 
where the emphasis is placed on public investments (including sector-spe-
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cific subsidies) together with redistributive measures towards people on 
low income, the unemployed, young people etc. The state takes responsi-
bility for increasing employment and alleviating the negative social conse-
quences of the crisis.
– The stability-oriented approach: characterises Germany for instance where 
the focus is on state guarantees to companies, short-time work and subsidies 
to key sectors (e.g. the car industry). Redistributive measures have a rela-
tively minor role in comparison to tax cuts or wage subsidies. The restruc-
turing of the workforce is also less important.
– The liberal approach is best illustrated by the example of the United King-
dom with tax cuts (VAT) and labour market measures (hiring premiums, 
improving employment services) having a prominent role.
table 2: eu member states according to approaches to crisis management
Approaches Countries
State-oriented Cyprus, Spain, France, Malta (Austria*)
Stability-oriented Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia
Liberal Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom (Austria*)
* Austria has elements of both approaches. Ireland, Estonia and Romania could not be 
classified into any of these categories.
Source: Economix, cited by: Vogler-Ludwig, K., 2009, p. 7.
1.2 The key to successful crisis management
A thematic review seminar (Mutual Learning Programme) on labour mar-
ket policy-responses to the crisis was held in Brussels on May 19, 2009. At 
this seminar Madsen, the Danish “father” of the concept of flexicurity put 
forward seven principles for successful labour market responses to the down-
turn. (Madsen, P.K, 2009) They were the following.
– Don’t protect jobs, encourage mobility! Or differently: promoting mobil-
ity should be the core of employment. Measures to promote mobility in-
clude the up-skilling of unemployed people and those threatened by re-
dundancy; adequate levels of income replacement for unemployed people 
to allow them to maintain a reasonable quality of life during the periods of 
job-search and training; and a well-functioning system of public employ-
ment services that support matching of labour market needs both in the 
short- and long-run.
– In the long-run, it is still necessary to increase labour supply in order to 
maintain the balance between the active and inactive population. For this 
reason, it is important that short-term measures aiming to reduce unem-
ployment do not clash with long-term objectives.
– Leaving unemployment to rise decreases effective labour supply and in-
creases structural unemployment. Therefore, unemployment should defi-
nitely not be left to rise.
Seven principles for  
successful labour market 
approaches to deal  
with the crisis
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– In the short-run labour market policy cannot create jobs. An active mac-
roeconomic policy should take the lead in this.
– The need for policy integration remains important even at times of 
crisis.
– The economic crisis should be considered as an opportunity to upgrade skills 
that will later bring benefits to the individual as well as to society.
– The introduction of successful policy measures should also include the de-
sign of efficient implementation structures as well as the involvement of 
social partners and local stakeholders.
The lesson of this Mutual Learning Programme was that labour-market pol-
icy responses to the crisis should focus on 5 priorities, namely: 1) restructur-
ing the financial sector; 2) protecting existing jobs; 3) preserving vulnerable 
jobs; 4) restructuring the workforce; 5) mitigating social tensions.
1) Restructuring of the financial sector. Although here the most impor-
tant tasks are fiscal stabilisation and new regulatory frameworks for the fi-
nancial markets, employment policy also has a role in upgrading the skills of 
the workforce and promoting R&D.
– Training should be focused on the economics of capital markets, fair in-
formation practices to customers, controlling and risk assessment. Govern-
ments should initiate the introduction of such new training programmes 
in the financial sector.
– Given that the risk assessment instruments failed to predict long-term risks, 
R&D should be directed at improving these.
2) Protecting existing jobs. The crisis might destroy many healthy jobs 
that will once again be necessary when the economic turmoil has subsided. 
Short-time working arrangements might be an appropriate instrument to 
defend these jobs. However, they should be implemented together with in-
struments that increase the flexibility of working time in general. For ex-
ample averaging workers’ hours over longer periods of time during a down-
turn in demand might be an alternative to redundancy. Pay cuts should also 
be taken into account and governments should ease the burden by reducing 
contributions.
3) Preserving vulnerable jobs. by investment in research and development, 
training and education and direct job creation; or differently the development 
of human capital rather than the physical infrastructure. Companies need 
to learn crisis management. Redundancies could be limited by incentives to 
employers who preserve jobs. The introduction of risk premiums in unem-
ployment insurance can be a viable option.
4) Restructuring the workforce. The world will be different after the cri-
sis. Strong competition will force many companies out of their markets, 
high productivity will be a key to survival, emerging countries will see new 
opportunities to enter European markets, and some jobs will disappear for-
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ever. This can be achieved by supporting companies’ efforts to keep their 
markets rather than public investments. Also the times of underemploy-
ment should be used to upgrade the skills of the labour-force. The better al-
location of labour within the economy should be supported by promoting 
geographical mobility.
The Dutch Example
Short-time working: first response to the crisis
This was the adjustment of an already existing em-
ployment scheme (the shortening of working time 
on economic grounds open between November 30, 
2008 and March 31, 2009)
Features
– Eligibility: fall in sales by at least 30% in two 
consecutive months (must be evidenced by an au-
dit certificate)
– Duration: maximum 24 weeks.
– Level of assistance: 75% of last earned wage dur-
ing the first 2 months, 70% thereafter.
– Conditionality: employers have several obliga-
tions with respect to training, posting and contin-
ued payment of wages and an obligation to main-
tain the contract for at least four weeks following 
the end of the subsidy.
– Financing: The Government allocated 200 mil-
lion euros to the public unemployment benefit 
funds to cover the additional expenses.
Impact
– High take-up, mainly in metal/steel industry, real 
estate, wholesale, and logistics. The additional time 
was mostly used for training. (+)
– It was impossible to target “healthy businesses”, 
therefore it delayed necessary adjustments in some 
sectors/companies. (–)
Part-time unemployment assistance
At the end of March the Government proposed a 
crisis package – Working for the Future – which was 
an Annex to the Coalition Agreement. This consist-
ed of an economic stimulus package with emphasis 
on short-term employment, restoration of sound 
government finances and a long-term agenda.
The opportunity for part-time unemployment as-
sistance was part of the former, and was intro-
duced on April 1, 2009 replacing the short-time 
work scheme. In this scheme employers can reduce 
working time by up to 50% for which workers re-
ceive part-time unemployment assistance to com-
pensate for the loss of income. This is available ini-
tially for 3 months but can be extended twice for a 
period of up to 6 months each time. Applications 
for the assistance can be made until January 1, 2010. 
Part-time unemployment assistance must always 
be accompanied by a training agreement with the 
company and workers are required to take part in 
training. Employers must reimburse the subsidy if 
the worker is made redundant during or within 3 
months of receiving part-time unemployment as-
sistance. The Government allocated 375 million 
euros to this scheme which has a low administra-
tive threshold so SMEs can also access it.
Impact
– The advantage of the second scheme is that it is 
better targeted at healthy businesses because they 
self-select to take part. The scheme is attractive for 
companies that need short-term financial assistance 
to tackle temporary financial difficulties. How-
ever it is not appealing to those who are planning 
redundancy of workers in the short term because 
they are required to reimburse 50% of the subsidy. 
It is not the aim of the Government to support de-
laying necessary restructuring.
– The possible risks are a potential deadweight loss 
(subsidising jobs that would have been maintained 
anyway). Although this scheme is better targeted 
and therefore less likely to delay restructuring, this 
effect cannot be ruled out either.
In summary: The short-time work scheme focused 
on those hardest hit by the crisis while the part-time 
unemployment assistance scheme supports those 
who have the best chance of survival.
Source: Sweers, M., 2009.
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Short-time work instead of redundancy; training instead of redundancy in Germany
The general rules on short-time work as a labour 
market measure stipulate that workers temporar-
ily laid-off due a reduction in orders are entitled to 
60% of their net wage (67% if they have children). 
This is paid by the labour market agency via the 
employer. In relation to the lay-off period employ-
ers are required to pay a reduced rate – 80% – of 
social insurance contribution; 50% of which is paid 
by the employer and 50% paid by the labour mar-
ket agency. If the worker is involved in training, 
the labour market agency pays 100% of the social 
insurance.
As a response to the crisis, existing rules were amend-
ed as follows.
– The subsidy can be paid for up to 18 months in-
stead of 6 months (since it was initiated this has 
been extended to 24 months).
– The labour-market agency pays 50% of the social 
insurance contribution which rises to 100% if the 
worker is involved in training.
– The subsidy for short-time work is available to 
employers if they reduce the wage of at least one 
employer by 10%. This replaced the earlier condi-
tion that the reduced working time should affect 
at least a third of the workforce.
– The administration of the scheme should be fast 
and uncomplicated. The subsidy can be claimed 
if:
– The shortening of working time is caused by eco-
nomic or other, unavoidable circumstances.
– The company is forced to cut the full-time equiva-
lent wage of at least one worker by at least 10%.
– They have previously tried all other possible 
measures, for example introducing flexible work-
ing time, and
– The loss of orders has been reported to the la-
bour market agency.
A fifty percent reduction of working time means 
that the employer pays 50% of the wage. Lower 
pay also means savings attached with non-wage 
labour costs. For the affected time the employee 
receives 60/67% of his/her net pay (this is equal to 
the income-replacement rate of the unemployment 
benefit). The short-time work allowance itself is 
tax-free, however it counts towards the tax base of 
total taxable income. Both the wage and the short-
time work allowance are paid by the employer to 
the worker. Half of the social insurance contribu-
tion paid after the reduced wage is paid by the em-
ployer and the 50% is paid by the employee. The 
rate of the social insurance contribution on short-
time work is 80% of the original rate which is paid 
jointly (50–50%) by the employer and the labour 
market agency (if the worker takes part in training 
the labour market agency pays 100%).
Another response to the crisis is the placement of 
redundant workers in labour-market “transfer com-
panies” (employment companies). These are public 
companies funded by the state to allow companies 
to temporarily “park” redundant workers. Employ-
ees receive two thirds of their original salary for up 
to 24 months and the state also covers social insur-
ance contributions. Transfer companies can also 
offer training to workers.
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Kurz zur Kurzarbeit, Januar 2009.
5) Mitigating social tensions. Unemployment strongly discriminates be-
tween skills and social groups. The burden of recession is often borne by the 
lower skills groups. This calls for a new type of solidarity pact between the 
social groups which has a two-fold objective. On the one hand, it is impor-
tant to maintain the employability of unemployed people, and on the other 
hand it is important to demonstrate solidarity among the labour force. A 
solidarity contribution by those who have a job could be used to finance an 
increased amount of public work. This would give jobs to unemployed people, 
sustain or even improve the level of social services, and show that the work 
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force is sharing the burden. In addition to skills, unemployment discriminates 
between regions as well. EU Structural Funds could be re-oriented to com-
bat local origins of unemployment. In general public spending programmes 
should consider the strongly different labour market situation among regions 
and allocate resources in order to compensate for local disadvantages.
How have our regional competitors responded to the crisis?
The growth prospects in the new Member States 
of the European Union significantly deteriorated 
and they have had to, and will have to, introduce 
tough anti-crisis measures. The Baltic states and 
Hungary face severe constraints as a result of the 
mistakes of earlier economic policies. Elsewhere 
the conditions are somewhat more favourable. 
Most countries in the region are faced with the 
dilemma of either increasing the budget deficit or 
trying to maintain budgetary balance through a 
combination of measures designed to reduce ex-
penditure and increase revenue. The responses to 
the crisis in the region, to some extent, seem simi-
lar because most countries are forced to introduce 
extraordinary cuts in expenditure and measures 
to increase revenues as a result of the deepening 
recession. At the same time, the lower economic 
output and the decline of consumption are reduc-
ing tax revenues. In addition to the increasing do-
mestic unemployment, many migrants who have 
been working in wealthier EU countries are also 
losing their jobs. As a result not only is there a de-
cline in the remittances paid by migrants but many 
of them return home and take up unemployment 
or social assistance which puts additional strain 
on national budgets.
Source: www.hirszerzo.hu, February 19, 2009.
1.3 The role of public employment services in tackling the 
economic crisis
The European Economic Recovery Plan put forward a clear expectation 
towards national employment services to take up a key role in tackling the 
employment effects of the crisis and responding to future challenges such as 
avoiding structural and long-term unemployment, and rapid changes in 
the economy and in society. As regards specific actions a conference was or-
ganised to bring together the representatives of national employment serv-
ices from EU Member States, Norway and Iceland to discuss actions to pro-
mote inclusive labour markets in a rapidly changing and global economy, 
both during the present downturn and beyond. (PES Conference, Brussels, 
14–15 May 2009)
The modernisation of public employment services over recent decades made 
a substantial contribution towards the prevention and reduction of massive 
and long-term unemployment, and also improved transparency in the labour 
market. Unlike in the past when the PES only administered statutory assist-
ance to unemployed individuals, now the labour market institutions have the 
task of providing early and effective responses to the economic downturn cy-
cles and effective services to their target customers: jobseekers and employers. 
Topics for debate and  
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In this context, the conference sought a pragmatic response to the question 
“how and with which instruments should labour market institutions ad-
dress the present and future labour market challenges?” There is a risk that 
the economic crisis evolves into a social crisis, yet it should still be regarded 
as an opportunity for testing the implementation of multiple and combined 
labour market measures to help return to growth and stability. What were 
the short- and long-term issues at debate?
a) The impact of the present economic crisis and future global challenges 
on the mission of the labour market institutions;
b) The effectiveness of the instruments at the disposal of the labour mar-
ket institutions (mainly PES) to address the effects of the crisis – short-time 
working, job redundancies and mass dismissals, businesses restructuring, 
migration flows, and the exclusion of vulnerable people (in particular young 
and older people);
c) Good practices and pilots to bridge the gap between the present and the 
longer-term challenges to help labour institutions better anticipate and re-
spond to different labour market events and changes.
At the conference the heads of public employment services put forward re-
commendations regarding possible organisational responses to the challenges 
of the crisis. They were as follows.
1) Labour-market institutions ready for action
In most Member States the economic downturn led to mass redundancies. 
The PES must be able to handle the hectic cycles of labour markets (mass 
inflows of jobseekers together with rapid restructuring of companies). Al-
though job creation is beyond the remit of the PES, it is required to balance 
and bridge the gap between demand and supply.
Labour-market events are highly unpredictable and therefore 1) there is an 
unexpected strain on PES resources and increasing expectations towards their 
efficient use; 2) there is an increased demand from job seekers to integrated 
case work (developing individual career paths); early interventions and services 
based on individual agreements are necessary to ensure safe and swift transi-
tion between jobs; 4) employers expect better services; and 5) a more targeted 
follow-up of labour-market trends and better forecasting of demand become 
crucial. A number of countries decided to strengthen crisis management ca-
pacities and develop interventions based on a combination of measures.
These are underpinned by macro-economic policies such as relieving the 
tax and social insurance burden on businesses to protect jobs and increase 
employment (UK, Sweden, France, Germany); the extension of work con-
tracts paid by the state and prolonging the payment of unemployment as-
sistance (France).
Strategies at public 
employment services 
to alleviate the 
impact of the crisis
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Examples of PES interventions to address the crisis
Netherlands: To prevent unemployment the PES es-
tablished 30 mobility centres that assist in the trans-
fer of workers threatened by redundancy to a new 
job. These centres are meant to support on a project 
basis, companies that make use of the regulation to 
find new employment (secondment, temporary jobs) 
for their redundant workers. This approach is also 
applied in the case of mass dismissals.
Spain: Developed an extraordinary plan containing 
orientation, professional training and labour mar-
ket integration measures. In the framework of this 
plan 1,500 advisors were hired to carry out support 
tasks in the public employment service.
Germany: Hiring of 5,000 additional job place-
ment officers (as part of the Employment Pact of 
16 January).
Austria: An additional 35 million euros per year to 
the Labour Market Service (AMS) for vocational 
training of the unemployed, particularly women. 
A general tool for retraining delivered under the 
new scheme for the car industry is the so-called 
“outplacement company” (this combines short-
term work, internal and external training and the 
placement of redundant workers in new jobs). An 
additional 120 million euros were allocated to 
active labour market policies; their budget now 
reaches 1 billion euros. In addition 200 new staff 
in 2009 and a further 50 in 2010 are hired by the 
PES. They will be allocated to provide early inter-
vention services and manage programmes for un-
employed young people.
UK: An additional £1.3 billion for Jobcentre Plus 
to deliver support for unemployed people. Out of 
this £800 million is “new” money and £500 million 
will come from postponing the closing of 25 Job-
centre Plus offices.
Ireland: Increased provision of night class training 
from approximately 8,000 places to 24,000 places 
in 2009. Such places will be available free of charge 
to people who are unemployed.
Belgium: the Government offers training for people 
who have lost their job. The system of temporary 
unemployment cancels or postpones (for blue collar 
workers) dismissals due to economic reasons.
Source: Conference on Labour market institutions in time of crisis: challenges and experiences, Brus-
sels, 14–15 May 2009, Final report on the main discussion points, submitted by GHK Consulting Ltd., 
June 2009.
2) New impetus towards the future
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities has been monitoring Member States’ ini-
tiatives aimed at tackling the recession since December 2008. (CEC, 2008a) 
In addition to anticipating viable sectors for the future, it also looks at future 
demand for skills. An expert working group was set up to assist modelling 
forecasts and national employment services take part in the monitoring of la-
bour markets. To identify new skills the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) prepared a report on “Employment Trends” and is currently working 
on a model to forecast skills demand. The ILO is also looking at skills needs 
that would allow a shift towards more green jobs. (International Labour Of-
fice, 2009)
In relation to the above public employment services are faced with the fol-
lowing challenges.
– They must be prepared to identify increasingly complex job profiles re-
quired by employers (a job requires an increasing number of vocational and 
general skills).
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– They must consider how they can offer motivating jobs to people. In the 
USA for example employees consider changing jobs on average 14 times be-
fore the age of 38. Public Employment Services are also expected to give more 
effective assistance in job search in the European Union.
– If they spend money on training they should not do this only during the 
current recession but also prepare skills for the next growth period. It is the 
responsibility of the PES to monitor current demand and anticipate future 
needs. Labour-market institutions also need to mobilise disadvantaged groups, 
identify them and their training needs – this is crucial for the EU and the in-
tegrated employment and social services.
3) Flexible security – adaptation strategy for economic recession
Labour organisations must focus on the modernisation of labour markets 
and must adopt a coordinated combination of policy responses in particular 
for disadvantaged people. As an immediate intervention the flexicurity strat-
egy can be an obvious response and offer a comprehensive policy framework. 
The flexibility of work contracts and a combination of active labour market 
measures can give a rapid policy response to mass redundancies or company 
closures because they allow a swift transition to a new job. In the current cli-
mate of uncertainty flexicurity demonstrates the possibility of transition with 
the assistance of skills development, active labour market measures and social 
protection systems that can reduce the negative effects of the crisis. They also 
increase citizens’ confidence and allow a quick labour (re)integration of dis-
advantaged people and those who have lost their job. A comparative analysis 
of unemployment at the end of 2008 reveals that its growth had been slower 
in Europe than in the USA. This is the result of a widespread application of 
internal flexibility measures (flexible working time systems) which allow the 
adaptation of the workforce and avoid redundancies.
For this reason most European public employment services are making ef-
forts to ensure fast, flexible and effective services for jobseekers and employ-
ers. During times of recession the PES plays a key role in introducing flexi-
curity policies (Table 3) and in meeting the needs of the most disadvantaged 
groups on the labour market.
“By providing support and delivering services, Public Employment Serv-
ices actively contribute to the implementation of the common principles of 
flexicurity. The operations of public employment services focus on organising 
and assisting successful labour market transitions. PES services help to reach 
a balance between flexibility and fluidity of employment on the one hand and 
security during job changes and career development moves likely to occur dur-
ing the life cycle on the other.” (The contribution of PES to flexicurity, Joint 
Opinion of Heads of PES, 1112/2008, Nice)
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table 3: examples of flexicurity policies applied during the crisis
Security
Flexibility Job security Employment security Income security
Combination security 
(care and work)
External numerical 
flexibility (hiring and 
firing)
Temporary placement 
in other firms
Worker pools Use of benefits as 
wage subsidy or edu-
cational support
Mortgage support
Internal numerical 
flexibility (working 
time flexibilization)
Shorter working 
hours, Work-time 
accounts
Joint employership Part-time unemploy-
ment benefit, Re-
duced working hours
Leave schemes
Functional flexibility 
(between job func-
tions)
Job rotation Internships in other 
firms, retraining
Retraining for new 
job
Accreditation of prior 
learning
Wage flexibility (vari-
able pay)
Adjustment of wages Supplement wage in 
new job
Extra UB as compen-
sation
Increased family 
allowance
Source: Adapted from a presentation by Ton Wilthagen at the conference “Implement-
ing flexicurity in times of crisis” in Prague, March 25, 2009 cited by Madsen, P. K, 
2009.
2. responses to the crIsIs In hungary
Crisis management as in the context of developed countries – and presented 
in the first chapter – did not happen in Hungary. However, there was crisis 
management in the sense that Hungary successfully avoided bankruptcy with 
the help of the IMF loan and Parliament adopted the necessary budgetary 
restrictions. The Government and the Central Bank signed an agreement on 
a 20-billion euro loan package with the European Union, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in November 2008. In this Hungary 
pledged to implement measures to increase fiscal stability and reduce the 
budget deficit, and also implement long postponed structural reforms (Table 
4). These limit Hungary’s room for manoeuvre in crisis management.
The Government – in accordance with the Convergence Programme – pre-
pared the National Action Plan for Growth and Employment in November 
2008. (Government of the Hungarian Republic, 2008.) The response to the 
national recommendations of the European Economic Recovery Plan should 
have been prepared as an attachment to this document, however there was 
no scope for pro-growth, stimulatory measures further increasing the budget 
deficit, and the Government decided to address the issues by the reallocation 
of sources within the budget and extra-budgetary instruments. The European 
Council considered this unsatisfactory.
The EU’s assessment on Hungary’s implementation of the Lisbon Strategy 
Structural Reforms in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan 
states the following: “The National Reform Programme (NRP) for 2008–
2010 does not reflect a clear coherent strategy for the medium-long term. 
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The action plan provides some elements to illustrate the country’s response 
to policy recommendations and a general timetable, though it does not offer 
budget coverage. Consultation on the NRP needs to improve as comments 
could be submitted only on the Internet. 
table 4: restricted path: changes to the IMF programme
Letter of intent, 04. 11. 2008. Letter of intent after 1st revision, 11. 
03. 2009
Letter of intent after 2nd revision, 11. 06. 2009.
Macroeconomic forecast  
for 2009
Macroeconomic forecast  
for 2009
Prognosis for
2009 2010
GDP change –1% (–3) – (–3.3) % –6.7% –0.9%
Inflation: 4% 3.7 – 3.9% 4.5% 3.8%
Current account deficit/GDP: 2% 3.9% 4.1% 4 %
Budget deficit/GDP: 2.5% 2.9% 3.9% 3.8%
Fiscal measures, structural re-
forms. Spending cuts (freeze on 
nominal salaries in the public 
sector in 2009, taking away the 
13th month salary from public 
sector workers, capping the 
13th month pension at 80,000 
forints,* restricting access to 
early retirement, postponing 
the new indexation of social 
expenditure, corresponding 
cuts in the budgets of minis-
tries), adopting an act on budg-
etary responsibility, new rules 
on financing local governments, 
extending the statutory powers 
of the Financial Supervisory 
Authority and the Central Bank 
to emergency interventions, an 
injection of 600 billion forints 
to strengthen liquidity and 
capital resources of banks.
Fiscal measures, structural reforms. 
Due to the deeper than expected 
economic recession state rev-
enues are down by 300 billion 
forints. This is only matched by a 
190-billion-forint spending cut, 
therefore the forecast for the 
budget deficit is increased. New 
rules for pension increases; newly 
retired pensioners are not entitled 
to 13th month pension, the retire-
ment age will rise in 2016. Family 
allowance will be counted as tax-
able income for personal income 
tax. From June the budget for 
subsidised energy prices is cut by 
40 billion forints. Revenue-neutral 
tax reform: tax cuts on labour 
compensated by higher tax on 
consumption (rate of value added 
tax increased by 3 percentage 
points) and wealth.
Fiscal measures, structural reforms. Tax revenues decline 
due to the lower than expected nominal GDP. Public ex-
penditure continues to increase. The Government im-
proves the balance of the budget with 170 billion forints, 
however the expected deficit continues to grow. The 13th 
month pension is scrapped and a pension premium is 
introduced instead, applicable if economic growth is 
above 3.5%. The rise in retirement age is brought forward 
to 2012. The public sector salary is frozen for 2 years, 
13th month salary abandoned altogether, pay cuts at 
managerial levels. Sick pay is reduced from 70% to 60% 
of the salary. Parental benefit is reduced to 2 years. The 
family benefit is scrapped and the budget for agricultural 
subsidies is cut by 45 billion forints. The mortgage inter-
est subsidy for Forint-based mortgages is abolished. A 
saving of at least 120 billion forints by reducing the re-
sponsibilities of local governments. Subsidy for rail trans-
port cut by 40 billion forints. Revenue-neutral tax reform: 
From July 1, 2009 the VAT-rate is increased by 5%, new 
18%-rate for basic foods and communal heating. From 
2010 personal income tax rates cut, “super gross salary”, 
value-based property tax.
* Forint is the national currency of Hungary. At the time of finalising this Chapter 1 
Euro = 270 forints.
Source: compiled by Zoltán Farkas, HVG, July 11, 2009. page 59.
Political ownership appears limited and the Lisbon strategy is mostly followed 
at technical level. The following challenges remain important for Hungary: 
poor R&D performance, state aid, the uncertainty of the regulatory envi-
ronment, weak incentives to work and to remain in the labour market, slow 
progress in the implementation of the integrated employment and social serv-
ices system, and undeclared work.” (CEC, 2009b.)
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– The main labour market challenge for Hungary is the low economic ac-
tivity and employment, particularly of young people, young mothers, older 
people, low-skilled people and other disadvantaged groups, such as the Roma 
population. Moreover, the most disadvantaged social groups are concentrated 
in the poorest areas.
– The existence of an integrated flexicurity strategy is not evident. Many 
active labour market programmes are in place, but their effectiveness needs 
to be improved. A comprehensive lifelong learning strategy exists, however 
its implementation needs to be stepped up. Contractual arrangements vary 
between the extremes of the high level of protection offered to public sector 
workers and complete flexibility of the self-employed entrepreneurs. The com-
prehensive review of the Labour Code is still pending.
– The ‘Pathway to Work’ programme is a welcome response to the Council 
recommendation on improving the labour market situation of the low skilled 
and long-term unemployed. However the specific design, budget and timeta-
ble for this programme remain unclear. Increasing the efficiency and coverage 
of active labour market policies remain a challenge. Although the new range 
of policies directed at the Roma population are steps in the right direction, 
it will be crucial to develop further concrete policy instruments and to focus 
on implementation. A number of targeted programmes have been announced 
which aim to improve the labour market situation in the most disadvantaged 
micro-regions, however they need to be complemented by measures to foster 
labour mobility.
– The Government has taken a range of measures to improve the quality, 
effectiveness and accessibility of education in response to the Council’s rec-
ommendations. These include combating segregation in public education, the 
introduction of an integrated assessment system of both schools and teachers, 
and the involvement of employers in the development of curricula in higher 
education. However the impact of these measures is so far unknown.
– The Council asked Hungary to focus attention on improving incentives 
to work and to remain in the labour market. In response conditions for early 
retirement were tightened and financial incentives to remain in employment 
were introduced. These are only the first steps and further action is required in 
order to reduce disincentives within the tax and benefit systems and to develop 
a long-term pension and active ageing strategy. There were no steps towards 
facilitating the reconciliation between work and private life. In particular, the 
commitment made to improve childcare provision for children aged 0–3 years 
should be translated into action, accompanied by the reform of lengthy parental 
leave schemes and more flexible work arrangements. Although the establish-
ment of the integrated employment and social services system appears to be on 
the right path, further integration and strengthening of the system is needed. 
Adequate measures were implemented to transform undeclared work into for-
Main comments on  
employment policies
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mal employment, and Hungary’s clear determination to improve the situation 
is welcome. The implementation of the lifelong learning strategy is ongoing, 
and further measures need to be implemented to increase adult participation 
in lifelong learning, especially among the low-skilled and older workers.
The measures taken by the crisis-managing Government responded to these 
critical comments.
2.1 One-year Action Plan of the Crisis-managing Government 
and its Implementation
In April 2009 a new Government formed with the specific mandate of crisis 
management. It’s Programme entitled “Managing the Crisis and Building 
Confidence” was adopted by Parliament and identified the following objec-
tives:
– immediate actions to address the short-term effects of the crisis;
– long-term improvement of the budgetary balance;
– promoting sustainable growth; and
– restoring confidence.
Large scale spending cuts were introduced to reduce the budget deficit:
– freeze on public sector salaries and hiring for 2 years. The 13th month sal-
ary was scrapped;
– cutting back expenditure on family subsidies:
– the family allowance was frozen for 2 years and the upper age limit for 
eligibility was reduced from 23 to 20 years;
– the family allowance became taxable income (it is still received tax-free 
but it is part of the taxable income);
– the duration of parental leave (Child Care Benefit and Child Care Al-
lowance) was reduced from 3 to 2 years (this is not applicable to parents 
already on parental leave).
– At the same time the following were decided:
– the simplification of child care regulations,
– the introduction of family child care as a new type of child care,
– parents returning to work in the public sector must be offered the possi-
bility of part-time work,
– the development of the kindergarten and nursery network, and
– increasing the state subsidy of family day nurseries.
– There were cutbacks in other social expenditures as well:
– sick pay was reduced by 10% points;
– the 13th month pension was scrapped;
– the retirement age to gradually rise to 65 years;
– the gas and communal heating benefit is being phased out;
– the housing support scheme was suspended and replaced by a smaller grant 
for first-time home owners.
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With the view of returning the economy to growth the tax burden on la-
bour was reduced and incentives to work were strengthened.
In 2009
– Contributions paid by the employer were cut by 5% points (from 32 to 27%) 
on salaries up to 200% of the minimum wage.
– The lowest rate – 18% – of personal income tax was extended to an annual 
income threshold of 1.9 million from 1.7 million forints,
– The VAT increased from 20% to 25% and a new, reduced rate was intro-
duced for basic foods and communal heating.
In 2010
– The 5%-points cut in employer’s contribution will be extended to all sal-
aries.
– The income threshold for the lowest personal income tax rate will increase 
significantly (from 1.8 million in 2009 to 5 million forints), however the 
taxable income will be calculated on the basis of the “super gross salary” 
(i.e. the gross salary plus the national insurance contributions – 27% – paid 
by the employer).
– The personal income tax rates will be amended from 18 and 36% to 17 
and 32%.
– The fixed-sum health care contribution will be scrapped.
– A property tax will be introduced.
Solidarity package
– Assistance to mortgage owners. The state provides a temporary guarantee 
for those who own certain types of mortgage and lose their job as a result 
of the economic crisis after September 30, 2009. In June 2009 the scheme 
was extended to those on a low-income who although not losing their job 
struggle to pay their mortgage.
– Crisis assistance scheme. this is a one-off payment to low-income families, 
in particular families with children and pensioners.
Vocational training
To increase the flexibility of vocational training, reduce the drop-out rate and 
make vocational training more attractive to young people the Government 
scrapped the restrictive regulation that prevented people aged under 16 years 
starting vocational training. This allows young people to begin vocational 
training straight after leaving elementary school at the age of 14. Years 9–10 
in vocational training offer students the possibility to strengthen basic skills 
and provide the foundation for further training. The accreditation of prior 
experience/skills also becomes possible which can reduce the time required 
to complete the qualification.
New tax and  
contributions  
system
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2.2 The Government’s Measures to Counter the Negative Impact 
of the Crisis on Employment
The Government adopted various measures to alleviate the negative effect of 
the economic downturn on the labour market. The crisis management and 
economic stimulus package announced during the autumn of 2008 addressed 
the problems both on the financial and labour markets. The resources of the 
New Hungary Development Plan were re-programmed and new measures 
were introduced that aimed to cushion the negative effects of the crisis.
With EU funding:
– a financial package of 1.4 billion forints for SMEs – for working capital 
loans, microloans, loan guarantee;
– orders worth 1.8 billion forints to the construction sector;
– a total of 20 billion forints allocated to the 4+1 integrated job retention and 
training schemes that – according to estimates – will provide assistance in 
the preservation of more than 50,000 jobs.
The working time regulations were also reviewed in order to provide great-
er flexibility to adjust working hours to the fluctuations of demand resulting 
from the crisis.
2.2.1 More flexible working time
The Parliament amended the Labour Code and the new rules already entered 
into force on June 1, 2009. There were new regulations on calculating the 
working time limits, daily rest and overtime.
Working time limit: on the basis of daily working hours employers could 
apply the working time limit over a period of 3 months or 12 weeks. The new 
regulation extends this by one month or 4 weeks.
So far on-call duty had to be followed by a daily rest of at least 11 hours, 
unless specified differently by a collective agreement. According to the new 
rules, if no work had to be undertaken during the on-call duty, the employee 
is not entitled to the daily rest.
Overtime: According to the old rules overtime was possible for workers 
who agreed to work longer and for a maximum of 300 hours (200 hours and 
if justified a further 100 hours) each year. The agreement could only be signed 
if the employer had already started to recruit another worker for the same po-
sition and had reported the vacancy to the employment service but had not 
yet filled the post. Overtime was also legitimate in high-level or highly spe-
cialised jobs that were essential to ensure the continued operation of the em-
ployer. From June 1 only the first requirement needs to be met.
2.2.2 Employment protection measures
For the employment protection schemes of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour (MoSAL) a total funding of 17.93 billion forints was available in 
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2009; 7.23 billion forints for 3 programmes in the budget of the National 
Employment Foundation (NEF), 10 billion forints for the programmes im-
plemented by the Public Employment Service (PES) and 700 million for-
ints for a job protection scheme managed directly by the Ministry. (MoS-
AL, 2009.)
The following gives an overview of the utilisation of these funds based on 
the report prepared for the Parliament’s Committee on Employment and La-
bour by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.
These schemes had a three-fold objective:
– maintaining the operation of businesses in order to protect jobs;
– facilitating the transfer and re-employment of redundant workers with a 
new employer;
– if redundancy cannot be avoided, supporting the individual – also by up-
grading his/her skills – to find a new job.
The main forms of assistance:
– subsidy towards labour costs – wage and contributions,
– introducing short-time work,
– assistance towards training and re-training expenses,
– the provision of labour-market services,
– assistance towards the cost of commuting and housing.
a) The job protection scheme of the National Employment Foundation
The NEF supported 494 applications with a total sum of 7,150.136 million 
forints. This directly contributed to the employment of 18,647 workers and 
to the protection of a total of 33,752 jobs.
The Management Committee of the Labour Market Fund allocated ad-
ditional money to the job protection scheme of the NEF in June 2009. This 
allowed the funding of a further 20 already submitted applications. Alto-
gether the 448 subsidised projects employed 16,969 workers. The average 
length of the subsidy was 6.9 months, which together with the job reten-
tion requirement guaranteed the employment of workers for 13.8 months. 
According to the conditions of the scheme, employers receiving the subsidy 
were required to retain the total initial headcount for the whole duration 
of the project, which means the survival of 31,255 jobs at least on average 
for 13.8 months.
In small firms with less than 50 employees a total of 2,962 workers were 
involved in job protection schemes on average for 7.3 months. The number 
of retained workers was highest in medium-sized businesses; a total of 13 
thousand employees. Working time flexibility measures were most common 
in large companies – 7,833 workers were involved in these – and they were 
more likely to use the subsidy to upgrade the skills of their workforce. Table 
6 gives detailed figures.
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table 5: summary table of the national employment Fund’s job protection schemes
Name of the programme
“Protection” “Into work” Total
Number of projects (No) 448 46 494
Requested subsidy (thousand HUF) 9,610,780 830,891 10,441,671
Awarded subsidy (thousand HUF) 6,484,954 665,182 7,150,136
Protection (persons) 7,371 7,371
Short-time work (persons) 9,598 9,598
Training (persons) 273 102 375
Transfer of workers to another employer (cont. employ-
ment) (persons) 131 131
Workers referred by Labour Centre (persons) 1,547 1,547
Total participants (persons) 16,969 1,678 18,647
Retained workforce (persons) 31,255 2,497 33,752
Awarded subsidy Training Total participants
Awarded/requested subsidy (%) 68
Participants placed into training/total participants (%) 2
New jobs within the “Into work” Programme (%) 49
Protected/retained workforce in the “Protection” Pro-
gramme (%) 54
Source: MoSAL 2009.
table 6: participants in job protection schemes by size of business (persons)
Size of business
Job  
protection
Short-time 
work Training
Retained 
workforce
Small firm with less than 50 workers 2,825 137 6 7,583
Medium-sized firm with 51–250 workers 4,267 1,628 46 13,031
Large firms with more than 251 workers 279 7,833 221 10,641
Total 7,371 9,598 273 31,255
Source: MoSAL 2009.
Sixty percent of the money allocated for job protection was spent on wage 
subsidy, supporting 43% of the total participants.
table 7: total spending and number of participants by type of subsidy
Type of subsidy
Awarded subsidy Participants Retained workforce
thousand HUF persons
Job protection subsidy 3,859,247 7,371 18,105
Short-time work 2,625,703 9,598 13,150
Source: MoSAL 2009.
The scheme supporting the re-employment of redundant workers received 
83 applications out of which 46 received assistance. The total funding of 
665 million forints supported the transition of 1,678 redundant workers to 
new jobs; 1,547 job seekers were referred by the labour centre and 131 work-
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ers were transferred in a business take-over. The length of the subsidy is on 
average 8.8 months and that guarantees the employment of participants for 
17.6 months.
The number of firms with less than 50 workers is 40 and they employ 24% 
of the total subsidised participants. They typically hire jobseekers submitted to 
their vacancies by the local job centre. The number of medium-sized businesses 
is 5, and they typically increase their workforce as a result of a takeover. This 
was the only category of companies that used the possibility of training, even 
though small firms also hired 19 workers as part of a business takeover.
table 8: Main characteristics of the neF scheme supporting  
the re-employment of redundant workers
Size of the business
Number 
of 
projects
Awarded  
subsidy
Job seekers 
referred by 
the PES
Employees 
transferred 
within  
takeover
Involved 
in training
Retained 
workers
thousand HUF persons
Small firms with less 
than 50 workers 40 348,088 415 19 767
Medium-sized firms 
with 51–250 workers 5 171,894 37 112 102 634
Large firms with more 
than 251 workers 1 145,200 1,095 1,096
Total 46 665,182 1,547 131 102 2,497
Source: MoSAL 2009.
According to the conditions of the scheme, employers receiving the subsidy are 
required to maintain the initial headcount at the time of application through-
out the total duration of the project. This means the retention of 2,497 jobs 
on average for 17.6 months.
b) The labour-market scheme implemented by the PES: “For the 
Protection of Jobs”
The PES or more closely the regional labour centres were receiving applica-
tions for job protection subsidies from businesses between February 9 and 
September 14, 2009. Then on the basis of these they designed labour-market 
schemes that were submitted for approval to the Employment and Social Of-
fice. Within these schemes the following subsidies can be provided:
– job protection subsidy,
– subsidy for short-time work,
– subsidy for re-employment with a new employer (including wage subsidy), 
and
– training subsidy attached to job protection or re-employment.
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Labour centres also provide integrated labour-market services to workers 
affected by redundancy.
Employers together with the local labour centre prepared detailed Pro-
gramme Plans outlining their need for assistance. These were forwarded – ei-
ther by company or by region – to the Employment and Social Office. Busi-
nesses operating in more than one region submitted their application directly 
to the Employment and Social Office (ESO). The final decision on the ap-
proval or rejection of an application was made by the Minister for Social Af-
fairs and Labour. The evaluation of applications was on-going until funding 
was available, and commitments could be made until December 31, 2009 at 
the latest. However, the scheme was suspended on September 14, 2009 be-
cause the budget was exhausted – the approved and the submitted but not 
yet evaluated applications requested a total of 12 billion forints. (Napi Gaz-
daság, 11. 09. 2009.)
The scheme “For the Protection of Jobs” aims to support businesses in tem-
porary financial difficulty. The projects are implemented jointly by the employ-
ers and the PES. The total number of applications registered by June 12, 2009 
was 1,331 distributed between the different types of subsidy as follows:
– 1,268 applications for job-protection subsidy,
– 26 applications for re-employment with wage subsidy,
– 37 applications for wage subsidy attached to short-time work.
The submitted projects have a total of 2,281 individual claims by employ-
ers, mainly from the retail, auto repair, manufacturing, construction, and 
tourism sectors. The number of workers in temporary difficulty was over 52 
thousand and the sum of the total requested subsidy was over 32 billion for-
ints. The total labour force of businesses applying for assistance was more 
than 95,000 workers.
According to information provided by the ESO, 769 projects were recom-
mended to the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment for approval based 
on the opinion of the Expert Committee by September 10, 2009. The total 
number of participants subsidised directly within the scheme was more than 
27 thousand, and the total number of jobs affected by the scheme was more 
than 48 thousand. The regional labour centres signed 754 funding agree-
ments with a total financial commitment of 7 billion forints. Most business-
es applied for job-protection subsidies and subsidy for part-time work. (Napi 
Gazdaság, 11. 09. 2009.)
2.2.3 Anomalies of the policy responses to the labour market crisis
“Although the crisis so far has destroyed surprisingly few jobs and the number 
of the jobless has increased only slightly more than across the whole of the 
EU, it does not promise anything positive. The recession does not only bring 
about a decline in jobs but also a slow-down of job creation which – under 
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normal conditions – would offset the loss. Therefore, if next year the number 
of newly created jobs will be only 100 thousand and annual job destruction 
jumps from the usual 250–300 thousand to 400 thousand then the number 
of jobs might decrease by up to 300 thousand which might double the unem-
ployment rate currently at 9.1%.” (Kőrösi, 2009. p. 6) The different job pro-
tection schemes aimed at preventing the growth of unemployment, however 
their implementation was not without problems.
1) Dearth of funding, centralised distribution. The three main sources to 
maintain the level of employment – 700 million forints in the budget of the 
MoSAL, 10 billion forints for the schemes of the PES and 7 billion forints 
for the NEF’s programmes – came from the decentralised employment funds 
of the regional labour centres. These funds were centralised and reallocated 
for policies that could have been dealt with locally, using the active measures 
defined by the Employment Act. The act of centralisation slowed down de-
cision making which is not permissible during times of crisis. The scarcity of 
funding is indicated by how quickly it was exhausted. The scheme of the NEF 
had to be terminated in March instead of November 30 because more than 
2,000 applications were received asking for a total of 18 billion forints. The 
10-billion-forint budget of the PES was only open until September 14, 2009. 
If this was the consequence of the insufficiency of the Labour Market Fund 
then the employer’s contribution should not have been cut.1
2) Overly complex programme objectives. The programme objectives were 
so diverse that all businesses could find a lifebelt for whatever their problems 
were and whether they were caused by the crisis or their weak performance. 
This set off a massive wave of applications. Moreover, these schemes offered 
subsidies that also form part of the repertoire of active labour market meas-
ures and services (e.g. wage subsidies, training, assistance towards commut-
ing costs). These are unreasonable duplications.
3) Complicated administration. To prevent extreme demand, the authori-
ties set bureaucratic procedures and required applicants to submit a variety 
of information and documents presenting their existing and planned crisis 
management measures including proof of financial resources, and a detailed 
outline of actions intended to address their employment problems. “While 
even the Government cannot exactly tell where bad economic policy ends and 
financial crisis starts, employers applying for these subsidies were required to 
prove that their employment difficulties were directly caused by the reces-
sion and were only temporary. The calls for proposal did not give any clear 
guidance on how to do this neither for the applicants nor those evaluating 
the projects besides the requirement of notifying the local labour centre of 
a plan to mass dismissal after October 31, 2008.” (Ilda G. Tóth, HVG, 02. 
05. 2009, p. 55)
1 On July 1, 2009 the employer’s 
contribution was reduced from 
3% to 1% on wages up to 200% 
of the minimum wage (143,000 
forints).
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4) Strict requirements for applicants. According to employers applying 
for the subsidy one of the most problematic requirements was that “appli-
cants must not make any redundancies while receiving the assistance and for 
an identical length of time (3–12 months) after that”. This was considered 
impossible in the given economic downturn. And therefore “some of those 
who had been awarded the subsidy decided not to sign the funding agree-
ment because they realised they took on too much”. (Ilda G. Tóth, HVG, 
02. 05. 2009, p. 55.)
Many also found the requirements regarding the business plan irrational. 
“The regional labour centres expect a lengthy business plan from businesses 
applying for state subsidies which has an illogical structure and numerous 
overlaps with the application form. There is no single application package, its 
content is different in every region. The conditions are so general that they 
could give scope for politically motivated decisions. The business plan is an ir-
rational requirement anyway. During time of crisis it changes frequently and 
will not reflect the real situation of any company.” (Kincsei, 2009.)
5) Lengthy administrative procedures to access funding. Companies sub-
mitted their application to the local labour centre of the PES and if they were 
eligible they made a joint project proposal that was submitted to the ESO for 
assessment. Then the Office made a shortlist of projects and businesses recom-
mended for approval. The shortlisted projects were forwarded to the MoSAL 
where they were also evaluated by the experts of the Management Committee 
of the Labour Market Fund. They submitted the final list of projects recom-
mended for approval to the Minister who awarded the subsidy. The funding 
agreement was signed between the labour centre and the employer. This pro-
cedure projects a lengthy decision time, even though in this case the proverb 
“he gives twice who gives quickly” is particularly true.
6) It is even harder to cope with EU programmes. Out of the EU co-fi-
nanced loan schemes for the smallest businesses, they could only use the New 
Hungary Microloan which was launched in the first half of 2008. This was 
available until the end of July 2009 and only 1,294 companies used it. They 
received a total loan of only 7 billion forints, even though the conditions of 
loan were made more favourable in the mean time: companies with a turno-
ver of less than 200 million forints or start-ups could receive up to 6 million 
forints as a working capital loan or up to 10 million forints as an investment 
loan with an interest rate of 5.9%. It is also telling that most applicants turned 
to the regional non-profit enterprise development agencies because their fees 
were considerably lower rather than using the 5 commercial banks also taking 
part in the scheme. On the other hand the willingness of businesses to take 
on a loan has also diminished. According to a recent survey by Coface Hun-
gary Ltd less than 10% of Hungarian businesses are creditworthy, and this is 
likely to deteriorate because only a small share of companies is increasing its 
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revenue. In this context it is not surprising that in the first quarter of 2009 
the number of insolvency proceedings was up by 22%, however the worst is 
yet to come. (Ilda G. Tóth, HVG, 25. 07. 2009)
2.2.4 “Short-time working – instead of redundancy”: A comparison of 
the conditions of the anti-crisis policy measure in Hungary and Germany
The adjustment of the conditions of short-time working to the employment 
“emergency” in Germany is a good example of effective crisis management 
on the labour market. Because this measure also exists in Hungary, it can 
be used to illustrate the difference (Table 9). The description of the German 
scheme can be found in Chapter 1.2. In Hungary new rules were adopted un-
der the title “Supporting part-time work to prevent redundancies”.2 These 
are the following.
The aim of the measure is to support the retention of workers threatened by 
redundancy in part-time employment. Employers are eligible for support if in-
stead of laying-off redundant workers they continue to employ them part-time, 
at least 4 hours/day. As a condition of the subsidy the employer is required to 
give prior notification of planned mass dismissal to the local labour centre.
The rate of the subsidy is up to 80% of the wage and contributions of the 
worker lost due to the reduction of the working time. The maximum wage 
eligible for subsidy is 150% of the national minimum wage. The subsidy can 
be paid for up to 12 months. The budget of the scheme is 10 billion forints 
earmarked within the Employment Sub-fund of the Labour Market Fund.
Employers need to apply for the subsidy for the workforce affected by re-
dundancy. Another condition is that the employer must not implement a mass 
dismissal, and retains the total workforce during the payment of the subsidy 
retaining the workers for the same length of time after that. Employers also 
agree to pay workers the sum monthly, in advance.
The difference in the terminology of the two schemes is not a purely seman-
tic issue but also reflects the difference in their content. According to the Ger-
man rules short-time workers remain full-time employees in the scheme. In 
Hungary however, work contracts must be converted to part-time by mutual 
agreement. This raises a number of important questions – that do not arise in 
the German scheme – such as changes in the salary, work-related benefits, im-
plications for pension, health insurance or paid leave. These issues must be ne-
gotiated between the employer and the workers which might be a lengthy pro-
cedure contradicting the whole purpose of the scheme, namely fast response.
Part-time employment also has direct implications for the amount of the 
Job Search Allowance. Given that the allowance is linked to the previous wage 
during a third of the eligibility period, and its amount is calculated on the 
basis of the average wage in the 4 quarters prior to becoming unemployed, 
workers can end up being worse off if their employer is forced to dismiss them 
2 – 70/2009. (02. 04) Govern-
ment Regulation on Supporting 
the Work placement of Unem-
ployed School Leavers with a 
Vocational Qualification and 
Part-time Working to Prevent 
Redundancies. In force from 
05. 04 2009.
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table 9: differences between the german and hungarian “short-time work” schemes  
introduced as a response to the crisis
Issue German provision Hungarian provision
Terminology Short-time work (Kurzarbeit): clearly distinguished 
from part-time work (Teilzeitbeschäftigung).
Part-time work: Blurs the distinction between voluntary part-
time work and forced short-time work.
Conditions Shortening of working time due to economic difficul-
ties or other unavoidable circumstances resulting in 
at least a 10% reduction in the wage of at least 1 
worker.
Notice of a planned mass dismissal, not implemented as a 
result of the subsidy. Work contract must be modified to reflect 
reduced working time. This must be at least 0.5 of FTE.
The subsidy Income replacement according to the rate of unem-
ployment allowance. National insurance paid on 
80% of the lost income, labour market agency co-
finances 50%, 100% if the individual is taking part 
in training.
Up to 80% of the wage and contributions. The level of eligible 
wage is up to 150% of the national minimum wage.
Payment In 2009 the maximum duration of payment was 
increased from 6 months to 18 months. From 2010 
this will rise to 24 months as a result of the pro-
longed crisis.
Up to 12 months.
Requirements Retain workers during the receipt of the subsidy. Retain the total workforce as at notice of planned mass dis-
missal, retain part-time workers during receipt of the subsidy 
and for an equal period after that.
Access Simplified administration; the local offices of the 
Employment Agency receive the applications and 
make the funding decision. The application form 
can be submitted on-line. For applications received 
before the end of the month, the full subsidy can be 
claimed for the given month.
The scheme was managed by the PES however its budget was 
exhausted in September 2009. Companies submitted their 
application to the local labour centre of the PES and they made 
a joint project proposal that was submitted to the ESO for as-
sessment. Then the Office made a shortlist of projects and 
businesses recommended for approval. The shortlisted projects 
were forwarded to the MoSAL where they were also evaluated by 
the experts of the Management Committee of the Labour Mar-
ket Fund. They submitted the final list of projects recommended 
for approval to the Minister who awarded the subsidy. The fund-
ing agreement was signed between the labour centre and the 
employer. This procedure projects a lengthy decision time, even 
though in this case the proverb “he gives twice who gives quick-
ly” is particularly true.
later due to bankruptcy than if they had been made redundant straight away 
following the emergence of economic problems.
There are significant differences in the flexibility of rules as well: in Germany 
it is enough if the decline in orders results in a 10% cut of working hours for 
one worker. In Hungary the scheme is an alternative to mass redundancy. 
The period of eligibility in Germany is one and a half times, from 2010 twice 
as long as in Hungary. German companies are required to retain the short-
time workers during the receipt of the subsidy, their Hungarian counterparts 
for twice as long. And finally the administration and access to the scheme is 
simpler than in Hungary.
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3. IncreasIng eMployMent and labour Market partIcIpatIon 
In hungary
Improving the employability of unemployed and inactive people and the la-
bour market integration of disadvantaged people had already been the pri-
orities of Hungarian employment policies before the economic downturn. 
Labour market participation in Hungary is especially low by international 
comparison, and therefore this objective remained valid despite the economic 
crisis. The main reasons behind the poor employment indicators are the de-
pendency traps generated by the large welfare systems – such as pension and 
child care: the crisis managing Government initiated structural reforms that 
in the long-run will reduce the number of people dependent on transfers that 
keep them away from the labour market. These have been discussed earlier in 
relation to the Government Programme, therefore only a few examples are 
mentioned here.
– Encouraging the labour market participation of women by shortening the 
eligibility period of parental leave schemes.
– Promoting the activity of older workers by introducing changes in the pen-
sion system.
– Gradual reallocation of the tax burden to transform undeclared work into 
formal employment and reduce labour costs.
Willingness to work should also be encouraged by short-term measures. 
These include extending the requirement to cooperate with the public em-
ployment service to a larger group of long-term jobseekers which took place 
in the “Pathway to Work” scheme. Contribution relief schemes for employ-
ers hiring disadvantaged people are also an important instrument to improve 
their prospects on the labour market.
3.1 The “Pathway to Work” scheme
The “Pathway to Work” is a complex scheme that started on January 1, 2009.3 
It aims to help people claiming regular social benefits to return to the labour 
market. The target group of approximately 200 thousand persons is divided 
into two groups. The group that has no chance – at least in the short-run – 
of returning to work will continue to receive Regular Social Allowance. The 
other group however, is made up of people who are capable of and expected to 
work. If there are no vacancies on the open jobs market, they can join public 
works schemes and receive a regular wage instead of benefits. The number of 
early school leavers is estimated to be around 7–8 thousand. They will be re-
quired to finish school so that at a later stage they can take part in vocational 
training or job training. Eligible people of working age, who are prevented in 
taking part in any of the active schemes for reasons not attributable to them, 
can claim Stand-by Allowance.
3 Act CVII of 2008 on the 
Amendment of Certain Social 
and Employment-related Leg-
islation. The Act was ratified 
by the Parliament on December 
15, 2008 and it amended the 
provisions of Act III of 1993 
on Social Administration and 
Assistance.
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table 10: eligibility for cash benefits for people of working age
Regular Social Allowance (RSA) Stand-by Allowance (SA)
– Long-term health condition prevents employ-
ment 
– Aged over 55 years 
– No access to child care for children aged un-
der 14 years (other parent is not claiming any 
assistance) 
 – Other reasons stipulated in a local govern-
ment regulation.
– Not eligible for Regular Social Allowance 
– Unable to find paid work due to a shortage of 
jobs
– Cannot take part in training or takes part in a 
training programme without income replace-
ment
Unemployed people who are capable of work will be registered as jobseekers 
by the local labour centre office. If they are aged under 35 years and have not 
finished primary education, they will be required to complete that according 
to the provisions of their Job Search Agreement. If there is no training start-
ing within 30 days, they will be required to join a public works programme 
like any other members of the target group.
According to the new regulation, the eligibility of all individuals of work-
ing age claiming Regular Social Allowance on December 31, 2008 had to be 
re-assessed by March 31, 2009. If they were no longer eligible, the payment 
of the benefit was terminated. Otherwise they continued receiving either 
the new Stand-by Allowance or the Regular Social Allowance. Eligibility for 
working-age benefits must be re-assessed at least every two years.
table 11: people claiming working-age benefits and participants  
in public works programmes, national data, 1st half of 2009
January February March April May June
People receiving Regular 
Social Allowance 212,339 203,643 190,020 138,869 37,105 33,929
People receiving Stand-by 
Allowance – 11,192 35,832 93,402 180,481 166,652
People in public works 
programmes 7,909 7,599 9,387 18,640 52,128 76,437
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Cash Transfers and Pension Insurance 
Department, (cited by Vajda, 2009. p. 3.)
After the re-assessment of eligibility in the first half of 2009 only one in seven 
claimants continued to receive Regular Social Allowance. (See Table 11.) At 
the same time the number of people receiving Stand-by Allowance jumped to 
over 166 thousand, suggesting that around 75% of people receiving working-
age benefit were redirected into this scheme. Also, the number of people in 
public works programmes increased 10-fold. If these two categories are add-
ed together – 76,000 people in public works and 166,000 receiving Stand-
by Allowance – the total number of participants suggests an increase in the 
number of people eligible for working-age benefits by 20,000 compared to 
the beginning of the year.
mária frey
212
Table 12 shows the distribution of people claiming Regular Social Al-
lowance by eligibility categories. Of particularly interest are those who are 
in groups with no chance of entering work. The number of people claiming 
RSA due to a long-term health condition was 9,400 in July 2009. More than 
15,000 people received RSA because they were aged over 55, and approxi-
mately 1,200 people could not work due to the lack of child care.
People claiming Regular Social Allowance – except those with a long-term 
health condition – are required to cooperate with the institution designated 
by the local government – usually the local family support service – if they 
want to retain their eligibility. The exact content and form of this cooperation 
is set out in the Reintegration Agreement and can include skills upgrading, 
lifestyle counselling or training.
table 12: number of claimants and spending on regular social allowance,* July 2009
Eligible according  
to rules in force on 
31. 12. 2008
Long-term health  
condition Aged over 55 years
No access  
to child care for  
dependent children  
aged under 14 years
Low income
Persons HUF Persons HUF Persons HUF Persons HUF Persons HUF
3,594 96,512,158 9,398 241,470,408 15,540 409,033,954 1,201 42,666,338 2,598 30,009,015
* According to 62/2006. (27. 03) Government Regulation which sets out the account-
ing rules for social benefit payments. These are corrected figures taking into ac-
count the cash flow from any missed payments, overpayments or repayments.
Source: Ministry for Local Governments, based on local governments’ monthly appli-
cations for normative funding (Vajda 2009, p. 3.)
The monthly rate of the Stand-by Allowance is equal to the old-age minimum 
pension (28,500 forints in 2009) regardless of the size and composition of the 
family. According to the information in Table 13, there have been approxi-
mately 160,000 people receiving this benefit since July 2009.
table 13: number of claimants and spending on stand-by allowance,* July 2009
Old-age minimum  
pension
Eligible according to rules 
in force on 31. 12. 2008
Eligible for RSA coop-
erating with the PES
Entering work and notify-
ing the authorities Total
Persons HUF Persons HUF Persons HUF Persons HUF Persons HUF
117,907 3,137,182,395 30,774 1,210,340,542 1,394 0 8,340 114,293,388 158,415 3,544,897,435
* According to 62/2006. (27. 03) Government Regulation which sets out the account-
ing rules for social benefit payments.
Source: Ministry for Local Governments, based on local governments’ monthly appli-
cations for normative funding (Vajda 2009, p. 4.)
The state budget co-finances Regular Social Allowance at 80% – 10 percentage 
points less than in the previous system. The same rate applies for the Stand-
by Allowance. There have also been important changes in the financing of 
public works. Instead of the flat-rate per diem of 3,900 forints, local govern-
ments get reimbursed for 95% of the actual labour costs (wage and contribu-
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tions) and the remaining 5% is incorporated into the normative funding for 
local social expenditures, cash transfers and in kind benefits. Local govern-
ments have protested at various forums against bearing the material costs of 
public works alone.
For employment in public works – at least 6 hours/day and 90 days – a 
fixed-term contract must be drawn up. According to Table 14 the number of 
people employed in public works programmes was just over 86,000 in July 
2009. Around 60,000 of these worked full-time and 26,000 people worked 
part-time. Work must be arranged by the local government for which they 
were allowed to hire staff for a period of two years. People employed in public 
employment programmes receive a wage which cannot be less than the offi-
cial minimum wage. Employers are entitled to a 50% reduction on contribu-
tions, including the Social insurance contribution, the Employer’s contribu-
tion and the Fixed-sum Healthcare contribution. This can be used on wages 
up to 130% of the minimum wage.
table 14: number of people employed and spending on public works programmes,* 
July 2009
Number of workers (persons) Total number of  
workers (persons) Total (HUF)Full-time Part-time
59,670 26,564 86,234 6,846,112,553
* According to 62/2006. (27. 03) Government Regulation which sets out the account-
ing rules for social benefit payments.
Source: Ministry for Local Governments, based on local governments’ monthly appli-
cations for normative funding (Vajda 2009, p. 4.)
Local governments must prepare a public works plan by February 15 each 
year. The local office of the labour centre and in localities with more than 
2,000 inhabitants the local social policy partnership board must be con-
sulted on the draft plan. The document must set out the estimated number 
of people eligible for the Stand-by Allowance and the timing and budget of 
public works. The public works plan must be sent to the Treasury within 5 
days after its adoption.
The regional labour centres have processed 2,955 public works plans by the 
end of April 2009. According to summary data from these plans the number 
of participants in public works programmes will be around 152,840 people 
during the year, out of which 10,363 will be aged under 35 years and with 
no completed primary education. (Péter 2009.) The analysis has also identi-
fied some problems.
– The local office of the labour centre must be consulted on the draft plan, how-
ever consultation is not required if the plan is amended during the year.
– The plan must be submitted to the Treasury, however it is unclear what the 
Treasury needs to do with it.
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– Professional assessment and financial control of public works plans are not 
required.
– No organisation is appointed to collect data on public works plans, moni-
toring system or set up.
Most people who are eligible for working-age benefits are joint custom-
ers of the employment service and local authorities, and even though most 
issues clearly belong to one of these authorities, they are also strongly inter-
linked. To ensure that the division of tasks between the employment service 
and the local government is clear and the transmission of data on eligibility 
and payment is up-to-date a database – Employment and Welfare Database 
– is being set up. This will be an electronic database of individuals eligible 
for working-age benefits.
The budget allocated 100 billion forints to regular benefit payments and the 
implementation of the “Pathway to Work” Programme in 2009, however it is 
uncapped in case there is increased demand. According to first estimates, out 
of 210,000 people claiming Regular Social Allowance, approximately 100,000 
would be involved in the programme either through training or fixed-term 
employment in public works. At the same time public works plans estimated 
the total number of people involved in the programme at 150–160,000. Eri-
ka Szűcs the ministerial commissioner responsible for the implementation of 
the Programme said that approximately 100,000 people could be involved in 
public works employment or receive Stand-by Allowance. It is therefore nec-
essary to create rules that motivate businesses and public bodies to take part 
in the programme. The MoSAL also has plans to start a new employment 
scheme for women setting up a national care and support service. Promot-
ing the employment of 220,000 people with disabilities is also a priority. 
(Erika Szűcs, 2009.)
3.2 Start Cards – more incentives to employ disadvantaged 
workers
Contribution reliefs for employing disadvantaged workers are an important 
tool in improving their labour market chances. They are available to employ-
ers hiring school leavers, people returning from parental leave and the long-
term unemployed (particularly those aged over 50 and the low-skilled). The 
targeted reduction increases the chances of disadvantaged jobseekers when 
applying for a job.
The amended tax regulations in force from mid-2009 also reduced the gen-
eral contribution rates payable by employers. The discounts given for disadvan-
taged workers were adjusted accordingly to keep their incentivising effect.4
The Start Plus scheme aims to encourage employers to hire the long-term 
unemployed or people returning to work after looking after their child or 
caring for a relative. According to the figures provided by the Hungarian 
4 Article 37 of Act XXXV of 
2009 on the Amendment of Cer-
tain Tax Regulations and Other 
Related Regulations amended 
Article 5 (1) point b) and Arti-
cle 7 (1) point b) on incentives 
to promote the employment 
of school leavers, unemployed 
people aged over 50 and people 
returning to work after parental 
leave or caring.
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Tax and Financial Control Administration from July 01, 2007 – the start of 
the Start Plus scheme – around 28,000 people applied for the Card by the 
end of May, 2009.
table 15: discounts for employers in the start schemes (from 01. 07. 2009.)
Start (young  
entrants)
Start Plus (parents 
returning to work, 
long-term jobseekers)
Start Extra (older 
persons, persons 
with low  
education)
Start Region* 
(people claiming 
Stand-by  
Allowance)
Fixed-sum health 
care contribution 
(1,950 Forints)
Exempt for  
two years
Exempt for  
two years
Exempt for  
two years
Exempt for  
three years
Contributions on 
the gross wage 
(1% Employer’s 
Contribution, 26% 
SI contribution)
– 1st year: 10% 
– 2nd: 20%
– 1st year: 10% 
– 2nd: 20%
– 1st year: exempt 
– 2nd: 10%
Exempt for three 
years if increases 
headcount
* Introduced in the most disadvantaged small regions and localities in 2009.
Between the launch of the Start Programme for young people in October 
2005 and the end of May, 2009 approximately 122,000 young people got the 
Start Card – 33,600 of these had higher education.
The largest discount is provided by the Start Extra scheme which also opened 
on July 1, 2007. The target group of this scheme are jobseekers aged over 50 
years and low-skilled people. By May 2009 more than 14,000 individuals 
had a Start Extra card.
The Start Region scheme – linked to the “Pathway to Work” programme – 
was introduced on January 1, 2009.5 This extends the discounts of the Start 
Extra scheme to employers hiring people claiming Stand-by Allowance. If the 
worker comes from a disadvantaged locality, then his/her employer is fully 
exempt from social insurance contributions for 3 years with the condition 
that the hiring of the new disadvantaged worker increases the workforce of 
the company and this is maintained for the duration of the subsidy.
The contribution relief encourages employers to hire a large number of young 
people which is highly desirable because the level of youth unemployment is 
a cause for concern. Figures in Table 16 show that the number of young peo-
ple employed with the Start Card had been increasing dynamically prior to 
the economic downturn, and it exceeded 40,000 in November 2008. Since 
then however, it has been steadily declining: in the first four months in 2009 
there were on average 3,000 workers less than in the same period of the pre-
vious year, and in April 2009 it was under 33,000.
The number of workers with a Start Plus card has so far been steadily grow-
ing (15,068 persons in April 2009) and this trend has not been affected by the 
crisis. The Start Extra card, despite the significant discount, did not make 
5 Article 41, Act CVIII of 2008 
on the Amendment of Certain 
Social and Employment Regu-
lations. In force from 01. 01. 
2009.
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hiring the most disadvantaged too attractive. Nevertheless their number is 
rising steadily despite the crisis.
table 16: the number of workers employed with start cards
Date Start Card Start-Plus Card Start-Extra Card
November 2005 3,561
November 2006 20,640
November 2007 38,469 2,646 1,134
November 2008 40,750 12,344 5,115
Annual average, 2009 39,159 8,219 3,534
Jan-Apr average, 2008 37,234 4,739 2,014
Jan-Apr average 2009 34,269 13,963 5,349
April 2009 32,857 15,068 5,972
Source: Hungarian Tax and Financial Control Administration.
With regard to the characteristics of young people employed with a Start 
Card, there is extremely limited information. An evaluation study would be 
necessary to establish how many young people would have found a job without 
the subsidy, or differently what is the deadweight effect of the scheme? So far 
the only available data suggest that 12–13% of the employers are public sec-
tor organisations. There is more detailed information on the characteristics 
of participants in the Start Plus and Start Extra schemes because these are 
both financed by the European Social Fund and it is a requirement to moni-
tor these programmes and organise their on-going evaluation and employ-
ment impact assessment.
table 17: workers employed with start plus cards issued  
between 01. 01. 2009 and 30. 06. 2009 by gender and age (persons)
Age
Returning after parental 
leave Jobseeker for over one year Total
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
15–24 – 39 39 180 333 513 180 372 552
25–49 23 957 980 1,201 2,226 3,427 1,224 3,183 4,407
50–54 4 14 18 8 21 29 12 35 47
55–64 1 8 9 3 6 9 4 14 18
Total 28 1,018 1,046 1,392 2,586 3,978 1,420 3,604 5,024
Source: Hungarian Tax and Financial Control Administration.
Table 17 shows that only one in five workers with a Start Plus card was re-
turning to work after parental leave and the majority were long-term unem-
ployed. The share of women in the former category was 97.3%, mainly from 
the age group 24–49 years. Two thirds of the long-term unemployed with the 
Start Card are also women.
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table 18: workers employed with start extra cards issued  
between 01. 01. 2009 and 30. 06. 2009 by gender, age and education (persons)
Male Female Total
Primary Secondary Higher
Total
Primary Secondary Higher
Total
Primary Secondary Higher
Total
education education education
15–24 79 – – 79 94 – – 94 173 – – 173
25–49 607 – – 607 342 – – 342 949 – – 949
50–54 152 186 30 368 178 349 54 581 330 535 84 949
55–64 69 116 25 210 85 141 20 246 154 257 45 456
Total 907 302 55 1,264 699 490 74 1,263 1,606 792 129 2,527
Source: Hungarian Tax and Financial Control Administration.
The take-up of the Start Extra scheme reflects its policy intentions, namely 
helping the low-skilled and older people into work. Men were represented 
equally in the two categories, however only one third of the women were 
low-skilled and two thirds were jobseekers aged over 50. The share of men 
and women among people with the Start Extra card was almost the same 
(Table 18).
3.3 Supporting the work experience of school leavers with 
vocational qualification6
The high and rising unemployment of school leavers prompted the Govern-
ment to re-introduce the work experience scheme in April 2009. This scheme 
existed between 1996 and 2006, but in 2007 it was merged into the wage sub-
sidy scheme of disadvantaged job seekers. Considering that it is increasingly 
difficult for school leavers with a vocational qualification to find a job, with 
this measure the Government aimed to address one of their main obstacles 
in the labour market, namely the lack of work experience. The revival of the 
work experience scheme aims to create incentives for employers to hire school 
leavers for formal jobs. “It is a common experience that most school leavers 
start working, however they are more likely to work illegally or they discover 
too late that their employment was not declared. Young people are less aware 
of job security, more vulnerable and less well informed than their older col-
leagues partly because issues related to social insurance such as pension, work-
related illness or sick pay still seem distant.” (MoSAL, 2009a.)
The scheme supports the work experience of young people with sought-after 
qualifications who have not been able to find a job after 90 days of job search 
either independently or with assistance from the employment service. In the 
absence of work experience their skills and knowledge would quickly start to 
deteriorate and their motivation to work would also decline.
The experiences of the labour centres show that some of the young people 
with the Start Card are unable to find work despite the discounts offered by the 
card. Therefore they are also eligible to take part in the work experience scheme 
6 – 70/2009. (02. 04) Govern-
ment Regulation on the Work 
Experience Scheme for School 
Leavers with Vocational Quali-
fication and on Part-time Work 
Scheme to Prevent Redundan-
cies. In force from April 05, 
2009.
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if they have a sought-after vocational qualification and have been searching 
for a job for at least 90 days with assistance from the employment service. In 
this case the subsidy is given on the wage reduced by the Start discount.
Employers are eligible for the subsidy if they hire school leavers with cer-
tain vocational qualifications – defined by the regional labour centre together 
with the regional labour council and regional development and training com-
mittee – in jobs that will provide them with work experience. The subsidy is 
paid for the period of employment but not more than 365 days. The rate of 
the subsidy is 50–100% of the wage costs. If it is paid at the 100%-rate, then 
its sum cannot be higher than:
– the minimum wage for school leavers with basic level vocational qualifi-
cation;
– 150% of the minimum wage for school leavers with medium-level voca-
tional qualifications;
– 200% of the minimum wage for school leavers with advanced- or high-level 
vocational qualifications.
The scheme is administered by the employment service. The source of the 
subsidy is the decentralised budget of the Labour Market Fund’s Employ-
ment Sub-Fund. The Government did not allocate any additional funding 
to this scheme.
The budget of the Labour Market Fund’s decentralised Employment Sub-
Fund – the source of active labour market policies – was 30.2 billion forints 
in 2009. This was significantly lower than the 2008 budget of 38.5 billion 
forints. The decline resulted from the re-allocation of resources to local gov-
ernments to finance public works programmes.
Ten billion out of the 30.2 billion forints were not allocated to regional la-
bour centres – according to earlier practice – because it was earmarked for 
labour market crisis interventions in the regions worst hit by the economic 
downturn. The majority of the remaining 20.2 billion forints had already been 
committed in 2009. Therefore only 8 billion forints were left for new meas-
ures, such as the work experience scheme for school leavers in 2009. (Fund 
Management Department, MoSAL, 2009)
To compensate for this a new programme was launched to support the em-
ployment of disadvantaged people in 2009. The programme (Measure 1.1.2. of 
the Social Renewal Operational Programme: “Decentralised Programmes for 
the Employment of Disadvantaged People”) is co-financed by the European 
Social Fund and has a total budget of 27 billion forints. Additional funding 
is available in the decentralised and training budgets and the Social Renewal 
Operational Programme for the implementation of labour market training 
schemes in the employment service.
At the same time the Employer’s Contribution which is the main source 
of income for the Labour Market Fund, was cut from 3% to 1% from July 
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1, 2009. Unemployment was also increasing faster than expected leaving 
the 2009 budget for passive assistance (95 billion forints) nearly exhausted 
by July 2009. According to a forecast by the Budgetary Council spending 
on passive assistance might exceed 150 billion forints in 2009. (Budgetary 
Council, August 2009.)
4. suMMary
The year 2009 has so far been dominated by the economic downturn both in 
Hungary and in Europe. Therefore the chapter on the legal and institutional 
environment of the labour market has focused on international and Hun-
garian policy responses to the crisis.
The first part has presented the employment and social effects of the eco-
nomic crisis in Europe as well as the responses of European Union institu-
tions. The European Economic Recovery Plan adopted by the European 
Council in November 2008 clearly expressed the need to tackle unemploy-
ment by investing in human resources and supporting the employment of the 
most disadvantaged who are worst hit by the crisis: the low-skilled, atypical 
workers, young and older workers, ethnic minorities and people with disa-
bilities. National employment services have a key role in crisis managements 
and they must be prepared to offer individualised services, job search advice, 
intensive (re)training, apprenticeships, subsidised employment and assistance 
to becoming self-employed.
As an immediate response flexicurity strategies are recommended for EU 
Member States because these protect employment and long-term employ-
ability rather than jobs. The flexibility of work contracts and a combination 
of active labour market measures can give a rapid policy response to mass re-
dundancies or company closures because they allow a swift transition to a new 
job. In the current climate of uncertainty flexicurity demonstrates the pos-
sibility of transition with the assistance of skills development, active labour 
market measures and social protection systems that can reduce the negative 
effects of the crisis. A comparative analysis of unemployment at the end of 
2008 reveals that its growth had been slower in Europe than in the USA. 
This is attributed to the widespread application of internal flexibility meas-
ures (flexible working time systems) which allow the adaptation of the work-
force and avoid redundancies.
For this reason most European national employment services are making 
efforts to ensure fast, flexible and effective services for jobseekers and employ-
ers. During times of recession public employment services play a key role in 
introducing flexicurity policies and responding to the needs of the most dis-
advantaged groups on the labour market.
“By providing support and delivering services, Public Employment Serv-
ices actively contribute to the implementation of the common principles of 
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flexicurity. The operations of public employment services focus on organising 
and assisting successful labour market transitions. PES services help to reach 
a balance between flexibility and fluidity of employment on the one hand and 
security during job changes and career development moves likely to occur dur-
ing the life cycle on the other.” (The contribution of PES to flexicurity, Joint 
Opinion of Heads of PES, 1112/2008, Nice)
Although the effects of the crisis are different in each country, region and 
sector, and many sectors are affected by job losses, job creation is also hap-
pening in other sectors. After the downturn, the shortage of skilled labour 
will be the main characteristic of the European economy competing in the 
globalised world. European job markets are becoming increasingly complex 
with new forms of atypical employment, labour mobility and atypical work-
ing times.
The ageing of the population will also pose a new challenge for maintain-
ing, using and developing their skills. Furthermore the share of the migrant 
workers in the labour force is expected to grow, counteracting some of the 
consequences of demographic changes. The transition toward a low-carbon 
economy and the growing importance of new technologies offer great poten-
tial for the creation of sustainable jobs. This will have an impact on skills de-
mands and create new jobs especially in the energy, construction and transport 
industries. This is why the EU’s “New Skills for New Jobs” initiative aims at 
promoting a better matching of skills so that as many vacancies as possible 
can be filled by people with the right set of skills. This requires forecasting 
and anticipation of labour demand in the EU.
By pursuing an integrated flexicurity and adaptability approach in times of 
economic downturn, employment services can simultaneously address the long 
term demographic and environmental pressures over the labour market.
Crisis management as in the context of developed countries did not hap-
pen in Hungary. Here crisis management meant that the country successfully 
avoided bankruptcy with the help of the IMF loan and Parliament adopted 
the required budgetary restrictions. Given that there was no scope for pro-
growth stimulatory measures that would increase the budget deficit, the Gov-
ernment decided to address the employment effects of the recession by real-
locating resources with the budget to job protection schemes. The Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Labour spent nearly 18 billion forints national funding 
on these in 2009.
These schemes had a three-fold objective:
– maintaining the operation of businesses in order to protect jobs;
– facilitating the transfer and re-employment of redundant workers with a 
new employer;
– if redundancy cannot be avoided, supporting the individual – also by up-
grading his/her skills – to find a new job.
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The main forms of assistance:
– subsidy towards labour costs – wage and contributions,
– introducing short-time work,
– assistance towards training and re-training expenses,
– the provision of labour-market services,
– assistance towards the cost of commuting and housing.
Out of the 18 billion forints, 7 billion were distributed to employers by the 
National Employment Fund which supported more than 18,000 workers 
to remain in work and thus protected nearly 34,000 jobs. The NES scheme 
however had to be suspended as early as March instead of its planned closure 
on November 30, 2009 because the budget was exhausted. Nonetheless in Feb-
ruary 2009 the Programme “For the Protection of Jobs” implemented by the 
Public Employment Service was launched. The budget for this scheme was 10 
billion forints which lasted until September 14. During this time more than 
27,000 workers were supported and the subsidies paid to employers helped 
to protect nearly 48,000 jobs.
After national resources were exhausted, EU funding was made available 
to mitigate the employment effects of the recession by re-programming the 
New Hungary Development Plan:
– a financial package of 1.4 billion forints for SME-s for working capital 
loans, microloans, loan guarantee – allocated;
– orders worth 1.8 billion forints to the construction industry;
– 20 billion forints allocated to the 4+1 integrated job retention and train-
ing schemes that – according to estimates – will provide assistance to the 
preservation of more than 50 thousand jobs.
The working time regulations were also reviewed in order to provide great-
er flexibility to adjust working hours to the fluctuations of demand resulting 
from the crisis.
The Hungarian employment policy had been committed to improving 
the employability of unemployed and inactive people and promoting the la-
bour market integration of disadvantaged people even prior to the economic 
downturn. Labour market participation in Hungary is especially low by in-
ternational comparison, and therefore this objective remained valid despite 
the economic crisis. The third part has presented new initiatives to increase 
employment and labour market participation in Hungary.
The main reasons behind the poor employment indicators are the depend-
ency traps generated by the large welfare systems – such as pension and child 
care – and the crisis managing Government initiated structural reforms that 
in the long-run will reduce the number of people dependent on transfers that 
keep them away from the labour market. These have been discussed earlier in 
relation to the Government Programme, therefore only a few examples are 
mentioned here:
mária frey
222
– Encouraging the labour market participation of women by shortening the 
eligibility period of parental leave schemes.
– Promoting the activity of older workers by introducing changes in the pen-
sion system.
– Gradual reallocation of the tax burden to transform undeclared work into 
formal employment and reduce labour costs.
Willingness to work should also be encouraged by short-term measures. 
These include extending the requirement to cooperate with the public em-
ployment service to a larger group of long-term jobseekers which took place 
in the “Pathway to Work” scheme. Contribution relief schemes for employ-
ers hiring disadvantaged people are also an important instrument to improve 
their prospects on the labour market. The third part of the study has also ad-
dressed some of the initial experiences of these schemes.
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Statistical tables on labour market trends that have been published in The Hungarian 
Labour Market Yearbooks since 2000 can be downloaded in full from the website of 
the Institute of Economics:
http://econ.core.hu/english/publications/lmyb.html
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Table 1.1: Basic economic indicators
Year GDP
* Industrial 
production* Export Import
Real  
earnings*
Employ-
ment*
Consumer 
price index*
Unemploy-
ment rate
1989 100.7 95.0 100.3 101.1 99.7 98.2 117.0 …
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 …
1991 88.1 81.6 95.1 105.5 93.0 92.6 135.0 …
1992 96.9 84.2 101.0 92.4 98.6 90.3 123.0 9.8
1993 99.4 103.9 86.9 120.9 96.1 93.8 122.5 11.9
1994 102.9 109.7 116.6 114.5 107.2 98.0 118.8 10.7
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
1996 101.3 103.2 104.6 105.5 95.0 99.1 123.6 9.9
1997 104.6 111.1 129.9 126.4 104.9 100.1 118.3 8.7
1998 104.9 112.5 122.1 124.9 103.6 101.4 114.3 7.8
1999 104.2 110.4 115.9 114.3 102.5 103.2 110.0 7.0
2000 105.2 118.1 121.7 120.8 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.8 103.6 107.7 104.0 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 103.5 102.8 105.9 105.1 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 102.9 106.4 109.1 110.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.6 107.4 118.4 115.2 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 104.1 107.0 111.5 106.1 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 103.9 109.9 118.0 114.4 103.5 100.7 103.9 7.5
2007 101.1 108.2 115.8 112.0 95.4 99.9 108.0 7.4
2008 100.5 98.9 104.2 104.3 100.8 98.8 106.1 7.8
* Previous year = 100.
Source: Employment: 1989–1991: KSH MEM; 1992–: KSH MEF. Other data: KSH.; 
import-export: volume index.
Figure 1.1: Annual changes of basic economic indicators
Source: KSH.
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Figure 1.2: Annual GDP time series (2000 = 100%)
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 1.3: Employment rate of population aged 15–74
Source: Eurostat.
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Table 2.1: Population*
Year
In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual  changes
Population  
age 15–64
Demographic dependency rate
Total1 Old age2
population
1980 10,709 103.6 – 6,500.0 0.54 0.21
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
1994 10,350 99.8 –0.1 6,978.2 0.48 0.21
1995 10,337 99.6 –0.1 6,986.9 0.48 0.21
1996 10,321 99.5 –0.1 6,984.2 0.48 0.21
1997 10,301 99.3 –0.2 6,986.3 0.47 0.21
1998 10,280 99.1 –0.2 6,980.0 0.47 0.21
1999 10,253 98.8 –0.3 6,969.6 0.47 0.21
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6,961.3 0.47 0.21
2001 10,200 98.3 –0.2 6,963.3 0.46 0.22
2002 10,175 98.1 –0.2 6,962.8 0.46 0.22
2003 10,142 97.8 –0.3 6,949.4 0.46 0.22
2004 10,117 97.5 –0.3 6,943.5 0.46 0.23
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,949.4 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,943.5 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,931.3 0.45 0.23
2008 10,045 96.8 –0.2 6,912.7 0.45 0.24
2009 10,031 96.7 –0.1 6,898.1 0.45 0.24
* January 1st.
1 (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
2 (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Note: Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Table 2.2: Population by age groups, in thousands*
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 2,341.2 1,464.4 4,399.8 1,054.7 1,449.4 10,709.5
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
1994 1,929.6 1,601.5 4,240.6 1,136.2 1,442.2 10,350.0
1995 1,891.7 1,610.1 4,250.6 1,126.2 1,458.0 10,336.7
1996 1,858.8 1,609.7 4,253.6 1,120.8 1,478.3 10,321.2
1997 1,824.4 1,607.2 4,260.3 1,118.9 1,490.5 10,301.2
1998 1,792.8 1,593.0 4,262.6 1,124.4 1,506.9 10,279.7
1999 1,762.4 1,573.2 4,268.5 1,127.9 1,521.4 10,253.4
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2001 1,692.0 1,480.1 4,338.5 1,144.7 1,545.0 10,200.3
2002 1,660.1 1,436.9 4,378.0 1,147.9 1,551.9 10,174.9
2003 1,633.7 1,392.5 4,390.8 1,166.1 1,559.2 10,142.4
2004 1,606.1 1,355.0 4,401.6 1,186.9 1,567.1 10,116.7
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
2008 1,508.8 1,273.3 4,377.1 1,262.3 1,623.9 10,045.4
2009 1,492.6 1,259.9 4,346.1 1,292.0 1,640.3 10,030.9
* January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
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Figure 2.1: Age structure of the Hungarian population, 1980, 2009
Source: KSH.
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups, in thousands*
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
1992 1,032.3 797.7 2,350.4 255.5 539.8 4,975.7
1993 1,008.7 812.2 2,349.0 253.9 542.5 4,966.3
1994 986.8 819.9 2,350.3 250.5 546.0 4,953.4
1995 967.4 824.0 2,353.3 246.1 550.8 4,941.6
1996 950.5 823.7 2,358.3 239.5 557.2 4,929.2
1997 933.0 822.4 2,366.2 233.9 560.5 4,916.0
1998 916.8 815.4 2,375.5 229.3 564.7 4,901.8
1999 901.5 805.0 2,383.2 226.1 568.6 4,884.4
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2001 865.7 757.0 2,425.2 228.9 574.2 4,851.0
2002 850.1 733.9 2,446.1 233.0 573.8 4,837.0
2003 836.8 711.3 2,456.5 239.9 574.0 4,818.5
2004 823.0 691.9 2,470.3 244.4 574.5 4,804.1
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
2008 773.9 649.2 2,501.3 252.5 592.8 4,769.6
2009 765.8 642.7 2,497.0 258.4 599.2 4,763.1
* See the note under Table 2.2.
Source: KSH.
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups, in thousands*
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
1992 986.5 760.4 2,138.1 318.1 1,194.9 5,397.9
1993 963.6 774.8 2,141.2 314.4 1,204.7 5,398.7
1994 942.8 781.6 2,146.2 313.1 1,212.9 5,396.6
1995 924.4 786.2 2,151.0 312.6 1,221.0 5,395.1
1996 908.3 786.0 2,152.4 316.4 1,228.8 5,392.0
1997 891.4 784.8 2,155.6 318.3 1,235.1 5,385.3
1998 876.0 777.6 2,156.0 324.4 1,243.9 5,378.0
1999 861.0 768.2 2,159.3 326.7 1,253.8 5,369.0
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2001 826.3 723.1 2,193.4 330.4 1,276.1 5,349.3
2002 810.0 703.0 2,211.6 328.6 1,284.7 5,337.9
2003 796.9 681.2 2,217.4 330.7 1,297.8 5,323.9
2004 783.1 663.1 2,220.8 338.5 1,307.1 5,312.6
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
2008 734.9 624.1 2,194.5 373.2 1,349.1 5,275.8
2009 726.8 617.2 2,176.0 381.8 1,366.1 5,267.9
* See the note under Table 2.2.
Source: KSH.
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Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years*
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,679.6 308.8 432.9 810.9 270.0 500.7 2,014.5 6,002.9 250.5 8.4 2,268.0 2,526.9
2007 3,676.6 303.7 426.8 832.6 267.2 475.8 2,002.4 5,982.7 249.5 8.2 2,296.1 2,553.8
2008 3,631.4 318.5 408.6 819.6 279.8 493.1 2,001.1 5,951.0 248.1 10.7 2,327.7 2,586.5
* In thousands. Annual average figures.
Note: Till 1999 updated figure based on 1990 population census since 2000 based on 
2001 population census. ‘Employed’ includes conscripts and working pensioner. Data 
on students for 1995–97 have been estimated. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. 
Unemployment: 1990–91: FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males*
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,076.5 163.6 268.1 404.1 7.0 239.3 918.5 3,158.4 60.5 1.0 770.9 832.8
2007 2,082.6 163.2 267.7 412.3 3.8 225.2 909.0 3,154.8 60.4 1.0 779.0 840.4
2008 2,052.0 173.4 266.3 408.2 4.8 240.4 919.7 3,145.1 58.8 0.9 791.7 851.4
* See the note under Table 3.1.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. 
Unemployment: 1990–91: FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females*
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,603.1 144.8 164.8 406.8 263.0 262.0 1,096.6 2,844.5 189.6 7.4 1,497.1 1,694.1
2007 1,594.0 140.5 159.1 420.3 263.4 250.6 1,093.4 2,827.9 189.1 7.2 1,517.1 1,713.4
2008 1,579.4 145.1 142.3 411.4 276.0 252.7 1,082.4 2,806.9 189.3 9.8 1,536.0 1,735.1
* See the note under Table 3.1.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. 
Unemployment: 1990–91: FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1995 58.7 6.7 8.1 11.9 4.7 9.8 34.5 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 58.3 6.5 8.4 12.2 4.8 9.9 35.2 100.0 4.5 0.3 95.3 100.0
1997 58.4 5.6 8.9 12.4 4.8 9.9 35.9 100.0 4.2 0.3 95.5 100.0
1998 59.5 5.0 9.7 11.5 4.9 9.3 35.4 100.0 3.9 0.3 95.8 100.0
1999 61.3 4.7 8.9 11.2 4.9 9.1 34.0 100.0 4.8 0.1 95.1 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.1 7.2 13.5 4.5 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
2007 61.5 5.1 7.1 13.9 4.5 7.9 33.5 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.9 100.0
2008 61.0 5.3 6.9 13.8 4.7 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.6 0.4 90.0 100.0
Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population  
at male 15–59 and female 15–54, total
Source: See Table 3.4.
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Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. 
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1995 63.6 8.2 8.9 11.6 0.2 7.5 28.2 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 63.4 7.7 9.2 11.8 0.1 7.8 28.9 100.0 3.7 0.2 96.1 100.0
1997 63.7 6.7 9.7 11.9 0.0 7.9 29.6 100.0 3.3 0.2 96.4 100.0
1998 63.7 5.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 8.4 30.4 100.0 3.4 0.4 96.2 100.0
1999 65.5 5.4 9.9 10.7 0.1 8.3 29.1 100.0 4.6 0.1 95.4 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.7 5.2 8.5 12.8 0.2 7.6 29.1 100.0 7.3 0.1 92.6 100.0
2007 66.0 5.2 8.5 13.1 0.1 7.1 28.8 100.0 7.2 0.1 92.7 100.0
2008 65.2 5.5 8.5 13.0 0.2 7.6 29.2 100.0 6.9 0.1 93.0 100.0
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59
Source: See Table 3.5.
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Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. 
Unemployment: 1990–91: FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
economic activity
237
Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, per cent
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1995 53.4 5.2 7.3 12.2 9.6 12.3 41.4 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.1 100.0
1996 52.8 5.2 7.6 12.6 9.8 12.0 42.0 100.0 4.8 0.3 94.9 100.0
1997 52.6 4.5 8.1 12.9 9.9 12.0 42.9 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1998 55.0 4.1 8.4 12.0 10.2 10.4 40.9 100.0 4.1 0.3 95.6 100.0
1999 56.6 3.9 7.7 11.7 10.1 10.0 39.5 100.0 4.9 0.1 95.0 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.4 5.1 5.8 14.3 9.2 9.2 38.6 100.0 11.2 0.4 88.4 100.0
2007 56.4 5.0 5.6 14.9 9.3 8.9 38.7 100.0 11.0 0.4 88.6 100.0
2008 56.3 5.2 5.1 14.7 9.8 9.0 38.6 100.0 10.9 0.6 88.5 100.0
Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population at female 15–54
Source: See Table 3.6.
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Table 3.7: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), in thousands
1999 2000 2001 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a
Together
In work 3,710.8 3,778.9 3,804.1 3,827.4 3,827.1 3,843.6 3,834.4 3,852.2 3,864.1 3,857.2 3,800.7
Unemployed 473.5 448.1 411.6 414.5 410.4 431.8 451.0 488.2 468.1 448.3 481.4
Student; pupils 753.9 749.9 716.4 739.9 763.1 767.7 783.8 792.0 847.8 870.4 868.9
Pensioner 1,079.7 991.8 968.9 990.8 940.4 856.4 800.3 755.6 617.8 568.6 611.0
Disabled 195.5 223.8 245.4 251.0 284.4 338.3 370.4 359.7 520.4 560.3 530.0
On child care leave 289.0 272.4 280.1 272.3 278.3 281.7 274.7 272.4 273.5 279.7 292.4
Dependent 167.5 165.9 168.9 170.7 160.4 181.7 133.3 134.6 116.1 111.9 106.2
Out of work for other reason 113.1 133.6 181.8 184.7 185.7 181.7 178.4 160.0 108.0 103.3 103.6
Total 6,783.0 6,764.4 6,777.2 6,851.3 6,849.8 6,836.3 6,826.3 6,814.7 6,815.8 6,799.7 6,794.2
Males
In work 2,042.7 2,075.4 2,091.8 2,089.5 2,090.2 2,087.3 2,082.8 2,088.3 2,105.0 2,108.9 2,074.0
Unemployed 286.1 270.4 255.7 255.2 239.3 244.2 247.7 265.2 251.6 241.9 257.5
Student; pupils 375.9 371.4 353.0 363.6 380.9 383.7 391.1 398.5 418.9 430.2 431.5
Pensioner 426.4 388.6 377.3 386.3 368.1 337.4 322.5 304.5 236.0 205.2 233.8
Disabled 106.0 120.4 133.1 134.2 148.1 169.9 184.5 178.7 250.4 269.9 259.4
On child care leave 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.5 4.1 5.8
Dependent 6.5 5.3 6.3 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.0 5.8 6.6 7.2
Out of work for other reason 67.4 77.6 99.9 100.8 101.2 97.5 89.6 80.1 54.9 52.1 52.1
Total 3,314.9 3,312.9 3,321.1 3,339.9 3,337.8 3,330.0 3,329.1 3,328.4 3,328.1 3,318.9 3,321.3
Females
In work 1,668.1 1,703.5 1,712.3 1,737.9 1,736.9 1,756.3 1,751.6 1,763.9 1,759.1 1,748.3 1,726.6
Unemployed 187.4 177.7 155.9 159.3 171.1 187.6 203.3 223.0 216.5 206.4 223.8
Student; pupils 378.0 378.5 363.4 376.3 382.2 384.0 392.7 393.5 428.9 440.2 437.4
Pensioner 653.3 603.2 591.6 604.5 572.3 519.0 477.8 451.1 381.8 363.4 377.2
Disabled 89.5 103.4 112.3 116.8 136.3 168.4 185.9 181.0 270.0 290.4 270.6
On child care leave 285.1 268.6 276.1 268.3 273.4 277.0 269.8 266.3 268.0 275.6 286.7
Dependent 161.0 160.6 162.6 164.4 155.3 129.8 127.3 127.6 110.3 105.3 99.1
Out of work for other reason 45.7 56.0 81.9 83.9 84.5 84.2 88.8 79.9 53.1 51.2 51.4
Total 3,468.1 3,451.5 3,456.1 3,511.4 3,512.0 3,506.3 3,497.2 3,486.3 3,487.7 3,480.8 3,472.8
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. 2001 serves as 
a “Janus year”.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), per cent
1999 2000 2001 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a
Together
In work 54.7 55.9 56.1 55.9 55.9 56.2 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.7 55.9
Unemployed 7.0 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.1
Student; pupils 11.1 11.1 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.4 12.8 12.8
Pensioner 15.9 14.7 14.3 14.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.1 9.1 8.4 9.0
Disabled 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.6 8.2 7.8
On child care leave 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3
Dependent 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6
Out of work for other reason 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 61.6 62.6 63.0 62.6 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.7 63.2 63.5 62.4
Unemployed 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.8
Student; pupils 11.3 11.2 10.6 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.0
Pensioner 12.9 11.7 11.4 11.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.1 7.1 6.2 7.0
Disabled 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5 8.1 7.8
On child care leave 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Out of work for other reason 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 48.1 49.4 49.5 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.2 49.7
Unemployed 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.2 5.9 6.4
Student; pupils 10.9 11.0 10.5 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.6 12.6
Pensioner 18.8 17.5 17.1 17.2 16.3 14.8 13.7 12.9 10.9 10.4 10.9
Disabled 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.9 4.8 5.3 5.2 7.7 8.3 7.8
On child care leave 8.2 7.8 8.0 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.3
Dependent 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9
Out of work for other reason 1.3 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.1: Employed
Year In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratio1
1980 5,458.2 133.7 … 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 … 59.0
1992 4,082.7 100.0 –9.7 49.0
1993 3,827.0 93.7 –6.3 45.8
1994 3,751.5 91.9 –2.0 44.8
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.8 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.1 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,859.5 94.5 0.3 …
2001a 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002a 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003a 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004a 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005a 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006a 3,930.1 96.3 0.7 46.0
2007a 3,926.2 96.2 0.0 46.0
2008a 3,879.4 95.0 –1.2 45.4
1 Per cent of the population above 14 year.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.1: Employed
Source: See Table 4.1.
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Table 4.2: Employment by gender
Year
Males Females Share of females 
(%)in thousands 1992 = 100 in thousands 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1992 2,218.2 100.0 1,864.5 100.0 45.7
1993 2,077.0 93.6 1,750.0 93.9 45.7
1994 2,055.0 92.6 1,696.5 91.0 45.2
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,130.6 96.1 1,728.9 92.7 44.8
2001a 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002a 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003a 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004a 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005a 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006a 2,137.4 96.4 1,792.7 96.1 45.6
2007a 2,143.0 96.6 1,783.2 95.6 45.5
2008a 2,110.8 95.2 1,768.6 94.9 45.6
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.2: Employment by gender
Source: See Table 4.2.
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups, males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 5.1 12.6 55.4 10.2 8.0 8.7 100.0
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
1992 3.3 10.9 67.2 9.1 6.5 2.9 100.0
1993 2.9 11.1 68.3 9.2 6.1 2.3 100.0
1994 2.9 11.3 68.7 9.5 5.5 2.0 100.0
1995 2.8 11.3 68.8 9.7 5.6 1.8 100.0
1996 2.5 11.6 69.3 9.6 5.6 1.4 100.0
1997 2.3 12.3 68.9 9.9 5.4 1.2 100.0
1998 2.3 13.4 67.6 10.3 5.1 1.3 100.0
1999 1.9 13.2 67.1 10.5 5.6 1.6 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.1 10.9 68.3 11.0 6.9 1.8 100.0
2001a 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002a 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003a 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004a 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005a 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006a 0.6 6.6 68.5 13.0 8.4 2.9 100.0
2007a 0.5 6.5 68.7 13.0 8.5 2.8 100.0
2008a 0.5 6.3 69.0 13.1 8.3 2.8 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups, females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1980 5.3 9.7 61.8 10.7 12.5 100.0
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
1993 3.3 9.9 71.4 10.3 5.1 100.0
1994 3.2 10.2 71.8 10.4 4.5 100.0
1995 2.7 10.2 72.2 10.6 4.3 100.0
1996 2.4 9.9 72.2 11.0 4.5 100.0
1997 2.0 10.8 72.2 10.5 4.5 100.0
1998 2.3 12.2 71.2 10.5 3.8 100.0
1999 1.7 12.1 70.2 11.6 4.4 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 10.1 70.0 13.0 5.8 100.0
2001a 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002a 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003a 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004a 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005a 0.4 6.4 67.6 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006a 0.4 6.1 66.8 16.2 10.6 100.0
2007a 0.3 5.8 67.3 16.0 10.6 100.0
2008a 0.3 5.5 67.4 16.1 10.7 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1980 40.8 32.3 18.2 8.7 100.0
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
1995 21.3 38.5 25.5 14.7 100.0
1996 20.2 39.3 25.3 15.2 100.0
1997 20.1 39.4 26.5 14.1 100.0
1998 20.3 39.4 25.7 14.7 100.0
1999 16.8 41.5 26.8 14.9 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.7 42.7 26.0 15.6 100.0
2001a 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002a 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003a 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004a 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005a 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006a 12.3 40.8 28.3 18.6 100.0
2007a 11.8 40.8 28.7 18.7 100.0
2008a 11.7 39.4 29.0 19.8 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF. Since 1999 slight changes 
carried out in the categorisation system.
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1980 53.1 12.3 27.5 7.2 100.0
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
1995 26.5 20.1 37.1 16.3 100.0
1996 25.6 19.6 37.3 17.6 100.0
1997 25.1 20.6 37.9 16.4 100.0
1998 23.6 20.2 38.2 18.0 100.0
1999 20.6 20.3 40.6 18.5 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.0 21.2 40.4 19.4 100.0
2001a 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002a 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003a 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004a 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005a 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006a 14.3 20.7 40.1 24.9 100.0
2007a 13.6 21.2 40.1 25.1 100.0
2008a 13.3 20.3 39.3 27.1 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF. Since 1999 slight changes 
carried out in the categorisation system.
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Table 4.7: Employed by employment status, in thousands
Year
Employees Member of  cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1994 3,045.2 103.3 174.7 369.3 3,692.5
1995 2,978.9 84.2 167.9 391.8 3,622.8
1996 2,961.2 79.0 151.8 413.1 3,605.1
1997 2,989.7 68.9 137.4 414.3 3,610.3
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,296.3 30.7 119.1 398.4 3,844.5
2001a 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002a 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003a 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004a 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005a 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006a 3,431.4 4.8 126.7 367.2 3,930.1
2007a 3,439.7 4.4 123.2 358.9 3,926.2
2008a 3,405.1 2.3 122.5 349.5 3,879.4
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.8: Composition of the employed persons by employment status, per cent
Year
Employees Member of  cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1994 82.5 2.8 4.7 10.0 100.0
1995 82.2 2.3 4.6 10.8 100.0
1996 82.1 2.2 4.2 11.5 100.0
1997 82.8 1.9 3.8 11.5 100.0
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.4 100.0
2001a 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002a 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003a 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004a 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005a 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006a 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
2007a 87.6 0.1 3.1 9.2 100.0
2008a 87.7 0.1 3.2 9.0 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.9: Employees by industry, per cent
Industries* 1980** 1990** 1995 2000 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 18.0 15.8 5.0 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 2.2 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2
Manufacturing (15-37) 29.2 29.5 24.5 26.4 26.9 26.8 25.5 24.9 24.0 23.6 24.0 24.3
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7
Construction (45) 7.0 5.9 5.4 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.8 7.0 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.2
Trade, repairing (50-52) 8.7 8.9 10.6 12.3 12.6 12.8 12.8 12.5 13.7 13.6 13.8 14.0
Hotels and restaurants (55) 2.3 2.4 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 7.4 6.7 9.3 8.5 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.6 8.0 8.0 7.7
Financial intermediation (65-67) 1.1 1.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4
Real estate, renting, business activities 
(70-74) 3.2 2.9 3.2 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.7
Public administration and defence, com-
pulsory social security (75) 4.0 5.6 8.7 8.5 8.3 8.4 8.7 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.4
Education (80) 6.0 7.1 11.1 9.6 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.7 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.9
Health and social work (85) 5.3 5.5 7.6 7.0 6.8 6.9 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.2 6.8
Other 2.7 3.4 4.9 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
** Includes members of cooperatives and partnerships.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.10: Employees by industry, males, per cent
Industries* 1995 2000 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 7.3 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.8 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.0
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 1.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4
Manufacturing (15-37) 26.9 28.8 29.2 29.5 28.4 28.1 27.6 27.2 27.3 28.1
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 4.4 3.5 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5
Construction (45) 9.3 10.8 10.8 10.9 11.9 12.2 13.0 13.1 13.3 12.6
Trade, repairing (50-52) 8.0 10.4 10.9 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.1 11.4 12.0
Hotels and restaurants (55) 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 12.6 11.4 11.3 11.1 10.7 10.7 10.5 10.8 11.1 10.4
Financial intermediation (65-67) 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4
Real estate, renting, business activities 
(70-74) 3.0 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.7 5.8 6.3 6.1 6.6
Public administration and defence, compul-
sory social security (75) 9.2 8.4 8.1 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.4 7.6 7.9
Education (80) 5.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.6
Health and social work (85) 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6
Other 5.1 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.11: Employees by industry, females, per cent
Industries* 1995 2000 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Manufacturing (15-37) 21.9 23.8 24.4 23.9 22.3 21.4 20.1 19.7 20.2 20.2
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8
Construction (45) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3
Trade, repairing (50-52) 13.4 14.5 14.5 15.0 14.7 14.2 16.6 16.2 16.5 16.2
Hotels and restaurants (55) 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9
Transport, storage, communication 
(60-64) 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.3 4.9 4.6 4.7
Financial intermediation (65-67) 4.0 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.5
Real estate, renting, business activities 
(70-74) 3.3 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.6 6.9
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security (75) 8.2 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.8 9.2 9.4 9.1 9.0 9.0
Education (80) 17.5 15.8 15.3 15.5 15.7 16.1 15.3 15.2 14.9 14.8
Health and social work (85) 12.2 11.3 11.2 11.3 12.1 12.5 12.2 12.4 12.1 11.5
Other 4.6 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1992–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.12: Employed in their present job since 0–6 months
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Hungary 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.6
Source: MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
Table 4.13: Distribution of employees in the corporate sector by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20–49 50–249 250–999 1000 and more
employees
2000 20.2 7.0 23.5 22.5 26.8
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
2007 25.2 14.2 20.0 18.4 22.2
2008 26.0 15.7 20.7 18.9 18.6
Note: Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: FSzH BT.
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Table 4.14: Employees of the corporate sector by the share of foreign ownership, per cent
Share of foreign ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
100% 17.5 19.0 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0 19.4 20.4
Majority 11.7 11.0 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.4
Minority 5.3 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.2
0% 65.5 65.1 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3 70.3 71.0
Note: Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: FSzH BT.
Figure 4.3: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
Source: FSzH BT.
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Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, males, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 14.6 64.7 82.8 71.8 48.7 17.1 9.9 58.9
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 10.0 3.2 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 10.4 3.8 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 11.8 3.8 56.8
2001a 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 13.1 3.1 57.1
2002a 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 14.4 3.4 57.1
2003a 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 16.8 3.8 57.6
2004a 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 20.1 4.3 57.5
2005a 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 20.9 4.2 57.4
2006a 4.2 43.9 83.3 70.3 58.6 19.2 4.3 58.0
2007a 3.7 43.8 83.7 70.7 58.2 18.9 4.7 58.0
2008a 3.5 42.2 83.1 71.2 55.1 16.8 4.9 57.2
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 4.16: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, females, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 16.0 54.0 72.2 58.4 18.2 10.7 5.3 46.6
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 5.0 1.2 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 5.5 1.6 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 5.1 1.8 43.0
2001a 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 5.5 1.3 43.1
2002a 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 6.0 1.5 43.3
2003a 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 7.3 2.0 44.3
2004a 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 9.0 1.9 44.1
2005a 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 9.6 1.5 44.2
2006a 2.5 33.9 67.5 67.9 42.6 8.9 1.6 44.4
2007a 2.1 32.5 67.8 68.3 40.0 9.7 2.1 44.3
2008a 1.9 31.0 67.7 68.7 38.7 10.0 2.3 44.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.17: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 35.6 75.8 71.8 86.3 60.0
1998 35.0 75.3 67.0 84.9 60.4
1999 33.6 76.8 68.3 86.8 62.4
2000 33.6 77.4 67.9 87.1 63.1
2001a 33.0 77.6 67.3 87.4 62.9
2002a 32.0 77.6 67.1 85.8 62.9
2003a 32.4 76.5 67.8 86.4 63.4
2004a 31.0 75.7 67.3 87.1 63.1
2005a 31.6 74.7 66.9 86.9 63.1
2006a 31.5 75.2 67.5 85.7 63.8
2007a 31.6 74.6 67.5 85.9 64.0
2008a 31.3 72.6 66.5 84.7 63.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.4: Employment-age profiles, men aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.18: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
university Total
1993 30.8 65.0 64.0 79.2 49.3
1998 26.6 60.5 58.1 76.9 47.3
1999 26.1 61.4 59.0 77.5 49.0
2000 26.0 61.0 59.3 77.8 49.7
2001a 26.1 60.8 59.2 77.8 49.8
2002a 26.0 60.4 58.6 77.9 49.8
2003a 25.3 59.7 59.5 78.3 50.9
2004a 25.0 58.8 58.1 78.1 50.7
2005a 25.1 57.6 57.9 78.9 51.0
2006a 24.5 58.2 57.5 77.6 51.1
2007a 24.0 57.8 57.2 75.4 50.9
2008a 23.9 55.5 56.4 75.5 50.6
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.5: Employment-age profiles, women aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80 60-64 éves55-59 éves50-54 éves
25-49 éves20-24 éves15-19 éves
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996199519941993
SzázalékPer cent
unemployment
251
Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by gender and per cent of long term unemployed,  
per cent
Year
Unemployment rate Share of long term 
unemployed1Males Females Together
1992 10.7 8.7 9.8 …
1993 13.2 10.4 11.9 …
1994 11.8 9.4 10.7 43.2
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2001a 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2002a 6.1 5.4 5.8 44.9
2003a 6.1 5.6 5.9 43.9
2004a 6.1 6.1 6.1 45.0
2005a 7.0 7.5 7.2 46.2
2006a 7.2 7.8 7.5 46.8
2007a 7.1 7.6 7.4 48.2
2008a 7.6 8.1 7.8 47.6
1 Long term unemployed are those who have been without work for 12 months or more, 
the denominator does not include those starting new jobs.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
Source: See Table 5.1.
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Table 5.2: Unemployment rate by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 20.3 15.0 9.7 2.9 13.5
1998 14.6 9.1 5.9 2.2 8.5
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001a 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002a 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003a 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004a 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005a 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006a 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2
2007a 18.4 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1
2008a 19.8 7.6 5.3 2.3 7.6
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of pri-
mary school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 39.0 40.8 17.3 2.8 100.0
1994 37.3 42.7 15.8 4.3 100.0
1995 37.7 44.0 14.7 3.6 100.0
1996 37.6 44.0 15.1 3.3 100.0
1997 38.9 43.7 15.4 2.0 100.0
1998 37.4 42.0 17.2 3.4 100.0
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.8 42.9 17.4 2.9 100.0
2001a 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002a 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003a 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004a 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005a 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006a 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0
2007a 34.9 38.8 20.3 6.0 100.0
2008a 35.2 39.4 19.8 5.6 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1992–: KSH MEF. Since 1999 slight changes carried out in the categorisation 
system.
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Table 5.4: Unemployment rate by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 14.6 12.8 8.1 3.2 10.4
1998 11.6 7.8 5.8 1.8 7.0
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001a 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002a 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003a 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004a 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005a 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006a 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
2007a 16.0 9.4 6.2 3.3 7.6
2008a 17.5 9.5 6.9 3.2 8.1
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 5.5: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of pri-
mary school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 45.8 22.6 27.4 4.2 100.0
1994 44.4 23.1 29.4 3.1 100.0
1995 41.0 24.3 29.7 5.0 100.0
1996 38.2 24.9 31.6 5.4 100.0
1997 44.2 23.2 28.4 4.2 100.0
1998 41.6 22.7 31.4 4.3 100.0
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.3 28.2 32.5 6.1 100.0
2001a 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002a 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003a 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004a 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005a 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006a 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
2007a 31.2 26.6 31.7 10.5 100.0
2008a 32.2 24.3 33.3 10.2 100.0
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: 1992–: KSH MEF. Since 1999 slight changes carried out in the categorisation 
system.
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Figure 5.2: Quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–74 years
Employment Unemployment Inactivity
Employment
Unemployment
Inactivity
The data refer to 15–74 aged cohorts observed in the LFS in two consecutive quarters. 
Red curves: smoothed with fourth degree polinomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.6: The number of unemployed* by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
Length of job search, weeks [month]
Total1–4  
[<1]
5–14  
[1–3]
15–26  
[4–6]
27–51 
[7–11]
52  
[12]
53–78  
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105– 
[>24]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 – 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 – 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.7 36.9 33.1 38.3 11.3 31.4 20.9 44.1 230.7
2001a 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002a 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003a 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004a 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005a 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006a 13.3 50.7 48.3 51.9 17.4 41.5 26.6 58.8 308.5
2007a 13.8 49.4 44.3 50.1 12.7 43.3 26.0 64.9 304.5
2008a 13.7 50.4 47.8 53.5 13.4 39.6 27.2 74.8 320.4
* Without those unemployed who will get a new job within 30 days; since 2003: within 
90 days.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment-age profiles, men aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.4: Unemployment-age profiles, women aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
0
1
2
3
4
55-59 éves50-54 éves25-49 éves20-24 éves15-19 éves
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996199519941993
M
un
ka
né
lkü
lis
ég
i r
át
a 
lo
ga
rit
m
us
a
Lo
g o
f t
he
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
0
1
2
3
4
55-59 éves50-54 éves25-49 éves20-24 éves15-19 éves
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996199519941993
M
un
ka
né
lkü
lis
ég
i r
át
a 
lo
ga
rit
m
us
a
Lo
g o
f t
he
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
unemployment
257
Table 5.7: Registered unemployed* and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15–24
In thousands Rate in % In thousands Rate in % In thousands Rate in %
1990 47.7 – … … … …
1991 227.3 4.1 … … … …
1992 557.0 10.3 444.2 9.8 120.0 17.5
1993 671.8 12.9 518.9 11.9 141.3 21.3
1994 568.4 11.3 451.2 10.7 124.7 19.4
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006 393.5 9.0 316.8 7.5 64.1 19.1
2007 426.9 9.7 311.9 7.4 57.6 18.0
2008 442.3 10.0 329.2 7.8 61.0 19.9
* The modification of the Employment Act of 1991 in November 2005 replaced the term 
“registered unemployed” for “registered jobseekers.” Since only 50–60 per cent of the 
registered unemployed seek jobs actively (see Table 5.10.), in this yearbook we will 
continue to use the original terminology.
Note: the denominator of registered unemployment rate in the economically active pop-
ulation on 1st January the previous year.
Sources: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: FSzH REG; LFS unemployment: KSH 
MEF.
Figure 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment rates
Source: See Table 5.7.
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Table 5.8: Composition of the registered unemployed* by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
8 grades of primary school or less 41.2 40.8 40.6 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0 42.4 43.3
Vocational school 35.1 35.6 36.0 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1 31.5 30.9
Vocational secondary school 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.1
Grammar school 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2
College 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3
University 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* See the footnote under Table 5.7.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.9: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leavers * by educational attainment,  
yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
8 grades of primary school or less 4.6 20.2 23.4 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.3
Vocational school 41.9 35.7 34.1 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 17.3
Vocational secondary school 27.0 23.9 24.2 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.3 20.7 21.2
Grammar school 21.8 15.5 14.0 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7 12.8 13.3
College 3.6 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9
University 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Since 2006: registered school-leaver jobseekers. See the footnote under Table 5.7.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.10: Registered unemployed* by economic activity  
as observed in the LFS, per cent
Year Employed MEF-unemployed Inactive Total
1992 5.1 71.6 23.3 100.0
1993 10.0 63.6 26.4 100.0
1994 14.4 54.5 31.1 100.0
1995 11.8 53.7 34.5 100.0
1996 13.7 51.8 34.5 100.0
1997 18.7 44.1 37.2 100.0
1998 24.8 35.1 40.1 100.0
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0
2002a 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0
2003a 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0
2004a 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0
2005a 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0
2006a 3.9 58.7 37.5 100.0
2007a 3.7 62.6 33.7 100.0
2008a 3.7 63.1 33.2 100.0
* See the footnote under Table 5.7.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Note: the data pertain to those who classify themselves as registered jobseekers in the 
KSH-MEF. Starting in 1999, those who indicated that their last contact with a job 
center was over 2 months ago were filtered out from those who classified themselves as 
registered jobseekers.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.11: Selected time series of registered unemployment*, yearly averages, in thousands and percent
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Registered unemployment* 671.7 568.4 507.7 500.6 470.1 423.1 409.5 390.5
Of which:
School-leavers 59.7 62.1 54.5 46.2 42.4 32.5 29.9 26.0
Non school-leavers 612.0 506.2 453.2 454.4 427.7 390.6 379.6 364.4
Male 395.3 333.0 293.8 284.1 267.1 233.4 221.4 209.7
Female 276.4 235.3 213.8 216.5 203.0 189.7 188.1 180.8
25 years old and younger 174.8 153.3 134.2 124.0 105.8 89.9 85.4 79.1
Manual workers 556.0 467.6 414.3 407.4 386.3 349.0 336.8 321.2
Non manual workers 115.8 100.7 93.4 93.2 83.8 74.1 72.7 69.3
Unemployment benefit recipients 404.8 228.9 182.8 171.7 141.7 130.7 140.7 131.7
Unemployment assistance recipients** 89.3 190.3 210.0 211.3 201.3 182.2 148.6 143.5
Unemployment rate, % 12.9 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School-leavers 8.9 10.9 10.7 9.2 9.0 7.7 7.3 6.7
Male 58.8 58.6 57.9 56.7 56.8 55.2 54.1 53.7
25 years old and younger 26.0 27.0 26.4 24.8 22.5 21.3 20.9 20.3
Manual workers 82.8 82.3 81.6 81.4 82.2 82.5 82.3 82.2
Flows***, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 48.6 42.3 45.7 52.8 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1
Of which: school-leavers 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.5 9.2 9.8 9.3 8.0
Outflow from the Register 51.2 51.7 47.6 54.3 57.3 60.4 57.2 56.8
Of which: school-leavers 6.6 7.9 8.5 8.9 9.0 11.0 9.4 8.2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Registered unemployment* 364.1 344.7 357.2 375.9 409.9 393.5 426.9 442.3
Of which:
School-leavers 26.8 28.5 31.3 33.8 40.9 38.7 40.4 41.4
Non school-leavers 337.4 316.2 325.9 342.2 369.1 354.7 386.5 400.9
Male 196.4 184.6 188.0 193.3 210.4 200.9 219.9 228.3
Female 167.7 160.1 169.2 182.6 199.5 192.5 207.0 214.0
25 years old and younger 75.6 71.1 71.6 71.4 78.9 75.8 80.3 75.9
Manual workers 302.0 286.3 296.2 308.5 336.2 321.9 … …
Non manual workers 62.1 58.4 61.0 67.4 73.7 71.6 … …
Unemployment benefit recipients 119.2 114.9 120.0 124.0 134.4 151.5 134.6 136.5
Unemployment assistance recipients** 131.2 113.4 116.2 120.4 133.4 121.8 133.0 147.5
Unemployment rate, % 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School-leavers 7.3 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.4
Male 53.9 53.5 52.6 51.4 51.3 51.1 51.5 51.6
25 years old and younger 20.8 20.6 20.0 19.0 19.2 16.5 18.8 17.2
Manual workers 82.9 83.1 82.9 82.1 82.0 81.8 … …
Flows***, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0
Of which: school-leavers 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.0 6.2 6.3
Outflow from the Register 59.4 55.8 53.5 54.4 59.8 51.4 48.4 51.3
Of which: school-leavers 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.1 7.9 7.1 6.0 6.2
* See the footnote under Table 5.7. (The data concern the closing date of each month.)
** Before 2005 the number of income supplement recipients, later the number of regular 
social assistance recipients.
*** Monthly averages.
Source: FSzH REG.
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Table 5.12: Monthly entrants to the unemployment register*,  
monthly averages, in thousands
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
First time 
entrants 17.0 13.4 12.8 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.0 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.0 7.1
Re-entrants 39.2 42.0 44.4 42.9 45.8 45.6 44.8 47.3 50.0 42.2 43.4 46.9
Together 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0
* Since 2006 it is called Jobseekers’ Register instead of Unemployment Register. See the 
footnote under Table 5.7.
Source: FSzH REG.
Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register
Source: See Table 5.12.
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Table 5.13: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programs
Year
Unemploy-
ment benefit*
Regular 
social  
assistance**
UA for  
school-leavers
Do not 
receive 
provision
Public work Retraining Wage  subsidy
Other  
programmes Total
1990 In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 … … … … 61.0
Per cent 69.6 30.4 100.0
1995 In thousands 150.8 192.9 26.3 109.1 21.7 20.4 10.9 64.7 596.8
Per cent 25.3 32.3 4.4 18.3 3.6 3.4 1.8 10.8 100.0
1996 In thousands 145.4 218.5 2.6 127.8 38.5 20.6 16.4 74.5 644.3
Per cent 22.6 33.9 0.4 19.8 6.0 3.2 2.5 11.6 100.0
1997 In thousands 134.1 193.5 0.1 121.8 38.9 25.1 29.7 95.7 638.9
Per cent 21.0 30.3 0.0 19.1 6.1 3.9 4.6 15.0 100.0
1998 In thousands 123.9 158.6 0.1 109.4 37.4 24.5 30.9 86.7 571.5
Per cent 21.7 27.7 0.0 19.1 6.5 4.3 5.4 15.2 100.0
1999 In thousands 135.5 146.7 0.0 107.1 35.7 28.0 31.1 60.6 544.7
Per cent 24.9 26.9 0.0 19.7 6.6 5.1 5.7 11.1 100.0
2000 In thousands 117.0 139.7 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001 In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002 In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003 In thousands 105.1 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004 In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7 29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005 In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5 29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006 In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
2007 In thousands 128.0 133.1 – 151.8 19.3 14.6 23.4 6.8 477.0
Per cent 27.6 28.7 32.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 100.0
2008 In thousands 120.7 145.7 – 158.2 21.2 21.2 25.0 14.1 506.1
Per cent 23.8 28.8 31.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 2.8 100.0
* Since 2006: jobseekers’ allowance recipients. See the footnote under Table 5.7.
** Before 2005 the number of income supplement recipients, later the number of regular social assistance recipients.
Note: October in each year. The denominator of all rates is the sum of registered persons and programme partici-
pants.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.14: The number of registered unemployed* who became employed** on subsidised  
and non-subsidised employment
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent
Subsidised  
employment 119,448 40.5 137,136 42.7 130,081 37.4 104,842 32.7 118,703 34.0
Non-subsidised 
employment 175,393 59.5 184,389 57.3 217,606 62.6 215,686 67.3 230,558 66.0
* See the footnote under Table 5.7.
** Yearly totals.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.15: Distribution of registered unemployed*, unemployment benefit recipients  
and unemployment assistance recipients** by educational attainment
Educational attainment 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Registered unemployed
8 grades of primary school or less 43.6 40.9 42.3 42.7 41.8 41.5 42.8 43.8
Vocational school 34.5 36.0 34.2 32.2 32.6 32.3 31.5 30.7
Vocational secondary school 11.7 12.8 13.0 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.2 12.8
Grammar school 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1
College 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2
University 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
482.7 406.4 359.6 350.7 388.1 359.6 402.7 415.6
Unemployment benefit recipients1
8 grades of primary school or less 36.9 32.0 29.7 28.9 28.2 25.4 25.4 24.4
Vocational school 36.6 39.5 40.7 39.2 39.3 39.5 37.4 37.0
Vocational secondary school 14.9 16.0 16.7 17.7 17.9 18.7 19.2 19.3
Grammar school 8.3 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.5 10.1 10.9 11.0
College 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.6 3.7 4.5 5.0 6.0
University 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
164.1 121.3 110.3 100.3 104.9 91.5 119.3 92.5
Unemployment assistance recipients2
8 grades of primary school or less 56.8 50.0 55.5 61.1 60.4 60.1 60.3 60.3
Vocational school 30.6 34.3 30.0 27.6 27.8 27.7 27.1 26.5
Vocational secondary school 6.9 8.7 7.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8
Grammar school 4.5 5.7 5.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.7
College 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
University 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
220.7 186.6 136.9 114.6 127.8 116.5 130.9 145.8
* See the footnote under Table 5.7.
** Since 2006: jobseekers’ benefit recipients and ‘jobseekers’ assistance recipients.
1 Without pre-pension recipients in 2004.
2 Before 2005 the number of income supplement recipients, later the number of regular 
social assistance recipients.
Notes: On the closing date of June in each year.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.16: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPs*, per cent
Active labour market programmes 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Suggested training programmes1 44.5 46.3 46.8 46.8 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1 37.5 42.2
Accepted training programmes2 50.2 51.1 51.5 50.0 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9 47.6 48.0
Retrainig of those who are employed3 92.8 90.4 94.7 94.8 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 … 92.3 93.9
Support for self-employment4 90.2 88.1 91.7 90.5 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4 87.6 83.6
Wage subsidy programmes 70.1 66.3 59.1 59.7 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3 63.4 65.0
Work experience programmes5 – 65.7 59.1 55.8 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.3 74.6
Continued employment programme6 – 72.1 75.1 68.5 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0 77.5 –
* Three months after the end of programmes. (ALMP: Active Labour Market Policies.)
1 Suggested training: traning programmes suggested by the PES
2 Accepted training: participation in programmes initiated by the jobseekers and ac-
cepted by PES.
3 Training for employed persons: training for those whose jobs are at risk of termination
4 Support to help self-employment: support of jobseekers for 6 months (the amount of 
the monthly minimum wage) or HUF 3 million lumpsum support (to be repaid or not) 
to help them to become individual entrepreneurs or self-employed.
5 Work experience programmes: to help first time jobseekers (school-leavers) to gain 
6–9 months work experience (50–90% of the sum of wages and additional costs).
6 Further employment programmes: to support the continued employment of school-
leavers at workplaces which provided practical training for them.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.17: Outflow from the Register
Year
Total number of outflows
Of which:
became employed, % benefit period expired, %
1993 580,880 32.1 n.a.
1994 485,045 27.8 n.a.
1995 370,941 27.7 n.a.
1996 408,828 24.2 58.4
1997 327,486 26.8 58.7
1998 322,496 26.5 64.5
1999 320,132 26.0 67.4
2000 325,341 28.1 64.6
2001 308,780 27.2 65.1
2002 303,288 27.6 66.7
2003 297,640 26.7 65.2
2004 308,027 27.4 64.6
2005 329,738 27.2 63.0
2006 234,273 33.2 53.7
2007 251,889 33.4 46.9
2008 232,151 40.0 48.7
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.18: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participants*
Groups of training partici-
pants 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Participants in suggested 
training 35,486 44,988 48,558 52,045 52,198 53,447 46,802 45,261 33,002 29,252 36,212 32,747 48,561
Participants in accepted 
training 31,167 26,522 26,906 28,311 30,949 32,672 31,891 28,599 19,406 9,620 7,327 5,766 4,939
Non-employed partici-
pants together 66,725 71,509 75,465 80,356 83,147 86,211 78,693 73,859 52,407 38,872 43,539 38,513 53,500
Of which: school-leavers 16,843 21,658 24,359 25,260 22,131 20,592 19,466 18,320 12,158 9,313 1,365 1,111 12,604
Employed participants 5,255 4,484 4,139 4,408 5,026 5,308 4,142 9,036 7,487 4,853 3,602 3,303 3,564
Total 71,980 75,993 79,604 84,764 88,173 91,519 82,835 82,895 59,894 43,725 47,141 41,816 57,064
* The figures contain all participants financed from the Labour Market Fund and from EU Social Funds.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.19: Employment ratio of former participants of ALMPs* by gender, age groups and educational attainment 
for the programmes finished in 2008, per cent
Non-employed participants Supported 
self-employ-
ment1
Wage subsidy 
programme
School leavers
suggested 
training
accepted  
training total
work experience 
programme
further employ-
ment programme
By gender
Males 40.0 48.5 41.7 86.6 63.1 68.0 –
Females 43.8 47.5 44.4 81.0 66.6 79.4 –
By age groups
–20 35.3 40.2 36.2 0.0 58.6 37.5 –
20–24 45.4 49.0 46.1 74.0 65.1 83.0 –
25–29 45.5 54.4 47.1 83.5 66.3 50.0 –
–29 together 44.2 49.6 45.3 80.2 0.0 74.6 –
30–34 43.7 46.9 44.3 84.1 65.8 – –
35–39 40.6 52.6 42.6 88.8 67.7 – –
40–44 40.7 38.5 40.3 83.7 65.8 – –
45–49 41.6 48.4 42.4 80.6 63.5 – –
50–54 37.6 44.7 38.4 84.1 67.0 – –
55+ 31.4 40.0 32.1 84.5 57.0 – –
By educational attainment
Less than primary school 21.4 40.0 22.3 0.0 46.1 0.0 –
Primary school 36.8 43.3 37.7 78.2 59.1 60.0 –
Vocational school for skilled 
workers 42.4 47.5 43.5 87.9 64.8 100.0 –
Vocational school 43.0 36.7 41.7 93.3 61.2 0.0 –
Special vocational school 20.0 0.0 20.0 87.5 71.4 0.0 –
Vocational secondary school 44.0 52.4 45.3 81.8 70.6 71.4 –
Technicians secondary school 43.1 59.5 46.1 85.2 66.8 80.0 –
Grammar school 42.2 43.5 42.4 81.0 67.5 70.0 –
College 49.3 54.2 50.2 78.0 69.9 81.8 –
University 49.4 40.5 47.8 83.7 68.6 … –
Total 42.2 48.0 43.1 83.6 65.0 74.6 –
1 Survival rate.
* 3 months after the end of each programme.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.20: The distribution of the yearly number of labour market training participants,  
according to the type of traning, per cent
Types of training 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Approved qualification 80.4 77.9 79.8 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5 69.0 65.8
Non-approved qualification 15.8 16.0 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9 19.9 22.8
Foreign language learning 3.8 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5 11.1 11.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.21: The distribution of those entering into the training programmes  
by age groups and educational level
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total number of entrants 45,092 25,760 27,727 26,459 25,353 42,710
By age groups
–20 10.4 9.0 9.7 8.7 7.0 8.1
20–24 24.1 22.3 23.1 23.0 24.7 26.9
25–44 54.7 54.9 52.3 52.0 51.3 48.3
45–49 6.5 7.9 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.0
50+ 4.3 5.9 7.1 8.4 9.2 9.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education
Less than primary school 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.6 2.1
Primary school 23.1 23.8 26.3 25.1 24.0 28.1
Vocational school 26.9 26.6 25.7 26.8 24.5 21.9
Vocational and technical 
secondary school 25.7 24.5 23.3 23.5 23.9 22.6
Grammar school 15.5 14.2 14.4 15.0 16.3 15.9
College, university 7.6 9.2 8.1 8.4 9.8 9.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
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Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross  
earnings
Net  
earnings
Gross earnings 
index
Net earnings 
index
Consumer 
price index
Real earnings 
index
HUF Previous year = 100 %
1989 10,571 8,165 117.9 116.9 117.2 99.7
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1991 17,934 12,948 130.0 125.5 135.0 93.0
1992 22,294 15,628 125.1 121.3 123.0 98.6
1993 27,173 18,397 121.9 117.7 122.5 96.1
1994 33,939 23,424 124.9 127.3 118.8 107.2
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,645 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,553 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,482 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,187 88,751 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,520 93,715 106.0 105.6 106.8 99.0
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,239 110,896 108.1 107.5 103.9 103.5
2007 185,004 114,112 108.0 103.0 108.0 95.4
2008 198,964 122,267 107.5 107.0 106.1 100.8
Source: KSH IMS.
Figure 6.1: Change of gross earnings and real earnings
Source: See Table 6.1.
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Table 6.2: Gross average earnings by industries*
Industries** 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
(01-05) 76.8 74.9 73.7 72.0 69.3 67.6 69.6 68.8 65.1 66.6 67.7 65.4 66.0 67.2
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 130.5 128.3 134.4 125.4 124.1 128.8 122.9 113.2 108.7 111.3 117.9 113.8 108.6 115.4
Manufacturing (15-37) 99.7 100.7 100.6 99.1 98.9 100.6 97.7 92.8 90.4 93.7 93.2 92.7 93.5 92.6
Electricity, gas, water supply 
(40-41) 130.6 133.5 132.2 133.3 135.4 136.4 131.0 126.9 127.0 132.1 142.9 132.4 135.4 133.5
Construction (45) 83.7 82.0 81.9 79.9 73.5 73.3 77.0 70.4 68.4 68.5 69.2 68.6 73.5 73.2
Trade, repairing (50-52) 93.3 97.1 93.8 92.5 86.7 88.7 87.5 87.0 84.2 83.9 81.7 84.8 85.4 86.2
Hotels and restaurants (55) 75.5 75.3 71.6 68.5 64.9 64.6 65.8 66.2 63.8 61.9 58.9 60.1 60.6 61.5
Transport, storage, communi-
cation (60-64) 106.5 110.0 110.5 112.3 114.3 112.7 110.5 106.6 103.9 108.4 109.0 107.4 104.0 104.5
Financial intermediation 
(65-67) 183.0 189.5 199.2 210.2 214.2 216.1 208.6 197.0 199.6 222.6 230.4 235.8 211.0 217.8
Real estate, renting, business 
activities (70-74) 107.2 110.5 106.8 119.7 115.8 115.3 117.6 109.2 105.8 106.0 103.8 100.4 103.6 108.8
Public administration and 
defence, compulsory social 
security (75)
117.9 114.3 114.1 111.7 120.3 118.0 127.2 137.1 131.8 126.7 130.2 130.2 137.0 134.4
Education (80) 89.6 83.3 86.4 88.3 94.4 92.7 94.3 105.1 118.4 110.2 109.1 111.6 104.4 102.3
Health and social work (85) 83.4 80.1 79.2 77.9 76.6 77.9 76.1 84.3 94.7 90.2 85.5 88.7 86.4 85.4
Other 102.5 102.2 95.2 94.3 92.2 91.1 88.5 91.1 94.2 94.6 95.0 91.2 97.9 94.2
* National average = 100.
** According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing at least 20 workers [1993–
94], 10 workers [1995–98] and 5 workers [1999–], respectively.
Source: KSH IMS.
Table 6.3: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Male 0.1690 0.1660 0.1680 0.1690 0.1520 0.1500 0.1270 0.1400 0.1370 0.1310 0.1380 0.1630 0.1540
Less than primary 
school –0.5130 –0.5930 –0.5610 –0.5490 –0.5540 –0.4520 –0.4080 –0.4040 –0.3860 –0.4850 –0.3850 –0.4400 –0.3730
Primary school –0.4070 –0.4160 –0.4140 –0.4100 –0.3770 –0.3440 –0.3220 –0.3450 –0.3490 –0.3480 –0.3500 –0.3800 –0.3710
Vocational school –0.2540 –0.2740 –0.2660 –0.2700 –0.2307 –0.2270 –0.2310 –0.2360 –0.2400 –0.2410 –0.2430 –0.2510 –0.2430
College, university 0.5180 0.5450 0.5450 0.5960 0.6000 0.5660 0.5700 0.6390 0.6130 0.6200 0.6170 0.6020 0.5890
Estimated labour 
market experience 0.0250 0.0243 0.0224 0.0236 0.0215 0.0189 0.0186 0.0196 0.0207 0.0204 0.0232 0.0230 0.0233
Square of esti-
mated labour 
market experience
–0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004
Civil servant 0.2260 0.2180 0.1970 0.1100 0.1770 0.1620 0.4820 0.2110 0.3400 0.3290 0.3240 0.2590 0.2680
Public servant –0.2030 –0.1750 –0.2290 –0.2230 –0.1900 –0.1720 0.0208 0.0966 0.1030 0.1140 0.1290 0.0769 0.0599
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the reference group in log points 
(approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at the 0.01 level. 
All equation specifications control for industrial classification. We do not include the parameter estimates of the 
industrial classification variables, since the classification changed several times between 1994 and 2008. The region 
parameters can be seen in Table 9.6.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), in the business sector, working 
in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: FSzH BT.
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Table 6.4: Percentage of low paid workers* by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
By gender
Males 16.9 16.1 15.2 15.6 18.1 18.1 18.8 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7 21.9 21.2
Females 21.3 25.6 24.8 26.5 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9 21.3 20.8
By age groups
–24 39.6 42.4 40.2 37.8 39.1 37.7 37.9 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3 40.1 34.6
25–54 16.9 18.7 18.0 19.4 20.2 20.6 21.3 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2 21.4 20.6
55+ 12.7 11.4 10.3 11.0 11.8 12.7 17.2 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.8 15.5
By level of education
8 grades of primary school or less … 40.4 37.6 40.1 40.6 42.9 43.9 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1 41.4 41.3
Vocational school … 25.9 24.7 23.7 27.0 26.9 28.6 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9 32.9 32.1
Secondary school … 12.0 12.9 13.1 14.0 14.2 15.4 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7 16.1 15.4
Higher education … 1.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.2 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.5 2.4
By industries**
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 31.9 38.4 32.1 30.1 36.7 36.7 38.1 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6 37.9 36.6
Manufacturing (15-37) 16.4 18.9 16.4 15.8 18.5 18.9 18.9 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1 20.8 23.5
Construction (45) 15.7 23.3 23.5 26.7 32.7 32.6 36.7 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2 43.1 37.5
Trade, repairing (50-52) 25.1 30.4 31.9 31.7 36.0 37.7 36.8 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4 40.9 35.9
Transport, storage, communication 
(60-64) 8.6 10.3 8.6 8.5 8.8 8.8 9.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1 13.2 14.6
Financial intermediation (65-67) 14.2 16.4 17.9 17.0 19.9 19.9 21.1 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.9 20.0
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security (75) 17.5 16.4 17.0 25.9 19.0 15.5 16.0 13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3 7.4 6.7
Education (80) 21.2 19.0 20.6 25.6 21.7 23.2 23.8 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1 9.0 7.2
Health and social work (85) 28.9 21.6 25.2 25.9 24.1 25.8 28.0 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6 12.6 11.1
Total 19.2 20.8 19.9 21.0 21.9 22.0 22.7 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3 21.6 21.0
* Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning.
** According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: FSzH BT.
Figure 6.2: The percentage of low paid workers by gender
Source: See Table 6.4.
0
10
20
30 EgyüttNőkFérfiak
200820062004200220001998199619941992
Males Females To ether
Per cent
wages
269
Figure 6.3: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
Source: FSzH BT.
Figure 6.4: Age-income profiles by education level in 1998 and 2008, women and men
Source: FSzH BT.
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Figure 6.5: The dispersion of the logarithm of gross real earnings
Source: FSzH BT.
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Table 7.1: School leavers by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1991 158,907 59,302 54,248 16,458
1992 151,287 66,261 59,646 16,201
1993 144,200 66,342 68,607 16,223
1994 136,857 62,902 68,604 18,041
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250 35,500a 72,200a 28,300a
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,441 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
2007 108,889 17,967 77,527 29,059
2008 106,426 19,289 68,453 28,957
a Estimated data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Ex-
cludes special schools.
Source: OM STAT.
Figure 7.1: Full time studens as a percentage of the different age groups
Source: OM STAT.
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Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 171,347 60,865 57,213 17,886
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
1993 125,679 76,977 87,657 35,005
1994 126,032 77,146 87,392 37,934
1995 123,997 65,352 82,665 42,433
1996 124,554 58,822 84,773 44,698
1997 127,214 53,083 84,395 45,669
1998 125,875 39,965 86,868 48,886
1999 121,424 33,570 89,184 51,586
2000 117,000 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,393 56,709
2002 112,345 33,497 94,256 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
2007 98,766 31,897 92,957 55,789
2008 97,345 32,774 90,667 52,755
a Estimated data.
Note: Excludes special schools.
Source: OM STAT.
Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
Source: OM STAT.
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980/81 1,162,203 162,709 203,238 64,057
1989/90 1,183,573 213,697 273,511 72,381
1990/91 1,130,656 222,204 291,872 76,601
1993/94 1,009,416 198,859 330,586 103,713
1994/95 985,291 185,751 337,317 116,370
1995/96 974,806 172,599 349,299 129,541
1996/97 965,998 158,407 361,395 142,113
1997/98 963,997 143,911 368,645 152,889
1998/99 964,248 128,203 376,626 163,100
1999/00 960,601 117,038 386,579 171,516
2001/02 905,932 123,954 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,341 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
2007/08 783,948 122,978 441,886 227,118
2008/09 765,822 123,640 439,957 224,894
Note: Excludes special schools. Beginning with the 2001/2002 schoolyear, students in 
grades 5–8 who attend a 6 or 8 year high school are included in the number of high 
school students. The reason for the missing data in 2000/01 is that the OM was unable 
to carry out the analysis based in the source data due to technical difficulties.
Source: OM STAT.
Table 7.4: The number of pupils/students not in full time by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980/81 15,627 – 130,332 37,109
1989/90 13,199 – 75,581 28,487
1990/91 11,536 – 68,162 25,786
1991/92 11,724 – 66,204 23,888
1992/93 10,944 – 70,303 25,078
1993/94 8,982 – 76,335 30,243
1994/95 6,558 – 81,204 38,290
1995/96 5,205 – 75,891 50,024
1996/97 4,099 – 74,653 56,919
1997/98 3,165 – 78,292 80,768
1998/99 3,016 – 84,862 95,215
1999/00 3,146 – 88,462 107,385
2000/01 2,940 – 91,700 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
2007/08 2,245 5,874 83,008 132,273
2008/09 2,083 4,983 74,008 115,957
Source: OM STAT.
statistical data
274
Table 7.5: Number of high school applicants, full time
Year
Applied Admitted
Admitted as a 
percentage of 
applied
Applied Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
2007 74,849 50,941 68.1 96.5 65.7
2008 63,976 49,792 77.2 93.5 72.2
Source: OM STAT.
labour demand indicators
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Table 8.1: Registered vacancies*
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing day***
Number of registered unem-
ployed** at closing date
Vacancies per 100  
registered unemployed***
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
2007 29,933 426,915 7.0
2008 25,386 442,333 5.7
* Monthly average stock figures.
** See the footnote under Table 5.7.
*** The number of vacancies reported to the local offices of the PES (earlier: to the local 
offices of the County Labour Centres).
Source: FSzH.
Figure 8.1: Number of registered vacancies
Source: See Table 8.1.
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Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff*, per cent
Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase
1993 I. 34.7 23.6 2000 I. 24.4 41.0
II. 28.5 22.3 II. 27.2 36.5
1994 I. 24.5 29.1 2001 I. 25.3 40.0
II. 21.0 29.7 II. 28.6 32.6
1995 I. 30.1 32.9 2002 I. 25.6 39.2
II. 30.9 27.5 II. 27.9 35.4
1996 I. 32.9 33.3 2003 I. 23.6 38.5
II. 29.4 30.4 II. 32.1 34.3
1997 I. 29.6 39.4 2004 30.0 39.8
II. 30.7 36.8 2005 25.3 35.0
1998 I. 23.4 42.7 2006 26.6 36.2
II. 28.9 37.1 2007 20.4 27.0
1999 I. 25.8 39.2 2008 26.9 23.2
II. 28.8 35.8
* In the period of the next half year after the interview date, in the sample of FSzH 
PROG.
Note: Since 2004 the survey is acconplished only once a year.
Source: FSzH PROG.
Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
Source: See Table 8.2.
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Employment rate*
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 62.3 57.7 62.0 57.2 52.2 52.5 57.9 58.0
1993 58.4 55.2 60.5 52.9 49.3 48.4 53.4 54.5
1994 57.2 54.4 59.9 52.4 47.7 47.5 53.0 53.5
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.8 59.8 63.2 52.5 49.6 49.6 56.2 56.5
2001a 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002a 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003a 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004a 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005a 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006a 62.7 61.4 62.8 53.6 50.4 51.1 54.3 57.3
2007a 62.7 61.8 63.4 51.2 50.8 50.5 55.2 57.3
2008a 62.7 60.3 62.1 51.0 49.5 49.9 54.5 56.7
* Age: 15–64.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates,  
gross monthly earnings and gross domestic product in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: KSH.
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Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rate*
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 7.4 11.7 7.3 9.6 14.0 12.5 10.2 9.9
1993 9.9 12.6 9.0 12.8 16.1 14.8 12.4 12.1
1994 8.8 10.7 7.7 12.0 15.2 13.8 10.5 10.8
1995 7.4 11.0 6.9 12.1 16.0 13.8 9.3 10.3
1996 8.2 10.4 7.1 9.4 15.5 13.2 8.4 10.0
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.2 7.8 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2001a 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002a 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003a 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004a 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005a 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006a 5.1 6.1 5.7 9.0 11.0 10.9 7.8 7.5
2007a 4.7 5.0 5.0 10.0 12.3 10.8 7.9 7.4
2008a 4.6 5.8 5.0 10.3 13.4 12.0 8.8 7.8
* Age: 15–64. Excluding conscript.
a See the note under Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: See Table 9.2.
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Table 9.3: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rate*, per cent
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1991 1.7 3.7 2.8 4.8 7.0 6.5 5.2 4.1
1992 5.7 10.4 7.2 10.8 15.7 15.0 12.2 10.3
1993 8.0 12.8 9.1 13.1 19.1 18.2 14.7 12.9
1994 6.6 11.5 8.5 11.9 16.6 16.9 12.9 11.3
1995 6.3 10.6 7.6 11.7 15.6 16.1 11.5 10.6
1996 6.4 10.7 8.0 12.6 16.7 16.8 11.3 11.0
1997 5.6 9.9 7.3 13.1 16.8 16.4 11.0 10.5
1998 4.7 8.6 6.1 11.8 16.0 15.0 10.1 9.5
1999 4.5 8.7 5.9 12.1 17.1 16.1 10.4 9.7
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
2007 3.5 6.9 6.3 13.6 17.6 16.6 11.7 9.7
2008 3.6 7.1 6.3 14.3 17.8 17.5 11.9 10.0
* See the footnote under Table 5.7.
* The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the previous 
year. (Based on KSH MEM).
Source: FSzH REG.
Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rate in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: See Table 9.3.
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Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment rate* by counties, per cent
County 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Budapest 0.1 6.6 5.9 5.7 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1
Baranya 1.1 13.2 11.7 11.8 12.2 13.3 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 12.9 13.6
Bács-Kiskun 1.1 16.0 13.1 11.0 10.9 10.7 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2 11.4 12.0
Békés 1.1 16.3 15.1 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5 15.0 14.8
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2.3 20.2 17.5 16.7 18.0 19.0 17.9 19.5 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0 19.9 20.1
Csongrád 1.0 11.7 10.8 9.9 9.3 9.2 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8 9.2 9.3
Fejér 1.0 12.5 11.3 10.6 10.4 9.4 8.4 8.3 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.5
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0.5 8.2 7.7 6.8 7.4 6.4 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1
Hajdú-Bihar 0.9 16.6 15.3 14.2 15.6 15.0 14.0 15.6 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9 15.6 16.5
Heves 1.6 15.2 13.9 12.5 13.6 12.1 11.7 12.3 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1 12.2 12.7
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1.6 17.1 15.8 14.6 14.8 14.8 13.5 13.7 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4 11.8 12.2
Komárom-Esztergom 1.0 14.4 12.6 11.3 12.0 11.4 9.8 10.1 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.5
Nógrád 2.4 21.3 17.2 16.3 17.0 16.3 15.6 16.2 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1 17.7 17.8
Pest 0.5 11.0 8.1 7.6 7.8 7.3 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.4
Somogy 1.4 11.6 10.9 11.2 12.5 12.7 11.3 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6 16.2 16.9
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2.6 20.6 19.3 19.3 19.7 18.9 17.2 18.7 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8 21.0 22.4
Tolna 1.6 14.7 13.4 12.2 13.4 13.5 12.3 12.9 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5 11.5 12.1
Vas 0.4 9.1 8.3 7.2 7.2 6.7 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1
Veszprém 0.9 11.9 10.9 10.0 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7 8.0 8.2
Zala 0.8 10.3 9.8 9.2 9.8 9.2 8.1 7.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0 9.3 9.4
Total 1.0 12.9 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0
* See the footnote under Table 5.7. The denominator is the economically active population on 1st January in the 
previous year.
Source: FSzH REG.
Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rates in the counties, 2008
Source: See Table 9.4.
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Table 9.5: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earnings*
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1989 11,719 10,880 10,108 10,484 10,472 9,675 9,841 10,822
1992 27,172 22,174 20,975 19,899 20,704 19,563 20,047 22,465
1993 32,450 26,207 24,627 25,733 24,011 24,025 23,898 26,992
1994 43,010 34,788 32,797 31,929 31,937 31,131 31,325 35,620
1995 46,992 38,492 36,394 35,383 35,995 34,704 33,633 40,190
1996 58,154 46,632 44,569 43,015 41,439 41,222 41,208 47,559
1997 70,967 56,753 52,934 51,279 51,797 50,021 50,245 58,022
1998 86,440 68,297 64,602 60,736 60,361 58,208 58,506 69,415
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
2007 229,897 173,937 164,378 156,678 159,921 153,241 153,050 186,229
2008 245,931 185,979 174,273 160,624 169,313 160,332 164,430 198,087
* Gross monthly earnings (HUF/person), May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing at least 20 
workers (1992–94), at least 10 workers (1995–99) and at least 5 workers (2000–), respectively.
Source: FSzH BT.
Table 9.6: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials*
Year
Central  
Hungary
Western 
 Transdanubia
Southern  
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain
1994 0.1190 –0.0385 –0.0733 –0.1130 –0.0806 –0.0623
1995 0.1140 0.0051 –0.0521 –0.0801 –0.0534 –0.0901
1996 0.0909 –0.0327 –0.0711 –0.1170 –0.1060 –0.0868
1997 0.0863 –0.0381 –0.0842 –0.1090 –0.1020 –0.0913
1998 0.0897 –0.0416 –0.1010 –0.1270 –0.1280 –0.1140
1999 0.1190 –0.0105 –0.0927 –0.1060 –0.1120 –0.1030
2000 0.1070 –0.0093 –0.1410 –0.1330 –0.1350 –0.1340
2001 0.1000 –0.0095 –0.1230 –0.1310 –0.1300 –0.1350
2002 0.1100 –0.0274 –0.0936 –0.0840 –0.0977 –0.0788
2003 0.0807 –0.0450 –0.1070 –0.1150 –0.1280 –0.1180
2004 0.0849 –0.0338 –0.1270 –0.1010 –0.1290 –0.1150
2005 0.0699 –0.0304 –0.1110 –0.0921 –0.1180 –0.1130
2006 0.0850 –0.0236 –0.1250 –0.0891 –0.1180 –0.1020
2007 0.0772 –0.0778 –0.1260 –0.1210 –0.1420 –0.1270
2008 0.0563 –0.0831 –0.1480 –0.1280 –0.1700 –0.1460
* See the note under Table 6.3.
Source: FSzH BT.
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month
1994 619 365 424 353 292 311 350 422
1995 792 494 559 442 394 386 449 544
1996 993 617 701 532 459 468 539 669
1997 1,254 801 871 641 554 569 640 830
1998 1,474 969 1,083 754 662 660 742 983
1999 1,710 1,051 1,275 859 731 707 819 1,113
2000 2,014 1,255 1,468 957 827 815 918 1,290
2001 2,311 1,372 1,539 1,074 947 965 1,031 1,458
2002 2,701 1,462 1,703 1,204 1,050 1,062 1,136 1,648
2003 2,940 1,719 2,001 1,321 1,186 1,213 1,254 1,841
2004 3,237 1,953 2,143 1,468 1,366 1,351 1,439 2,021
2005 3,564 2,056 2,169 1,517 1,439 1,390 1,483 2,185
2006 3,921 2,139 2,370 1,596 1,512 1,564 1,564 2,363
2007 4,162 2,357 2,487 1,730 1,627 1,596 1,692 2,534
Per cent
1994 145.6 86.4 100.7 84.0 69.6 73.9 83.3 100.0
1995 144.3 90.5 102.9 81.6 72.9 71.2 83.2 100.0
1996 146.9 91.9 105.0 80.0 69.1 70.4 81.2 100.0
1997 149.1 96.0 105.2 77.6 67.3 69.1 77.9 100.0
1998 147.8 98.1 110.5 77.2 68.0 67.7 76.3 100.0
1999 151.1 93.7 114.9 77.7 66.3 64.1 74.5 100.0
2000 152.2 97.3 113.9 74.8 64.6 63.4 71.8 100.0
2001 158.5 94.1 105.6 73.7 64.9 66.2 70.7 100.0
2002 163.9 88.7 103.4 73.0 63.7 64.4 68.9 100.0
2003 161.1 92.4 107.6 71.6 64.0 65.3 68.0 100.0
2004 157.9 95.3 104.5 71.6 66.6 65.9 70.2 100.0
2005 163.2 94.0 99.2 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.8 100.0
2006 163.1 94.1 99.3 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.9 100.0
2007 164.2 93.0 98.1 68.3 64.2 63.0 66.8 100.0
Source: KSH.
Table 9.8: Commuting*
Year
Working in the residence Commuter
in thousands per cent in thousands per cent
1980 3,848.5 76.0 1,217.2 24.0
1990 3,380.2 74.7 1,144.7 25.3
2001 2,588.2 70.1 1,102.1 29.9
2005 2,625.1 68.2 1,221.3 31.8
2008 2,645.2 70.9 1,085.1 29.1
* For methodological notes see Dr. Lakatos Miklós – Váradi Rita: A foglalkoztatottak 
napi ingázásának jelentősége a migrációs folyamatokban (The role of daily commuting 
in geographical mobility). Statisztikai Szemle. (87), 2009. 7–8., 763–794.
Source: 1980–2005 NSZ, microcensus, 2008 MEF ad-hoc modul.
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Table 10.1: Strikes
Year Number of strikes
Number of  
involved persons Hours lost (in thousands)
1991 3 24,148 76
1992 4 1,010 33
1993 5 2,574 42
1994 4 31,529 229
1995a 7 172,048 1,708
1996 8 4,491 19
1997 5 853 15
1998 7 1,447 3
1999 5 16,685 242
2000 5 26,978 1,192
2001 6 21,128 61
2002 4 4,573 9
2003 7 10,831 19
2004 8 6,276 116
2005 11 1,425 8
2006 16 24,670 52
2007 13 64,612 189
2008 8 8,633 n.a.
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH strike statistics.
Table 10.2: National agreements on wage increase recommendations*
Year
ÉT Recommendations Actual indexes
Minimum Maximum Budgetary sector Competitve sector
1992 113.0 128.0 120.1 126.6
1993 110.0–113.0 125.0 114.4 125.1
1994 113.0–115.0 121.0–123.0 127.0 123.4
1995 – – 110.7 119.7
1996 113.0 124.0 114.6 123.2
1997 114.0 122.0 123.2 121.8
1998 113.5 116.0 118.0 118.5
1999 112.0 115.0 119.2 114.8
2000 108.5 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 … … 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 4.5% real wage growth 117.5 108.9
2004 107.0 108.0 100.4 109.3
2005 106.0 112.8 106.9
2006 104.0 105.0 106.4 109.3
2007 105.5 108.0 106.4 109.1
2008 105.0 107.5 106.2 108.4
* Average increases of gross wages: recommendations accepted by the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council (ÉT). Previous year = 100.
Sources: Actual indexes: KSH. Other data: SzMM.
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Table 10.3: Minimum wage, guaranteed wage minimuma
Date
Monthly amount 
(HUF)
Average gross 
earnings = 100
Monthly amount 
of the guaranteed 
minimum wageb
Monthly amount 
of the guaranteed 
minimum wagec
Monthly amount 
of the guaranteed 
minimum waged
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8 – – –
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1 – – –
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9 – – –
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4 – – –
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0 – – –
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7 – – –
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8 – – –
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1 – – –
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1 – – –
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6 – – –
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8 – – –
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4 – – –
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2 – – –
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6 – – –
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5 – – –
2006. VII. 1. 62,500 36.5 65,700 68,800 –
2007. I. 1. 65,500 35.4 72,100 75,400 –
2008. I. 1. 69,000 34.7 82,800 86,300 –
2009. I. 1. 71,500 … – – 87,000
2009. VII. 1. 71,500 – – 87,500
a The guaranteed minimum wage pertains to employees who have completed at least a 
secondary education level and are employed in an occupation requiring skills.
b Guaranteed minimum wage of skilled workers less, than 2 years of practical experi-
ence.
c Guaranteed minimum wage of skilled workers with at least 2 years of practical experi-
ence, or who are above the age of 50.
d Beginning in 2009. january 1, the specification regarding the 2 years of practical experi-
ence and those above the age of 50 was dropped from the legislation.
Note: As of September 2002, minimum wage earners do not pay personal income tax. 
(As a result of this measure, the net minimum wage increased by 15.9 per cent.)
Source: KSH.
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Table 10.4: Single employer collective agreements in the business sector, 1998–2008
Industries* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of agreements
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 57 61 60 58 58 61 64 64 66 63 65
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 15 15 16 15 12 14 15 10 10 8 9
Manufacturing total (15-37) 485 517 545 532 511 504 507 384 376 381 381
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 117 121 125 120 117 117 121 89 85 86 86
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 59 69 66 63 58 55 51 37 36 38 38
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 37 41 41 40 36 36 37 30 27 30 30
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 51 50 53 53 53 55 58 48 46 48 51
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 25 29 32 32 29 30 32 28 30 28 28
Basic metal products (27-28) 51 57 64 62 63 61 62 52 54 44 43
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 126 132 145 143 138 133 129 87 86 96 97
Other manufacturing (36-37) 19 18 19 19 17 17 17 13 12 11 8
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 91 106 112 111 103 102 104 96 95 99 95
Industry total (10-41) 591 638 673 658 626 620 626 490 481 488 485
Construction (45) 45 51 55 54 53 49 50 41 48 49 50
Trade, repairing (50-52) 257 259 261 252 229 229 233 160 156 157 156
Hotels and restaurants (55) 25 28 27 23 22 23 21 20 19 20 21
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 81 84 85 85 87 90 96 62 63 66 60
Transport, storage (60-63) 71 74 75 75 77 79 84 54 55 58 53
Post, telecommunication (64) 10 10 10 10 10 11 12 8 8 8 7
Financial intermediation (65-67) 22 27 32 30 30 31 31 27 26 23 22
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 75 84 89 95 99 94 98 93 105 92 89
Education (80) 8 10 9 10 8 8 7 6 6 7 8
Health and social work (85) 5 7 8 8 8 9 10 13 15 15 20
Other community, social services (90-93) 52 54 59 60 57 58 59 49 48 52 51
Total 1218 1303 1358 1333 1277 1272 1295 1025 1033 1032 1027
Number of persons covered
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 27508 27924 26310 25410 24309 23378 21814 23166 24856 20419 21462
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 8247 7804 7154 3576 3174 3548 3780 2206 2206 1869 1869
Manufacturing total (15-37) 292166 287442 288676 277835 259928 251575 245432 212815 191515 187761 182944
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 68378 64442 64713 61284 56515 54020 55089 45517 37733 37985 36176
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 39547 43581 39878 37354 33579 30562 29473 22741 21928 23096 23096
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 11123 12493 12156 10282 9848 9732 9900 8985 9743 11204 10105
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 56381 51040 50624 48169 44258 42227 38487 38854 38735 40078 39507
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 13735 16151 14700 15518 13647 12953 13368 13787 13894 12308 11746
Basic metal products (27-28) 29197 27909 30054 28962 28128 25543 22234 24955 26050 18512 19888
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 67519 66414 71408 70556 69044 71663 71956 53956 39492 40807 39341
Other manufacturing (36-37) 6286 5412 5143 5710 4909 4875 4925 4020 3940 3771 3085
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 69149 71508 69387 64785 57291 56043 52642 46764 46241 46501 43247
Industry total (10-41) 369562 366754 365217 346196 320393 311166 301854 261785 239962 236131 228060
Construction (45) 13143 14965 14197 13222 11841 9118 8720 7639 9380 8219 10017
Trade, repairing (50-52) 62344 68687 60518 59804 53623 56234 56452 41864 46691 46176 42800
Hotels and restaurants (55) 12195 10115 8431 7317 7546 8907 9655 6518 6211 6551 6020
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 180472 177700 174668 173300 175417 170981 168623 105412 95147 150894 95739
Transport, storage (60-63) 117210 116636 114869 114211 116329 115129 115805 50913 40049 95800 40757
Post, telecommunication (64) 63262 61064 59799 59089 59088 55852 52818 54499 55098 55094 54982
Financial intermediation (65-67) 31872 39421 39149 31966 32204 31521 26506 21467 21739 21188 21105
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 16792 17853 18598 18382 20202 18804 23782 26125 27059 22450 20357
Education (80) 720 760 685 775 704 631 391 165 165 163 289
Health and social work (85) 327 517 1383 1443 1338 1745 2510 3643 4874 4486 6645
Other community, social services (90-93) 19610 18563 20951 20447 20057 17376 17201 15334 13484 15388 15470
Total 734545 743259 730107 698262 667634 649861 637508 513118 489568 532065 467964
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.5: Single institution collective agreements in the public sector by industry, 1998–2008
Industries* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of agreements
Hotels and restaurants (55) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
R&D (73) 20 20 21 21 22 23 23 21 21 21 21
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security (75) 133 135 130 125 113 105 100 85 88 84 87
Education total (80) 1525 1565 1566 1567 1523 1531 1519 1310 1058 1269 1263
Primary, secondary education (80.1-
80.2) 1472 1513 1512 1523 1484 1492 1480 1285 1030 1240 1233
Higher education (80.3) 42 41 43 32 29 28 28 14 15 16 15
Health and social work total (85) 241 255 259 261 256 259 264 233 190 237 238
Human health activities (85.1) 118 125 127 125 123 126 127 108 94 103 101
Social work activities (85.3) 121 128 131 135 132 132 136 124 96 133 136
Other community, social services 
total (90-93) 66 73 73 72 77 79 86 77 60 76 76
Entertainment (92.1-92.4) 25 29 28 28 30 30 35 27 33 33 32
Libraries, archives (92.5) 33 36 37 37 40 42 41 28 37 38 39
Sports and other (92.6-92.7) 8 8 7 7 6 6 8 2 5 4 4
Other activities total 29 35 29 30
Total 2015 2084 2079 2077 2019 2026 2020 1750 1435 1711 1710
Number of persons covered
Hotels and restaurants (55) 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 148 148 53 53
R&D (73) 2545 2446 2611 2597 2633 2720 2737 2203 2429 2429 2429
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security (75) 26418 26896 26717 24096 21966 21119 20834 22024 18447 18950 19676
Education total (80) 117936 119895 120807 121957 116211 117881 117042 101483 99208 110765 109246
Primary, secondary education (80.1-
80.2) 77214 79337 79262 80743 79897 81103 81074 73611 66338 82454 82528
Higher education (80.3) 40349 40179 41166 40736 35874 36295 35481 27366 32032 27499 25837
Health and social work total (85) 102108 110556 110761 108197 99947 101214 101579 93504 77642 85335 84482
Human health activities (85.1) 89768 97124 96950 94158 86031 86810 86816 79433 65119 68612 67475
Social work activities (85.3) 12202 13294 13714 13942 13816 14302 14661 13971 12523 16651 16936
Other community, social services 
total (90-93) 6494 6395 7007 7137 7095 6951 6784 6785 4734 5451 5398
Entertainment (92.1-92.4) 2580 3028 3029 3035 2888 2920 3157 2127 3359 2374 2270
Libraries, archives (92.5) 3414 2867 3627 3665 3905 3735 3231 2469 3128 2965 3016
Sports and other (92.6-92.7) 500 500 347 437 257 251 292 31 194 56 56
Other activities total 1283 8077 4084 4091
Total 256848 274329 272051 268139 251849 251352 250492 228080 203497 224246 222547
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.6: Collective agreements concluded by employers’ organisations, in effect in October 2009
Employers’ organisation Trade union(s) Date of first agreement
Date of last 
amendment
Number 
of com-
panies 
covered*
Number of 
employees 
covered*
Date of first 
extension
1 KISZÖV Industrial Association of 
county Hajdú-Bihar
Regional Trade Union Committee of 
Industrial Cooperatives of county 
Hajdú-Bihar
1997/09/25 2004/05/01 16 1,525 –
2 Board of Directors of the Sugar In-
dustry Association
ÉDOSZ Trade Union of Sugar Industry 
Workers
1998/01/01 2002/01/01 6 1,843 –
3 Association of Electricity Companies Alliance of Trade Unions of Mining and 
Energy Industrial Workers; Alliance of 
Trade Unions of Electricity Industry 
Workers
1995/11/07 2009/02/26 11 27,262 1995/12/20
4 Association of the Hungarian Steel 
Industry
Alliance of Metallurgical Trade Unions 1996/01/01 2001/01/01 21 1,042 –
5 Association of Hungarian Furniture 
and Woodworking Industries
EFEDOSZSZ Trade Union of Timber and 
Furniture Industry Workers
1998/02/01 1999/11/23 27 4,028 –
6 National Association of Agricultural 
Cooperatives and Producers
Agricultural, Forestry and Water Man-
agement Workers’ Trade Union Asso-
ciation
2003/08/12 2007/12/19 882 48,250 –
7 National Alliance of Water Manage-
ment Associations
Agricultural, Forestry and Water Man-
agement Workers’ Trade Union Asso-
ciation
1992/08/11 2006/12/13 16 725 –
8 Federation of Hungarian Food Indus-
tries; National Association of Entre-
preneurs and Employers; Hungarian 
Association of Craftmen’s Corpora-
tions; Hungarian Baker Association
Trade Union of Baking Industrial  
Workers
1997/12/22 2006/09/18 32 19,420 1995/12/20
9 Hungarian Cement Association ÉFÉDOSZSZ Cement Trade Union 
Section
1996/02/29 1999/03/15 5 2,269 –
10 Hungarian Road Transport Associa-
tion
National Trade Union of International 
Drivers
2002/12/03 2007/03/27 45 1,616 –
11 Hungarian Water Utility Association Trade Union of Water Utility Workers 1997/02/27 2002/06/25 16 23,563 –
12 Hungarian Chemical Association Association of Trade Unions of Chemi-
cal Workers
1993/08/12 2001/01/01 27 9,081
13 Association of Public Transport Enter-
prises
Association of Public Transport Work-
ers’ Councils
1992/06/01 2005/10/25 46 25,219 –
14 Hungarian Light Industrial Associa-
tion
Trade Union of Leather Industrial 
Workers
1992/07/01 2001/05/30 8 2,693 –
15 National Association of Employers in 
Hotels and Restaurants
Trade Union of Employees in Hotels 
and Restaurant
1997/05/21 2001/01/01 34 15,024 2001/04/18
16 National Association of Entrepre-
neurs and Employers; Hungarian 
Association of Craftmen’s Corpora-
tions; National Federation of Hungar-
ian Contractors
National Association of trade Unions 
in Construction and Related Indus-
tries; Builders, Wood and Material 
Workers’ Unions
2005/11/16 2007/07/18 541 17,018 2006/03/19
17 Employers’ Association of Hungarian 
Security Companies
Association of Trade Unions in Security 2007/12/12 – 64 2,463 –
18 Association of Agricultural Compa-
nies, Cooperatives, and Entrepeneurs 
in Csongrád County
Association of Agricultural, Forestry, 
and Fishery Employee Trade Unions
2005/04/01 – 2 n.a. –
* Data submitted at first registration.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.7: Multi employer collective agreements in the business sector by industry, 1998–2008
Industries* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of agreements
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-
05) 1 1 3 2 3 2 2 6 6 8 8
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 1 1 1 1
Manufacturing (15-37) 28 34 33 34 32 32 37 29 31 31 33
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-
41) 3 4 3 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 8
Construction (45) 1 3 4 3 3 7 7 8 9 9 9
Trade, repairing (50-52) 3 3 9 9 8 8 7 8 7 6 5
Hotels and restaurants (55) 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4
Transport, storage, communication 
(60-64) 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
Financial intermediation (65-67) 1 1 1
Real estate, renting, business 
activities (70-74) 3 3 3 4 6 1 2 2 3
Education (80) 3 3 2 2
Health and social work (85) 1 2 1
Other community, social services 
(90-93) 6 5 4 6 6 1 1
Total 40 52 70 68 66 71 79 71 75 74 78
Number of persons covered
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-
05) 461 461 1221 952 1210 567 556 1525 255 1844 1499
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 284 284 284 284
Manufacturing (15-37) 224738 224276 93818 92361 86770 85211 82712 59277 51429 45348 48078
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-
41) 62730 63112 20145 20145 22166 26647 27320 3769 9658 9211 9092
Construction (45) 625 1935 3784 3522 3532 8743 7995 6553 5209 11051 7032
Trade, repairing (50-52) 720 714 2713 2673 2027 1043 641 4320 3199 2451 2394
Hotels and restaurants (55) 330 20016 20338 19584 19252 19057 19057 8781 6016 3248 3539
Transport, storage, communication 
(60-64) 27408 27556 28342 28342 28537 28462 28462 3326 3319 2850 2775
Financial intermediation (65-67) 2425 2400 2400
Real estate, renting, business 
activities (70-74) 14113 13415 12943 12871 16729 89 3362 4189 4888
Education (80) 185 214 308 308
Health and social work (85) 585 644 585
Other community, social services 
(90-93) 61976 32165 30008 79247 79695 69 77
Total 317012 338354 246734 213443 206729 261848 263752 92196 86079 83117 80506
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.8: Multi-institution collective agreements in the public sector by industry, 1998–2008
Industries* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of agreements
R&D (73) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Public administration and defence, comp. soc. sec. (75) 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
Education total (80) 3 6 6 7 6 6 6
Primary, secondary education (80.1-80.2) 6 6 7 6 6 6 3 3 2 1
Health and social work total (85) 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Social work activities (85.3) 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Other community, social services total (90-93) 1 1 1 1
Entertainment (92.1-92.4) 1 1 1 1
Other activities total 1
Total 7 11 12 10 9 9 10 5 4 2 1
Number of persons covered
R&D (73) 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336
Public administration and defence, comp. soc. sec. (75) 355 408 408 355 355 355 355
Education total (80) 165 288 288 325 289 292 292
Primary, secondary education (80.1-80.2) 288 288 325 289 292 292 308 308 238 n.a.
Health and social work total (85) 145 145 65 65 59 59 43
Social work activities (85.3) 80 145 145 65 65 59 59 43
Other community, social services total (90-93) 180 30 52 52
Entertainment (92.1-92.4) 180 30 52 52
Other activities total 562
Total 2498 2177 2357 2081 2045 2042 2072 403 360 238 n.a.
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.9: Shares of employees covered by collective agreements by type and by industry,  
after extension, 2001, per cent
Industries*
Single  
employer Multiemployer
Concluded by 
an employers’ 
organisation
Agreements 
total After extension
Total (with 
extension)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 20.7 0.9 0.0 21.0 0.0 21.0
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 54.2 3.8 0.0 58.1 0.0 58.1
Manufacturing total (15-37) 34.2 5.1 8.6 39.6 0.5 40.1
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 44.6 7.9 17.7 60.9 3.0 64.0
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 28.1 8.3 4.0 32.5 0.0 32.5
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 17.9 4.1 3.5 21.7 0.0 21.7
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 59.7 4.7 25.5 61.0 0.0 61.0
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 47.5 0.6 8.7 55.8 0.0 55.8
Basic metal products (27-28) 30.9 7.2 9.2 32.8 0.0 32.8
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 28.8 2.8 1.0 31.3 0.0 31.3
Other manufacturing (36-37) 20.1 0.6 16.4 27.8 0.0 27.8
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 80.1 1.5 41.5 86.4 3.6 90.0
Construction (45) 11.2 2.4 0.3 13.2 0.0 13.2
Trade, repairing (50-52) 19.2 2.0 0.1 21.2 0.0 21.2
Hotels and restaurants (55) 9.8 11.6 15.5 26.0 65.1 91.2
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 76.7 1.6 12.6 78.4 0.0 78.4
Transport, storage (60-63) 71.6 2.3 17.7 74.0 0.0 74.0
Post, telecommunication (64) 89.3 0.0 0.0 89.3 0.0 89.3
Financial intermediation (65-67) 60.9 0.0 0.0 60.9 0.0 60.9
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 16.5 6.6 5.5 16.7 0.0 16.7
Education (80) 49.4 0.8 0.0 49.7 0.0 49.7
Health and social work (85) 52.6 0.0 0.0 52.7 0.0 52.7
Other community, social services (90-93) 24.5 0.0 0.0 24.5 0.0 24.5
Total 37.2 3.1 5.9 40.2 2.3 42.5
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.10: Shares of employees covered by collective agreements by type and by industry,  
after extension, 2003, per cent
Industries*
Single 
 employer Multiemployer
Concluded by 
an employers’ 
organisation
Agreements 
total After extension
Total (with 
extension)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 21.7 1.1 46.0 68.7 0.0 68.7
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 49.0 3.7 0.2 52.9 0.0 52.9
Manufacturing total (15-37) 33.2 5.2 7.9 38.5 0.8 39.4
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 40.9 7.9 16.8 56.7 4.7 61.4
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 31.5 7.9 3.0 34.3 0.0 34.3
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 14.6 3.6 0.3 18.0 0.0 18.0
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 53.2 7.2 24.7 56.5 0.0 56.5
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 43.6 1.4 9.0 50.5 0.0 50.5
Basic metal products (27-28) 29.4 7.4 8.6 30.6 0.0 30.6
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 30.0 2.8 0.7 33.0 0.0 33.0
Other manufacturing (36-37) 18.4 0.6 16.5 26.2 0.0 26.2
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 88.2 4.2 75.8 94.5 5.5 100.0
Construction (45) 7.4 5.8 0.2 12.7 0.0 12.7
Trade, repairing (50-52) 17.9 0.5 0.1 18.4 0.0 18.4
Hotels and restaurants (55) 6.3 0.1 15.9 30.2 55.7 85.9
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 74.6 1.6 13.1 77.0 0.0 77.0
Transport, storage (60-63) 70.3 2.2 18.1 73.7 0.0 73.7
Post, telecommunication (64) 85.8 0.0 0.0 85.8 0.0 85.8
Financial intermediation (65-67) 58.7 0.0 0.0 58.7 0.0 58.7
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 12.5 2.3 0.5 13.2 0.0 13.2
Education (80) 48.1 0.7 0.0 48.3 0.0 48.3
Health and social work (85) 53.6 0.0 0.0 53.6 0.0 53.6
Other community, social services (90-93) 25.7 0.0 1.8 25.7 0.0 25.7
Total 36.0 2.6 8.3 41.7 1.9 43.5
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.11: Shares of employees covered by collective agreements by type and by industry,  
after extension, 2005, per cent
Industries*
Single  
employer Multiemployer
Concluded by 
an employers’ 
organisation
Agreements 
total After extension
Total (with 
extension)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 23.5 1.5 2.9 24.4 0.0 24.4
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 46.0 9.0 0.0 50.6 0.0 50.6
Manufacturing total (15-37) 33.3 10.7 5.5 36.2 3.0 39.2
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 43.2 9.3 7.1 46.7 18.4 65.1
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 34.0 20.7 0.1 44.0 0.0 44.0
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 15.6 5.1 0.0 17.9 0.0 17.9
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 52.5 26.9 10.7 57.0 0.0 57.0
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 62.0 1.9 7.9 62.4 0.0 62.4
Basic metal products (27-28) 46.3 19.3 22.0 40.2 0.0 40.2
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 21.9 4.1 0.4 25.5 0.0 25.5
Other manufacturing (36-37) 16.6 0.4 11.1 18.0 0.0 18.0
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 84.0 6.7 19.5 91.0 0.0 91.0
Construction (45) 6.0 4.9 0.5 10.8 0.0 10.8
Trade, repairing (50-52) 12.5 1.4 0.1 13.2 0.0 13.2
Hotels and restaurants (55) 8.0 10.6 13.2 20.6 67.3 87.9
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 65.8 1.5 12.9 50.9 0.0 50.9
Transport, storage (60-63) 55.9 2.0 17.5 35.7 0.0 35.7
Post, telecommunication (64) 93.4 0.0 0.0 93.4 0.0 93.4
Financial intermediation (65-67) 38.3 0.0 0.0 38.3 0.0 38.3
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 14.8 1.6 2.1 15.5 0.0 15.5
Education (80) 39.8 0.0 0.0 39.9 0.0 39.9
Health and social work (85) 44.0 0.2 0.0 44.3 0.0 44.3
Other community, social services (90-93) 26.7 25.0 1.7 39.4 0.0 39.4
Total 28.9 4.6 3.5 29.8 2.7 32.5
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.12: Shares of employees covered by collective agreements by type and by industry,  
after extension, 2007, per cent
Industries*
Single  
employer Multiemployer
Concluded by 
an employers’ 
organisation
Agreements 
total After extension
Total (with 
extension)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 22.6 2.0 3.1 23.5 0.0 23.5
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 40.8 4.5 0.0 43.5 0.0 43.5
Manufacturing total (15-37) 28.9 8.9 5.0 32.4 2.8 35.2
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 39.2 9.1 7.5 43.3 19.3 62.6
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 40.3 23.9 4.1 56.4 0.0 56.4
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 19.6 5.2 0.1 22.1 0.0 22.1
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 53.5 29.1 10.6 57.9 0.0 57.9
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 53.0 1.4 7.5 52.3 0.0 52.3
Basic metal products (27-28) 24.8 7.4 14.2 29.5 0.0 29.5
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 16.7 2.3 0.5 17.7 0.0 17.7
Other manufacturing (36-37) 16.9 0.0 8.3 17.0 0.0 17.0
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 95.2 18.8 21.5 95.0 0.0 95.0
Construction (45) 6.2 8.4 12.7 18.0 80.8 98.8
Trade, repairing (50-52) 13.5 0.8 1.0 13.7 0.0 13.7
Hotels and restaurants (55) 7.6 3.7 9.9 13.4 70.6 84.0
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 70.2 1.3 12.6 71.4 0.0 71.4
Transport, storage (60-63) 60.3 1.7 17.0 62.0 0.0 62.0
Post, telecommunication (64) 98.7 0.0 0.0 98.7 0.0 98.7
Financial intermediation (65-67) 36.7 3.6 0.0 35.7 0.0 35.7
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 11.5 1.7 1.8 13.2 0.0 13.2
Education (80) 40.2 0.0 0.0 40.3 0.0 40.3
Health and social work (85) 41.8 0.0 0.0 41.8 0.0 41.8
Other community, social services (90-93) 23.9 14.6 2.7 39.4 0.0 39.4
Total 27.9 4.0 4.0 30.5 6.5 37.0
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.13: The number of company wage agreements and the number of employees covered, 1998–2008
Industries* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of agreements
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 36 37 23 18 25 25 24 19 21 14 12
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 10 11 9 8 7 9 8 3 2
Manufacturing total (15-37) 327 358 219 203 224 210 182 108 92 68 60
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 83 89 44 41 55 44 47 33 21 20 14
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 39 44 25 25 25 23 13 7 10 4 4
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 21 25 13 13 14 17 15 8 5 3 3
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 38 37 26 23 26 35 30 16 12 13 12
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 17 18 16 19 13 12 14 7 7 6 4
Basic metal products (27-28) 39 44 32 34 33 26 25 12 14 6 6
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 76 87 58 45 51 46 32 19 19 16 15
Other manufacturing (36-37) 14 14 5 3 7 7 6 6 4 2
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 68 77 74 48 60 63 59 36 41 28 29
Construction (45) 31 33 24 23 24 18 16 7 13 7 7
Trade, repairing (50-52) 141 143 84 73 60 80 79 47 44 32 31
Hotels and restaurants (55) 12 15 9 7 12 11 9 4 5 7 5
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 54 58 49 33 48 51 56 33 31 28 18
Transport, storage (60-63) 48 51 46 28 47 47 50 28 29 25 17
Post, telecommunication (64) 6 7 3 5 1 4 6 5 2 3 1
Financial intermediation (65-67) 12 13 16 7 11 11 10 6 7 4 6
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 47 49 40 34 38 37 43 17 31 13 16
Education (80) 4 5 2 1 2 3 1 1
Health and social work (85) 3 3 2 1 4 3 5 4 4 2
Other community, social services (90-93) 23 25 21 15 16 24 23 14 11 13 14
Total 768 827 572 471 531 545 515 298 302 214 202
Number of persons covered
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 19131 18499 9157 5935 9193 6784 7164 5044 5496 2939 2481
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 4471 5358 2319 1936 1337 1577 1676 381 674
Manufacturing total (15-37) 233354 225490 112972 116802 133108 112702 94500 71408 52382 38703 36055
Food, beverage, tobacco (15-16) 50102 48748 21376 23243 28977 20503 20614 17003 10606 9886 7990
Textile, wearing apparel, leather (17-19) 24363 28599 16363 12397 16131 13040 8736 6558 7938 822 822
Wood, paper, printing (20-22) 5913 6748 4054 3594 4786 4323 4670 3191 2196 591 852
Coke, oil, chemical rubber (23-25) 53582 47666 26550 19582 23932 33071 27427 10572 10998 13687 8344
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 10842 11860 7762 10024 7371 7056 5929 3542 2947 3131 952
Basic metal products (27-28) 24905 24173 14301 16141 15547 12309 8536 13731 7190 5963 6994
Machinery, equipment (29-35) 58567 53419 20248 31111 35055 19893 17309 15090 8413 4623 8278
Other manufacturing (36-37) 5080 4277 2318 710 1309 2507 1279 1721 2094 1823
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 62831 65465 47474 27743 33982 35150 32580 23239 21949 15683 10221
Construction (45) 11273 11146 5863 5238 4935 3110 2010 2193 3047 2501 2659
Trade, repairing (50-52) 41688 43867 17889 26822 21514 24189 21335 14249 15446 9544 6580
Hotels and restaurants (55) 7096 8361 2559 1662 2223 4255 2794 628 1811 1342 933
Transport, storage, communication (60-64) 169672 168864 102568 49012 47031 106236 144921 38787 31698 83539 16181
Transport, storage (60-63) 107665 108633 46693 35116 46039 96547 94294 36417 30669 82196 15257
Post, telecommunication (64) 62007 60231 55875 13896 992 9689 50627 2370 1029 1343 924
Financial intermediation (65-67) 17027 22799 16964 8085 8127 5464 15121 3620 4470 3349 11486
Real estate, renting, business activities (70-74) 8590 9103 7733 7660 8967 7229 13695 4089 6747 5658 3348
Education (80) 438 456 50 21 149 304 23 126
Health and social work (85) 243 243 866 283 1051 1105 1667 1676 1475 1673
Other community, social services (90-93) 6937 7825 7642 7834 8136 8480 9737 4325 5827 8001 8463
Total 582751 587476 334056 259033 279753 316585 347223 169639 151022 171259 100206
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.14: The number of multi-employer wage agreements, and the number of  
covered companies and employees, 1998–2008
Industries* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of agreements
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 5 5
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 1
Manufacturing (15-37) 23 27 7 9 4 5 6 13 16 14 17
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 3 3 2 2 2 4 5 6 6
Construction (45) 3 1 1 4 2 8 7 7 7
Trade, repairing (50-52) 1 1 4 3 3 3 2 7 7 5 6
Hotels and restaurants (55) 1 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2
Transport, storage, communication  
(60-64) 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
Real estate, renting, business activities 
(70-74) 2 3 3 1 3 1 1 1
Health and social work (85) 1 1 1
Other community, social services (90-93) 3 1 1 1 2 1
Total 31 41 23 19 18 22 19 40 44 40 45
Number of companies
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 5 5 2 2 4 3 8 11 13 13
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 2
Manufacturing (15-37) 2899 3031 46 96 64 59 12 23 45 45 43
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 110 110 10 26 9 13 21 23 22
Construction (45) 7 2 2 31 10 62 51 51 50
Trade, repairing (50-52) 2 3 10 7 7 8 4 18 18 7 9
Hotels and restaurants (55) 3 46 42 10 10 10 7 6 6 6
Transport, storage, communication  
(60-64) 29 27 28 28 51 5 5 5
Real estate, renting, business activities 
(70-74) 33 36 33 9 43 2 2 2
Health and social work (85) 3 3 3
Other community, social services (90-93) 48 32 16 45 61 6
Total 3048 3231 211 181 172 243 145 145 162 147 150
Number of persons covered
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (01-05) 461 461 269 258 222 211 1225 1421 1544 1544
Mining and quarrying (10-14) 284
Manufacturing (15-37) 214017 215709 12128 49253 28659 27143 3992 20779 28975 19825 26308
Electricity, gas, water supply (40-41) 62730 62730 2403 25513 2623 2982 3434 4868 4780
Construction (45) 1935 657 615 5211 2058 3813 2777 2770 2686
Trade, repairing (50-52) 136 130 1000 612 265 202 71 1758 1758 1462 1462
Hotels and restaurants (55) 330 20016 15676 4560 3958 4033 3817 3817 3248 3248
Transport, storage, communication  
(60-64) 27361 27509 25705 25324 25299 32 32 n.a.
Real estate, renting, business activities 
(70-74) 11777 13415 12943 243 12494 18 18 18
Health and social work (85) 585 585 585
Other community, social services (90-93) 58115 1042 1704 989 3141 48
Total 305035 328774 125327 68882 76129 88855 25175 35039 42817 33735 40046
* According to TEÁOR’03 classification.
Source: SzMM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.15: Unionization by industry and gender (2001–2009, %)
Industries*
2001 2004 2009
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
A - Agriculture, forestry, fishing 5.4 8.0 6.0 9.4 12.6 10.1 4.8 1.3 3.9
B - Mining and quarrying 30.3 28.2 30.1 34.6 51.4 37.6 24.9 12.5 23.9
C - Manufacturing 16.4 14.9 15.8 14.6 14.6 14.6 10.1 9.9 10.0
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 28.0 36.4 30.0 31.9 30.6 31.5 30.1 28.3 29.7
E - Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation  
activities
23.1 31.1 24.8 24.0 28.1 25.0 18.1 29.7 20.7
F - Construction 3.8 4.7 3.8 3.5 9.7 4.1 2.4 2.6 2.4
G - Trade, repairing 5.9 8.1 7.1 4.3 6.2 5.3 2.0 3.4 2.8
H - Transportation and storage 39.3 41.6 40.0 32.9 37.6 34.2 27.6 27.3 27.5
I - Accommodation and food service 
activities 2.6 6.1 4.4 3.2 4.6 4.1 0.6 2.3 1.6
J - Information and communication 19.4 21.5 20.2 14.8 19.3 16.4 3.6 1.7 2.9
K - Financial and insurance activities 12.1 17.9 16.2 10.2 13.2 12.3 6.0 14.0 11.4
L - Real estate activities 6.9 7.1 7.0 4.5 6.5 5.5 5.6 4.9 5.2
M - Professional, scientific and techni-
cal activities 9.1 8.3 8.6 6.3 7.0 6.7 3.7 2.7 3.2
N - Administrative and support service 
activities 9.8 14.4 11.8 7.5 11.8 9.3 3.7 2.1 3.0
O - Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security 25.4 33.4 29.3 26.7 25.3 26.0 25.4 19.7 22.4
P - Education 37.4 40.0 39.4 26.9 29.9 29.3 21.8 24.5 23.9
Q - Human health and social work 
activities 33.1 34.0 33.8 26.9 26.1 26.3 22.2 19.5 20.0
R - Arts, entertainment and recreatio 12.2 13.6 12.8 12.1 17.0 14.2 10.1 18.7 14.5
S+T+U Other 10.6 12.8 12.0 9.9 14.6 12.9 4.2 7.6 6.4
Total 17.3 22.4 19.7 15.3 18.7 16.9 11.1 12.9 12.0
* According to TEÁOR’08 classification.
Source: KSH MEF ad hoc modul.
Table 10.16: Unionization by age group and gender (2001–2009, %)
Age groups
2001 2004 2009
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
15–19 3.2 2.0 2.7 2.0 0.0 1.3 11.8 0.0 7.4
20–24 6.6 9.7 7.9 5.2 10.0 7.3 4.0 3.9 4.0
25–29 10.4 15.9 12.7 9.2 9.5 9.3 6.7 5.5 6.2
30–39 18.4 22.2 20.1 15.2 17.4 16.2 9.4 11.3 10.3
40–54 22.2 27.3 24.9 19.7 22.9 21.4 15.3 16.6 16.0
55–59 26.2 28.8 27.1 22.0 24.7 23.3 13.8 16.9 15.3
60–74 25.0 19.4 22.8 19.3 23.9 21.1 11.0 12.2 11.6
Total 17.3 22.4 19.7 15.3 18.7 16.9 11.1 12.9 12.0
Source: KSH MEF ad hoc modul.
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Table 10.17: Unionization by major occupation groups and gender (2001–2009, %)
Major occupation groups
2001 2004 2009
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
Managers – legislators, senior government officials, 
chief executives, financial managers 24.8 29.2 26.5 17.8 23.7 20.1 11.1 17.0 13.6
Professionals – occupations requiring independent 
application of university or college skills 28.1 41.1 35.9 20.3 28.8 25.4 13.3 23.8 19.5
Technicians and associate professionals – other  
occupations requiring higher education 20.8 29.5 26.6 16.7 25.0 22.2 13.8 15.9 15.2
Clerical support workers 22.2 22.3 22.3 11.8 17.7 17.3 7.1 10.8 10.5
Service and sales workers 15.7 10.2 12.6 17.0 9.4 12.7 12.8 5.5 8.7
Skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers 4.1 4.0 4.1 6.5 9.1 7.3 5.4 1.4 4.2
Craft and related trade workers 14.8 12.8 14.4 12.5 13.1 12.6 8.6 9.9 8.8
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 17.0 12.5 15.6 16.8 13.1 15.6 12.9 8.5 11.6
Elementary occupations – occupations that do not 
require skills 8.2 15.0 11.9 6.0 10.6 8.6 2.9 5.9 4.7
Armed forces occupations 32.6 35.3 32.8 39.5 53.6 41.7 34.3 27.3 33.2
Total 17.3 22.4 19.7 15.3 18.7 16.9 11.1 12.9 12.0
Source: KSH MEF ad hoc modul.
Table 10.18: Ratio of employees who believe there is a union functioning in their workplace  
by industry and gender (2001–2009, %)
Industries*
2001 2004 2009
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
A - Agriculture, forestry, fishing 12.4 14.5 12.9 13.4 17.9 14.4 10.3 7.5 9.6
B - Mining and quarrying 57.1 76.8 59.4 52.8 55.8 53.4 41.4 30.2 40.5
C - Manufacturing 35.1 31.9 33.7 30.9 29.2 30.2 26.6 26.4 26.5
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 59.1 62.6 59.9 59.8 61.8 60.4 64.1 54.6 62.0
E - Water supply, sewerage, waste management 
and remediation activities 48.9 53.5 49.8 44.8 54.5 47.1 41.3 54.7 44.3
F - Construction 8.7 13.8 9.1 6.4 16.3 7.3 4.5 8.7 4.8
G - Trade, repairing 11.8 16.4 14.3 8.2 10.9 9.6 7.4 8.3 7.9
H - Transportation and storage 60.2 70.0 63.0 53.7 62.4 56.0 50.0 63.9 54.0
I - Accommodation and food service activities 6.2 11.1 8.7 6.2 8.2 7.4 4.4 6.5 5.7
J - Information and communication 33.1 40.3 35.8 27.2 34.0 29.6 13.2 8.4 11.4
K - Financial and insurance activities 26.6 35.7 33.1 26.8 27.2 27.1 16.4 27.0 23.5
L - Real estate activities 12.9 17.5 15.2 11.7 13.9 12.8 6.2 13.6 10.3
M - Professional, scientific and technical  
activities 17.2 18.8 18.1 15.0 15.4 15.2 11.6 6.8 8.9
N - Administrative and support service activities 18.0 28.1 22.5 15.8 22.2 18.5 10.0 7.7 9.0
O - Public administration and defence, compul-
sory social security 51.6 58.2 54.9 51.0 52.6 51.8 54.0 48.8 51.3
P - Education 70.7 68.0 68.6 62.0 60.1 60.5 62.6 56.5 57.8
Q - Human health and social work activities 66.4 65.2 65.5 55.6 57.1 56.8 56.6 51.6 52.6
R - Arts, entertainment and recreatio 26.2 27.5 26.8 21.6 28.1 24.3 24.0 39.2 31.8
S+T+U Other 22.5 26.6 25.1 18.2 24.6 22.4 7.8 11.8 10.4
Total 33.5 41.6 37.3 29.4 37.0 33.0 25.7 31.5 28.5
* According to TEÁOR’08 classification.
Source: KSH MEF ad hoc modul.
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Table 10.19: Coverage of collective agreements by industry and gender  
based on the Labour Force Survey (2004–2009, %)*
Industries**
2004 2009
Males Females Total Males Females Total
A - Agriculture, forestry, fishing 11.1 16.3 12.3 8.9 7.8 8.6
B - Mining and quarrying 37.1 56.0 40.4 27.0 30.2 27.3
C - Manufacturing 24.7 22.2 23.7 20.7 20.7 20.7
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 43.9 55.0 47.2 50.0 49.3 49.8
E - Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 33.7 46.9 36.8 29.5 46.9 33.4
F - Construction 5.4 13.0 6.1 4.5 7.9 4.8
G - Trade, repairing 8.3 9.9 9.2 5.6 7.2 6.5
H - Transportation and storage 44.7 52.8 46.9 39.9 49.4 42.7
I - Accommodation and food service activities 8.4 8.4 8.4 4.2 5.0 4.6
J - Information and communication 23.9 27.0 25.0 13.8 4.7 10.3
K - Financial and insurance activities 25.1 23.9 24.3 11.2 18.9 16.4
L - Real estate activities 12.8 12.0 12.4 6.6 11.8 9.4
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 14.7 13.3 13.9 13.7 4.6 8.5
N - Administrative and support service activities 15.1 18.2 16.4 8.8 8.3 8.6
O - Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 31.9 33.6 32.7 33.0 27.3 30.0
P - Education 44.8 43.1 43.5 39.1 38.2 38.4
Q - Human health and social work activities 39.2 39.9 39.8 37.0 34.6 35.1
R - Arts, entertainment and recreatio 18.9 21.3 19.9 17.6 22.8 20.3
S+T+U Other 16.4 19.8 18.6 4.8 6.4 5.8
Total 23.0 27.5 25.2 19.2 22.1 20.6
* The ratio of employees who believe there is a collective agreement in effect at their workplace (2001–2009, %).
** According to TEÁOR’08 classification.
Source: KSH MEF ad hoc modul.
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Table 10.20: Presence of works (public servant) councils by industries and gender.  
The share of yes answers in workplaces employing more than 50, 2001–2009
Industries*
2001 2004 2009
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
A - Agriculture, forestry, fishing 15.4 18.2 16.0 21.7 26.5 22.9 12.9 20.6 14.9
B - Mining and quarrying 44.5 56.3 45.8 44.6 57.4 46.4 47.6 0.0 46.5
C - Manufacturing 30.6 25.7 28.4 36.0 32.1 34.3 33.9 28.5 31.6
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 38.7 37.0 38.2 44.5 50.9 46.4 51.7 49.8 51.3
E - Water supply, sewerage, waste management and  
remediation activities 33.6 39.7 35.1 39.6 50.9 42.0 34.3 36.7 34.8
F - Construction 10.2 23.6 11.5 11.9 26.4 14.2 13.2 21.8 14.0
G - Trade, repairing 16.6 13.9 15.2 17.0 20.0 18.5 16.0 13.9 14.8
H - Transportation and storage 48.1 55.5 50.2 53.9 58.1 55.0 53.7 51.4 53.0
I - Accommodation and food service activities 12.7 20.5 17.2 11.8 19.5 16.0 16.5 14.2 15.3
J - Information and communication 32.0 35.4 33.2 36.0 39.5 37.2 22.4 23.7 22.8
K - Financial and insurance activities 9.5 17.7 14.8 29.0 23.5 25.5 12.8 21.3 17.9
L - Real estate activities 16.5 8.4 13.0 18.6 19.2 18.9 20.2 35.5 26.8
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 19.9 12.1 15.9 21.4 20.8 21.1 25.4 11.3 18.2
N - Administrative and support service activities 20.2 24.8 22.1 22.9 30.1 26.0 15.8 11.0 13.7
O - Public administration and defence, compulsory social  
security 23.4 35.3 29.1 28.1 33.6 30.8 34.4 30.4 32.3
P - Education 43.7 41.4 42.1 51.5 48.8 49.6 38.9 44.2 42.7
Q - Human health and social work activities 38.8 37.1 37.5 37.4 41.4 40.5 43.4 43.5 43.5
R - Arts, entertainment and recreatio 14.4 34.1 20.8 27.8 30.4 28.6 21.3 29.6 25.3
S+T+U Other 16.3 23.2 20.4 26.3 28.7 27.8 47.9 33.8 38.3
Total 29.6 30.7 30.1 34.6 35.7 35.1 33.3 32.0 32.7
* According to TEÁOR’08 classification.
Source: KSH MEF ad hoc modul.
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Table 11.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for families1 Child benefit2 Regular child protection allowance3
Wage related maternity 
benefit4
Flat rate maternity  
benefits4
Average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average  
monthly amount 
per family  
(HUF)
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
Average 
number of 
recipients
Average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
Average 
number of 
recipients
1990 – – 3,539 1,514,100 – – 5,199 154,977 3,303 94,711
1995 – – 5,841 1,429,500 – – 13,215 128,540 7,882 175,773
2000 3,359 1,112,177 8,496 1,299,800 3,436 786,000 31,448 54,008 16,660 245,410
2001 6,547 1,172,862 8,617 1,295,800 4,193 780,000 39,274 62,904 17,828 234,221
2002 6,588 1,069,911 10,034 1,277,900 4,338 758,000 44,901 70,167 19,842 222,104
2003 6,841 1,009,660 11,283 1,292,000 4,705 704,000 48,742 77,942 22,091 214,640
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,597 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,484 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 62,684 91,678 27,102 212,741
2007 23,031 1,224,000 – – 68,394 93,973 28,496 207,608
1 Introduced in 1999. Beginning in 2006, this became a part of family benefits, only families with 3 or more children 
are entitled to tax credits in the amount of 4000 Ft per child.
2 Annual mean. From 1999 to 2002. november 8, the child care benefit includes the family allowance and schooling 
support. Beginning in 2002, the benefits paid in the 13th month are included as well.
3 Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005.
4 Annual average.
Sources: APEH and CSO Welfare Statistics.
Table 11.2: Unemployment benefits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit and 
other non-means tested benefits1 Means tested unemployment assistance
2 Net monthly earnings, HUF3
Average  
monthly amount  
(HUF)
Average number  
of recipients
Average  
monthly amount  
(HUF)
Average number  
of recipients Male Female Together
1990 3,845 30,302 3,209 46,823 11,226 9,455 10,371
1995 11,891 182,788 6,590 234,411 28,831 24,283 26,637
2000 22,818 131,665 14,656 162,245 60,319 50,562 55,650
2001 25,677 119,210 14,749 142,001 69,910 59,059 64,750
2002 30,113 114,934 14,869 132,895 82,745 72,036 77,770
2003 34,762 107,226 15,010 138,127 94,612 84,632 89,906
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426 110,951
2007 46,208 96,463 25,703 194,716 114,282
2008 47,809 97,047 122,047
1 Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (1998–2002) and the school 
leavers’ allowance (1990–1996).
2 This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore figures for 2006 are given for the period July-December 
2006.
3 Net earnings for the whole economy (including the public sector). Data on the private sector cover firms with 
more than 19 employees before 1999, and more than 4 employees thereafter.
Sources: PES: Labour Market Report, 2001. CSO: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, Yearbook of Demo-
graphics.
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Table 11.3: Number of those receiving self-entitled pension, and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received in January of the given year
Year
Old age pension Disability pension under and above retirement age
Number  
of recipients
Average amount 
before increase 
(HUF)
Average amount 
after increase  
(HUF)
Number  
of recipients
Average amount 
before increase 
(HUF)
Average amount 
after increase  
(HUF)
2000 1,671,090 33,258 35,931 762,514 29,217 31,556
2001 1,667,945 37,172 41,002 772,286 32,381 35,705
2002 1,664,062 43,368 47,561 789,544 37,369 40,972
2003 1,657,271 50,652 54,905 799,966 43,185 46,801
2004 1,637,847 57,326 60,962 806,491 48,180 51,220
2005 1,643,409 63,185 67,182 808,107 52,259 55,563
2006 1,658,387 69,145 72,160 806,147 56,485 58,935
2007 1,676,477 74,326 78,577 802,506 59,978 63,120
2008 1,716,315 81,975 87,481 794,797 65,036 69,160
Source: ONYF.
Table 11.4: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health,  
and the mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Temporary annuity Regular social annuity Health damage annuity for miners Total
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount  
(HUF)
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount  
(HUF)
Number of 
recipients
Average  
amount  
(HUF)
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount  
(HUF)
2000 15,491 18,309 196,689 14,435 2,852 48,581 215,032 15,167
2001 15,640 20,809 198,820 15,610 3,304 53,379 217,764 16,556
2002 11,523 26,043 200,980 17,645 3,348 59,558 215,851 18,744
2003 12,230 30,135 203,656 19,907 3,345 65,380 219,231 21,171
2004 11,949 33,798 207,300 21,370 2,950 69,777 222,199 22,681
2005 13,186 36,847 207,091 22,773 2,839 74,161 223,116 24,259
2006 14,945 40,578 195,954 23,911 2,786 77,497 213,685 25,776
2007 19,158 42,642 184,845 25,050 2,693 80,720 206,696 27,406
2008 21,538 46,537 170,838 27,176 2,601 85,805 194,977 30,096
Source: ONYF.
Table 11.5: The number of those receiving a disability annuity and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Disability annuity
Year
Disability annuity
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount  
(HUF)
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount  
(HUF)
2000 25,267 13,746 2005 28,738 27,257
2001 25,490 18,220 2006 29,443 28,720
2002 26,350 20,931 2007 30,039 30,219
2003 27,058 23,884 2008 30,677 32,709
2004 27,923 25,388
Source: ONYF.
statistical data
302
Table 11.6: The median age for retirement and the number of pensioners, 2001–2008
Pension
2001 2002 2003 2004
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
Females
Old age and similar 57.6 14,388 56.8 25,730 58.8 13,591 57.6 36,806
Disability and accident-related  
disability pension 47.8 24,836 48.1 23,649 48.5 21,507 48.7 19,901
Total 51.4 39,224 52.6 49,379 52.5 35,098 54.5 56,707
Males
Old age and similar 60.1 28,932 60.1 30,217 59.7 32,611 60.1 36,111
Disability and accident-related  
disability pension 49.6 30,820 49.7 29,013 50.0 27,115 50.1 24,915
Total 54.7 59,752 55.0 59,230 55.3 59,726 56.0 61,026
Together
Old age and similar 59.3 43,320 58.6 55,947 59.5 46,202 58.9 72,917
Disability and accident-related  
disability pension 48.8 55,656 49.0 52,662 49.3 48,622 49.5 44,816
Total 53.4 98,976 53.9 108,609 54.3 94,824 55.3 117,733
2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
Females
Old age and similar 57.7 45,115 57.5 46,093 57.8 62,015 57.3 39,290
Disability and accident-related  
disability pension 49.1 19,250 49.3 18,488 49.8 15,837 50.5 8,565
Rehabilitation annuity 44.1 1,604
Total 55.1 64,365 55.2 64,581 56.2 77,852 55.7 49,459
Males
Old age and similar 59.9 30,560 59.9 33,134 59.7 50,878 59.8 25,749
Disability and accident-related  
disability pension 50.5 24,565 50.6 23,045 51.1 19,032 51.9 11,069
Rehabilitation annuity 44.5 1,556
Total 55.7 55,125 56.1 56,179 57.4 69,910 56.9 38,374
Together
Old age and similar 58.6 75,675 58.5 79,227 58.7 112,893 58.3 65,039
Disability and accident-related  
disability pension 49.9 43,815 50.0 41,533 50.5 34,869 51.3 19,634
Rehabilitation annuity 44.3 3,160
Total 55.4 119,490 55.6 120,760 56.8 147,762 56.2 87,833
Note: the source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so 
these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police. Data on MÁV is included from 2008.
Source: ONYF.
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Table 11.7: Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data  
on the number of newly determined old-age pension claims
Year
Disability and accident-
related disability pension Old-age and old-age type pensions
* From the total: at the age limit From the total: under the age limit
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together
1996 59,967 31,770 59,939 91,709 9,893 20,073 29,966 18,681 31,857 50,538
1997 48,262 37,886 32,614 70,500 10,630 1,138 11,768 24,308 28,154 52,462
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
2007 34,991 51,037 62,168 113,205 3,722 6,660 10,382 45,731 54,177 99,908
2008 19,832 25,912 39,423 65,335 3,154 288 3,442 22,180 38,761 60,941
* Old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age threshhold allowance (early retire-
ment), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ pensions.
Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). The source of these sta-
tistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the 
data for the armed forces and the police. 
Source: ONYF.
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Table 12.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population aged 15–64  
by gender in the EU-15, EU-25 and EU-27, 2008
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
males females together males females together
Austria 78.5 65.8 72.1 3.6 4.2 3.9
Belgium 68.6 56.2 62.4 6.5 7.6 7.0
Denmark 81.9 74.3 78.1 3.1 3.7 3.4
United Kingdom 77.3 65.8 71.5 6.2 5.1 5.7
Finland 73.1 69.0 71.1 6.2 6.7 6.4
France 69.8 60.7 65.2 6.9 7.9 7.4
Greece 75.0 48.7 61.9 5.1 11.5 7.8
Netherlands 83.2 71.1 77.2 2.5 3.0 2.7
Ireland 74.9 60.2 67.6 7.2 4.6 6.1
Luxembourg 71.5 55.1 63.4 4.3 6.1 5.1
Germany 75.9 65.4 70.7 7.5 7.6 7.6
Italy 70.3 47.2 58.7 5.6 8.6 6.8
Portugal 74.0 62.5 68.2 6.9 9.4 8.1
Spain 73.5 54.9 64.3 10.1 13.1 11.4
Sweden 76.7 71.8 74.3 6.0 6.6 6.3
EU-15 74.2 60.4 67.3 6.7 7.7 7.2
Hungary 63.0 50.6 56.7 7.7 8.1 7.9
Bulgaria 68.5 59.5 64.0 5.6 5.8 5.7
Cyprus 79.2 62.9 70.9 3.3 4.3 3.8
Czech Republic 75.4 57.6 66.6 3.5 5.7 4.4
Estonia 73.6 66.3 69.8 5.9 5.4 5.6
Poland 66.3 52.4 59.2 6.5 8.0 7.2
Latvia 72.1 65.4 68.6 8.3 7.2 7.7
Lithuania 67.1 61.8 64.3 6.1 5.7 5.9
Malta 72.5 37.4 55.2 5.7 6.9 6.1
Romania 65.7 52.5 59.0 7.0 5.0 6.1
Slovakia 70.0 54.6 62.3 8.4 11.0 9.5
Slovenia 72.7 64.2 68.6 4.1 4.9 4.5
EU-25 73.2 59.4 66.3 6.7 7.7 7.1
EU-27 72.8 59.1 65.9 6.7 7.5 7.1
Source: CIRCA.
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Table 12.2: Employment composition, 2008
Country Self employed Part time Fix term contr. Service Industry Agriculture
Austria 13.7 23.3 9.0 68.4 26.0 5.6
Belgium* 14.2 22.6 8.3 73.5 24.7 1.8
Denmark 8.9 24.6 8.4 74.6 22.6 2.8
United Kingdom 13.3 25.3 5.4 77.2 21.4 1.4
Finland 12.8 13.3 15.0 70.0 25.4 4.5
France 10.5 16.9 14.2 73.9 23.1 3.0
Greece* 35.4 5.6 11.5 66.8 21.8 11.4
Netherlands 13.2 47.3 18.2 79.4 18.0 2.6
Ireland 17.4 18.6 8.5 68.7 25.7 5.7
Luxembourg 6.5 18.0 6.2 83.0 15.2 1.8
Germany 11.6 25.9 14.7 68.1 29.7 2.2
Italy 25.5 14.3 13.3 66.5 29.7 3.8
Portugal 24.0 11.9 22.8 59.3 29.3 11.5
Spain 17.6 12.0 29.3 67.9 27.8 4.3
Sweden 10.4 26.6 16.1 … … …
EU-15 15.4 21.0 14.4 … … …
Hungary 12.2 4.6 7.9 63.4 32.1 4.5
Bulgaria 12.4 2.3 5.0 … … …
Cyprus* 20.0 7.8 13.9 73.2 22.5 4.3
Czech Republic 16.1 4.9 8.0 56.1 40.5 3.3
Estonia 7.7 7.2 2.4 60.4 35.5 3.9
Poland 22.9 8.5 27.0 … … …
Latvia 10.1 6.3 3.3 63.5 28.6 7.9
Lithuania 11.5 6.7 2.4 61.6 30.5 7.9
Malta 13.3 11.5 4.3 72.6 25.5 2.0
Romania 32.6 9.9 1.3 39.8 31.4 28.8
Slovakia 13.8 2.7 4.7 56.5 39.5 4.0
Slovenia 14.1 9.0 17.4 … … …
EU-27 16.5 18.2 14.0 … … …
EU-25 15.8 18.9 14.7 … … …
* In the case of those with a fixed term contract, the indicator contains the ratio for 
workers with a contract, in the other cases, the ratio for employees in the 15 year old 
and the older age groups.
Source: Eurostat (Newcronos) Labour Force Survey.
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1. CSO Labour Force Survey – KSH MEF
The Hungarian Central Statistical Office has been 
conducting a new statistical survey since January 
1992 – using the experience of the pilot survey car-
ried out in 1991 – to obtain ongoing information on 
the labour force status of the Hungarian population. 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a household survey 
which provides quarterly information on the non-
institutional population aged 15–74. The aim of the 
survey is to observe employment and unemployment 
according to the international statistical recommen-
dation based on the concepts and definitions recom-
mended by the ILO independently from the existing 
national labour regulations or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey 
is a widely used statistical tool to provide simulta-
neous, comprehensive and systematic monitoring of 
employment, unemployment and underemployment. 
The survey techniques minimise the subjective bias 
in classification (since people surveyed are classified 
by strict criteria) and provide freedom to also con-
sider national characteristics.
In the LFS the population surveyed is divided into 
two main groups according to the economic activity 
performed by them during the reference week:
– economically active persons (labour force) and
– economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists 
of those being in the labour market either as em-
ployed or unemployed during the reference week.
The definitions used in the survey follow the ILO 
recommendations. According to this those desig-
nated employed are persons aged 15–74 who, dur-
ing the reference week:
– worked one hour or more for pay, profit or pay-
ment in kind in a job or in a business (including 
on a farm),
– worked one hour or more without payment in a 
family business or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family 
workers),
DeSCrIpTIon of The MAIn DATA SourCeS
– had a job from which they were temporarily absent 
during the survey week.
Persons on child-care leave are classified accord-
ing to their activity. Conscripts are considered as 
economically active persons, exceptions are marked 
in the footnotes of the table.
From the survey’s point of view the activities be-
low are not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household 
or institute (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or flat,
– housework,
– work in the garden or on own land for self-con-
sumption.
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 
who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were 
at work (for one hour or more) in paid employment 
or self-employment during the reference week
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks follow-
ing the reference week or were waiting to start a 
new job within 30 days.
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment office to find a job, applying to 
an employer directly, inserting, reading, answering 
advertisements, asking friends, relatives or other 
methods.
The labour force (i.e. economically active popu-
lation) comprises employed and unemployed per-
sons.
Persons are defined economically inactive (i.e. not 
in the labour force) if they were neither employed nor 
unemployed, as defined.
Passive unemployed (known as “discouraged per-
sons” according to the ILO concepts) are persons 
aged 15–74 who desire a job but have given up any 
active search for work, because they do not believe 
that they are able to find any.
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comes from the registration system of the National 
Employment and Social Office. Source of the labour 
force: working age population, active earners out of 
working age and employed pensioners.
3. CSO Institution-Based Labour Statistics – 
KSH IMS
The source of data is the monthly (annual) institu-
tional labour statistical survey. The survey range cov-
ers enterprises with at least 5 employees, and public 
and social insurance and non-profit institutions ir-
respective of the staff numbers of employees.
The earnings relate to the full-time employees on 
every occasion. The potential elements of the prevail-
ing monthly average earnings are: basic wages, bo-
nuses, allowances (including miner’s loyalty bonus, 
any Széchenyi-grant), payments for time not worked, 
bonuses, premiums, wages and salaries for the 13th 
and more months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting 
from the gross average earnings the actual personal 
income tax, employee’s social security contributions, 
etc., according to the actual rates (i.e. taking into ac-
count the threshold concerning the social security 
contribution).It does not take into account the im-
pact of the new tax allowance related to the number 
of children. The personal income tax is calculated by 
the actual withholding rate applied by the employers 
when paying out monthly earnings.
The difference between the gross and the net (af-
ter-tax) income indexes depends on eventual annu-
al changes in the tax table (tax brackets) and in the 
tax allowances.
The change of net real earnings is calculated from 
the ratio of net income index and the consumer price 
index in the same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupa-
tions classified by the ISCO-88 in major groups 1–4., 
manual workers are persons with occupations clas-
sified in major groups 5–9. since 1st January 1994. 
Census data were used for the estimation of the em-
ployment data in 1980 and 1990. The aggregate eco-
nomic data are based on national account statistics, 
the consumer’s and producer’s price statistics and in-
dustrial surveys. A detailed description of the data 
sources are to be found in the relevant publications 
of the Statistics Office.
The Labour Force Survey is based on a multi-stage 
stratified sample design. The stages of sampling are 
defined as follows: primary sampling units (PSUs) 
are enumeration districts (EDs) and secondary sam-
pling units (SSUs) are dwellings in settlements with 
15,000 or more inhabitants, while PSUs are settle-
ments, SSUs are EDs and ultimate sampling units 
are dwellings in all other cases.
The main indicators of the labour market are rep-
resentative for regions.
The LFS sample is basically a sample of dwellings, 
and in each sampled dwelling, labour market infor-
mation is collected from each household and from 
each person aged 15–74 living there. For 1998, the 
quarterly sample contains about 33,000 households 
and 66,000 persons. The sample has a simple rota-
tion pattern: any household entering the sample at 
some time is expected to provide labour market in-
formation for six consecutive quarters, then leaves 
the sample permanently. The samples of two consecu-
tive periods tend to be less than 5/6, which would be 
obtained at a 100 per cent response rate.
In the LFS sample design strata are defined in 
terms of geographic units, size categories of settle-
ments and area types such as city centres, outskirts, 
etc.
2. CSO Labour Force Accounting Census – KSH 
MEM
Before the publication of the Labour Force Survey 
the annual Labour Force Account gave a view of 
the total labour force in the period between the two 
census.
The Labour Force Account, as its name shows, is a 
balance-like account which compares the labour sup-
ply (human resources) to the labour demand at an 
ideal moment (1 January). Population is taken into 
account by economic activity with a differentiation 
between those of working age and the population 
outside of the working age.
Source of data: Annual labour survey on employ-
ment on 1th January of enterprises with more than 5 
employees and of all government institutions, labour 
force survey, census, tax records and social security 
records, and company registry. The number of per-
sons employed in small enterprises having a legal en-
tity is based on estimation. Data on unemployment 
statistical data
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4. Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Register Database 
– FSzH REG
The other main source of unemployment data in 
Hungary – and in most of the developed countries – 
is the huge database containing so called admin-
istrative records which are collected monthly and 
include the individual data of the registered unem-
ployed/jobseekers.
The register actually contains all jobseekers, but 
out of them, at a given point of time, only those 
are regarded as registered unemployed/jobseekers, 
who:
– had themselves registered with a local office of the 
Public Employment Service (PES) as unemployed/
jobseekers (i. e. he/she has got no job but wishes 
to work, for which they seek assistance from the 
labour market organisation).
– at a point of time (on the closing day of any months), 
the person is not a pensioner or a full-time student, 
and is ready to co-operate with the local employ-
ment office in order to become employed (i. e. he/
she accepts the suitable job or training offered to 
him/her, and keeps the appointments made with 
the local employment office’s placement officer/
counsellor/benefit administrator).
If a person included in the register is working un-
der any subsidised employment programme on the 
closing day, or is a participant of a labour market 
training programme, or has a short-term, tempo-
rary job her/his unemployed/jobseeker status is sus-
pended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the 
local office he/she is removed from the register of the 
unemployed/jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the 
register – allow not only for the identification of date 
related stock data but also for monitoring flows: in-
flows as well as outflow within a period.
Based on the records of the labour requests needs 
reported to the PES, the stock and flow data of va-
cancies are also processed and published for each 
month.
Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partic-
ipation in the different active programmes, number 
of participants and their inflows and outflows are 
also prepared monthly.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a break-
down of country, region, county, local employment 
office service delivery area and community – build on 
the secondary processing of administrative records 
that are generated virtually as the rather important 
and useful “by-products” of the accomplishment of 
the PES’s main functions (such as placement serv-
ices, payment of benefits, active programme sup-
port, etc.).
The National Employment and Social Office (and 
its predecessors, i. e. OMK – National Labour Cen-
tre, OMMK and OMKMK) has published the key 
figures of these statistics on a monthly basis since 
1989. The more detailed reports which also contain 
data by local office service delivery area are pub-
lished by the County/Metropolitan (Budapest) La-
bour Centres (since 2007 by the Regional Labour 
Centres).
The denominators of the unemployment rates cal-
culated for the registered unemployed/jobseekers are 
the economically active population data published 
by the Central Statistical Office’s labour market ac-
count (KSH MEM).
The figures of the registered unemployed/jobseek-
ers and the registered unemployment/jobseekers rate 
are obviously different from the figures based on the 
Central Statistical Office’s labour force survey. It is 
mainly the different conceptual approach, definition 
and the fundamentally different monitoring/meas-
uring methods that account for this variance.
5. Short-Term Labour Market Projection Surveys 
– FSzH PROG
At the initiative and under the co-ordination of the 
National Employment and Social Office (and its le-
gal predecessors), the PES conducted the so called 
short term labour market survey since 1991, twice a 
year, in March and September. The survey uses an 
enormous sample, it contains over 4,500 employers. 
Since 2004 the survey is conducted once a year, in 
the month of October.
The interviews focus on the companies’ projec-
tions of their material and financial processes, their 
development and human resource plans, and they 
are also asked about their concrete lay-off or recruit-
ment plans as well as their expected need for any ac-
tive labour market programmes.
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The surveys are processed from bottom up, from 
the service delivery areas, through counties and re-
gions to the whole country, providing useful infor-
mation at all levels for the planning activities of the 
Public Employment Service.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibil-
ity for the regions, the counties and Budapest to an-
alyse in greater depth (also using information from 
other sources) the major trends in their respective 
labour markets, to make preparations for tackling 
problems that are likely to occur in the short term, 
and to effectively meet the ever-changing needs of 
their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the sur-
vey. Further very important “by-products” include 
regular and personal liaison with companies, the up-
graded skills of the placement officers and other ad-
ministrative personnel, enhanced awareness of the 
local circumstances, and the adequate orientation of 
labour market training programmes in view of the 
needs identified by the surveys. One of the most im-
portant by-product is the so called Labour Market 
Barometer, which shows the most wanted and mostly 
superfluous occupations, based on the recruitment 
and layoff plans of the employers.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supple-
mented with supplementary surveys to obtain some 
further useful information that can be used by re-
searchers and the decision-makers of employment 
and education/training policy.
From 2005 the surveys are conducted in coopera-
tion with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy 
and Entrepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce. Since then the main re-
sults are available on the internet also in the form of 
an interactive database.
6. Wage Survey Database – FSzH BT
The National Employment and Social Office (and its 
legal predecessors) has conducted since 1992, once a 
year, a representative survey to investigate individual 
wages and earnings. The survey uses an enormous 
sample and is conducted at the request of the Min-
istry of Social Affairs and Labour (formerly: Minis-
try of Labour, Ministry of Social and Family Affairs, 
Ministry of Social Policy and Labour).
The reference month of data collection is the 
month of May in each year, but for the calculation 
of the monthly average of irregularly paid benefits 
(beyond the base wage/salary), the total amount 
of such benefits received during the previous year 
is used.
In the competitive sector, they data collection ini-
tially only covered companies of over 20 persons; it 
was incumbent on all companies to provide informa-
tion, but the sample includes only employees born on 
certain dates in any month of any year.
Data collection also covered companies of 10–19 
since 1995, and companies of 5–9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved 
in data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per 
cent) and the selected ones have to provide informa-
tion about all their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can 
only be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, 
thus it is practically these huge, annually generat-
ed databases that can serve as the basis of the wage 
reconciliation negotiations conducted by the social 
partners.
In the budgetary sector all budgetary institutions 
provide information, regardless of their size, in a 
way that the decisive majority of the local budget-
ary institutions – the ones that are included in the 
TAKEH central payroll accounting system – provide 
fully comprehensive information, and the remain-
ing budgetary institutions provide information only 
about their employees who were born on certain days 
(regarded as the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in 
every third year, thus we are in possession of an 
enormous data base of the years of 1983, 1986 and 
1989 too.
Of the employees included in the sample, the fol-
lowing data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, 
employer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership 
structure
– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, 
age, educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the 
data by individual, the data is analysed every year 
in the following ways:
– standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the so-
cial partners, used for wage reconciliation nego-
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tiations (which is received by every confederation 
participating in the negotiations)
– model calculations to determine the expected im-
pact of the rise of the minimum wage
Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy De-
partment, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, for 
the comparison and presentation of wage ratios (to-
tal national economy, competitive sector, budgetary 
sector, and also by regions and counties).
The entire database is adopted every year by the 
Central Statistical Office, which enables the Office to 
provide data also for certain international organisa-
tions, (e. g. ILO and OECD). The National Employ-
ment and Social Office also provides special analyses 
regularly for the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual 
allows for a) the analysis of data for groups of peo-
ple determined by any combination of pre-set crite-
ria, b) the comparison of basic wages and earnings, 
with special regard to the composition of the differ-
ent groups analysed, as well as c) the analysis of the 
dispersion of the basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002 the survey of individual wages and 
earnings was substantially developed to fulfill all 
requirements of the EU. So from this time it serves 
alo for the purposes of the Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES), which is obligatory for each member 
state in every fourth year (SES 2002 was the first 
and recently the database of SES 2006 was also sent 
to the Eurostat.)
Since 2003 the most important results of the Wage 
Survey are also available on the website of the Hungar-
ian PES, since 2006 also in English (www.afsz.hu).
7. Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Benefit Register 
– FSzH REG
The recipients’ fully comprehensive registry is made 
up, on the one hand, of the financial records con-
taining the disbursed unemployment benefits (un-
employment benefit, school leavers’ unemployment 
benefit, pre-retirement unemployment benefit, job-
seekers’ benefit, jobseekers assistance) and, on the 
other hand, of the so-called master records contain-
ing the particulars of benefit recipients. This regis-
ter allows for the accurate tracking of the recipients’ 
benefit related events, the exact date of their inclu-
sion in and removal from the system, as well as why 
they have been removed from it (e. g. got a job, eli-
gibility period expired, were excluded, joined an ac-
tive labour market programme, etc.)
This huge database allows for reporting for any 
point of time the detailed data of persons who received 
benefits on a given day, in a breakdown of country, re-
gion, county and local office service delivery area. In 
order to align these data with the closing day statistics 
of the registered unemployed, these monthly statistics 
are also completed by the 20th of each month. (Stock 
in the closing day.) In addition, the monthly statis-
tics also contain information on the number of those 
who were effected during the month, e.g. the number 
of those who have received benefits on any day of the 
month between the previous month’s and the given 
month’s closing day. Of course, data indicating in-
flows and outflows are also reported here.
It is an important and rather useful aspect from a 
research perspective that, in addition to the stand-
ard closing day statistics, groups defined by any cri-
teria can be tracked in the benefit register, e. g. inflow 
samples can be taken of newly registered persons for 
different periods, and through tracking them in the 
registry system the benefit allocation patterns of dif-
ferent cohorts can be compared.
The detailed data of unemployment benefit recipi-
ents have been available from the benefit register since 
January 1989. The first two years had a different ben-
efit allocation system, and the current system, which 
has been modified several times since then, was imple-
mented by the Employment Act of 1991 (Act IV).
For the period of between 1991 and 1996, the reg-
ister also contains the stock and flow data of the re-
cipients of school leavers’ unemployment benefit. 
Between 1997–2005 the system has also contained 
the recipients of pre-retirement unemployment ben-
efit. In addition to headcount data, the benefit regis-
ter can also monitor the average duration of the pe-
riod of benefit allocation and the average monthly 
amount of the benefits allocated.
The key data regarding benefits were published 
by the National Employment and Social Office in 
the monthly periodical Labour Market Situation. 
In addition, time series data was published annu-
ally in the Time Series of the Unemployment Regis-
ter, always covering the last six years in the form of 
a monthly breakdown. More recently these publica-
tions are available on the website of the Hungarian 
PES (www.afsz.hu).
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